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ABSTRACT
COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ETHNICALLY RESTRUCTURED STATES:
THE BALTICS
Do vile Budryte 
Old Dominion University, 2000 
Director: Dr. Regina C. Karp
Drawing on democratic theory, this dissertation explores a thesis that the 
experience of ethnic restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state 
to successfully consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is 
hypothesized, have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political 
communities, which is a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy.
To test the thesis, the comparative case study method is applied to the ethnically 
restructured states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The goal of the case studies is to 
examine the approaches that the Baltic states used to reduce polarization. The historical 
background to the case studies includes an analysis of recently released archival 
documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states that deal with the 
demographic history of the Baltic states.
One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of 
political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic 
differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory of deportations 
and planned migration. Consequently, successful approaches to community building 
should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of autochthonous ethnic groups and 
the need of the immigrants to have a say in community building and everyday affairs.
Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local (sub-state) level. They are
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likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating flexible forms of political 
organization.
International actors interested in helping stales to reduce ethnic polarization should 
focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from “above” for this 
purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of 
nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as 
an endangered ethnic identity.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized in the literature on democratization and democratic 
consolidation that the existence of different ethnic groups within the same polity may 
become a challenge to successful democratization and democratic consolidation. A 
respectable body of scholarship subscribes to the view of John Stuart Mill who argued that 
democracy and multiethnicity are, in fact, incompatible, and that democracy is quite often 
a luxury to be enjoyed by ethnically homogenous (or ethnically cleansed) states.1 Stephen 
Van Evera has summarized this perspective in one of his hypotheses on the relationship 
between nationalism and stability. He hypothesizes that “the more closely the boundaries 
o f emerging nationstates follow ethnic boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.”2 A logical 
extension of this hypothesis is that multiethnic states have fewer chances than ethnically 
homogenous states to establish sustainable democracies because they are more prone to 
ethnic wars.
The ideas expressed by this school of thought are generally embraced by orthodox 
liberals who believe in individual rights, a free market economy and modernization. The 
representatives o f this school of thought, such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, argue
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements o f The Chicago Manual 
o f Style, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
'For a summary of this debate, see Walker Connor, “Self Determination: The New 
Phase,” World Politics 20, no. 1 (October 1967): 32.
2Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International 
Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 8.
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that the creation and sustainability of democracy in multiethnic entities may be facilitated 
by inclusive democratic institutions and extending rights to minorities.3 Many 
representatives of this school are engaged in a search for the model that could insure 
stability and democracy in multiethnic areas. The emerging consensus within this school 
of thought has been that multiethnic or multireligious societies can become stable 
democracies if they adopt the right kind of inclusive political institutions, such as 
representation of minorities in decision-making processes and power sharing 
mechanisms.4 Since this group of scholars believes that the right kind of inclusive 
institutions exist, they are often in favor of political conditionality. This means that they 
are in favor of linking economic and political aid to emerging democracies to prescribed 
policies regarding ethnic minorities, such as rights and representation in decision making 
processes.
Their critics, led by Charles Taylor, argue that instead of trying to come up with a 
model that is universally applicable, scholars should recognize that there are different 
ways of sharing what Taylor calls the “identity space.” The political arrangements in 
multiethnic states should be context-related and sensitive to historical factors.5 Other 
critics of the orthodox liberal perspective suggest that the existence of different ethnic 
groups may help to initiate and sustain democratization by providing alternative foci of
3Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 33.
4For a review, see Mark Peceny, “The Social Construction of Democracy,” 
International Studies Review  l ,n o . 1 (Spring 1999): 95-102.
5Charles Taylor, “Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?),” in Citizenship, 
Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan C. Caims, 
John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1999), 281-86.
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3power to the authoritarian regime. Instead of being an obstacle to democratic 
consolidation, multiethnicity may, in fact, be a sustaining factor.6
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to this debate by tracing democratic 
community building processes in multiethnic states burdened by historical memories. This 
dissertation is interested in two themes. First, it explores the long term effects of ethnic 
restructuring on the ability of a state to create a cohesive democratic community. Second, 
it examines whether the approaches to community building advocated by the two schools 
of thought help to reduce ethnic polarization within such states.
Chapter II describes the methodological framework that will be used in the 
dissertation. The first section discusses the thesis of the dissertation, which is that the 
experience of ethnic restructuring critically affects the ability of a state to consolidate its 
emerging democracy. The second section describes the methodology— case studies— used 
in the dissertation. The final section discusses rival propositions, drawn from other 
theoretical schools.
Chapter in  reviews the research that has already been done on the impact that 
ethnic restructuring has on democratic processes. It divides the literature into four 
conceptually and thematically distinguishable areas. The first part reviews historical 
approaches that pay attention to the specific historical experiences of national and ethnic 
groups. These approaches suggest that the experience o f ethnic restructuring can become a 
source of ethnic nationalism, which can threaten stability and democracy. The second part 
reviews theories on ethnic mobilization, which argue that ethnic groups can be mobilized 
within a nationstate in order to oppose or retaliate against various national political
6E.g.. see Lord Acton's argument in Connor. 33.
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projects, such as forced assimilation, genocide, or national self-determination. 
Mobilization along ethnic lines can lead to ethnic conflict, which threatens stability and 
democracy. The third part discusses modernization theories, pioneered by Karl Deutch. 
Ethnic segmentation, which can be a product o f previous ethnic restructuring, is conceived 
as an obstacle to the creation of a “communications community” or nation. A nation is a 
requirement for democracy. Therefore, ethnic restructuring can be an obstacle to 
successful democratization. The fourth part reviews theories of ethnopolitics that try to 
establish a link between the presence of different ethnic groups within a nationstate and 
the transition to democracy.
Chapter IV joins a major debate within this body of literature on whether the 
presence of different ethnic groups (a product o f previous ethnic restructuring) within one 
nationstate hinders or helps democratic processes. This chapter puts forward a theoretical 
argument which can be summarized as follows. Multiethnicity in and of itself does not 
constitute a danger, and in fact may be helpful toward the creation of a sustainable 
democratic community, especially in the beginning stages of democratization. By voicing 
demands for cultural rights, ethnic communities can form an opposition to nondemocratic 
polities or strengthen nascent civil societies in emerging democracies.
However, ethnic polarization does present a challenge. The legacy of ethnic 
restructuring can lead to polarization. Polarization is the presence of ethnopolitical groups 
actively opposed to the state and to the dominant ethnic group (and/or the presence of 
ethnopolitical groups actively opposed to the inclusion of minorities within an emerging 
nationstate.) Such condition may prompt ethnic groups to take revenge for wrongs 
inflicted in the past or in the present. This chapter concludes by arguing that in order to
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5understand how to bring about the consolidation of democracy in multiethnic states further 
empirical research will be needed. (Namely, it is needed in order to identify ways of 
reducing polarization.)
The goal of Chapter V is twofold. First, it documents the extent and impact of the 
ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the Soviet Union in the Baltic states. Second, 
it explores whether the experience o f ethnic restructuring has induced ethnic polarization 
in the Baltic states. Ethnic restructuring is defined as the sudden alteration of the ethnic 
make-up of a geographically specific population involving (1) the physical removal of a 
large number of the members of an ethnic group or groups by the members of another 
ethnic group (or groups) and/or (2) the introduction of a large number of settlers belonging 
to one or more ethnic groups.
To achieve the first goal, Chapter V draws on recently released documents. The 
USSR never released official statistics on population movements. Therefore, recently 
released archival documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states help to fill 
in a grey area in the demographic history of the Baltic states. In addition, Chapter V sheds 
light on some of the lesser known aspects of ethnic restructuring, such as postwar 
population exchanges and the attitude of the Soviet state towards non-territorial 
nationalities residing in the Baltic states.
To achieve the second goal. Chapter V traces the response of the local population 
to the deportations and to the subsequent influx of settlers. Since there were no reliable 
public opinion polls in the USSR prior to 1988, the analysis of memoirs and letters helps 
to evaluate this response. This chapter concludes by tracing the emergence of 
ethnopolitical groups with concrete political demands, some of whom were opposed to the
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6emergence of the Baltic republics as independent nationstates. This development is 
characterized as “polarization."
The following three chapters are case studies of community building in the Baltic 
states. The goal of Chapter VI is to trace the approaches that the Estonian state used to 
reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power toward minorities that were opposed 
to the state. This case study consists of four parts. First, it traces the attitudes o f Estonia’s 
minorities towards the state during the initial stage o f political community building. Many 
Russians living in Estonia were opposed to the emergence of Estonia as an independent 
nationstate. There was even a movement in the Narva region that called for secession 
from the state.
Second, this chapter traces political community building “from above.” This 
means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Estonian state 
toward its minorities. The state adopted a citizenship law which disenfranchised Estonia’s 
Russians. One of the main factors present during the debate about the citizenship law was 
the historical memory o f the deportations carried out by the Soviet Union.
Third, the chapter traces political community building “from below.” It examines 
ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Estonia’s Russians 
were allowed to use the state as a “service station” (i.e., whether they received full 
economic and social rights as permanent residents o f Estonia), and looks at the ways that 
the two communities handled their different historical memories. This chapter concludes 
by exploring the level o f polarization in Estonia in the late nineties. It argues that giving 
Russians the right to vote at the local level and extending to them full social and economic 
rights were the most successful approaches employed by the Estonian state to reduce
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7polarization.
The goal of Chapter VII is to trace the approaches that the Latvian state used to 
reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power towards minorities who were 
opposed to the state. The structure of this case study is the same as the one used for 
Estonia in Chapter VI. First, it traces the attitudes of Latvia’s minorities toward the state 
during the initial stage of political community building. Although fewer Russians were 
opposed to the emerging nationstate in Latvia than in Estonia, there was still widespread 
distrust. In addition, there were several active ethnopolitical movements opposed to the 
state.
Second, Chapter VII traces political community building “from above.” This 
means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Latvian state toward 
its minorities. Similarly to Estonia, the state adopted a citizenship law which 
disenfranchised Latvia’s Russians. One of the main factors present during the discussions 
about the citizenship law was the historical memory o f the deportations that were carried 
out by the Soviet Union.
Third, Chapter VII traces political community building “from below.” It examines 
ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Latvia’s Russians 
were allowed to use the state as a “service station” and looks at the ways that the two 
communities handled their different historical memories. Unlike Estonia, Latvia did not 
extend rights of participation at the local level. It did, however, give full social and 
economic rights to all people residing in its territory. This chapter concludes by exploring 
the level of polarization in Latvia in the late nineties. It argues that the most successful 
approach used by the Latvian state to reduce polarization was the extension of full social
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and economic rights to Latvia’s Russians.
Similarly to the previous two chapters, the goal of Chapter VIII is to analyze the 
approaches employed by the Lithuanian state to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis ethnic 
minority groups who initially opposed the existence of an independent Lithuanian state.
To analyze the approaches used by the Lithuanian state, the chapter takes three steps.
First, it evidences the existence of polarization between the state and ethnopolitical groups 
opposed to the existence of Lithuania as an independent state and who claimed to 
represent Lithuania’s Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and 
ethnic Poles) during the initial stage of political community building. To do that, the first 
part of the case study analyzes the results of public opinion surveys taken during that 
period. In addition, this part outlines the platforms of these ethnopolitical movements.
The second and the third parts of Chapter V1U trace the process of political 
community building “from above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., 
polarization) described in the first part. The second part explores the circumstances 
surrounding the adoption of the law on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of 
minorities. It also documents the response of Lithuania’s ethnic minorities and their 
“mother states” (i.e., Russia and Poland) to these policies.
The third part of Chapter VIII focuses on developments within civil society (i.e., 
“below”)— the creation of local governments, the ability of Lithuania’s minorities to use 
the state as a “service station” and the impact of different historical experiences on inter­
ethnic relations. The chapter concludes by arguing that the more than 180 liberal laws 
defining the status of Lithuania’s minorities were not enough to reduce ethnic polarization. 
A  lack of funds at the local level, as well as the interference of the central government in
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9local politics caused dissent among Lithuania’s ethnic minorities.
The dissertation concludes by relating the findings of the case studies to the on­
going debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas (which was outlined earlier in the 
introduction). The first part puts forward a theory of political community, which 
conceptualizes the “demos” as an entity with two dimensions. The vertical dimension 
refers to the basis of legitimacy for state power. The legitimacy of this power is based on 
an on-going association of people loyal to the state who possess the citizenship of the 
state. This on-going association implies a common history, shared historical memory and 
a common identity. In most nationstates, these three aspects are the basis of a common 
identity that keeps the nationstate together. Consequently, the question of the relationship 
between the vertical and the horizontal axes is the question of nation building and the 
attitude of the nationstate toward its immigrants and ethnic minorities. Drawing on the 
material covered in the three case studies, the concluding chapter applies this theory to 
ethnically restructured states.
One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of 
political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic 
differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory of deportations, 
displacement and forced population transfers. Consequently, successful approaches to 
community building should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of 
autochthonous ethnic groups and the need of the immigrants to have a say in community 
building and everyday affairs. Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local 
level, or “below.” They are likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating 
flexible forms of political organization. Thus, the case studies show support for the beliefs
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of the second school of thought that argues for flexible arrangements. In states inhabited 
by ethnic groups with different historical memories, there is no one model to reduce 
polarization. However, states are capable of implementing such approaches if (1) they 
have a stable economy and (2) if they have a strongly established “vertical” axis.
International actors interested in helping states to reduce ethnic polarization should 
focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from “above” for this 
purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of 
nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as 
an endangered ethnic identity. Such by-products o f political conditionality hinder the 
creation o f tolerant political culture that is necessary for democratic consolidation in 
multiethnic areas tom by different historical memories.




The goal of this chapter is to describe the methodological framework that will be 
used in the dissertation. The first section discusses the thesis of the dissertation, which is 
that the experience of ethnic restructuring critically affects the ability of a state to 
consolidate its emerging democracy. It points out the independent, dependent, and 
intervening variables in it. Furthermore, it puts forward definitions of the main 
concepts—ethnic restructuring and democratic consolidation—on which the hypothesis is 
built.
The second section describes the methodology—case studies— that is used in the 
dissertation. It outlines the structure o f  the case studies and identifies the major sources 
used. The final section discusses rival propositions, drawn from other theoretical schools. 
These hypotheses offer alternative explanations for changes in the dependent 
variable—the consolidation of democracy in an ethnically restructured state— when 
compared to the main hypothesis.
THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS AND ITS VARIABLES
Hypothesis
This dissertation explores the relationship between a state’s experience of ethnic 
restructuring and the ability of that state to consolidate democracy. This hypothesis is
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drawn from democratic studies that are interested in exploring ways in which to support 
emerging democracies.
This proposition is limited to the analysis of ethnically restructured states which 
have retained ethnic heterogeneity after having experienced deportations, expulsions, and 
other forms of forceful population transfers. The further discussion of "multiethnic states" 
or ethnically segmented states refers to ethnically restructured multiethnic states.
The Variables
Ethnic Restructuring. Ethnic restructuring is conceptualized as an independent 
variable. The forcibly changed domestic ethnic structure of a country— which is likely to 
give rise to political and societal ethnic groups that are opposed to inclusive minority 
policies and that reject the state outright— is an intervening variable. International actors 
exercising political conditionality is another intervening variable. (See Figure 1.)
The term “ethnic restructuring” refers to the sudden alteration of the ethnic make­
up of a geographically-specific population involving (1) the physical removal of a large 
number of the members of an ethnic group (or groups) by the members of another ethnic 
group (or groups) and/or (2) the introduction of a large number of settlers belonging to one 
or more ethnic groups. Ethnicity is defined as a historically-specific construct which may 
become the basis for the activity of political groups.1
‘For a more elaborate definition of ethnicity and its relation with the concept of a 
“nation.” see Chapter III.
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Figure 1. The Variables
E thnic--------
Restructuring













In practice, ethnic restructuring involves the forcible removal of large groups of 
people through deportation, expulsion, or resettlement. Ethnic restructuring is not just a 
state-supported policy vis-a-vis a national group: it is something that is experienced 
collectively by the members of the affected group. It often leads to the emergence of 
political groups among the members of the affected party who are resisting the policy. 
Examples of ethnic restructuring include forced migration, genocide, politicide, ethnic 
conflict, expulsion, and deportation.
It is believed that states which have undergone ethnic restructuring (and have 
remained ethnically heterogenous) are more likely than other multiethnic or monoethnic 
states to be sensitive to issues of ethnicity. Historical experiences, such as discrimination, 
deportations, or expulsions, create distance between ethnic groups. Thus, often 
differences between the groups are perceived as irreconcilable.2 In societies that are
2Staffan Zetterholm, “Why is Cultural Diversity a Political Problem?” in National 
Cultures and European Integration: Exploratory Essays on Cultural Diversity and 
Common Policies, ed. Staffan Zetterholm (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 70.
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extremely polarized, ethnic identity becomes the only politically relevant identity.
This is especially true of states in which ethnic restructuring has occurred within 
one generation. Most importantly, such states are likely to contain politically influential 
groups who define their interests, first and foremost, in terms of identity. This condition, 
known as ethnic polarization, makes democratic political negotiation, which is necessary 
for every democratic polity, more difficult.3 Consequently, the presence of ethnic 
polarization may endanger the process o f democratic consolidation.
Democratic Consolidation. Democratic consolidation is the dependent variable in 
the hypothesis. This dissertation builds on the concept of democratic consolidation 
devised by Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz who argue that it is "a political situation in 
which, in a phrase, democracy has become ‘the only game in town.”' Pivotal to this 
theoretical notion is acceptance of the fact that not all states that engage in the process of 
democratization will complete the transition.4
The definition of democratic consolidation put forward by Linz and Stepan implies 
that there are no significant political groups attempting to secede from the state or to
3Albert F. Reiterer, “Reducing Ethnic Conflicts: Contemporary Approaches to 
Conflict Resolution in Western Europe,” in Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society: Proposals 
fo r  a New Era in Eastern Europe, ed. Andreus Klinke, Ortwin Reur, and Jean Paul 
Lehners (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1997), 54.
4Karen Dawisha,“Democratization and Political Participation: Research Concepts 
and Methodologies,” in The Consolidation o f  Democracy in East Central Europe, ed. 
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 43. 
This concept has been criticized for failing to identify the point at which democratic 
consolidation is completed. See Guillermo O ’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” 
in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, 
Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 
40-57, or Giuseppe Di Palma, An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1990), 138-53. One answer to this critique is that one indicator for 
democratic consolidation in multiethnic states is the absence o f strong movements 
opposed to the state.
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overthrow the democratic regime; the majority of the public accepts the institutions of the 
state as the most appropriate way to govern collective life; and throughout the territory of 
the state governmental and non-govemmental forces agree to solve conflict within the 
laws of the state.5 In other words, the majority of a state’s citizens accept the legitimacy of 
state power. The degree to which the residents of a territory accept the political unit in 
which they live as the appropriate entity to make legitimate decisions, or the legitimacy of 
a state’s power in the eyes of the governed, is a key variable for democratic theory.6
Thus, following this definition, in order to become a consolidated democracy, a 
state must create a sense of "we-ness," a sense of cohesiveness that makes collective 
decision-making possible. On the other hand, the residents must accept the legitimacy of 
the state’s power by embracing state institutions as the most appropriate way to solve 
conflict. A political situation when the two conditions, outlined above, are met, is a 
criterion indicating that the democratic regime has become consolidated.
Creating cohesiveness within a state is a two-way process. In the case of 
multiethnic states, the policies o f the state toward its minorities must be endorsed by the 
minorities themselves.7 The minorities must recognize that the rules and institutions 
created by the state provide enough political space to safeguard their interests. The degree
sLinz and Stepan, 5-6.
6Ibid„ 27.
7This is an important criterion for determining the success o f democratic 
institutions within multiethnic entities. Sir George Otto Trevelyan captured the essence 
of the problem: ‘T h e  truth is that even the most genuine and established democratic way 
of life is exceedingly difficult to apply when you are dealing with a minority that does not 
want to live under your rule. We know very well that we ourselves were never able to 
apply democracy to our own attempt to govern the Irish.” Cited in Charles Ingrao, 
“Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: A Historical Perspective,” 
Nationalities Papers (June 1999); PROQUEST.
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to which a minority accepts the power of the state which they inhabit is reflected by the 
activities of ethnically based political groups and the attitude of that minority. For 
example, a minority can exhibit extreme disloyalty to the slate by attempting to secede 
from the state. Such a state, its minority policies and successful development in other 
areas notwithstanding, cannot be considered a consolidated democracy.8
In sum, the absence of one or both of these characteristics (cohesiveness and 
legitimacy of state power) implies that a democratizing multiethnic state has not yet 
become a consolidated democracy. If a state has failed to develop a sense of cohesiveness 
among its residents (i.e., if the majority of people living within the state do not feel that it 
is "their" state) it means that the state is prone to disintegration. In the absence of a 
cohesive identity uniting the residents within a multiethnic state, there is the possibility of 
ethnic conflict emanating from within the state or o f separatism among disloyal minorities. 
Such developments present a threat to the survival o f the stale, and, needless to say, to the 
consolidation of democracy within a state. The sense of "we-ness" (cohesive identity) is, 
therefore, a constitutive aspect of a consolidated democracy. In this dissertation, this 
aspect is referred to as democratic community.
Democratic Community. The cohesiveness within a state that makes democratic 
decision making possible is often referred to as demos or “political community” in the 
literature on the subject.9 It is a constitutive aspect of democratic consolidation. The
8One exception to this statement are so-called “velvet divorces,” when two groups 
within a state decide to split peacefully. However, such divorces are rather rare, and 
usually they are a result of democratic arrangements, such as referendums. More often, 
secessionism and ethnic tensions are followed by widespread violence.
^ .g . ,  see Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 116-31; Christopher J. Berry, The Idea o f  a Democratic 
Community (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989), 100-4; or Alfonso J. Damico, Individuality
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terms demos and “political community," meaning the entity underneath the state that 
makes democratic decision-making possible, are used interchangeably. Theoretically, 
political community is defined as an arena in which society “constitutes itself politically 
to select and monitor democratic government,”10 or, in other words, in which society 
participates in political process: elections, political parties, and electoral alliances. The 
civility which makes such participation possible is learned in free associational networks, 
such as economic interest groups, corporations, or religious associations.11 Therefore, 
democratic political community is impossible without a functioning civil society— the 
entity in which self-organizing groups and individuals, relatively independent from the 
state and often outside o f the political process, advance their interests. The relationship 
between political community and civil society should not be understood in terms o f the 
opposition of civil society to political community. It can be seen as a dialectic between 
these two axes.12
The main hypothesis implies that the development of an inclusive political 
community, which is a necessary condition for a functioning consolidated democratic 
regime, is most likely to be thwarted by the legacy of ethnic restructuring. Consequently, 
creating successful institutional arrangements and adopting policies that promote
and Community: The Social and Political Thought o f  John Dewey (Gainesville, Fla.: 
University Presses of Florida, 1978), 104—18.
10Linz and Stepan, 8. Others have underlined the fact that most political 
communities are, first and foremost, systems of inclusion and exclusion. See Andrew 
Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the Post- 
Westphalian Era (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 2.
"Michael Walzer, ‘T he  Concept of Civil Society,” in Toward a Global Civil 
Society, ed. Michael W alzer (Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 1995), 24.
l2Michael Buchowski, “Civil and Civic Society in Poland,” in Civil Society: 
Challenging Western Models, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 82.
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cohesiveness among the residents of a state are a crucial aspect of democratic 
consolidation. In multiethnic states that have rebellious ethnic minorities such 
arrangements could help to reduce alienation and polarization. These arrangements are 
necessary for the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups.13
The success of the arrangements and policies a state uses to reduce polarization 
and to promote cohesiveness can be assessed using several criteria. The first criterion of 
success is the behavior of ethnopolitical groups opposed to the state and the amount of 
public support that they enjoy. If the activities of such ethnopolitical groups diminishes 
after the adoption of strategies to reduce polarization, and if public support for such 
ethnopolitical groups declines, then ethnic polarization has decreased. If a causal link 
between polarization-reducing policies and a decline in anti-state activities and feelings 
can be established, it means that the policies have achieved their goal.
The second criterion of success for policies designed to reduce polarization is a 
change in public opinion. Public opinion surveys, especially when supported by mass 
media content analysis, reflect changes in the attitudes o f different groups within the 
society toward the state and toward other ethnic groups. Once again, if a causal link 
between polarization-reducing policies and a change in public opinion (showing a 
decrease in polarization) can be established, then the policies can be regarded as 
successful. The section that follows describes the methodology that is used to analyze and 
assess the polarization-reducing policies of a state.
l3This process of interaction does not imply that different ethnic groups can meet 
halfway for a compromise, and thus consolidate a democratic regime. A regime is 
consolidated when the two conditions, outlined above, are met.
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TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: METHOD AND CASE SELECTION
The proposition that the legacy of ethnic restructuring significantly affects a state’s 
ability to consolidate democracy suggests a two-step empirical testing method. First, 
nations that have experienced a high degree of ethnic restructuring must be selected. 
Second, the ethnic polarization within those states and the methods that have been used to 
reduce this polarization must be documented. In addition, a causal relationship between 
the legacy of ethnic restructuring and ethnic polarization must be demonstrated.
Structured case studies is the most appropriate methodology to achieve the above 
goals. Case studies yield research that is both historically interpretive and causally 
analytic. Such research gathers evidence “in a manner sensitive to historical chronology” 
and offers limited historical generalizations that are sensitive to context.14 These 
characteristics of the method are especially relevant to the major goals of the 
dissertation— to understand the long term effects o f ethnic restructuring and to learn 
whether ethnic restructuring affects the ability of a state to create a cohesive community.
Case-oriented research allows a small number of cases to be examined 
intensively, but its inherent problem is that it contributes less to building theory than 
studies which include multiple cases or studies which search for associations between and 
among variables.15 One way to overcome this problem is to use case-oriented research
l4Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 35.
l5This particular merit o f case-oriented research and its inherent problem were 
identified by Arend Lijphart in his scheme “Situating the Comparative Method,” 
reproduced by David Collier, ‘T he Comparative M ethod” in Theory, Case, and Method 
in Comparative Politics, ed. Nikolaos Zahariadis (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, 1997). 36.
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deductively by building on an existing theory (which is based on previously conducted 
empirical investigations). An existing theory provides guidance as to what variables 
should be examined more closely and what variables do not deserve sustained attention.16 
Relying on previous theories puts the chosen empirical studies into broader perspective 
and allows one to identify generalizable trends (e.g., under what conditions the previously 
made theoretical arguments hold true).
In order to be able to make generalizations and thus contribute to theory building, 
this dissertation uses a deductive case study method. Prior to applying the case study 
method to empirical data, it draws on previous theorizing about the impact o f ethnic 
restructuring on the processes of community building to construct its own theoretical 
argument. Consequently, Chapter IH is devoted to the examination of previous theory 
about the impact of ethnic restructuring and multiethnicity on the processes of community 
building. Having identified the variables that need further examination, the dissertation 
proceeds to construct its own theoretical argument about the impact o f ethnic restructuring 
on community building and the ways to deal with the legacy of ethnic restructuring. The 
theoretical argument is tested against empirical evidence from several ethnically 
restructured states.
Case Selection
One criterion for case selection is variance in the key variable: forced changes in
I6NikoIaos Zahariadis, ‘Theoretical Notes on Method and Substance,” in Theory, 
Case, and Method in Comparative Politics, ed. Nikolaos Zahariadis (Fort Worth, Tex.: 
Harcourt, 1997), 18.
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the ethnic structure of a country. Domestic ethnopolitical groups, whose emergence is 
prompted by drastic changes in the ethnic make-up of a country, are a potential source of 
resistance to the state. The central proposition of this dissertation implies that the higher 
the level o f ethnic restructuring experienced in the past, the stronger the resistance to 
inclusive policies regarding minorities will be. In such a context, an agreement about 
minority policies and their status is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In addition to 
the first criterion, other criteria for case selection are: 1) forced resettlements pursued by a 
non-democratic regime in the past and an influx of residents belonging to different 
national groups from other territories (the experience of ethnic restructuring), and 2) 
attempts to democratize within an ethnically restructured state.
Using these criteria, the three Baltic states are selected. They share one major 
characteristic: ethnic restructuring in these three states was pursued according to the same 
plan and at the same time.17 All three states experienced an influx of residents from other 
parts of the USSR after the Second World War. Major repressions, including mass 
deportations, ended at the same time in all three states.
The three cases have variance in the key variable: the changed domestic ethnic 
structure. The demographic legacy of ethnic restructuring within the three states is 
different: by 1997, Latvia and Estonia had sizable (32.5% and 28.7%) Russian minorities. 
(This compares with 8.8% and 8.2% before World W ar II.) The most homogenous of the 
three, Lithuania, has fewer Russians (9%) and an active Polish-speaking minority (8%).
17The plan is reflected by the document signed by Serov prior to 19 May 1941.
This document is reproduced in Mokslo ir enciklopedijij leidykla, Lietuvos kovij ir kanciy 
istorija. Lietuvos gyventojif treniimai 1941, 1945—1952 m. [A History of Lithuania’s 
Fights and Ordeals. Deportations of People Living in Lithuania in 1941, 1945-1952] 
(Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijij leidykla, 1994), 14—20.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
22
(This compares with 2.5% Russians in 1923.)18 In addition to ethnically-based political 
groups, there have been a number of international actors (e.g., the OSCE (the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Latvia and Estonia, and the EU (the European 
Union) in all three states) involved in community building processes within the three 
states. Russia and Poland, the minority “mother” states, have also attempted to propagate 
minority policies and thus influence the process of community crafting in the Baltic states.
Historical Background to the Case Studies
To document the degree of ethnic restructuring experienced by the Baltic states, a 
historical account of the population movements carried out by the Soviet state will be 
made. The sources used for this account are archival materials, private records of former 
deportees, and previously written historical studies. Specifically, the chapter draws on the 
instructions issued by the Soviet Secret Police on how to conduct deportations and 
resettlements (available in Lithuania’s Special Archive), similar materials from the 
Occupation Museum in Riga, and various Russian archives.
In addition, the historical account will be enriched by the personal narratives of 
former deportees. The publications of the Genocide and Resistance Research Center of 
Lithuania (LGGRTC, or Lietuvos Gyventojif Genocido ir Rezistencijos Tyrimo Centras) 
include memoirs of former deportees and resistance fighters. Analyzing memoirs and 
other documents (e.g., letters written during the time when ethnic restructuring took place,
l8The ethnic composition of the three states in 1997 is from Dzintra Bungs, The 
Baltic States: Problems and Prospects o f Membership in the European Union (Baden- 
Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft, 1998), 69.
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the partisans’ press, etc.) that record the actions of resistance groups within the Baltic 
states will help to assess the populations’ response to ethnic restructuring.
The goal o f this dissertation is not simply to document the extent of the 
demographic changes, but also to establish a link between this policy and the beginning 
stages of democratization. To do that, the dissertation will examine periodicals from the 
Baltic states that were published during the beginning stage of democratization, the 
narratives of Baltic resistance leaders, and sociological studies of public opinion. The 
news reports and press releases of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty will be used to trace 
the actions o f ethnopolitical groups. Using these sources will help to establish whether 
there was ethnic polarization in the Baltic states prior to the first stage of community 
building.
The Structure o f  the Case Studies
The goal of the case studies is to trace the approaches that the Baltic states used to 
reduce polarization. Each case study is structured around three themes. The first part of 
each case study explores the attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the state during the 
initial stage of community building. By drawing on public opinion surveys, mass media 
reports and the accounts of political leaders, this part documents the ethnic polarization 
that was present during the first stage of community building.
The position of ethnic minorities toward the state can be established by making a 
content analysis of mass media publications geared towards a minority audience 
(Molodezh' Estonii and Narvskaya gazeta in Estonia, Druzhba in Lithuania, SM-Segodnya
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and the Russian edition of Diena in Latvia) and sociological surveys conducted by the 
Baltic Data House. The actions of ethnopolitical groups will be traced from the news 
reports and press releases of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and local newspapers such 
as Lietuvos Rytas, Lietuvos Aidas, Eesti Paehvaleht, and Postimees.
The second theme of each case study is tracing the process o f community building 
from “above” and from “below.” Tracing community building from “above” identifies the 
approaches of each of the Baltic state to the issues of citizenship and minorities’ rights, 
such as the right of the members o f a minority community to be educated in their own 
language. The main sources for this analysis are official legal documents defining the 
status of minorities and mass media reports describing the circumstances under which the 
laws were adopted. Describing the circumstances will make it possible to discern the role 
of international actors (such as minority mother states and international institutions).
These actors exercised political conditionality to push for what they saw as the relevant 
laws affecting the status of minorities.
Each case study will identify the response of ethnic minorities to the newly adopted 
or discussed laws and regulations. A minority’s reaction to a state’s policies reflects the 
degree to which a minority accepts the power of the state in which it lives. Tracing a 
minority's reaction will help us to make an assessment of the effectiveness of policies 
defined by the laws.
At the sub-state level, the decisions taken by the elites may be challenged (or 
approved) by local political groups, including ethnically-based parties. These groups have 
a vested interest in the minority policies pursued by the state. In democratizing states with 
weak enforcement mechanisms, some laws and regulations may never be fully
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implemented. Therefore, tracing developments and policies within the sub-state sphere (or 
civil society)— the actions of local governments in areas with a significant number of 
ethnic minorities, the functioning of the state as a “service station,” and the ways that 
ethnic groups have addressed their different collective memories— represents an equally 
important source of ways that can be used to reduce polarization.
The final part o f the case studies will reflect on the results of the policies that the 
Baltic states adopted to reduce polarization. Using public opinion polls and mass media 
reports, this part will help to establish whether the policies described in the previous 
sections helped to reduce ethnic polarization. Comparing the findings from the case 
studies will help to identify whether the Baltic states adopted and implemented the liberal 
universalist policies advised by international actors, and whether these policies or other 
policies helped to reduce polarization. In other words, the case studies will help to 
establish whether there is one “right” way to create a cohesive society and thus consolidate 
an emerging democratic regime.
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSITIONS
The main proposition of this dissertation explores the impact of historical 
experiences on democratic community building. This thesis fits into the domestic level of 
analysis within international relations theory.19 Other theories exploring the relationship 
between the variables analyzed by this dissertation are reviewed in Chapter IH. The main
l9Kenneth N. Waltz was the author of the idea of the systemic, domestic, and 
individual levels. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical 
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
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alternative propositions to the main thesis are situated within the systemic, or structural 
level of analysis of International Relations theory.20
Structure can be defined as a set of relatively stable constraints on the behavior of a 
nationstate. Structuralist theories focus on the impact of structural factors, such as power 
distribution within a region, globalization and related global trends, on the behavior of a 
nationstate and processes within a nationstate. They assume that the system (or structure) 
of world politics provides the architecture and the incentives that affect the actions of its 
component units— i.e., the nationstates.
The Geostrategic Hypothesis
The first alternative proposition, drawn from the Neorealist scholarship which 
focuses on power distribution, is that previous ethnic restructuring and consequent ethnic 
segmentation have little if anything to do with the consolidation of democracy. This 
hypothesis suggests that in order to consolidate democracies within multiethnic states, a 
secure environment (a “security umbrella”) should be established to insure democratic 
development. In other words, a security umbrella is a necessary condition for a democracy 
to be consolidated.21
20Another big group of theories fits into the individual level. However, while 
tracing the process whereby a feeling of “we-ness” is created, this dissertation takes 
individuals (the leaders of ethnopolitical groups) and their beliefs into account.
2iE.g., see Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, “Democratization in Eastern Europe: The 
External Dimension,” in Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International 
Dimensions, ed. Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (London: Routledge, 1994),
220-52: and East European Security Reconsidered, ed. John R. Lampe and Daniel N. 
Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993). Richard J. Krickus makes a 
similar argument to support the incorporation of the Baltic states into NATO. See
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This hypothesis emphasizes geostrategic factors, or the external dimension of 
democratic transitions. It is popular among those who study East Central Europe. It 
suggests that a favorable or supportive geostrategic environment is essential, even crucial, 
to the success of democratic transitions in a given region. The proponents of this 
hypothesis point out the fact that the international dimension has been a decisive factor for 
the emerging democracies in East Central Europe." Those states that were not part o f the 
“zone” of Western influence (e.g., Moldova, the Caucasus or the former Yugoslavia) 
exploded into ethnic conflict. Those that were under the patronage of Western powers 
(e.g.. Central European states) have been stable. Therefore, states that are under the 
patronage of the West are likely to consolidate their emerging democracies.
This explanation is based on the assumption that a security vacuum in a region is 
capable of “unleashing long-suppressed national animosities”23 in multiethnic states. 
Following this school of thought, one scenario could be as follows. In the absence of 
stabilizing outside powers, ethnic minorities living within a multiethnic state mobilize. 
Their leaders press for secession. If one region secedes, then an ethnic minority left in that 
region is going to feel threatened and may ask for protection from its mother state. This 
may lead to endless intrastate and interstate wars.24 The presence of outside powers can
Richard J. Krickus, ‘T he  Case for Including the Baltics in NATO,” Problems o f Post- 
Communism 45, no. 1 (January/February 1998): 3—9.
"Geoffrey Pridham, ‘T he International Dimension of Democratization: Theory, 
Practice, and Inter-regional Comparisons,” in Building Democracy? The International 
Dimension o f  Democratization in Eastern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, 
and George Sanford (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), 7-9.
23 Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, The International Politics o f  East Central Europe 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 223.
24Barry Posen refers to a “window of opportunity” seen by ethnic leaders in 
unstable multiethnic regions. These leaders press for full sovereignty for their ethnic 
group. The basis of his argument is that the perceived “window of opportunity” triggers
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prevent such scenarios. This presence can be established through the presence of NATO 
and the EU.25 These two international organizations can do the job of stabilizing the 
region because they are supported by important powers— the United States and Germany.26 
Therefore, such institutions can become the pillars of the security architecture that is 
necessary to preserve the stability and security of emerging democracies.
The intellectual roots of such arguments can be traced to the Realist and Neorealist 
schools of thought in International Relations. These schools of thought emphasize the 
importance and autonomous existence of material structure. The Neorealist school of 
thought emphasizes the distribution of material capabilities (that is, the military and 
economic power of the nationstates). “Power vacuum” refers to the absence of a strong 
military and economic power. This condition is the main reason for the outbreak o f wars 
and, subsequently, for the fall o f  democratic regimes.
Pioneered by Hans Morgenthau, the Realist and Neorealist perspectives rely 
heavily on the concepts of power, rationality, and balance of power. World politics is seen 
as a constant struggle for power because the international realm is seen as a competitive,
ethnic mobilization. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 
35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27^17.
■^here is an ongoing debate between Realists, Neorealists, and Institutionalists 
about the role and influence of international institutions in maintaining security. The 
classical Realist view of institutions considers the interests of states to be crucial to the 
success of institutions in maintaining stability. Neorealists dwell on power distribution 
and security architecture. M argarita Balmaceda, “Institutions, Alliances and Stability: 
Thinking Theoretically About International Relations in Central East Europe,” European 
Security 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 86-87. See also John Mearsheimer, “The False 
Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19. no. 3 (Winter 
1994/1995): 5 ^ 9 .
26For a similar argument for integration of East Central Europe into transatlantic 
structures, see Stephen F. Larrabee, East European Security After the Cold War (Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993): 170-72.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
29
anarchical field and also because human nature is seen as constantly lusting for power.27
Neorealism, more so than Realism, is preoccupied with balance of power28 and 
international structures as a way of preserving stability. Consequently, as many critics of 
Neorealism have already pointed out, it is likely to overlook both history and human 
subjectivity.29 Neorealism cannot theorize about the emergence or evolution of the state 
nor can it theorize about when and how “ethnic hatreds” will be released. The argument 
that a security vacuum leads to the “unleashing of ancient hatreds” embraces a simplified 
idea of ethnicity. There are cases when ethnic tensions and ethnic conflict persist even in 
stable states that are within a security community. The existence of security guarantees is 
not sufficient to predict the future o f ethnic relations and thus to hypothesize about the 
future fate of domestic political systems. Arguments based on the Neorealist school of 
thought do not identify possible sources of change within the system.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the perspectives that focus on geostrategic 
factors identify one necessary condition for democratic consolidation. This condition is 
regional stability and the absence of interstate wars. It is true that many democratic 
regimes were strangled by outside intervention. Furthermore, the proponents of this 
hypothesis draw attention to the considerable influence of international actors on 
democratic processes. Consequently, the research design embraced by this dissertation has
27For further description and critique of the Realist and Neorealist paradigm in 
International Relations, see Robert O. Keohane, “Neorealism and World Politics,” in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), 10-25.
28Balance of power can be understood as an equilibrium of relative strength of the 
nationstates through which stability can be achieved.
29E.g., see Richard K. Ashley, ‘T h e  Poverty of Neorealism” in Neorealism and Its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 255-300.
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incorporated the influence of international actors as an intervening variable.
The Constructivist Hypothesis
A second alternative proposition can be drawn from Constructivist (also known as 
Structuralist) scholarship in international relations, which argues that states can change 
their identities and acquire new interests while interacting at the international level.30 
Identities of the states, in other words, are shaped by international structures (i.e., from 
“outside”)- Therefore, past policies of ethnic restructuring have little to do with present 
difficulties in creating an inclusive democratic regime. The real problem is that there is 
not enough international involvement, which, according to this proposition, would help to 
reconstruct the identity of the state and even make it more open to inclusive minority 
policies.
The Constructivist hypothesis emerged as a critique of Realist and Neorealist 
approaches to International Relations. Alexander Wendt, who has pioneered a new 
Constructivist paradigm, has identified a major assumption shared by Realist and 
Neorealist theorists. These two perspectives take self-interested actors as constant and 
exogenously given. Wendt argued that states can develop new collective identities 
through interaction in the international system, and this relationship should be theorized as 
“structuration.” This theory implies that agents (e.g., nationstates) and structures are 
mutually constitutive yet distinct entities. Thus, the investigation of change in worlds
30For an introduction to this hypothesis, see Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 
(June 1994): 384-96.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
31
politics should focus on how the international structure affects the identities of 
nationstates, and how nationstates transform the international structure.31
The hallmark of the Constructivist hypothesis is its focus on the role of ideational 
factors, such as norms, identities, idealogies, and aspirations in international relations.
The representatives of this school of thought argue that given the prevalence of the Realist 
and Neorealist schools of thought, ideational factors have been ignored in world politics.32 
According to the Constructivist argument meaningful behavior between states is possible 
only within an intersubjective social context. States, just like any other actors studied in 
the social sciences, develop their relations with others through norms and practices. In the 
absence of norms and mutually understood and endorsed rules, the exercise of power 
would be meaningless.33 Structure is meaningless without intersubjective norms and 
practices; or, in Alexander W endt’s words, “anarchy (the major assumption of the Realist 
and Neorealist schools of thought) is what states make of it.”34
Consequently, if the behavior of states is affected by intersubjective international 
structures, then democratic states must have a way of understanding each other and 
establishing certain socio-international practices that are different from dictatorships.35 
This is an emerging Constructivist take on the democratic peace theory. Socio­
3‘Alexander Wendt, ‘T h e  Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (Fall 1987); 335-70.
32John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 
1998): 855.
j3Ted Hopf, ‘T he Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 
International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 172-73.
^Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
35Hopf, 192.
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international practices include conforming to rules founded upon similar expectations and 
coordinated sanctions against defectors.
Furthermore, Constructivists believe that well-established democratic states can 
socialize weak or young states. This can happen though the process of learning when 
norms and democratic rules are transmitted from one party to another. Material or 
political encouragement is one way to transfer these norms.36
When referring to the attractiveness of Western international institutions (such as 
the European Union and NATO) to nationstates in East Central Europe, Institutional 
Constructivists conclude that they have had an “overspill” effect. International institutions 
work as magnets, constantly attracting new non-members, and in the process change their 
identities. Non-member states are hypothesized to be ready to change some aspects of 
their domestic politics and accept new policy choices in order to be accepted into these 
institutions.
Financial aid and/or membership in international institutions can indeed affect the 
identity of a state. However, the line between material or political encouragement of 
“correct” behavior during the process of socialization (which, according to the 
Constructivist hypothesis creates new interests) and the agreement by aspiring members to 
adopt norms and other requirements to fulfill their existing interests, such as the need for 
security, is not clear.
36Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, “Structure, Strategy, and Institutional 
Roles,” in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 
1989-1991, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993): 395—401. This article refers to the process of 
democratization in East Central Europe as “socialization,” or the transmission of 
democratic norms from established democracies.
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This observation points to one of the major drawbacks of the Constructivist 
proposition. This theory has not yet established criteria that can be used to identify which 
interests and which aspects of the identities of nationstates are established during 
international interactions, and which aspects and interests are constructed from “within” 
(domestically). Without this distinction, it is difficult to determine whether international 
interaction indeed is such an influential variable.
Nevertheless, the Constructivist hypothesis points to a very influential variable 
affecting the identities of states and their political systems— international institutions. 
Furthermore, by hypothesizing that international institutions are capable o f transforming 
the identity of a state, this proposition reminds us about political and economic 
conditionality— the strategy that has been increasingly used by international actors to 
promote and consolidate democratic regimes. Empirical data shows that at the level of the 
international system, many types of interaction between established democracies and 
newly independent democratizing states include conditionality.37 Examples of such 
interaction include criteria for membership in international organizations (e.g., respect for 
democratic norms, a market economy, respect for the rights of minorities) and 
international financial aid. The latter includes liberalization of prices and economic 
activity, privatization, structural reform, debt management, and other similar 
requirements.38
3'Karen Dawisha and Michael Turner, ‘T h e  Interaction Between Internal and 
External Agency in Post-Communist Transitions,” in The International Dimension o f  
Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia, ed. Karen Dawisha 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 407.
38This is especially true when it comes to receiving IMF credits and financial 
support for development from the World Bank. See Dawisha and Turner, 407.
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The questions of whether and how to use political conditionality are closely related 
to the debate outlined in the Introduction on whether there is one “right” way, one 
“correct” model to consolidate democracies and to monitor political community building. 
Consequently, tracing the processes of political community building in ethnically 
restructured states must take the influence of international actors and their use of political 
and material encouragement and conditionality into account. In this way, this dissertation 
will take into account the Constructivist question about the ability of international actors to 
reconstruct the identities of nationstates.
The Globalist Hypothesis
The third alternative proposition is that globalization (usually understood as an 
“inter-connectedness” caused by the expansion of the global capitalist system)39 critically 
affects the ability of a nationstate to establish and to consolidate a democratic regime. The 
proponents of this thesis point out that since the mid-1970s the percentage of authoritarian 
states has fallen dramatically. They argue that worldwide democratization is a 
characteristic of globalization.40 Increased trade, new technologies, foreign investment,
39The concept o f “globalization” emphasizes the level of interdependence 
between nationstates. It is a term that describes the rapid acceleration of the world 
economy in the last fifty years. Most scholars and practitioners would agree that 
globalization is “about much more than trade or capital flows. It is about a world linked 
together by information, knowledge, and ideas as well.” Renato Ruggiero (World Trade 
Organization Director-General), “A New Partnership fo ra  New Century: Sustainable 
Global Development in a Global Age,” speech at the Bellerive/Globe International 
Conference “Policing the Global Economy,” 23 March 1998. Available from 
http://www. wto. org/wto/speeches/; INTERNET.
“ David Held, “Democracy and Globalization,” Global Governance 3, no. 3 
(September/December 1997): 251.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
35
and expanding media have fueled economic growth. This makes the eradication of 
poverty a real possibility. One of the main requirements for democratic consolidation is a 
well-functioning economy. Therefore, globalization offers great potential for the creation 
of capitalist democracies.41
This group of scholars and practitioners embraces a rather optimistic view of the 
effects o f globalization, hoping that global technological breakthroughs and the trend 
toward democratization offer great potential for human advancement and the 
establishment of democratic regimes worldwide. Some point to the possibility of the 
emergence of a global civil society due to the rapidity and ease of communication.42 
Globalization implies a “pattern of society where social relationships are conducted across 
great distances.”43
Not every one within the “globalist” camp agrees with this optimistic assessment 
of globalization. Many fear that emerging democracies are increasingly challenged by 
regional and global problems, such as the increasing gap between rich and poor countries, 
the spread of AIDS, and the unpredictability of the flow of financial resources. Some fear 
that the social institutions o f the state, a hallmark of consolidated democratic regimes, are
41For an optimistic argument emphasizing the role of a country’s economy in the 
consolidation of a democratic regime, see Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose 
Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure?” in 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun- 
han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997),
295-311. Przeworski et a l.’s main finding is that economic factors are crucial for the 
endurance of democracy.
42Ronnie Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global 
Civil Society,” Millennium  21, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 389—420.
43Anthony Giddens’ spatial logic, interpreted by Robin Brown, “Globalization and 
the End o f the National Project,” in Boundaries in Question: New Directions in 
International Relations, ed. John Macmiiland and Andrew Linklater (London: Pinter, 
1995), 55-56.
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likely to be threatened by global market forces. Others wonder what kind of control 
citizens can have over multinational corporations, and how democratic institutions can 
control the new international market forces.-14
Furthermore, others point to the growing gap between rich and poor countries. 
According to the 1999 UN Human Development Report, in 1997, the richest countries of 
the world (20% of the world population) had 86% of world GDP, while the bottom fifth 
had just 1%. Similar distribution of wealth is present in other sectors, such as trade and 
communications.45 Poor countries are plagued by ethnic and civil wars, unstable or non­
existent state institutions and widespread corruption at the highest levels of government.46
The intensification of ethnic hostilities after 1989— a development that coincides 
with globalization— is also presented as a serious challenge to the consolidation of 
democratic regimes. Even though contemporary debates on the impact of globalization 
have identified contradictory implications for ethnonational conflicts, some case studies 
try to establish a link between globalization and ethnonationalism. For example, it is
44E.g., during his 2000 New Year speech on Czech television, Vaclav Havel 
hypothesized that globalization is leading to the “reckless destruction of the planet” and 
to the spread of a “civilization based on pseudo-values, the swelling of organized crime 
and terrorism, and a short-sighted form of market economy that abuses poorer countries.” 
He went on to say that “it cannot be right when the total value of assets in the hands of 
the three richest persons in the world exceeds the GDP of developing countries with a 
total population of 600 million.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (4 January, 
2000).
45Thus, the richest fifth had 82% of world export markets, and the bottom fifth 
just 1%. The richest fifth had 74% of world telephone lines; the bottom fifth— only 
1.5%. UN, Human Development Report 1999: Globalization With a Human Face. 
Available from http://www.undp.org-, INTERNET.
46In April 2000, the United Nations issued a report putting a lot of blame for 
poverty on bad government. “Good governance” has been made the top priority in 
poverty-fighting by the UN Development program. Barbara Crosette, “UN Says Bad 
Government Is Often the Cause of Poverty,” New York Times (5 April, 2000).
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argued that globalization enables ethnic minorities that were relatively isolated in the past 
to mobilize their resources and challenge the state with its political order.47 This line of 
reasoning suggests a hypothesis that globalization may become an obstacle to the 
processes of democratization and democratic consolidation, especially in the poorest 
countries of the world.
This proposition is emphatically embraced by the second group of “globalists” (the 
pessimists) who focus on the power struggles and conflicts that are believed to be caused 
by globalization. Some envision worldwide clashes between different cultural groups, 
fierce fights over resources, or the spread of politico-economic crises rooted in bad 
political leadership and triggered by the sudden withdrawal of capital by foreign 
investors.48 The shift from national to another allegiance, which some analysts believe is 
happening, may become “a cultural and political earthquake,” a worldwide conflict, 
triggered by what is seen as the diffusion of power away from nationstates.49 Immanuel 
Wallerstein, one of the most prominent representatives of world system theory and a 
leading “globalist,” warns of a high level war-proneness around 2050, as the long period 
of global economic growth is likely to come to an end.50 Such pessimistic scenarios spell
47James Anderson and Liam O ’Dowd, “Contested Borders: Globalization and 
Ethno-national Conflict in Ireland,” Regional Studies 33, no. 1 (October 1999), 
INFOTRAC.
48For a theory about the clash of civilizations, see Samuel P. Huntington, ‘T he 
Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-A9. For a 
proposition that environmental disasters may become the causes of conflict, see Robert D. 
Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly (February 1994): 44—76.
49JessicaT. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January/February 
1997): 50-66.
50lmmanuel Wallerstein, “The Capitalist World Economy: Middle-Run 
Prospects,” in Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the M odem World System, ed. 
Immanuel Wallerstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 123—36.
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gloomy prospects for the establishment and sustainability of democratic regimes.
Given the richness and diversity of the literature on globalization and its effects, 
little agreement exists about even a specific definition of “globalization.” Consequently, it 
is difficult to identify an underlying theoretical concept unifying these works. The 
optimistic group of “globalists” (the ones who believe that cosmopolitan worldwide 
democracy is possible), trace their intellectual roots to Immanuel Kant and liberal 
economic theory pioneered by Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
Those critics of globalization who focus on the growing gap between rich and poor 
trace their intellectual roots to Karl Marx and his dependency theory, according to which 
the world system is seen as divided between industrialized “core” countries (rich 
established democracies) and underdeveloped “periphery” countries (poor conflict ridden 
states). A branch of this school of thought, world system analysis, focuses on the 
interaction of the units within the world system and not the constitution and/or functioning 
of the units (such as nationstates) themselves. During this interaction, different social, 
political and economic forms emerge within different regions of the world. These 
phenomena become the basis o f the “developmental pulse” of these regions. Nationstates 
and even regions are incapable of controlling these phenomena. Consequently, the future 
of the political and economic system within each country is affected (or even determined) 
by this “developmental pulse” and not by the actions of individual states.51
Such globalist perspectives suffer from a high degree of determinism.
Furthermore, Marxist and many post-Marxist perspectives that are based on historical
51For a review of this literature, see Robert A. Denemark, “W orld System History: 
From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations,” International 
Studies Review  1, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 51-53.
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materialism have been widely criticized for their failure to consider various forms of 
domination in world politics that are not reducible to “haves” and “have-nots.” Ethnic and 
gender domination are often cited as domains that are ignored by M arxists.52 These critics 
have included postmodernists, critical theorists, and feminists who do not see the 
emerging global order and transnational society as a single homogenous entity. They think 
of global society as a complex and diverse social system, and have continued to argue for a 
major restructuring of International Relations theory, which, many of them believe, cannot 
adequately explain the changes associated with globalization. Their view of global society 
and of nationstates is one of a field in which differences and power struggles are 
constantly played out.53
A major challenge faced by globalist perspectives, given their focus on the 
complex and often chaotic nature o f global issues, is their inability to link “micro” 
conditions within individual nationstates with macro-outcomes at the global level. As a 
result, many globalist accounts of world politics suffer from incompleteness and over­
generalization. This makes it difficult to come up with credible hypotheses at the systemic 
level about the prospects of democracy and democratic consolidation within specific 
nationstates.
In spite of this shortcoming, globalist perspectives draw our attention to the
52Andrew Linklater, ‘T h e  Question of the Next Stage in International Relations 
Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point o f View,” Millennium 21, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 
79-80.
53Mike Featherstone uses these two characteristics to describe “global culture.” 
Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism, and Identity 
(London: SAGE, 1995), 14. For a discussion of post-positivist approaches, see V. Spike 
Peterson, ‘Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International 
Relations,” Millennium  21, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 183-206.
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importance of economic factors, such as a market economy, free trade, and growing
economic interdependence between nationstates. This dissertation relates these insights to
the concept of the “state as a service station.” A state that can function effectively as a
service station has established functioning economic institutions and is capable of adapting
to growing economic interdependence. Such a state is also capable of providing basic
goods to its citizens and residents. Its political power has a strong economic foundation.
Furthermore, such a state can create the conditions that are necessary for the growth of
civil society, which, in tum, is a necessary condition for a sustainable democratic regime.
In sum, this dissertation does not dismiss alternative hypotheses as being irrelevant
to its line of inquiry. Alternative hypotheses point to important variables that must be
included in order to produce a credible account of community building in the post-CoId
War world. In the words o f Andrew Linklater:
“No sociology of community will proceed very far if it neglects state-building, 
geopolitics and war. [These are the variables examined by geostrategists.] No 
account will succeed if it overlooks the effects of commerce or production at the 
domestic and international levels. [These are the variables examined by 
globalists.] No account will reach far enough if it neglects the cultural dimensions 
of international relations which shape domestic and international order and 
structure images of the self and the other. [This dimension is the focus of 
Constructivist analyses.]”54
This dissertation has incorporated the main insights of other leading schools of 
thought into its research design. To be more specific, it will assess the role of 
international actors and their use of conditionality during the process o f community 
building as “intervening variables.” Furthermore, it will address the ability of 
democratizing multiethnic states to become effective “service stations.”
54Linklater, “The Question of the Next Stage,” 94.
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The following chapter reviews related bodies of literature that focus on the 
domestic and individual levels of analysis. It identifies the major bodies of literature on 
which the main thesis of this dissertation is based and points to areas in need of theoretical 
refinement and further empirical research.
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CHAPTER ED
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY
This review consists of four parts which divide the previous literature into 
conceptually and thematically distinguishable areas. One goal of this chapter is to identify 
the main bodies o f literature from which the main hypothesis about the impact of ethnic 
restructuring on democratic consolidation is drawn. Another goal of the chapter is to 
identify which of the debated areas of the existing theoretical approaches are in need of 
conceptual refinement and further empirical research.
To demonstrate the conceptual differences between previous works, the chapter 
employs a chart with two intersecting lines, representing two concepts— the nation and 
ethnicity (see Figure 2). The vertical line is the “nation” line. The area to the right is 
marked as “nation as a construct,” and the area to the left is marked “nation as an actor.” 
The term “nation as a construct” implies that the theories on the right side of the chart 
conceptualize the nation as a historically specific construct, capable of change with each 
generation. Such a nation may permit the entry of new members through membership in 
civil society and the state. The opposing theoretical view embraces a more static and, in 
some cases, even primordial view of the nation. The nation in this view is a community 
with a distinct language and history.1
‘Don Maclver, “Introduction: States and Ethnic Pluralism,” in The Politics o f  
Multinational States, ed. Don M aclver (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999). 3.
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Figure 2. Theories Categorized According to Their Understanding of Ethnicity and Nation
NATIONS


























The horizontal line is the “ethnic groups” line. The area on top is marked “ethnic 
groups as a construct.” The area on the bottom “ethnic groups as actors.” Similarly to the 
previously described definition of the “nation,” the theories which fall into the area on top 
conceptualize ethnicity as a historically specific concept, emphasizing the different 
historical experiences of each ethnic group. Some of these theories maintain that ethnic 
identities are primarily activated by group elites with particular purposes in mind. The
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opposing theories embrace a more static, primordial view of ethnicity, treating ethnic 
groups as givens in domestic and international politics. They maintain that ethnic 
identities are deeply rooted in historical origins, which define the nature of an ethnic 
group.2 The chart divides the theoretical approaches to the subject into four quadrants, 
reflecting the differing definitions of “nation” and “ethnicity” that each embraces.
THE FIRST QUADRANT: HISTORICAL APPROACHES
The Experience o f  Ethnic Restructuring as a Source o f  Minority-unfriendly Nationalism
The theories which fall into the first quadrant conceptualize ethnicity and nation as 
historically specific constructs. They encourage us to pay attention to the specific 
historical experiences of national and ethnic groups. The differences in historic 
experiences are the basis for perceiving oneself as a member of an ethnic or national 
community. No theoretical distinction between ethnic and national collectivities is made, 
incorporating them instead into the term “identity.”3
The best known representative of this quadrant is Rogers Brubaker’s study 
Nationalism Reframed: Nations and Nationhood in the New Europe * Arguing that nation
:MacIver, 6.
3“I am deliberately avoiding the term ‘ethnicity’,” writes Peter Burke, “which 
raises more problems than it solves, and replacing it with the term ‘identity’ . . .” Peter 
Burke, “French Historians and Their Cultural Identities,” in History and Ethnicity, ed. 
Elizabeth Tonkin, Malcolm Chapman, and Maryon McDonald (London: Routledge,
1989), 159. For a discussion of the term “ethnicity” and its limitations, see Malcolm 
Chapman, Maryon McDonald, and Elizabeth Tonkin, “Introduction,” ibid., 11-17.
4Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nations and Nationhood in the New  
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
45
must be conceptualized as a historically specific construct, Brubaker’s ground-breaking 
study constructs an elegant “Minority-Nationalizing State-Minority Mother State” triangle 
for the study of European nationalities. An example o f this triangle is the situation of the 
Russian minority in post-Soviet states. The Russians are subjected to the “nationalizing” 
policies of post-Soviet states, but at the same time they are “protected” by their ethnic 
patron—Russia. Such triangles are usually the products of the disintegration o f empires, 
when their multiethnic populations “unmix” into separate nationstates. In the case of the 
former Soviet Union, the triangles are the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy, which 
involved ethnic restructuring (i.e., planned migration and deportations whereby large 
numbers of Russian speakers were moved into the Soviet republics, and some of the local 
inhabitants of the republics were deported).5
A thesis put forward by the study is that the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy 
has become a source of minority-unfriendly nationalism in the Soviet successor states. 
Brubaker argues that in almost all new post-Soviet states the ethno-culturally defined, 
“state-owning” core nation is sharply distinct from other residents of the state. The core 
nation has been represented by its elites as weakened and underdeveloped as the result of 
previous discrimination and repression (i.e., ethnic restructuring). To compensate for 
previous injustices, the new state is seen as having the responsibility to protect and 
promote the interests of the core nation by adopting strict language laws or even expelling 
the minorities. Due to this reason post-Soviet states are unlikely to adopt the democratic
5For a well-written, rich historical accounts about the ethnic changes in the former 
Soviet Union, putting them into the context of ethnic changes in 20th century Europe, see 
Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: Population Changes 1917-1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1947) and Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population 
Transfers 1939—1945 (1946; reprint. New York: Russell and Russell, 1971).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
46
models, such as binational, multinational or civic, that are advocated by the proponents of 
democratic policies in multiethnic states. Brubaker hypothesizes that the prospects of the 
minority rights model, according to which minorities are endowed with special cultural 
rights and autonomy, seem better because international institutions, such as the Council of 
Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the 
European Union (EU) push these new states to adopt this model.
Gerhard Simon puts forward a similar thesis about the impact of Soviet 
nationalities policy: that it resulted in a surge of nationalism in the Soviet republics.6 
Simon argues that even during Soviet times deportations and russification resulted in the 
emergence of small and, in some cases, large resistance groups that rejected nationalities 
policy either in part or completely. These groups, such as civil rights, re-emigration 
movements (e.g., the deported Crimean Tatars demanding a right to go back to their 
homeland), or national opposition movements, made concrete demands. Having 
researched the responses to this policy within the Soviet republics, Simon concludes that 
the processes of decolonization, which meant the development of the new (or re-newed) 
nationstates, began to take place even before the collapse of the Soviet Union (although 
they were less obvious than in other empires).
Vieda Skultans’ study The Testimony o f  Lives: Narrative and Memory in Post- 
Soviet Latvia, which is based on anthropological and historical research conducted in post- 
Communist Latvia, underlines one of the most important aspects o f Soviet nationalities 
policy— the deportations.7 Skultans argues that in Latvia “they (i.e., postwar events,
6Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward Nationalities in the Soviet 
Union (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
7Vieda Skultans, The Testimony o f  Lives: Narrative and M emory in Post-Soviet
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including deportations and resistance) have come to play a central role in defining national 
identity”8 because they are vividly remembered by the former victims and assert 
themselves in public commemorative practices.
Svetlana Aliyeva’s thesis is similar to that of Skultans’.9 She also argues that the 
experience of deportations has played a central role in the construction of post-Soviet 
identities. Furthermore, Aliyeva suggests that past deportations and repressions have 
become a source of conflict in several former republics, thus becoming an obstacle to 
democratization. Aliyeva’s book covers the first post-Soviet discussions about 
deportations in the Soviet Union and relates them to the conflict in North Ossetia and 
Checheno-Ingushetia.
Valery Tishkov, a former Russian nationalities minister, makes a similar argument. 
Tishkov attempts to trace the influence that Soviet deportations have had on the 
construction of post-Soviet identities by the Ingush and the Chechens and the eruption of 
conflict in that area o f the former USSR.10 In the same vein, recent studies by Nikolai F. 
Bougai, a Russian historian, also maintain that the deportations carried out by the Soviets 
have, in the long run, engendered ethnic conflicts in the territory of Russia. This is 
especially true about the conflicts in the Caucasus."
Latvia (London: Routledge, 1998).
8Ibid., xi. Skultans argues that public commemorative practices to remember the 
deportations carried out in the postwar period did not contrast with the personal memories 
of the respondents.
9SvetIana Aliyeva, Tak eto bylo: natsional’nye repressii v SSSR 1919-1952 gody 
[That’s How It Happened: National Repressions in the USSR, 1919-1952] (Moscow: 
Insan, 1995).
l0VaIery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet 
Union: The Mind Aflame (London: SAGE, 1997).
"See the introduction to Nikolai F. Bougai and Askarbi M. Gonov, Kavkaz: 
narody v eshelonakh (1920-1960-ye gody) [The Caucasus: The Nations in Railway Cars
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The most pessimistic thesis regarding the prospects for democratization in states 
with a troubled history can be drawn from a survey of East Central European political 
history by Joseph Rotschild. In Return to Diversity: A Political History o f  East Central 
Europe Since World War II Rotschild argues that the region has suffered from 
“fundamental weaknesses.” These weaknesses, which include multiethnicity, the 
instability of institutions, and irresponsible governments, explain why countries in this 
region lost their independence in the past and why they have remained underdeveloped 
and non-democratized when compared to countries in Western Europe.12 Like most 
historical perspectives on ethnic issues, this survey is successful in identifying broader 
trends and the persistence of crises in the history of post-Communist Europe. However, it 
does little to theorize the link between multiethnicity and democratic processes.
In general, despite the visibility of nationalism in post-Communist politics in the 
early nineties, less new theoretical ground has been broken than might be expected from 
the multitude of case studies researched. What is probably one of the most important 
conceptual breakthroughs was achieved by Rogers Brubaker who distinguishes between 
civic and ethnic forms of nationalism.13 In the case of civic nationalism, the members of a
(1920-1960s)] (Moscow': Insan, 1998), 8-52, and Nikolai F. Bougai, “Postsovetskaya 
Rossiya: problema reabilitatsii narodov v premlomlenii obshchestvennogo soznaniya” 
[Post-Soviet Russia: the Problem of the Rehabilitation of Nations during the Time of 
Transition], a paper presented at the Conference “Im Jahrhundert der Fliichtlinge: 
Umsiedlung and Vertreibung im Gedachtnis der Europaischen Volker” [The Century of 
Refugees: Resettlement and Expulsion in the Memory of European Nations] on 28 May 
1999 at Europa-Universitat Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
l2Joseph Rotschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History o f  East Central 
Europe Since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
l3For a discussion of this idea, see Raymond Taras. “From Matrioshka 
Nationalism to National Interests,” in New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet 
Nations, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 685.
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particular group identify first and foremost with the nation and the state in which they live 
(territorial identification), and not with a particular ethnic group within the state (“blood” 
identification). Ethnic nationalism is minority-unfriendly nationalism. In his article 
“Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States,” Brubaker argues that the politics of 
citizenship in Soviet successor states are shaped by the claims of politicized ethnicity, or 
by ethnic nationalism, which is more exclusive and more irreconcilable with democracy 
than civic nationalism.14 This argument suggests that in ethnically restructured states the 
logic of democracy and the logic of nation building may be incompatible.
With the exception of Brubaker’s works, the approaches within the first quadrant 
do not go beyond the description of identity construction. They fail to identify the 
conditions when the legacy of ethnic restructuring interferes with democratization and 
democratic consolidation within states. Besides, these approaches do not explore why 
some multiethnic states get involved in the creation of democratic institutions to 
accommodate the needs o f minorities. Nor do they explain why some agree on power 
sharing arrangements, decentralization, or the extension of minority rights (instead of 
succumbing to non-democratic ways, such as expulsion or ethnic cleansing). A recurrent 
theme among the approaches located in the first quadrant is that a previous experience of 
ethnic restructuring does matter. It may become a source of minority-unfriendly 
nationalism and, consequently, an impediment to successful democratization and 
democratic consolidation in multiethnic states.
14Rogers Brubaker, “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States,” 
International Migration Review  26, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 269—89.
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Previous Ethnic Restructuring as a Potential fo r  Mobilization
The second quadrant (“nations as actors; ethnic groups as constructs”) contains 
those theories that define nations as “actors” in domestic and world politics. Ethnic 
groups are normally invisible, but ethnicity can be mobilized in order to oppose or to take 
revenge for various national political projects, forced assimilation, genocide, and self- 
determination.15 This approach is popular in the political science literature on ethnic 
relations, which has tried to identify the circumstances (e.g., a sense o f deprivation vis-a- 
vis another ethnic group) that accompany conflicts between ethnic groups and thus make 
ethnic groups “visible” within nations.16 These theories have, for the most part, examined 
competition between different ethnic groups.
The main thesis drawn from this quadrant about the impact o f past ethnic 
restructuring is that it often becomes a potential for ethnic mobilization by the group 
which was previously oppressed or is currently oppressed by another ethnic group. Ted 
Robert Gurr, author of Minorities at Risk: A Global View o f  Ethnopolitical Conflict and 
Donald L. Horowitz, the editor o f Ethnic Groups in Conflict, are the pioneers of this
l5Richard Davies, “Ethnicity: Inside Out or Outside In?” in Identities in 
International Relations, ed. Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (New York: St. Martin’s,
1996), 87-88.
16E.g., Donald L. Horowitz, ed.. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985). Horowitz underlines the sense of deprivation and its 
importance for ethnic conflict. Also see David B. Carment, ‘T he Interstate Dimensions 
of Secession and Irredenta: A Crisis-Based Approach,” a paper presented at the 
International Studies Association’s Annual Meeting in San Diego. California (16-20 
April 1996).
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approach.17
Drawing on psychology. Vamik D. Volkan pursues a similar line of inquiry. He is 
primarily interested in why ethnic groups mobilize themselves to get revenge for past 
wrongs, or, in his words, “what happens to a group’s ‘we-ness’, its distinction from others, 
to become so deadly?” 18 Drawing on evidence from the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, the 
Baltic states, and Palestine, the author defines and analyzes identities as “emotionally 
bonded large groups.” 19 He uses the analogy of a tent to explore large-group psychology 
and ethnic mobilization. Personal identity is the first layer, and it fits well. Ethnic identity 
is the second layer. It is a “loose” layer, and it embraces many other members under an 
ethnic “tent.” The ethnic tent is held up by a tent pole (a leader), and it provides a sense of 
security to those who are under the canvas. People may rally around the pole o f the tent 
when they feel threatened. Efforts to secure the tent and to straighten out the canvas may 
lead to violent mass behavior. Mourning over past losses may induce feelings of anger 
and prompt mobilization.
Ernest Gellner and Charles C. Ragin have developed a theoretical “reactive 
ethnicity” perspective.20 According to this perspective, the infiltration of a sub-national 
area (e.g., a Soviet republic) by the members of a dominant cultural group (e.g., Russians) 
causes an “ethnic backlash” against the dominant cultural group by the inhabitants of the 
effected sub-national area. According Charles Ragin, in such situations, the dominant
l7Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View o f  Elhnopolitical Conflict 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).
18Vamik D. Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1997), 17.
19Ibid., 18.
:oSee Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1969). and Ragin.
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strata (e.g., Russians) come to be seen as alien by the lower strata (e.g., the inhabitants of a 
Soviet republic). On the other hand, the people from the lower strata are stereotyped as 
inferior by those in the dominant strata. An “ethnic backlash” on the part of the lower 
strata may involve mobilization along ethnic lines for forceful political action.
Raymond Taras has applied this perspective to post-Soviet nationalities. He argues 
that this perspective explains the Baltic peoples’ sense of insecurity about having been 
infiltrated by large numbers of Russians.21 Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson applied the 
theory of ethnic mobilization to the Russian diaspora in Western Ukraine and Northeastern 
Estonia.22 They found that Estonia’s citizenship policy imposed limits on the political 
activities of the Russian diaspora, thus limiting the possibility of “an ethnic backlash” 
occurring, but Ukraine has left the “political opportunity” for its Russians open. The 
authors hypothesized that, given the relative passivity of Russia— the ethnic patron of 
these minorities— and the lack of an influential leadership to lead a movement, the 
likelihood of an “ethnic backlash” on the part of the Russians was unlikely in the two 
states.
The approaches in this quadrant hypothesize that an “ethnic backlash” may lead to 
separatist movements, which, in turn, would threaten the existence of a multiethnic state. 
Such situations can present an obstacle to democratic consolidation. This hypothesis is 
similar to the one put forward by the theoretical approaches in the first quadrant. The 
theories in both quadrants agree that the experience of ethnic restructuring may become a
2lTaras, 689.
"Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora: 
The Potential for Political Mobilization in Western Ukraine and Northeastern Estonia,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 5 (1997): 845-64.
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stimulus for identity-based movements.
However the theories in the second quadrant go one step beyond those in the first 
quadrant. Rather than assuming that grievance by itself leads to collective action (ethnic 
movements), these approaches explore the ways in which states can reduce the likelihood 
of an “ethnic backlash” occurring. States can control access to political participation by 
introducing restrictive laws; they can make deals with influential allies of the ethnic 
groups; or they can control the material resources available for mobilization. They may, 
on the other hand, choose to extend economic, minority rights and other civic rights to the 
minorities in order to ensure their loyalty.23 The theories in this quadrant excel in 
exploring those “ethnic backlashes” that are provoked by material factors (e.g., the 
economic deprivation of one ethnic group as compared to another), but they are less 
productive in exploring the influence of nonmaterial factors, such as previous ethnic 
restructuring, on the coexistence of several ethnic groups within a nation.
23E.g., see Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and 
Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Donald L. Horowitz 
has argued that the disposition to secede, or an “ethnic backlash,” varies by regional 
position (i.e.. whether the region inhabited by a minority group is economically backward 
or not) and the relative position of the group (i.e., whether the group is well-off when 
compared to other national groups). Therefore, multiethnic states should pay a lot of 
attention to the economic situation of their ethnic minorities. See Donald L. Horowitz, 
“Patterns of Ethnic Separation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 
(April 1981): 165-95.
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Elhnic Restructuring As an Obstacle to the Creation o f  a ‘'Communications Community’’
The third quadrant ("nations as constructs, and ethnic groups as actors”) represents 
the theory of nations pioneered by Karl Deutsch who argued that nations are constructs of 
historical, industrial, and communicative (the invention of mass media, print, the spread of 
ideas) developments.24 In this theoretical perspective, ethnic groups are conceptualized as 
intervening variables. They are actors that can hinder the creation of "communications 
communities” in the territory of a state. An integrated community is the "end-state” of the 
integrationist project. It is "a unified homogenous political and social unit which authority 
securely and democratically centralized.”25 One of the significant contributions of this 
theoretical approach, despite its Marxist linear view of the nation, is the finding that most 
democratic states contain a functioning sub-state community, which is the product of 
multiple transactions and interactions among the people living in those states.26
24“The community which permits a common history to be experienced as 
common, is a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication. . . .
A larger group of persons linked by such complementary habits and facilities of 
communication we may call a people,” wrote Karl W. Deutsch in Nationalism and Social 
Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations o f  Nationality (London: Chapman and 
Hall. Ltd.. 1953), 70. A similar definition of a nation was put forward by E. J.
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Since 1780 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
25This definition was put forward by Stephanie G. Neuman, Small Stales and 
Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment (New York: 
Praeger, 1976), 14.
26Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community.” He 
writes: “The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow 
members. . . .  It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
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Drawing on the tenets of this perspective, one could hypothesize that previous 
ethnic restructuring can impede the creation of a communications community, which is 
necessary for a functioning democratic state. This can happen if ethnic restructuring 
produces a situation when large ethnic groups, who have not shared the same transactions 
and interactions in the past and who do not want to get engaged in the communications 
community’s functions in the future, are placed into it.
After the end of the Cold War, the modernist theory was criticized for being 
flawed. This critique was based on evidence from the former Soviet Union. Some argued 
that not only did this theory “link the process o f modernization to the emergence of 
nations,” but that it suggested that nations were going to be transcended by supranational 
social and political integration.27 Many critics argued that the emergence of multiple non- 
Russian ethnic identities after the demise of the USSR has proved these theoretical 
approaches wrong.
Recently, however, the theories in the third quadrant have made a comeback. 
Drawing on the assumptions of these theories, some students of post-Soviet nationalities 
began to focus on the importance of the socioeconomic factors and common state 
functions that unite the residents of ethnically restructured states. According to this 
perspective, ethnically restructured states are engaged in the process of nation building. 
The arguments usually consist of the following elements: First, socioeconomic factors are 
considered to be pivotal to the current national integration processes in post-Soviet states.
It is argued that these states are undergoing the processes of nation building and
comradeship.” Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso, 1996), 6—7.
27Simon, 7.
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socioeconomic transformation simultaneously. Second, if there is a difference between the 
level of prosperity in a state in which a minority lives and its “mother” state, then this is an 
incentive for the minority to stay. Hence, the continuing presence of Russian minorities in 
post-Soviet states is often characterized as one of “passive perseverance” and not one of 
“active integration.”28 This suggests that those theoretical approaches which emphasize 
the importance of economics and functional integration still embrace a linear, materialist 
view of nations as integrated “communications communities.”
The “competitive assimilation” theoretical game model developed by David Laitin 
includes elements of the theories located in the third quadrant. Using data on Russians in 
the Baltic states, Laitin hypothesized that the ability of a nation to assimilate different 
ethnic actors depends on its economic performance.29 Therefore, according to Laitin’s 
model, given the relatively good economic performance of the Baltic states, and despite 
the restrictive language laws and citizenship policies of Latvia and Estonia, Baltic 
Russians should assimilate linguistically into the Baltic nations. In other words, he 
suggested that in order to do well economically, this ethnic group would have to learn the 
state language and thus eventually become a part of the “titular” nation. The scarce data 
that exists, however, on the linguistic assimilation of Latvia’s and Estonia’s Russians since
28The tenets of this approach were identified by Wim van Meurs in his essay 
“Social Citizenship and Non-Migration: The Immobility of the Russian Diaspora in the 
Baltics,” in Diasporas and Ethnic M igrants in 20th Century Europe , ed. Rainer Milnz, 
Rainer Ohliger, and William Safran (Newbury Park, UK: Frank Cass, forthcoming). Also 
see Wim van Meurs, Die Transformation in den baltischen Staaten. Baltische Wirtschafi 
und russische Diaspora [The Transition in the Baltic States: Baltic Economics and the 
Russian Diaspora] (Cologne. Germany: Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und 
intemationale Studien, 1999).
29David Laitin, “National Revival and Competitive Assimilation in Estonia,” and 
“Language and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Republics,” Post Soviet Affairs 12. no. 1 
(1996): 4-24, and ibid., 25-39.
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independence suggests just the opposite.30
In Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, 
Laitin concludes that economic factors do not fully account for the behavior of Russian- 
speaking populations in the Baltic states.31 He attempts to save the model by calling for 
the addition of other variables that reflect the social and political status of Russian 
speakers. Treating “cultural identity shift” as the main dependent variable, Laitin 
conducted a series of surveys and interviews to determine whether there is a potential for 
ethnic violence in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. According to Laitin, the 
Russian-speaking populations in Latvia and Estonia could easily be transformed into 
Russian-speaking nationalist movements because the Russians share one culture and past 
grievances about alleged discrimination during the initial stage of nation building. The 
only thing missing to speed up mobilization is an economic incentive to rebel.32
30Russian is the most popular language of communication in both Latvia and 
Estonia (96% and 83%, respectively, 1996 data). In Lithuania, however,the most popular 
language is Lithuanian (used by 97% of respondents). The questions asked were the 
following: “Which Languages Can You Speak Well Enough to Take Part in a 
Conversation, Including Your Mother Tongue?” Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
(March 1996), Annex Figure 44. Approximately 50% of Estonia’s ethnically Russian 
physicians do not know Estonian, even though they are required to know the state 
language to practice medicine. In Narva, the Russian ethnic enclave, Estonian is rarely 
ever spoken. “Polovina russkikh vrachei v Estonii ne vladeyut gosudarstvennym 
vazykom” [Half of the Russian Medical Doctors Do Not Know Estonian] and “V 
Narvu— integrirovat’sya” [Integration in Narva], Narvskava Gazeta (7 January, 1999),
15.
3lDavid Laitin. Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the 
Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
32Laitin, Identity in Formation, 359.
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THE FOURTH QUADRANT: THEORIES OF ETHNOPOUTICS AND DEMOCRACY
Ethnic Restructuring and Polarized Ethnicity as Obstacles to Political Community
The fourth quadrant (“nations and ethnic groups as actors”) contains theories of 
ethnopolitics, which conceptualize ethnic and national groups as political groups engaged 
in a search for power.33 No conceptual difference between nationhood and ethnicity is 
made. The term “ethnicity” is often used to refer to “a highly inclusive (and relatively 
large-scale) group identity based on some notion of common origin, recruited primarily by 
kinship, and typically manifesting some measure of cultural distinctiveness.”34 
Conceptualized in this manner, “ethnicity” may embrace groups differentiated by 
language, religion, or race.
Building on the insights of the theories from the previously reviewed three 
quadrants, the ethnopolitical approach focuses on the translation of ethnicity into political 
arenas and encourages the identification o f the power constellations behind each ethnic 
group. Joseph Rotschild, the author o f Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, is 
considered to be the pioneer of this approach. There are two groups of theories within this 
quadrant. The theories in the first group take an essentialist, stable view of ethnicity and 
nation. The theories in the second group consider ethnic and national identities as 
historical constructs, yet they argue that such identities can become “petrified” and thus
33See Rotschild, Ethnopolitics, or Rasma Karklins, Ethnopolitics and Transition 
to Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994), 4—5.
?4Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction,” in Nationalism, Ethnic 
Conflict, and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), xvii.
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become “relatively constant elements to be reckoned with.”35
The essentialists tend to see identity as “a fundamental empirical fact of social 
reality” and emphasize the stability of ethnic and national communities.36 Conceptually, 
they draw the definition of ethnicity and nationhood from Anthony D. Smith who defines 
the “ethnie” (a feeling of kinship) as the core around which nations are built. According to 
Smith, “national sentiment is no construct. It has a real, tangible mass base. At its root is 
a feeling of kinship, of the extended family, that distinguishes the nation from every other 
kind of sentiment.”37 Smith, like many other primordialists, embraces a view of the nation 
as an enduring community o f “history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, 
mass education system and common legal rights.”38 He encourages the identification of 
those conditions under which the ethnie is transformed into a nation. The study of the 
impact of ethnic restructuring, following these theoretical perspectives, is a study of the 
interaction between two or more ethnic groups with different historical experiences and 
different interests.
Rasma Karklins, the author of Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy, has 
applied the theory of ethnopolitics to the study of relations between ethnic Latvians and 
Russians in democratizing Latvia. Similarly to the theorists in the first and the second 
quadrants, she argues that Soviet nationalities policy, which included ethnic restructuring 
and was geared to promote internationalism, had the opposite effect from the one intended.
35Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r  
Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 205.
36KarkIins, 5.
37Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins o f Nations,” in Becoming National: A Reader, 
ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 107.
38Ibid.
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Collective identities were activated by the presence of strangers and competitors within the 
state, and ethnic tensions emerged. However, unlike the majority o f the theorists within 
the first quadrant, Karklins does not see the activity of ethnic groups as a threat to 
democratization, especially its initial stages. She argues that the existence of a cohesive 
Latvian collectivity actually helped to foster change in the regime.
A similar argument is put forward by Ghia Nodia, who argues that “clinging to 
nationhood” in fact favors the development of democracy and the protection of individual 
rights.39 Nationalism, according to Nodia, is the only effective unifying force for a 
community trying to restore itself from the atomized societies left behind by a totalitarian 
state. Nodia’s argument is supported by Francis Fukuyama, who views nationalism as a 
“transitional strategy” for getting to liberal democracy in the postcommunist world.40 
These perspectives suggest that ethnic restructuring may impede the initial stages of 
democratization if it weakens the nation, which is conceptualized as community 
underneath the state, necessary for a transition to democracy.
The concept of ethnopolitics encourages the exploration of a whole spectrum of 
political arrangements involving different ethnic groups. Democracy in Plural Societies: a 
Comparative Exploration, a classical study by Arend Lijphart, explores consociational 
democracy, a particular form of democracy. The study outlines the possibilities of power 
sharing arrangements in multiethnic states.41 The main thesis of the book is that it may be
39Ghia Nodia, “Nationhood and Self-Recollection: Ways to Democracy after 
Communism,” in Towards a New Community: Culture and Politics in Post-Totalitarian 
Europe, ed. Peter J. S. Duncan and Martyn Rady (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1993).
40See the collection of essays in Nationalism , Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, ed. 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
4'Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
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difficult, but not impossible, to achieve and maintain democratic government in a “plural 
society.” A plural society, as defined by Lijphart. is a society with “segmental cleavages,” 
which may be linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, ethnic, or religious.42
The most important element of consociational democracy is government by a grand 
coalition of political leaders representing all significant segments o f a plural society. 
Lijphart criticizes modernization theories by arguing that the replacement of segmented 
loyalties by a “national allegiance,” which is implied by the linear concept of the nation, 
may have grave consequences in practice. Such a replacement seems to be envisioned by 
the third quadrant theories as a goal for political development. Lijphart argues that 
identities are first and foremost primordial, and any effort to eradicate “segmental 
loyalties” may in fact foster ethnic tensions. That is why power arrangements allowing 
ethnic groups to cling to their “primordial loyalties” are better solutions in practice.
The central aspect of Lijphart’s argument was that leaders should not wait for 
reconciliation within societies and instead try to achieve peace from above. A similar 
argument was put forward by Eric A. Nordlinger, Milton J. Esman and other 
“consociationalists” who focused on deriving models of “balanced pluralism,” which were 
supposed to alleviate the consolidation of democracy in ethnically divided states.43 These 
approaches, like most of the approaches in the first group, assume that each ethnic and/or 
national group has a cohesive identity and a unitary leadership capable of negotiating inter­
ethnic agreements. The “consociationalists” consider ethnic parties to be the building
42Ibid„ 3.
4'For a summary and a critique of the arguments put forward by Eric A.
Nordlinger and Milton Esman about the power arrangements which are supposed to help 
democracy building in ethnically segmented states, see Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ed. 
Horowitz. 570-72.
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blocks of democratic coalitions. However, as multiple case studies show, even if the 
leaders of ethnic groups may be inclined to cooperate, their actions are likely to be 
questioned by the rest of the group. Therefore, the intention to cooperate shown from 
“above” may, in fact, lead to more ethnic conflict emanating from “below.”44
With several exceptions, such as Arend Lijphart, democratic theory has been, by 
and large, silent on the issues of ethnicity and its role in democratizing states. The 
theorists working within this paradigm have operated with the models o f a homogenous 
demos, which resembled and were built on the empirical evidence from states in Western 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Only after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union did issues of ethnicity again become salient to democratic theory. Concepts such as 
“minority rights” were revisited. Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A  Liberal 
Theory o f  Minority Rights has become a widely discussed book by scholars studying 
democratic processes in multiethnic entities.45 Kymlicka touches upon democracy in 
multiethnic states, which is still a grey area in democratic theory. He attempts to construct 
what he calls a “liberal approach to minority rights.” Kymlicka’s argument is different 
from that embraced by many democratic theorists who oppose the concept of collective 
rights arguing that in the states where individual rights are protected there is no need for 
collective rights. Kymlicka suggests that minority rights can be helpful and need not 
contradict individual freedom. He argues that multiethnic states may extend “external 
protection” to the minorities living in the state in order to limit the economic or political 
power exercised by the larger national group. Extending national rights to minorities may
"Ibid., 574.
45 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights 
(Oxford. UK: Clarendon, 1995).
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be a first step toward reconciliation in multiethnic states.
Kymlicka’s view of minority rights assumes the existence of a functioning state. 
Tamara J. Resler has applied this perspective to the study of Lithuania, Russia, and 
Ukraine— all of which are democratizing multiethnic states.46 Based on the evidence from 
these case studies, she argues that extending minority rights has helped to redress the 
wrongs of Soviet nationalities policy. In other words, she argues for the use of collective 
rights as a form of restitution related to the wrongs committed by the previous regime.
Unlike Kymlicka and Resler, Bamett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (Post-Soviet 
Political Order: Conflict and State Building) do not assume the existence of functioning 
states in the post-Soviet area.47 Their collection of essays traces the process of institution 
building in that area by interpreting the conflicts in the post-Soviet space as the 
“unmixing” of the Soviet Union into separate nationstates. This process has transformed 
the post-Soviet state into “normal instability,” which means that the likelihood of conflict 
has been greatly reduced.48 The main thesis o f the book is that the key problem in the 
region is state and nation building. The authors argue that the processes of 
democratization are dependent on successful state and nation. They hypothesize that in 
those places where effective state institutions are lacking, increased popular participation 
in politics is likely to trigger civil and even international conflict.
Works with a democratic perspective that embrace a static view of ethnicity
46Tamara J. Resler. “Dilemmas of Democratization: Safeguarding Minorities in 
Russia. Ukraine and Lithuania,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 1 (1997): 89—107.
4'Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building, ed. Bamett R. Rubin 
and Jack Snyder, (London: Routledge, 1998).
4!iBamett R. Rubin, “Conclusion: Managing Normal Instability,” in Post-Soviet 
Political Order: Conflict and State Building, ed. Bamett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 165.
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sometimes read like cookbooks, offering an array of recipes on what democratizing states 
should do with their ethnic groups. Theorists who embrace a static view of ethnicity do 
not believe that minority ethnic groups can adapt to a state ruled by another ethnic group. 
Instead, the state should adapt to minority ethnic groups by developing different 
institutional frameworks. States are advised to extend special rights to their minorities, to 
arrange power sharing arrangements with them, or to offer them autonomy. Some 
theorists even develop taxonomies of different modes to “regulate ethnic communities,” 
which, they argue, may help to avoid ethnic conflict.49 However, one significant aspect 
has been missing from these analyses. It is an analysis o f the responses of the ethnic 
groups to the initiatives undertaken by the states.
The second group of approaches attempted to address this question. This group 
focuses on the actions of ethnic and national groups.50 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's 
study Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe puts forward the concept of a consolidated 
democracy, which requires an understanding not only the actions of the state, but also of 
the acceptance of the power of the state by the people who live in that state. For Linz and
49E.g., see Brendan O ’Leary and John McGarry, “Regulating Nations and Ethnic 
Communities,” in Nationalism and Rationality, ed. Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, 
Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
245-89.
5°Defining identities as flexible means that identities are constructed and sustained 
through social practices. This does not mean that identities are malleable or somehow 
more peaceful. On the contrary, this means that the changes in identities may, in fact, be 
a cause of a conflict. For an argument that changes in identities may cause ethnic 
conflict, see Badredine Arfi, “Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity.” 
Security Studies 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998): 151—203. The fact that identities are 
increasingly defined as flexible suggests that the borders between the fourth and the first 
quadrant are becoming more permeable. In other words, theorists of ethnopolitics and 
democracy are becoming more open to the insights of historical perspectives.
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Stepan, democracy is a two-way process: the state is ready to be responsive to the needs of 
its citizens, and the latter "accept the political unit in which they live as an appropriate 
entity to make legitimate decisions.”51
In this model, democratic consolidation is a political situation when democracy has 
become the “only game in town.” It requires five supporting arenas. They are: a lively 
civil society (i.e., an entity with interest groups that are relatively independent from the 
state), a political community (a demos), the rule o f law, a set o f institutions to insure the 
functioning o f the state, and an economic society (a state-mediated market economy).
Linz and Stepan argue that non-democratic experiences in the past critically affects the 
path that a democratizing state takes and the challenges that it faces on its way to 
democratic consolidation.
The last statement suggests that similarly to the authors within the first three 
quadrants, Linz and Stepan’s theory suggests that the legacy of ethnic restructuring matters 
if it impedes the development of the supporting arenas of a consolidated democracy. By 
pointing out the importance of a political community and civil society that transcends the 
lines o f ethnic division (the first two supporting arenas), Linz and Stepan’s model provides 
a space for the insights o f the theories in the second quadrant, which warn of the dangers 
that ethnic mobilization poses to democratization. By arguing that the capability o f a state 
to perform economic, bureaucratic, and “rule o f law” institutional functions is necessary 
for the emergence of a consolidated democracy, their model allows the insights of the 
modernization theories in the third quadrant, which underline the importance o f creating 
“communications communities,” to be incorporated. In addition, this work makes an
5lLinz and Stepan, 27.
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attempt to theorize the relationship between state, nation and democratization.52
In this model, the main variable explaining the ability of a multiethnic state to 
successfully democratize is the prevalence of other nations beside the titular nation within 
a state. Thus, if there is no other nation in the territory of a state and there is little cultural 
and ethnic differentiation, then that state can be both a nationstate and a democratic state.
If there is another nation present in a state and if it is “awakened” or militant, then conflict 
is a very real possibility and democratization becomes very difficult. However, if there is 
no group which has sufficient cohesion and identity to be a nation builder, then no state is 
possible, so democracy is impossible. The model, therefore, yields two propositions about 
the impact of ethnic restructuring on democratizing states. First, the experience o f ethnic 
restructuring can affect the ability of a state to successfully democratize because it can 
produce a bi-national polity, in which one national group is mobilized. Second, this 
experience can have an analogous effect because it could “kill a nation”— i.e., prevent a 
group from having sufficient cohesion and identity to become a demos.
However, this model suffers from several flaws. By putting emphasis on the 
numerical ethnic variation in a state (i.e., the larger a minority’s ethnic or national 
presence, the greater the danger to democracy), this model cannot register the sharpness of 
the cleavages within societies.53 Besides, by ignoring the activities of a potentially active 
and aggressive minorities’ “mother state,” which may become involved in the mobilization 
of minorities or exploit the issue in its relationship with the host state, it does not explain
52Ibid., 36.
53The term “the depth of sharpness of sub-cultural cleavages” was used by Robert 
A.  Dahl in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 1971), 109.
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when or why a national group might become “awakened.” Previously developed models 
which ignore these factors suffer from similar flaws.54
Robert A. Dahl, the author of Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, views the 
existence of polarized (or “awakened”) antagonistic groups within a state as an obstacle to 
successful democratization. He argues that polarization between ethnic groups (which 
may be a legacy of previous ethnic restructuring) is a crucial variable. In fact, some case 
studies have shown that multiethnicity or ethnic pluralism per se, without polarization, 
may in fact be beneficial to “polyarchy” (or democracy) because it prevents any single 
unified group from having a monopoly of political resources.55
In his article “Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy,” Juan J. 
Linz returns to the typology of state, nation, and democracy-building strategies in 
multiethnic polities.56 He argues that if demos and nation are different, then states have 
two options on how to combine nation and democratic state building. The first option is 
for a state to alienate its minorities by adopting exclusionary citizenship and minorities’ 
laws and become an ethnic democracy. The second option is to make a “major effort to 
accommodate minorities by crafting a series of political and civil arrangements which 
recognize minority rights,” thus creating an inclusive democratic regime. The second
54E.g., see Marie R. Haug, “Social and Cultural Pluralism as a Concept in Social 
System Analysis,” American Journal o f Sociology 73. no. 3 (November 1967): 294—304.
55In Polyarchy, Dahl refers to a debate about the impact of multiethnicity on 
democratic processes. The debate took place in the late sixties. The supporters of John 
Stuart Mill put forward the thesis that multiethnicity per se is a danger to democracy. 
Their opponents argued that multiethnic pluralism is a counteragent to despotism and is 
not a danger to democracy. Dahl, Polyarchy. 108.
56Juan J. Linz, “Some Thoughts on the Victory' and Future of Democracy” in 
Democracy's Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 404-26.
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option holds more promise for democratic consolidation in the long run.
A collection of essays by Graham Smith et al. entitled Nation-building in the Post- 
Soviet Borderlands has begun to focus on the sources of polarization between different 
ethnic groups in post-Soviet states, referring to them as “the construction of group 
boundaries.”57 Arguing that “a politics defined in relation to a particular national 
community may not in itself be incompatible with processes of democratization,” the 
authors suggest that many post-Soviet entities are, in fact, embracing the broader and more 
inclusive view of a multiethnic political community.58 By exploring the role of myths, 
historical memory, political discourses and language policies, the authors begin to break 
the boundaries between the fourth quadrant, which focuses on the actions of ethnic groups, 
and the first quadrant, which dwells on the role of history. With the exception of the 
chapter on the Baltic states,59 this volume, however, focuses on the nationalizing policies 
of states and the creation of national identities instead of the processes of democratization.
A serious drawback of many of the approaches within democratic theory, including 
the one devised by Linz and Stepan, is that they do not explain why some states, especially 
those that have experienced ethnic restructuring and other injustices in the past, decide to 
adopt inclusive and minority-friendly strategies, especially if those strategies are unpopular 
domestically. Questions about the influence that a minorities’ mother state and other 
international actors might have and whether they impede or help democratic consolidation 
in such troubled areas are left unanswered. The problem of outside influence, together
57Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward 
Allw’orth, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics o f National 
Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
58Ibid., 1.
5,,Ibid.. 93-119.
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with questions about a states’ choice of policies to accommodate polarized ethnic 
differences, has become the topic of an ongoing debate within democratic theory.
CONCLUSION: ACKNOWLEDGING THE “GREY” AREAS, IDENTIFYING THE 
RELEVANT DEBATES
This review suggests the following conclusions. Most works reviewed agree that 
minority issues can become an obstacle to successful democratization and democratic 
consolidation in states that have experienced ethnic restructuring in the past. This 
observation is supported by extensive empirical tests which suggest that there is a 
correlation between ethnic pluralism and failed democratic regimes.60 Two reasons are 
specified: the rise of minority-unfriendly political groups which contribute to ethnic 
tensions (quadrants one, two, and four) and the possibility that ethnic restructuring resulted 
in the absence of a group with sufficient cohesion and identity to become a demos in the 
democratizing state (quadrants three and four). Some works reviewed, however, suggest 
that multiethnicity per se is an impediment to democratic processes (e.g., Rotschild within 
quadrant one and some democratic theorists within quadrant four).
Three important questions remain unanswered. First, the theorists do not clarify 
what aspect of the legacy of ethnic restructuring— multiethnicity per se, or only polarized 
ethnicity— may become an obstacle to successful democratic processes. This
“ For multi-country empirical studies that examine the correlation between a 
successful, peaceful democratic regime and multiethnicity see Arthur S. Banks and 
Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge: M.I.T.. 1963) and Ted Robert Gurr, 
“Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict 
since 1945.” International Political Science Review  14 (1993): 161-201.
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disagreement is part of a larger debate within democratic theory on whether multiethnicity 
is a danger to the viability o f representative democratic institutions in democratizing 
states.61
The theorists in the first quadrant (who define ethnic and national identity as a 
historically specific construct) and the democratic theorists in the fourth quadrant (who 
embrace a flexible view of ethnic identity) are inclined to believe that polarization, and not 
multiethnicity per se, is the crucial variable. Polarization is likely to be the product of 
historical experiences, such as expulsion, deportation, and planned migration.
On the other hand, the theorists (e.g., the first group within quadrant four and 
quadrant two) who take a primordial view of ethnicity are inclined to believe that 
multiethnicity per se, especially in the absence of a cohesive national group, is an obstacle 
to the creation of a functioning democratic regime. Ethnic differences (which is defined as 
division along linguistic, religious, or other similar lines) are often regarded as a major 
danger to the creation of a functioning democratic regime.
Second, the differences in the conceptualization of ethnicity (outlined in Figure 2) 
are central to the debate over which arrangements democratizing states should use to solve 
ethnic tensions.62 Those who embrace a flexible view of ethnicity tend to believe that
6lFor a summary of this debate see Dahl, Polyarchy, 108—21. Many case studies 
and multiple-variable schemes suggest that ethnic cleavages and a failure in 
democratization are often related. For a review of this research see Larry Diamond and 
Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction: Divided Societies,” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and 
Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994), xvii—xxii.
62For a review of this debate see Multiculturalisnt: Examining the Politics o f  
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Charles 
Taylor is probably one of the best known proponents of a communitarian perspective.
His opponents (e.g., Jurgen Habermas, K. Anthony Appiah) base their arguments on a 
Kantian perspective, arguing for a democratic state with equal rights for all citizens.
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including all residents of a state into collective decision-making is the key to establishing a 
functioning political community within a multiethnic state. This inclusion takes place at 
the individual level, as a state extends the right to vote to the majority of its residents and 
includes ethnic minorities into its power structures. This, in turn, is a step towards a 
consolidated democracy. Another group of scholars that embraces a rather flexible view 
of identity argues that multiethnic democratizing states should try to alleviate ethnic 
tensions by decentralizing their power, by involving antagonistic ethnic groups in local 
institutions, and by making flexible power sharing arrangements. This will make co­
existence among different ethnic groups easier.
On the other hand, those who embrace a more primordial view of ethnicity are 
likely to argue that “primordial loyalties” need special accommodation. They put more 
emphasis on special collective minority rights, including territorial autonomy and even 
secession.
These disagreements point to a debated area within democratic theory: the crafting 
of a political community in multiethnic states.63 Central to this issue is the question: How 
do ethnically heterogenous states legitimatize their power vis-a-vis their minorities? Do 
they extend special group rights and create power sharing arrangements? Questions about 
the legitimacy of the state have been neglected in democratic theory. As Linz and Stepan 
point out. this is unfortunate because it is of fundamental importance to democracy.64
The third question is the involvement of international actors in the process of
63This question is also central to the debate over who should be included in the 
demos. Giovanni Sartori wrote that there is a tendency in democratic theory to talk a 
great deal about the people “without actually looking at them.” Giovanni Sartori, The 
Theory o f  Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987), 25.
wLinz and Stepan, 27.
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political community building in multiethnic polities. As Brubaker's triangle theory 
suggests, a minority “mother” state may in fact become an active actor in this process, 
coercing the democratizing state to extend rights and privileges to its minorities. It even 
may use other international bodies, such as international institutions, to pursue its goals.
In addition, given their interest in conflict prevention and spreading democratic norms, 
international institutions may get involved in the process of community building in 
multiethnic states.
This last observation points to the third debated area in democratic theory: the role 
of international actors in multiethnic community building.65 The proponents of 
international involvement in demos building argue that international actors can help in the 
crafting of political communities in ethnically restructured states by pushing states to 
accept inclusive policies and/or extending minority rights. Without this international 
encouragement, it is argued, states themselves are unlikely to accept such policies— which 
are necessary for the well-being o f minorities and successful democratic consolidation.66
The opponents of this opinion respond that by pushing norms and 
recommendations, instead of promoting civic concord in multiethnic states, international 
actors are in fact polarizing ethnic differences even further. This makes the process of
65For an attempt to synthesize the possible effects of international actors on 
domestic actors see Dawisha and Turner, 398-424.
“ E.g., see Hyde-Price, “Democratization in Eastern Europe,” 220-52. Hyde-Price 
argues that the postcommunist states in Eastern Europe can be affected by the example of 
liberal Western democratic states. Larry Diamond lists different ways in which foreign 
actors can assist in the crafting of civil societies and political communities in 
democratizing states. Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, 
Instruments, and Issues,” in Dem ocracy’s Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 311-70.
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political community building more difficult.6'
These three debated questions suggest that political community building within 
multiethnic entities— a requirement for a consolidated democratic regime— is an area in 
need of theoretical and empirical refinement. The factors which may obstruct or facilitate 
this process need to be identified. The goal of the research that follows is to fill in this 
gap.
67E.g.. Joseph V. Montville writes, “the ultimate irony is that internal conflicts 
such as ethnic disputes are more difficult to mediate than international disputes, because 
any would-be conciliator from outside has little standing. In domestic disputes, 
mediation is meddling.” Joseph V. Montville, “Negotiations and Prenegotiations in 
Ethnic Conflict: The Beginning, the Middle, and the Ends,” in Conflict and Peacemaking 
in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 
1990), 530-31. He suggests fostering domestic private agencies, who can act without 
challenging state sovereignty, to work as “dispute resolution-marriage counselors.” Also 
see Ronald R. Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict,” 
International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 343-77. Krebs argues that 
international institutions are sometimes capable of fostering conflict between states.
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CHAPTER IV
CRAFTING POLITICAL COMMUNITIES IN MULTIETHNIC STATES: 
WHICH ACTORS, WHAT INSTITUTIONS?
The aim of this chapter is to identify the factors which may help or hinder political 
community building in multiethnic states. To do that, it will build on the three themes 
identified by the previous chapter. First, it will address theoretical relationships between 
multiethnicity and political community by exploring the question of whether 
multiethnicity presents a challenge to sustainable democratic political community. This 
question requires a re-investigation of the assumptions underlying the concept of 
"political community.” Consequently, in the First two segments, this chapter outlines the 
individualist and the pluralist perspectives on community building and the institutions that 
are suggested by these perspectives to create and maintain a democratic political 
community in multiethnic states and societies. Second, it puts forward a critique of the 
dominant approaches by identifying conditions in multiethnic entities that are often 
ignored by the dominant approaches. This chapter concludes by introducing a corrective 
to the dominant approaches and by identifying a set of factors which are particularly 
salient to political community building.
The answers to the questions considered in this chapter will be drawn from three 
major strands of democratic theory on political community building: individualism, 
pluralism, and perspectives on civil society.1 The First two theories, individualism and
‘Usually, three prevailing theoretical models are identified: Individualist, Pluralist 
Political, and Holistic Socialism, or Economic Democracy. See Carol C. Gould,
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pluralism, represent a continuum. At one end is the democratic individual version of 
community (the first perspective), while the pluralist version of political community can 
be found at the other end (the second perspective).2 According to the first perspective, an 
individual in pursuit of his or her individual interest is the major agency in politics. The 
second perspective views political groups as the most important actors. The identity of an 
individual is inseparable from that of a social or political group. The third perspective 
focuses on sub-state societal processes necessary for a functioning political community.
The three perspectives outline both supportive and unfavorable conditions for 
sustainable democratic communities. In its conclusions, this chapter relates the insights 
provided by these theories to the relevant debates within the field of democracy studies 
outlined in the previous chapter.
POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND MULTIETHNIC ITY. TWO THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES
The Individualist Perspective
The individualist perspective on political community building is based on the 
writings of Aristotle. Its central thesis is that the main function of a political community is
Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 92-113. This 
dissertation focuses on the first two, arguing that they suggest similar conclusions about 
the relationship between multiethnicity and democracy. The hypothesis drawn from the 
economic democratic model is presented in Chapter II as an alternative thesis.
:A similar continuum was represented by Christopher J. Berry in his discussion of 
Sandel’s conception of political communities. See Berry, 102.
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to provide a good life for its citizens— i.e., the individual members of a polity. However, 
even if the goal of the demos is to cater to individual interests, the community itself cannot 
be just a sum of separate individuals.3 According to this view, political community is a 
partnership of citizens in a constitution: the members of the community create the laws of 
the state. Participation in political life (i.e., the creation of laws) is, therefore, the most 
important aspect of membership in a political community. In short, the essence of a 
political community is that the members of demos are subject to the laws in which they 
have a part in making.4 This perspective later became the basis for arguments that a purely 
political solution (e.g., the inclusion of minorities in the political life of a democratic state 
by extending equal rights of citizenship) can be found to the problem of cohesion within 
multiethnic entities.5
Political community, as conceived by the individualist model, is well equipped to 
handle the differences and disagreements of its members within its borders.6 The
^The intimacy of the ties connecting the individuals is a debated issue. In 
Aristotle’s writings, it is a tightly knit community. Later Jean Jacques Rousseau and John 
Stuart Mill equated the community with the nation, romanticizing the links between 
individuals. In the twentieth century, the community was replaced by the “public.” Yet 
most theorists still would agree that the “public,” or the political community in modem 
democracies, is more than just a simple aggregation o f individuals. For a discussion of 
this issue in the context of John Dewey’s thought, see Damico, 104-18.
4Aristotle, Politics: Books /  and II, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon, 1995), 22.
sE.g., Bhikhu Parekh argues that “the modem liberal state itse lf’ can be a source 
of cohesion for different ethnic groups within a state. The state can provide a variety of 
different services, and it can serve as a “service station” to citizens belonging to different 
ethnic groups. Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 1996), 84-86.
fiAristotle writes, “Again, the state, as composed of the unlikes, may be compared 
to the living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and 
body, as soul is made as a rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, 
property of master and slave, so all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is 
composed; and therefore the excellence of all citizens cannot possibly be the same, any
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members handle their disagreements through dialogue and persuasion in the political 
sphere of the demos. In fact, the differences and disagreements between the members of 
the community are among the factors which help to keep political life within the public 
sphere of democratic community alive.
However, an individualist democratic community is much worse equipped to 
handle differences and disagreements emanating from outside its borders. When the 
community is overrun by another antagonistic polity, it is likely to cease to exist. As a 
matter of fact, if ethnic restructuring is understood as the organized motion of actors other 
than community members, pursued by one side (see Chapter II), then, according to 
Aristotle’s model, such an incident is likely to mark the end of the independent political 
community. In such a case, the members of Aristotle’s community can expect to be 
enslaved if they want to remain alive. Alternatively, if Aristotle’s community overran 
another state, the captured members of the other community would be likely to end up in 
the “private realm” of Aristotle’s community together with other slaves and women.7 If 
the level of community restructuring is significant (i.e., if the community acquires a 
significant number of slaves after its interaction with another polity), then mobilization 
and a consequent revolt of the enslaved newcomers may also eventually spell the end of 
democratic community.8
The gist of Aristotle’s theoretical perspective is that a democratic regime can be 
best sustained within the borders of one community, and that the members o f this
more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of a performer who 
stands by his side.” Aristotle: The Politics and Constitutions o f  Athens, ed. Stephen 
Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66.
7Ibid., 73-82.
8Ibid„ 122.
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community are united by their participation in the political process. If multiethnicity is 
understood as differences along linguistic or other similar lines, then it does not present a 
danger to a functioning political community as long as it is exhibited by the members of 
the clemos.9 However, violent interaction between several communities and the continued 
coexistence of these communities within the same territory may be dangerous to the 
democratic polity. This is the case unless the members of the other community are 
absorbed into the demos or placed “underneath" it (i.e., banished to the private sphere of 
the demos).
Tfie Pluralist Perspective
The pluralist theoretical perspective focuses upon the aggregation of individual 
interests as group interests.10 The goal of a political community is to provide an arena for
9The idea that the members of a community should be connected by close national 
links was introduced by Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. In their writings, 
the idea of a political community became equated with that of a nation. Drawing on the 
logic of Aristotle’s theoretical perspective, John Stuart Mill argued that democracy is next 
to impossible in states containing multiple nationalities. See John Stuart Mill, 
Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951). 
This view was challenged by Lord Acton, who thought that multiethnicity is beneficial 
for democratic regimes. Acton argued that democratic states should not identify with a 
single idea of the polity (whether nation or class). If the state absolutizes the will of the 
demos (or the “popular” will), then the values of other particular communities within the 
state are marginalized. The existence of multiple communities, he argued, may provide a 
shield against authoritarian tendencies within the state. See John Emerich Edward 
Dahlberg-Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, selected by Gertrude Himmelfarb 
(Boston: Beacon, 1949). Acton’s view is consistent with the main postulates of the 
second (pluralist) perspective.
l0Philosophically, this perspective owes to the writings o f John Dewey, who 
introduced the pluralistic conception of the state. He wrote: “Most states, after they have 
been brought into being, react upon the primary groupings. . . .  Our doctrine of plural 
norms is a statement of a fact: that there exists a plurality of social groupings, good, bad.
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interaction between different groups, which express the interests o f  individuals. Group 
interests, which are often conflicting, are represented in the political process by parties, 
voting groups, or social organizations. These interests influence political decisions made 
by the government and thus legitimate the power of the state. Ethnicity becomes relevant 
to this perspective when ethnic divisions begin to build solidarities affecting political 
thinking and action."
The essence of this perspective is captured by Dahl’s term “ polyarchy,” which 
means competitive politics, public contestation, and public opposition.12 Political 
community is consolidated when polyarchy becomes the “only game in town;” in other 
words, when the state and its residents agree on institutionalized management of their 
conflicting interests through the political process.
The existence of an opposition to the strongest actor is a necessary condition for 
the “democratic game” to take place because the concentration of power in the hands of 
one actor indicates the end of a democratic game. This game must always be played by 
more than one player. Therefore, following this logic, the existence of diverse ethnic or 
national groups may be a positive factor, challenging the authority o f  the authoritarian 
power.13 Consolidated ethnic groups may become centers of opposition to nondemocratic
and indifferent.” John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927; reprint, Denver: Alan 
Swallow, 1954), 71.
"Jyotirindra das Gupta, “Ethnicity, Language Demands, and National 
Development in India,” in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and 
Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 468.
"Dahl, Polyarchy, 4.
"E.g., Rajni Kothari argues that different ethnic groups formed an opposition to 
the upper-class, English-educated ruling class o f India. Rajni Kothari, “India: 
Oppositions in a Consensual Polity,” in Regimes and Opposition, ed. Robert A. Dahl 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 305-40.
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rulers. Thus, multiethnicity may in fact help to initiate the democratic game instead of 
impeding its start.
After the democratic game is initiated, politically active ethnic groups can join the 
government or remain in the opposition, i.e., be a political minority. Being a minority in 
the political community means having less power than the group that is currently 
associated with the government. By accepting the position of a minority, a politically 
active group has certain expectations. First and foremost, it expects to have a chance to be 
in the majority position. If a politically active minority defines itself solely in identity 
terms (i.e., language, race, or nationality) instead of interests, it may be impossible to be in 
the majority position in a multiethnic community without a certain level of assimilation or 
coercion.14 It is quite likely that multiethnic polities containing such politically active and 
influential minorities will have a hard time achieving consensus on official language 
policy and other, similar matters.15
A smoothly functioning pluralist community requires that its members have 
multiple, flexible identities. In political arenas, the ethnic identities of the members 
should be intertwined with their identities as citizens, entrepreneurs, etc. In other words, 
ethnic differences should alternate and compete with class, religious, or regional 
differences.16 If this is the case, then multiethnicity per se does not present a danger to a 
democratic regime.
l4Reiterer, 54-55.
15Don Maclver argues that such polities are likely to disagree not only over 
language policies, but also over the basic laws of the state, the composition of the 
government, recruitment to public service, and prioritization of groups and regions in the 
allocation of resources. Maclver, 14.
l0Horowitz, “Ethnic Policy,” 572.
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The logic of the pluralist perspective is similar to the individualist: both 
approaches argue that the inclusion of ethnic or national minorities (either as separate 
members or as politically active groups) into the political process is central to a 
functioning political community within multiethnic entities. They recommend institutions 
which could help to achieve this goal.
INSTITUTIONS WHICH HELP TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL 
COMMUNITY IN A MULTIETHNIC STATE
Top-Down Approaches
The two main theoretical perspectives, outlined above, are referred to as “top- 
down” approaches because they underline the importance of the state and its institutions to 
democratic community building. These approaches range from assimilationist strategies to 
arrangements endorsing relative ethnic separation, which allow minorities to have special 
territorial or cultural arrangements within the state (see Figure 3).17
17In addition to the political arrangements outlined by the diagram, nation-states 
have used expulsions or population exchanges to “manage” ethnic enmities. In the past, 
such practices were even considered legitimate internationally. For example, the massive 
population exchanges that occurred between European nation-states after World War II 
were endorsed by international bodies. The underlying assumption of population 
transfers was that ethnic nationality should serve as the basis not only for cultural life, but 
also for political organization. Forced resettlements of members of a certain ethnic group 
or groups have been a compulsory operation. Ethnic groups were moved without any 
regard for individual wishes. For a critique of population exchanges, see Eugene M. 
Kulischer, “Population Transfer,” South Atlantic Quarterly 65, no. 4  (October 1946): 
403-14. For an argument that ethnic separation may help democratization, see Raymond 
M. Basch, ‘The Effects o f Ethnic Separation on Democratization: A Comparative Study.” 
East European Quarterly 32, no. 2 (June 1998): 221-42. In Ethnic Cleansing (New
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The individualist perspective, built on the insights of Aristotle, suggests that 
creating a strong centralized inclusive state is the optimal solution in order to achieve the 
necessary cohesion within the demos. This also holds true for a multiethnic setting. Such 
a state adopts ethnically neutral executive, legislative, and administrative decision making 
mechanisms and pursues ethnicity-blind public policies. It thus embodies the individualist 
values of Aristotle’s demos', the goal of the neutral liberal state is to cater to individual 
citizens, regardless of their ethnic attachments. According to this perspective, special 
cultural rights or any other arrangements favoring the identity of a certain group will result 
in the creation of divisions among the citizens (in other words, they will result in the 
construction of “cultural ghettoes”). Assimilationist language policies (i.e., promoting the 
major language of the state) are deemed as normal and even necessary in such state: they 
enable the interaction among the members of the political community.
The individualist perspective puts a lot of faith in the political process. It is 
believed that by extending equal rights of participation to the majority of its residents, the 
state opens political spaces in which the citizens can actualize their problems or voice their 
grievances through social or political movements.18 This is the way in which citizens 
belonging to different ethnic groups can express their needs, and that is why special 
political arrangements to satisfy the needs of minorities are deemed unnecessary.
However, in states that contain ethnic communities with group-based demands 
(e.g.. the calls of ethnic minorities for quotas in political elections or even political
York: St. Martin’s, 1996), Andrew Bell-Fialkoff argues that outsiders can physically 
move endangered groups and thus help to resolve ethnic conflict.
l8Jurgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional 
Slate,” in Multicuhuralism . ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
1994). 113.
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autonomy), the individualist suggestions to create an integrative state are likely to 
engender resistance from politically active ethnic and national groups. Under such 
conditions, recognition of group rights and power sharing arrangements between ethnic 
and national groups may be necessary to avoid conflict or even the breakup of the polity. 
The pluralist perspective outlines such arrangements, which range from extending group 
rights to minorities within the polity to the territorial autonomy of ethnically distinct 
regions or even their peaceful secession from the state.19 The first pluralist policy (see 
Figure 3) dwells on minority rights— i.e., the rights of minorities to “receive equal 
treatment, to practice their culture, religion and language, and to participate fully in the 
political and economic life of the state.”20
This policy is often viewed as the one which avoids the extremes of a centralized 
state and ethnic separation. The first pluralist policy is a “middle o f the road” strategy, 
combining the insights of individualists and pluralists. Individual members of ethnic 
groups are encouraged to be involved in the political activities of the state in addition to 
being active in their own ethnic communities.
The second policy— multiethnic coalitions within a political party system— refers 
to cooperation among political parties based on ethnic foundations. Driven by similar 
interests (e.g., to form a government), several ethnically-based parties can form a 
“coalition of convenience.”
l9For a detailed review o f power sharing mechanisms in multiethnic states, see 
Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
20Hugh Miall, “Introduction,” in Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope fo r  a 
Transnational Regime, ed. Hugh Miall (London: Pinter, 1994), 2.
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Figure 3. Institutions to Maintain a Political Community in Multiethnic States
Assimilation
A
Individualist perspective: An inclusive, centralized, unitary state
Pluralist perspective: 1: Special minority (group) rights
2: Multiethnic coalitions, consociationalism 




Such coalitions are often formed after election and they disintegrate if the benefits 
of cooperation begin to decline. On the other hand, ethnic parties can form a more 
permanent alliance prior to the elections. The parties agree on their positions regarding 
ethnic issues prior to forming the government. Such coalitions, therefore, usually last 
longer than coalitions of convenience.21
The working principles of multiethnic coalitions, which can be described as “joint 
consensual rule” of several ethnic communities, include proportional representation in the 
government, the cooperation of elites, and mutual veto.22 The durability and success of
:iHorowitz, “Multiethnic Coalitions,” in Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ed. Donald L. 
Horowitz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 366-67.
"These working principles are definitely different from the majoritarian
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similar arrangements depends upon numerous factors, such as the ability of political 
leaders to convince the electorate of the necessity of such institutions, the internal 
cohesion of the parties, and the attitudes of the broader public regarding interethnic 
cooperation.
The third policy— territorial or communal autonomy— requires delegating 
considerable authority to local elites. The goal of this policy is to cater to the needs of 
regionally concentrated ethnic groups. It is quite possible that even nondemocratic 
regimes, such as multiethnic empires, were able to obtain obedience and gain some 
legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples living under their rule by allowing a high level of 
local self-govemance.23
The main difference between federalist institutions (e.g., decentralized, regional 
government) and consociational power sharing agreements, such as multiethnic coalitions, 
is that the former exhibits a territorial power sharing dimension (i.e., each ethnic or 
national group has power of governance over the territorial unit in which it lives), while 
consociational institutions refer to non-territorial power sharing. Yet all pluralist 
institutions are united by their goal: they aspire to accommodate the demands of ethnic 
groups within the existing political borders of the state. It is widely believed that 
territorial border changes can engender ethnic violence. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the fourth policy— secession— is regarded by pluralists as the least desirable approach.
democratic principle. For a comparison of the two, see Sartori, 238-40.
23Emest Gellner, “The Importance of Being Modular,” in Civil Society: Theory, 
History. Comparison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 32-33. The 
Habsburg empire is often quoted as an example.
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A Critique o f  Top-down Approaches
By suggesting that there are purely political solutions to the problem of cohesion 
within multiethnic states, top-down perspectives are assuming two conditions. First, they 
presume the existence of a well functioning state. In polities with serious ethnic problems, 
state institutions usually are weak and underdeveloped, unable to secure minority rights, 
even if they proclaim them legally.24
Second, the individualist and the pluralist perspectives assume that the members of 
the demos have agreed to initiate a political process in which the representatives of 
different ethnic groups are included. These perspectives do not take into consideration the 
possibility that the actors— either individual members of the demos or political and social 
groups— might not be willing to start the political game— a game that is crucial for the 
sustainability of the political community. Such a situation can be referred to as 
polarization. In a multiethnic setting, polarization may crystallize along ethnic lines. In its 
extreme form, ethnic polarization implies that ethnic groups are preoccupied by mutual 
mistrust and perceive themselves, first and foremost, in antagonistic identity terms. In 
such a context, polarized ethnicity becomes the only politically relevant identity.25
A potential cause for polarization is relative economic or political deprivation
24Or, in some cases, the states dominated by one ethnic group may initiate a 
violent action against their own minorities. See Kumar Rupesinghe, “Theories of Ethnic 
Conflict and Their Applicability to Protracted Ethnic Conflicts,” in Ethnic Conflict and 
Human Rights, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994), 
44.
25For a further discussion of ethnicity as the only politically relevant identity, see 
V. P. Gagnon Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” 
International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 136.
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experienced by one ethnic group vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Even though it is relatively 
difficult to bridge such ethnic differences in the short term, economic development 
policies, coupled with power sharing arrangements could provide a long term solution to 
such polarization. However, the issue o f polarization becomes much more complicated if 
the dividing line is drawn between the ethnic groups, one of which associates itself with 
the former victims and sees the other ethnic group(s) as former perpetrators. This may 
generate a phenomenon known as “ethnic fear”: once an ethnic group has been terrorized 
by a neighboring ethnic group in the past, it becomes fearful of the possibility that the 
same thing might happen again in the future.26
Given similar conditions, an ethnic group that sees itself as having been victimized 
in the past is more likely to opt for an authoritarian regime with the members of its own 
kin than to be open to the norms of democratic inclusiveness, especially if “inclusiveness” 
means embracing an ethnic group that is associated with the perpetrators of past evils. 
Ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security for the members of both ethnic groups, and 
they offer protection of one’s interests vis-a-vis the members of the other ethnic group.27
Under conditions of ethnic fear, the existence of a minority’s “mother state” ready 
to defend its minority against the majority ethnic group is a significant obstacle towards
26The concept “ethnic fear” is discussed by Montville, 538, and Arfi, 151-203. 
Wendy Bracewell portrays how ethnic fear emerged in Serbian-Croatian relations in 
1990s. The Serbs publicly remembered the crimes committed by the Ustasa during 
World War D and claimed that they were again threatened with genocide as the newly 
recreated Croatian state adopted the same national symbols that had been used by the 
Ustasa. Wendy Bracewell, “National Identities among Serbs and Croats,” in National 
Histories and European History, ed. M ary Fulbrook (London: University College London 
Press. 1993), 157.
27Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” in Nationalism, Ethnic 
Conflict, and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 49.
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the establishment of an interethnic dialogue. According to the logic of a pluralist 
democratic community, the political game within a demos must be played only by its 
members, and it must be relatively free from outside influence. Therefore, an outside 
actor— especially if seen as a former perpetrator— who is anxious to get involved in a 
community's political game may negatively affect the dynamics o f interaction between 
ethnic groups.
Ethnic fear, coupled with an active "mother state.” is likely to be a legacy of 
previous ethnic restructuring. The combination of these tw'o factors— the inability of the 
members of a community to play an independent political game and the lack of trust 
between the members of such a community— makes demos building under such conditions 
very difficult. The suggestions of the individualist and pluralist perspectives to include the 
"others" in the political process in order to create a functioning political community are 
therefore likely to be politically unthinkable. If different ethnic groups are not able to 
overcome the mistrust underlying their relations, then interethnic coalitions and alliances, 
propagated by the pluralist perspective, are likely to be short-term and tom by internal 
conflicts over basic ethnic issues (e.g., language). Extensive empirical research confirms 
the fragility of such political arrangements in different multiethnic settings, even though 
ethnic groups might have shared a variety of interests.28 Within such a climate, past 
experiences of ethnic restructuring or other injustices are likely to become politicized in 
order to legitimatize the power of an ethnopolitical party.29
28Ibid.. 45-51. and Horowitz. "Multiethnic Coalitions,” 366-67.
29For a discussion on how' ethnic or national identity can be used as a mode of 
power legitimation, see Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge. 
UK: Polity. 1997), 44-50 and 282-83.
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One outcome from a situation in which ethnicity has become a source of 
polarization is ethnic democracy.30 It is a political system within which full participation 
in the political process is limited to the members of a particular ethnic group, yet some 
civil and political rights are enjoyed by others as well. The members of other ethnic 
groups are prevented from taking part in this process by state-created barriers, such as 
limited access to organizational resources or deprivation of rights of political participation, 
yet at the same time, they can enjoy some other rights, such as cultural rights or the right to 
enjoy the economic goods produced by the state.31
Such a situation is similar to that described by Aristotle in his Politics: members 
from the “other” community are banished to the private sphere of the demos, thus 
excluding them from the political process. However, the greater the number of the 
unsatisfied “others” within the private sphere, the greater the latent danger facing the 
demos from a potential revolt. Thus, theoretically, even though ethnic democracy tries to 
achieve ethnopolitical stability by taking the contradictions and tensions inherent in such a 
system into account, endowing the “others” with a status different from that of the 
members of the demos does not constitute a long term solution for a sustainable political 
community within a multiethnic state.
Yet what can be done, if anything, to relieve ethnic polarization in order to start
30For a definition of ethnic democracy and its etymology in political science 
literature, see Velio Pettai, “Emerging Ethnic Democracy in Estonia and Latvia,” in 
Managing Diversity in Plural Societies. Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in 
Post-Communist Europe, ed. Magda Opalski (Ottawa: Forum Eastern Europe, 1998),
15-16.
3lFor a description of ethnic democracy, see Graham Smith, Aadne Aasland and 
Richard Mole, “Statehood, Ethnic Relations, and Citizenship,” in The Baltic States: The 
National Self-Determination o f  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, ed. Graham Smith (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1994), 189-90.
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and to sustain a political process within multiethnic entities? The two leading democratic 
theories on political community do not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. The 
strategies on how to reduce ethnic polarization fall into the realm of theories on civil 
society, or “bottom-up” approaches. These approaches focus on the cultivation of 
associations within the sub-state sphere. They suggest a proposition that such sub-state 
associations, bridging individuals belonging to different ethnic groups or establishing links 
between different ethnic groups may help to overcome polarization, the most dangerous 
condition for a sustainable political community.32
Bottom-Up Approaches
One of the main premises of “bottom-up” approaches researching the development 
of civil society is that social and political cohesion within the state is not guaranteed by the 
interaction of its “units”— either individuals, sub-state communities, or political parties.33 
For a democratic political process to take place, a certain level of societal unity must be 
present. This societal unity is sustained by integrative processes which are reflected by 
trust-generating social relationships, such as business groups, environmental groups,
3:This is a conclusion reached by Leo Kuper. He also argues that the development 
of civil society may preclude future instances of genocide. See Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its 
Political Use in the 20th Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).
j3For an account of the debates within several disciplines over the meaning of civil 
society, see Chris Hann, “Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology,” in 
Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 1-7. This section does not intend to suggest that different and 
often conflicting approaches have reached some kind of agreement on the meaning and 
the roles of civil society. It still remains a debated concept. However, most approaches 
underline the existence of free associations among the residents of the state as one of the 
defining aspects o f civil society.
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church groups, etc. The sub-state actors joined by such relationships are capable of 
challenging state power, especially when this power is perceived as threatening to their 
associations.
A functioning civil society within a democratic state entails more than a collection 
of strong and autonomous groups capable of balancing the state. Individual membership 
in these autonomous groups must be both voluntary and overlapping.34 Societal unity, a 
characteristic of civil society, describes a situation in which individuals belong to different 
political and social groups, but at the same time they retain their individual choice to 
escape from these groups. The identities of the members of these groups are multi-layered 
because the individuals conceive of themselves not only as members of ethnic groups, but 
also as members of the political community and other organizations within civil society. 
Under such conditions, violence among them becomes unthinkable.
However, how is it possible to create a sustainable civil society within a polarized 
multiethnic state? Based on previous case studies, “bottom-up” approaches suggest the 
following strategies: first, fostering civil concord could begin with catering to basic 
individual human needs, such as food, shelter, money, etc. Even during times of severe 
ethnic polarization, it has been possible to sustain a certain level of order and cooperation 
within multiethnic entities in this way.35 This strategy— building civil society on the
?4John A. Hall, “In Search of Civil Society,” in Civil Society: Theory, History, 
Comparison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 15. In his words, the 
creation of a functioning civil society entails the ability of individual members to “escape 
any particular cage” (i.e., any social or political group).
35Andreus Klinke and Ortwin Reur, “Ethnic Cooperation and Coexistence: 
International Mediation, International Governance, and Civil Society for Ethnically Plural 
States,” in Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society: Proposals fo r  a New Era in Eastern 
Europe, ed. Andreus Klinke, Ortwin Reur, and Jean Paul Lehners (Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate, 1997), 253-54.
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egoistic interests of individuals and households expressed through private 
business— eventually translates into voluntary collective organizations. As “economic’' 
civil society becomes stronger, individuals become engaged in well-established trust-based 
relationships which transgress ethnic boundaries.36
The latter observation points to the importance of a functioning local government, 
a second strategy often dwelt on by civil society approaches.37 Creating an autonomous 
local public body, such as a town council, is one of the ways in which individual citizens 
achieve their immediate interests and at the same time maintain independence from the 
state.38 Not only basic human interests, but also potentially explosive ethnic issues, such 
as language, the distribution of resources, and education, also often fall within the sphere 
of local government influence. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the 
ways in which multiethnic states allocate power to local governments and the ways in 
which the latter handle ethnically sensitive issues, such as language laws, and conduct 
community building on the local level.
The third approach focuses on the least explored area of civil society: social and
36A similar view, according to which private business horizontally integrates civil 
society, and the latter then becomes a balancing force vis-a-vis the state, has been referred 
to as an “East European view of civil society.” See David L. Wank, “Civil Society in 
Communist China?” in Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, ed. John A. Hall 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 60-62.
37These approaches overlap with the third strategy proposed by the top-down 
approaches. In addition to paying attention to local governments as a form of political 
governance, civil society approaches also study the formation of social associations 
among people of a community prompted by the existence of such governments. Scott A. 
Bo!lens, “Urban Policy in Ethnically Polarized Societies,” International Political Science 
Review 19, no. 2 (April 1998): 187-215.
3sChristopher G. A. Bryant, “Civic Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion,” in Civil 
Society: Theory, History, Comparison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 
143.
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psychological aspects of trust building among different ethnic groups. In a well 
functioning civil society, different ethnic and national groups are free to write their 
histories without fear: to publicly remember and mourn their dead, etc.39
Under nondemocratic rule, similar social relationships which so clearly manifest 
themselves in the public sphere, are usually suppressed because they are seen as a source 
of opposition to the state. Histories challenging the official narrative of the state are also 
silenced. It is not surprising, therefore, that in democratizing multiethnic societies, after 
decades o f imposed historical amnesia, ethnic groups are likely to produce conflicting 
interpretations about what has happened in the past. One ethnic group can easily become 
the “demonized other”: i.e., it can be blamed for the misfortunes experienced by another 
ethnic group during the previous regime. Numerous case studies on collective identity 
have recognized that those who control the images of the past shape the present. Political 
and social groups self-consciously engage in the process of shaping their national pasts to 
legitimate their current political views and policies.40 In such cases, mass media channels 
which enable open discussion of what has happened in the past, mediation by outsiders, 
international or national truth finding commissions, involving representatives from 
different ethnic groups, are among the ways to reduce polarization.41
39Michael Walzer, “The Concept o f Civil Society,” in Walzer, ed., 20.
40Daniel Levy, ‘T h e  Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing 
Memories in Germany and Israel,” History and M emory 38, no. 1 (February 1999), 51.
4lKlinke and Reur, 253-54. In addition, there is a body of literature on democratic 
transitions. It puts forward several hypotheses on how to face the crimes of the past 
regime: by creating truth commissions, by conducting trials or granting amnesty to the 
collaborators with the past regime, by compensating the victims, etc. Some have argued 
that these practices may help to provide social support for political democracy. See 
Guillermo O ’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” in Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with the Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington.
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The goal of these practices is to build a network of associations transgressing 
ethnic divisions. However, these associations are not self-sustaining and not sufficient, in 
and of themselves, to create a democratic political community. To illustrate, after the 
basic interests o f the ethnic groups are satisfied, the individuals belonging to the groups 
may choose to go back into their social ethnic “cages” if interethnic cooperation is not 
institutionalized in the ways outlined by the individualist or pluralist approaches. 
Furthermore, self-sustaining local governments do not provide a guarantee that democratic 
political community will be established within a multiethnic state. Local governments can 
be dominated by one ethnic group and therefore become abusive toward the members of 
other ethnic groups. In such cases, the existence of a countervailing power (i.e., the 
democratic state) to stop coerciveness is highly desirable.
Finally, there must be an actor capable o f providing secure spaces for different 
ethnic groups to carry out their “coping with history” practices (e.g., writing their histories, 
burying their dead, debating their past, and so on). In the absence of such an actor, while 
trying to negotiate its relationship with a troubled past, one national or ethnic group can 
initiate the policies which attempt to take out revenge upon or even exterminate other 
“guilty” ethnic groups.42 Instead of embracing and enforcing only one account o f the past, 
a democratic state opens channels for different ethnic groups to disclose their past 
embitterments. This characteristic distinguishes a nationalist autocratic state from a civic
D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace, 1995), 57-64. It is not entirely clear, however, how 
these practices work in multiethnic settings.
42For example, in 1986, the Serbian Academy of Science prepared a Memorandum 
which listed all injustices experienced by the Serbs in the past. This Memorandum 
became a basis for M ilosevic’s rhetoric. Ivo Banaco, “Historiography of the Countries of 
Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia,” American Historical Review  97, no. 2 (October 1992), 
1085-104.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
95
democracy. These observations imply that civil concord in multiethnic entities is highly 
unlikely without a democratic state, which, in the words of Michael Walzer, both “frames 
civil society and occupies space within it.”-*3
Toward a Synthesis o f the Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches
Synthesizing “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches means conceptualizing 
political community not just as an arena for a series of government decisions, but primarily 
as a multilevel process of interaction between the state and sub-state actors. Amitai 
Etzioni's concept of community illustrates the intimate relationship between the state and 
the entity beneath it within democratic regimes: “[The community] has sufficient power to 
countervail the coercive member of any member unit or coalition of them; it has a decision 
making center that is able to affect significantly the allocation of assets throughout the 
community; and it is the dominant focus of political loyalty.”44 This concept also outlines 
the relationship between political community and civil society. Political community is the 
sphere in which the political process described in the first two theoretical approaches (e.g., 
voting, power negotiations, or elections) takes place. Civil society is the sphere within 
which other sub-state societal links are forged. Thus societal unity is created, which is a 
necessary condition for the democratic political process to be carried out. The main 
difference between political community and civil society is that the former is capable of 
managing political power. In a democratic regime, the institutions of political community,
43Walzer, ‘T h e  Concept of Civil Society,” 23.
44 Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory o f Societal and Political Processes 
(New York: Free Press, 1968), 554.
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therefore, are capable of preventing unfair “insider deals" within civil society.
In addition, creating lasting, businesslike, interest-based relationships among 
individuals must be backed up by the construction of a democratic state as a “service 
station." The term “state as a service station” refers to a well functioning market 
economy, capable of fulfilling the basic needs of its citizens and non-citizen residents. To 
be more specific, modem liberal democratic states are capable of providing a wide variety 
of services for individuals, ranging from health care to food subsidies for the poor. Thus, 
they secure a web o f trust-based business relationships among their citizens.45
Taking this interdependent relationship between political community and civil 
society into account means recognizing that merely including members of ethnic 
communities into the political process will not solve the problem of polarization in 
multiethnic states. The process of inclusion must be sustained by other developments 
conducive to a functioning civil society, such as the establishment of local governments 
and the development of relationships of trust among the members of different ethnic 
groups. The three theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter suggest four factors 
which are particularly salient to political community building in a polarized multiethnic 
entity:
(a) the state (or groups with political power within a state-in-the-making) makes a decision 
on whether to include opposing ethnic groups into the political process on an individual or 
a collective level,
(b) the process of community building “from above" must be sustained by the following
45Bhikhu Parekh, quoted in Canovan. 84-85.
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developments within civil society (“below”):
1) the creation of business relationships based on individual interests which involve 
members of different ethnic groups. Such relationships entail construction of a democratic 
state as a “service station,”
2) the creation of functioning local governments,
3) the establishment of dialogic ethnic relations; i.e., making sure that no ethnic group 
becomes the “demonized other.”46
Considered together, these four factors indicate the ability of a multiethnic polity to 
create a sustainable democratic political community. They help to hypothesize whether a 
state will be capable of overcoming ethnic polarization. A potential fifth factor is the 
actions of an ethnic patron— an ethnic minority's mother state and other international 
actors.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
BUILDING
International actors are capable of affecting the creation of political community 
within a multiethnic polity both from “above” (i.e., by affecting the actions of the
46As defined by Harold H. Saunders, “sustained dialogue,” or dialogic relations 
between different ethnic groups, does not need to be as structured as negotiation or formal 
mediation, yet this concept implies that trust and transparency must be established among 
the ethnic groups. “Dialogic relations” mean that previously polarized interethnic 
relationships are changed in fundamental ways. Thus, the foundations for an interethnic 
body politic are laid. Harold H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue 
to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), 12-13.
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governments), and from “below” (i.e., by influencing the developments within civil 
society). In international relations (on the state level), there are three reasons explaining 
why a government obeys policies promoted by international actors: I) because it fears 
punishment, 2) because it sees the rule to be in its own self-interest, and 3) because it feels 
that the rule is legitimate and should be obeyed.47 Consequently, actions of international 
actors aimed at changing an institutionalized state’s attitude toward its minorities are likely 
to undertake one of these three forms: coercion, persuasion, or contagion.48
Theoretically, if threatened by a minority’s mother state or other international 
actors, a host state can change its institutionalized attitude toward its ethnic minorities and 
change the laws defining their status. However, if there are politically strong domestic 
groups opposing the inclusion of minorities into the demos or if the minorities residing 
within the state oppose the existence o f the state, then even coercion exerted by 
international actors may not be capable of changing the institutionalized attitude of the 
state toward its minorities. On the other hand, threatening the host state in order to make it 
change its attitude toward the minority is unlikely to reduce polarization within the sub­
state sphere.
Alternatively, both states can agree to solve the minority issue using international 
mechanisms. This may involve negotiations through regional organizations (e.g., the CoE, 
the OSCE, the Council of the Baltic States, etc.) or bilateral state-to-state agreements.
Using these approaches to address the minority issue symbolizes the second rule: both
4'Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International 
Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 379.
48The term “contagion” refers to the third action. For further discussion see 
Dawisha and Turner, 404-5.
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states should regard the agreement about the status of minorities as falling into their sphere 
of interest. Using regional organizations to help to build political community within 
multiethnic states can assume a variety of forms: elaborating the rights and entitlements of 
a minority, overseeing how these rights are implemented, etc. Bilateral and regional 
mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive; yet the most important difference between 
the two is that “regionalism” implies that dealing with the issue of minorities is not 
confined to the minority’s mother state and the host state.49 One aspect of bilateral 
agreements is that they are likely to enhance the self-confidence of ethnic minorities if 
they feel that their mother state, with whom they identify linguistically, and, in many 
cases, even politically, is championing their case.50
Third, states may choose to change the way that they treat their minorities because 
they believe that an international rule is legitimate or because they believe in the 
legitimacy of the international body that generated that rule.51 If a host state participates in 
a multilateral organization which promotes equal access of minorities and individuals to 
the political process, then it may choose to introduce changes in its own domestic 
legislation regarding the rights of minorities. However, given the vagueness of the status 
of minority rights in international law and international organizations, this course of action 
is highly unlikely.52
49lstvan Pogany, “Bilateralism versus Regionalism in the Resolution of Minorities 
Problems in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Post-Soviet States,” in Minority 




52T o  be more specific, international law affirms the “value of cultural diversity, of 
individual choice, and cultures as contexts of choice.” See Patrick Thomberry, 
“Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary,” in Minority Rights in the “New"
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International actors can considerably affect political community building from 
"below." but this influence is not always stabilizing. If an active minority's mother state 
lends its political, cultural, and economic support to its ethnic kin, such actions, even if 
they are well-intended, may complicate dialogic relations between different ethnic groups 
living within a state. On the positive side, international actors could help to strengthen 
civil society institutions by strengthening local governments, supporting free market 
reforms, and giving financial support to active civil society groups, the members of which 
include representatives from different ethnic groups.53
The importance of such activities should not be underestimated because, when 
acting from “below,” international actors are likely to be sensitive to domestic interethnic 
situations, which is especially important within ethnically polarized states.54 The sub-state 
interactions, outlined above, are likely to involve multiple actors, and most of them are
Europe, ed. Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999), 5. The 
UN Declaration on Minority Rights (adopted in December 1992) recognizes the value of 
collectivities, but it has retained its focus on individual rights. In 1992, the European 
Council issued the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which 
encourages the protection of minority languages, but it has not developed institutions to 
enforce this charter. The CSCE (now OSCE) has created the institution of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, but this institution can do next to nothing to help 
to protect minorities involved in ethnic conflicts. The O SCE’s position regarding ethnic 
minorities in minority host states is sometimes equated with the position of the minority’s 
mother state. This makes ethnic reconciliation very difficult. Although the EU actively 
promotes collective minority rights abroad, it has retained its focus on individual rights 
within its member states. For a collection of documents dealing with the rights of 
minorities, see Minority Rights in the “N ew ” Europe, ed. Peter Cumper and Steven 
Wheatley (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999), 327-74.
53For a detailed overview of what international actors can do to help the 
development of civil society within a democratizing state, see Diamond, “Promoting 
Democracy in the 1990s,” 311-70.
MIn fact, some analysts have argued that the sub-state level of interaction may be 
“the most important determining factor in the ability of external actors to influence the 
transformations” within democratizing states. See Dawisha and Turner, 398-424.
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likely to occur on a voluntary basis.
In sum. when the fifth factor— the role of international actors— is introduced into 
the set of factors which reflect the ability of a multiethnic state to create a sustainable 
democratic political community, the combination of external and internal factors affecting 
the creation of a political community within a multiethnic state is the following:
(a) Influenced by international and domestic actors, the state (or groups with political 
power within a state-in-the-making) makes a decision on whether to include the opposing 
ethnic groups into the political process on an individual or a collective level,
(b) this process of community building “from above” must be sustained by the previously 
outlined developments within civil society (“below”).
CONCLUSION
The theoretical argument put forward in this chapter can be summarized as 
follows. Examination of the dominant approaches to political community building 
suggests that multiethnicity in and of itself does not constitute a danger, and in fact can be 
helpful toward the creation of a sustainable democratic community, especially in the 
beginning stages of democratization. By voicing their demands for cultural rights and 
spaces to carry out their cultural practices, ethnic communities can form opposition to the 
nondemocratic polities or help to strengthen nascent civil societies in emerging 
democracies. However, ethnic polarization does present a challenge. Polarization along 
ethnic lines means that ethnic identity becomes the only politically relevant identity. The
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members o f ethnic groups are also divided by their threat perception.
Memories of traumatic events that happened in the past, such as ethnic 
restructuring, are likely to engender polarization along ethnic lines and to become an 
impetus for the creation of active ethnopolitical groups which oppose the inclusion of 
“others” in the political process, and, subsequently, into the political community; or, 
alternatively, to become an impetus for the creation of active ethnopolitical groups which 
reject the state and oppose the dominant ethnic group.
This line of argumentation lends support to the thesis that the experience of ethnic 
restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state to successfully 
consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is hypothesized, 
have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political communities, which is 
a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy.
This line of argumentation suggests that analyses o f democratic community 
building within multiethnic states should be sensitive to the historical experiences of 
ethnic groups instead of relying solely on numerical ethnic variation within the state. In 
other words, in order to hypothesize about the influence of the factors which may alleviate 
ethnic polarization, one needs to identify the sources of polarization. Examining the 
historical background underlying the relations between different ethnic groups enables us 
to make an analysis of the ways in which states try to overcome ethnic tensions— a 
necessary condition for the creation of a successful democratic regime.
If previous interactions between ethnic groups have resulted in polarization, then 
merely including the members from other ethnic communities in the political 
process—either on an individual or group basis— is not likely to help to dissolve ethnic
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tensions. Assimilationist strategies of a centralized state, proposed by the individualist 
model, are likely to engender resistance from ethnic groups which expect group-based 
rights. Consociationalist power sharing agreements, suggested by pluralist models, are 
also likely to disintegrate if underlying ethnic tensions are not addressed. In such cases, 
the process of inclusion must be sustained by the developments conducive to a functioning 
civil society, such as the establishment of functioning democratic local governments, the 
development of the democratic state as a “service station,” and the building of 
relationships o f trust between the members of different ethnic groups.
The three strands o f democratic theory on which this argument has been built 
assume that the state— its basic research unit— is relatively free from outside influences. 
Consequently, it is difficult to predict the dynamics of political community building in a 
triadic “host state-minority-mother state” setting. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the existence of a minority's mother state is likely to render the process of community 
building more complicated. This chapter hypothesizes that the most visible influence 
exerted by international actors will probably be “from above,” i.e., affecting the 
institutionalized attitude o f a state vis-a-vis its minority. Related questions about the 
international aspects of democratic community building, e.g., which 
mechanisms— bilateral (between the host state and the minority’s mother state) or 
multilateral (involving other international actors, such as regional organizations)— are 
more effective when it comes to addressing minority issues in ethnically polarized states, 
will be answered in the empirical case studies that follow.
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CHAPTER V
ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE BALTIC STATES:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE CASE STUDIES
The overall aim of this chapter is to undertake the first step in the case studies: to 
assess the degree of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the Soviet Union and 
to outline the response of the Baltic populations to this policy. Drawing on recently 
released historical studies and declassified documents, the first part of the chapter 
identifies the official goals of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the USSR. 
The second part o f the chapter traces the process whereby this policy was implemented in 
the Baltic states. The account is supplemented by material from the memoirs o f former 
deportees, which helps to describe what the immediate response on behalf of the local 
populations was. Since there were no reliable public opinion polls in the former Soviet 
Union prior to 1988, the analysis of memoirs and letters should help to evaluate this 
response and to hypothesize whether the policy induced long-lasting ethnic tension.
By drawing on recently released documents, the second part also assesses the 
degree of ethnic restructuring that took place in the three states and constructs two tables 
which capture the changes. One table presents the data—an approximate number of 
people deported from the Baltic states—which became available only recently. (The 
Soviet Union did not release the data on internal and external migration of its citizens.) In 
addition, it sheds light on some o f the lesser known aspects of ethnic restructuring, such as 
postwar population exchanges and the attitude o f the Soviet state toward non-territorial 
nationalities residing in the Baltic states. The last part of the chapter traces the activity of
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groups with concrete political demands, the emergence of which was prompted by ethnic 
restructuring.1
THE ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING CARRIED OUT BY THE SOVIET UNION: WHY 
AND HOW
Irving L. Horowitz wrote that states pursue drastic population policies, such as 
genocide, when the ruling elites decide that their survival in power is a higher goal than all 
other economic and social interests of the polity. Therefore, he argued, such population 
policies are a feature of totalitarian or authoritarian states.2 His insight about the nature of 
drastic population policies sheds some light on the ways in which ethnic restructuring was 
carried out in the Soviet Union. Most drastic population resettlements were carried out 
during the totalitarian dictatorship of Stalin. The first Soviet actions against “‘enemies of 
the state” (which included rebellious ethnic groups in the Caucasus) were planned and 
carried out in twenties under the rule of Lenin. Later, during the era of Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev, less violent population policies were used as a tool of political control over non- 
Russian republics and autonomous regions. They consisted of state-sponsored 
russification and planned migration.
Despite differences in tactics, the policies of ethnic restructuring carried out by 
Soviet leaders all shared one trait: the existence of politically active national (and
'The emergence of these groups is an indication of a political society, which 
should not be confused with civil society. Political society, however, usually plays a 
significant role during the initial stages of state building. Fora discussion of political 
society, see Hann, 23.
:Kuper, 49.
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especially nationalist) groups was considered to be an unwelcome legacy of the past and 
an obstacle to the survival of the Soviet state.3 Therefore, the Soviet state began to move 
around huge numbers of people within its ethnically heterogenous body, hoping to merge 
societies into socialist nations, which would never come into conflict with one another, 
would pursue identical political interests, and would smoothly integrate themselves into 
the central state.4 Hannah Arendt aptly described this process as trying to achieve a 
“heterogeneous uniformity” within the Soviet state.5
Even though Soviet nationalities policy did not have “nation-killing” as its goal, it 
did try to reconstruct them. This Soviet-style constructivism consisted of two 
distinguishable, but interrelated components: compulsory resettlement (deportation) and 
planned migration.6 The primary goal of compulsory resettlement in the USSR was to 
disperse members o f disobedient social groups. It involved a two-way population 
movement: when resettling a group from one area, the Communist leaders simultaneously 
repopulated that territory with an equal or even greater number of people from the other
3HeIene Carrere d ’Encausse, Decline o f  an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics 
in Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), 46. She goes on to argue that the Soviets 
thought that the solution to the “national problem” was the eradication of national 
differences. The latter statement was effectively challenged by other scholars who argued 
that the suppression of nationalism, and not “nation-killing,” was the ultimate goal of 
Soviet nationalities policy. See Yuri Slezkine, ‘T h e  USSR as a Communal Apartment, or 
How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” in Becoming National: A Reader, 
ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 203-38.
■*This description of the socialist nations is from Simon, 6.
5Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 
1958). 322.
°In addition, Soviet constructivism included what can be called nation-building, 
especially during the twenties and the thirties. The Soviet Union created administrative 
units along ethnic lines and even attempted to modernize “primitive”societies. Slezkine, 
2 1 0 .
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areas of the multinational state.7 Thus, the policy of ethnic restructuring usually iesulted 
in the movements of people in two directions. On the one hand, thousands of people were 
put into railway cars and deported to the underdeveloped parts of the USSR, such as 
Siberia or Tajikistan. On the other hand, depopulated villages and cities were repopulated 
with newcomers from other parts of the USSR. Eugene Kulischer documented this aspect 
of the policy after World War II: “a flood of migrants [was] moving westward into all 
marches between the Arctic and the Black Sea.”8 This flow of people coincided with 
intense collectivization and industrialization which demanded cheap labor. Consequently, 
the need for a mobile work force in a command economy was another reason for the mass 
resettlements carried out by the Soviet Union.9
Forced resettlement policies were first used by the USSR to deport hundreds of 
thousands of kulaks (farmers and peasants) during the period of collectivization. Some 
have traced the origins o f this policy to the fifteenth century, when Russian knights in 
Moscow and Novgorod practiced the principles o f Razwod , “separation.” and Wvwod. 
"taking away.” to control their disobedient populations.10 In the Soviet Union, the 
“extermination” of the kulaks was over by 1933. After that deportations were pursued 
mostly for political reasons (e.g., to punish people for collaborating with the Germans
'Andrei Lebed, “Compulsory resettlement,” in Institute for the Study of the 
USSR, Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group Destruction (Munich: Institute for the 
Study of the USSR, 1958), 6.
8Kulischer, 300.
9Eugenijus Grunskis. Lietuvos gyvenlojif iremimai 1940-1941, 1945-1953 metais 
[Deportation of Lithuania’s Residents, I940-I94I. 1945-1953] (Vilnius: Lietuvos 
Istorijos Institutas, 1996), 10.
l0Gotthold Rhode, Voelker a u f dem Wege: Verschiebungen der Bevoelkerung in 
Ostdeutschland und Osteuropa seit 1917 [People on the Move: Population Changes in 
Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe since 1917] (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1952), 12-13.
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during World W ar II or to suppress nationalism), even though the label “kulak" was still 
used. This also applies to the Baltic states, occupied by the USSR in 1940 and once again 
in 1944: not only farmers and peasants, but, first and foremost, those who opposed the 
regime were likely to be deported.
Following the scheme devised by Pavel Polian, compulsory resettlements in the 
Soviet Union were carried out according to social criteria (e.g., former members of the 
nobility and kulaks), ethnicity (e.g., the “guilty nations” of Germans, Chechens, Ingush, 
etc., but also Georgians, who were moved into areas formerly occupied by the Ingush, and 
Ukrainians, who were moved into areas formerly occupied by the Tatars), religious and 
political orientation (e.g.. former members of non-Communist religious and political 
organizations), and other criteria (e.g., the family members of persons who fell into any of 
the other categories, foreigners, and prisoners of war). Non-repressive migrations were 
planned migrations for industrialization, which aimed to replace those who had been 
deported." In addition, since migration within the Soviet Union was strictly controlled by 
a special residence permit (“propiska”) system, the state could create artificial migration 
into disobedient national and ethnic areas and thus pursue a policy of gradual 
denationalization.12
Although ethnic restructuring did include several cases of ethnic cleansing (i.e.,
"Pavel Polian, “Ethnische Deportation im Raum der Ehemaligen Sowjetunion” 
[Ethnic Deportations in the Territory of the Former Soviet Union], in Flucht und 
Vertreibung [Flight and Expulsion], ed. Robert Streibel (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1994). 
227-36.
l2Sergei Zamascikov, “Soviet Methods and Instrumentalities of Maintaining 
Control Over the Balts,” in Regional Identity Under the Soviet Rule: The Case o f  the 
Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys, and Laurence P. A. Kitching 
(Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for the Study of Law, Politics, and Society o f Socialist 
States. 1990), 95.
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population restructuring that is directed against an entire ethnic group), the major goal of 
this policy was really social homogenization. This is because, in most cases, the Soviets 
gauged the success of their policy based on whether or not it was capable of suppressing 
those groups that were opposed to the Soviet state, especially those that opposed its plans 
to create kolkhozes (collective farms). To illustrate, on 10 February 1948, Khrushchev, 
who w as the leader of the Ukrainian Communist party at that time, complained to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow that the peasants in Western 
Ukraine were not willing to join kolkhozes. He suggested that more “kulaks” ought to be 
deponed in order to “fix the problem.” As a result, 11,456 people were deported from the 
area, and the “problem” was solved.13 Similarly, Rezev, the Minister o f Internal Affairs 
for the Estonian SSR, w-rote in a letter to Kruglov, the Minister o f Internal Affairs for the 
Soviet Union, that “approximately one half of all farmsteads in Estonia were transformed 
into collective farms as a result o f successful deportations carried out in 1949.” 14
In 1954, after Stalin’s death, the Soviets began to relax the policy of compulsory 
resettlement. Limited mobility was granted to some who were in the places of deportation, 
and children under the age of ten were removed from the lists of deported people.15 At 
that time, at least 1.820,140 people, most of whom were German, were still living in 
camps in the places o f deportation.16 Two years later, in 1956, during the 20th Congress of 
the Communist Party, the policy o f ethnic restructuring was reevaluated for the first time.
13Zhukov, quoted by Grunskis, 126.
1JThis letter was written in April 1949. It is reproduced in Vdimatu Vaikida [It Is 
Impossible to Be Silent], ed. Hilda Sabbo (Tallinn: Uhiselu, 1996), 871-79.
15Simon, 241.
“There were at least 75,024 Lithuanians, 33.102 Latvians, and 16,070 Estonians 
in deportation then. Grunskis, 140.
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Khrushchev delivered a speech on Stalin's crimes, condemning the mass repressions 
carried out by his predecessor. He criticized the application of collective guilt whereby 
whole families o f kulaks and whole nations were punished using deportation.17 Yet, as 
Nikolai F. Bougai, a Russian historian, observes, “a close examination of formerly 
unavailable documents revealed that Khrushchev supported and actively participated in the 
compulsory resettlement of more than 550,000 residents of the Ukraine . .  . Therefore, any 
assertion that Khrushchev was sincere in his denunciation of these policies [i.e.. ethnic 
restructuring] in the speech condemning his predecessor should be taken with a grain of 
salt."18 The memoirs of the former deportees and other documents support his opinion: 
even during the time of the “thaw” those who streamed back to their homes were forcibly 
returned to the places of deportation.19
After Khruschev was removed from power, almost no critical articles dealing with 
deportations, planned migration and other nationality-related issues appeared in the Soviet 
press.20 In 1962-67, the “debates” in the journal Voprosv Istorii [The Questions about 
History] and Izvesiiya [the national newspaper] on whether to speed up the “fusion” of the
17“Khruschev’s Secret Speech on Stalin’s Crimes,” in Frank Chalk and Kurt 
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology o f  Genocide (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 300-22. Khruschev implied that only “military considerations” (i.e., the 
beginning of World W ar II) could have justified mass deportations.
l8Bougai and Gonov, 9.
l9E.g., see the narratives in the collection Lietuvos naikinimas ir tautos kova 1940- 
1998 [The Destruction of Lithuania and National Resistance 1940-1998], comp. Izidorius 
Ignatavicius (Vilnius: Vaga, 1999), 186. 214, 246. On 12 October 1957, the Estonian 
SSR adopted a law. prohibiting “persons guilty of especially serious state crimes and 
former members o f bourgeois government of Estonia, leaders of nationalist political 
parties and organizations . . .” to return to Estonia. Following the rulings from Moscow, 
similar laws were adopted by the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs.
:o“The Problem of Nationalism.” Radio Liberty Research Note (8 December,
1964).
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Soviet nations into the Soviet state never questioned the main tenet of the Soviet 
nationalities policy— the inviolability of the Moscow-centered Soviet “community” of 
nations, created with the help o f planned migration and russification.21
The use of ethnic restructuring was revisited in 1982. In a speech written for the 
60th anniversary of Soviet nationalities policy, Yuri Andropov mentioned “millions of 
Germans, Poles, Koreans, Kurds, and representatives of other nationalities . . .  who should 
be viewed as full citizens of the USSR.”22 Andropov, however, soon died and no real 
effort was made to address the legacy of ethnic restructuring or to rehabilitate its victims. 
Five years later, on 14 November 1989, following a stormy session of the Congress of 
People’s Deputies, an announcement was made that the “forced resettlements carried out 
by the Soviet Union were illegal.”23 This was the first official statement to that effect. A 
similar statement is present in the “Concept of the Nationalities Policy” of the Russian 
Federation, the successor to the USSR, which was adopted on 15 June 1996.
The Russian Federation continues to exploit the issue of the resettled Russian 
speakers to assert its influence in the region. Cashing in on the legacy of ethnic 
restructuring, the Russian policy of diaspora instrumentalization (the “Karaganov 
doctrine”) includes three components. First, it encourages the Russian diaspora to stay in 
the post-Soviet states so that the Russian speakers could be used as a leverage in fulfilling
2IOne group of scholars (“internationalists”) advocated an accelerated russification 
to achieve rapprochement of different national cultures in the USSR. Their opponents 
(“nationalists”) argued that retaining individual nations could only enrich the “Soviet 
community.” Ian Pennar, “A New Tum in the Soviet Nationalities Policy,” Radio Liberty 
Research Note, a Russian edition (20 June, 1967).
::Bougai, “Postsovetskaya Rossiya” [Post Soviet Russia].
23Ibid.. For a description of the First Congress of People’s Deputies, see The 
Soviet Empire: Its Nations Speak Out. ed. Oleg Glebov and John Crowfoot (Chur, Switz.: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1989).
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Russia's foreign policy objectives. According to the doctrine. Russia can defend its 
diaspora against “discrimination” by using diplomacy and economic pressure. The 
doctrine calls for closer economic links between Russia and Russian-owned enterprises in 
the former Soviet republics, so that a base for Russian political influence is formed. Third, 
it calls to strengthen cultural ties between Russia and minorities living in post Soviet 
entities.24
Following the doctrine, in February 1994, the Russian foreign minister Kozyrev 
declared the Baltic states a source of a threat and underlined the possibility of using force 
to protect the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, in a report 
issued on 24 September 1999, the Russian Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Working 
Group stressed that “the Baltic states will always be included in the zone of Russia's vital 
interest.” The report also denounced the “anti-Russian policy” of the Balts, which 
supposedly is directed against Russia and its ethnic minorities.25
The Baltic leaders have continued to press Russia to acknowledge and apologize 
for the abuses related to ethnic restructuring.26 The parliaments of the three states have
24Igor Zevelev, “Russia and Russian Diasporas,” Post Soviet Affairs 12, no. 3, 
(1996): 273. Also see Heino Ainso, “Estonian Nationalism at Crossroads,” Review 
Baltique 9 (1997): 15.
25“Russia Issues Report on Baltics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 
(27 September, 1999).
26Such demands are voiced by some Russians as well. E.g., Yuri Afanasyev, the 
rector of the Moscow Humanitarian University, argued that Russia should apologize to 
the Baltic states. This would be a step toward a democratic federation. “Let Yeltsin 
Repent Stalin’s Sins,” interview conducted by Kadri Liik, Postimees (23 August, 1999), 
2. Even though in August 1994 Yeltsin said that he “condemned the Stalinist crimes 
perpetrated against the Republic of Latvia,” so far, there has been no official recognition 
and apology for the occupation. See “Yeltsin Condemns Stalinist Crimes Against 
Latvia,” Radio Free Europe A-WIRE (1994), Open Society Archives, Budapest, 
collection 300, file 80/6/15.
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adopted resolutions urging Russia to take responsibility for the Soviet past.27 During his 
August 199S meeting with Valentina Matviyenko. then-Deputy Prime Minister of Russia 
and Co-chairman of the Estonian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee, Estonia’s 
president Lennart Men said that it was important for the development of the relations 
between two countries that Russia accepts the judgement given by the democratic world to 
the events of 1940 in Estonia.28
The Baltic states have used various international institutions as a forum to voice 
their demands for apology. Thus, during a summer 1998 meeting of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tunne Kelam, a member of the Estonian delegation, 
joined by the members of the Lithuanian delegation, argued that the individuals deported 
from the Baltic states (who are still in Russia) should be allowed to return to their 
homelands and receive compensation (from Russia). Furthermore, it was argued that the 
‘’normalization” of Balto-Russian relations was impossible without an official recognition 
by Russia of the crimes related to ethnic restructuring.29
Writing in the International Herald Tribune on 14 May 1999, Latvian Foreign 
Minister Valdis Birkavs asked Russia to “look at itself in the mirror” and “to accept the 
facts of their own history.” “An acknowledgment of Russia's role in Latvian history in this
27“Estonia and Latvia Demand Russia to Apologize for Soviet Crimes,” Baltic 
News Ser\>ice (25 February, 1994). Estonia adopted such resolution in February 1994, 
and Latvia in August 1996. Lithuania adopted a declaration “On the Assessment of 
Communism and Former Structures o f the Communist Occupation Regime” in December 
1998. The text of this declaration, however, did not include demands for an apology from 
Russia.
28Office of the President of Estonia, Press Release (4 December 1998). Available 
from http://www.president.ee; INTERNET.
29“Estonian Envoy at Council of Europe Seeks Russian Apology,” FBIS-SOV-98- 
775 (24 June, 1998).
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century will defuse many of the sensitive problems related to naturalization o f [Russian] 
non-citizens,” wrote Birkavs.30 Tracing the process whereby ethnic restructuring was 
conducted in the Baltic states helps to understand why its legacy is still a raw nerve in 
Russo-Baltic relations— both on the international and domestic levels.
SOVIET CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ACTION: THE BALTIC STATES
Compulsory Resettlement, or Deportations
According to the official documents, deportations in the Baltic states were not 
pursued according to ethnic criteria. In 1940 and 1941, the most often cited reasons for 
deportations and repressions were "activities against the revolution" and "punishment for 
property owners."31 Those who were deported from the Baltic states were referred to as 
"anti-Soviet, criminal, and socially dangerous elements.”32 Officially, the length of exile
10Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (17 May, 1999).
31 According to Gabor T. Ritterspom, “Gegenrevolutionare AktivitaC  [Crimes 
Against the Revolution] were the official reasoning for 33,1% of deportations to the 
camps in 1940 and 28,7% in 1941. “Slrajiaten gegen Eigentum" [Punishment for 
Property Owners] were the reasoning for 12.1% of deportations to the camps in 1940 and 
13,5% in 1941. He based his calculations on the documents from the Russian State 
Archive. Gabor T. Ritterspom, “Gab Es Etnische Sauberung in der Sowjetunion?” [Was 
There an Ethnic Cleansing in the Soviet Union?], paper presented on 7 January 1999 at 
Europa-Universitat-Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
3:See accounts of the repressive police on the “arrest and deportation of socially 
dangerous elements,” reproduced in Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, Lietuvos gyventojtf 
tremimai 1941, 1945-1952 m. [Deportations of the Lithuanian residents in 1941, 1945- 
1952] (Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, 1994), 50-53. Nikolai F. Bougai classified 
the deported from the Baltic states into three categories: “ 1) relocated for terms: for a 
limited period of time, 2) relocated without defined terms (1945-48), and 3) relocated 
forever (1949-1952).” Nikolai F. Bougai, The Deportation o f  Peoples in the Soviet Union 
(New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), 166.
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was limited from ten to twenty years, but beginning with 1949. the duration of deportation 
was supposed to be lifelong.'' It is not surprising, therefore, that many from the Baltic 
diaspora in the places of deportation, who did not return to Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia in 
the fifties after Khrushchev’s amnesty, became Russian speakers or simply perished. Only 
in the mid-nineties, the Baltic governments began to reach out to the former deportees, 
still living in the far regions of the former USSR, encouraging them to come back.34
In all three states, deportations were carried out according to the same plan. As 
explained by the order “On the Expulsion of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia,” signed by Commissar Serov, the official primary goal of the Soviet 
deportations in the Baltic states in 1941 was to clean out all “alien elements”— members 
of non-Communist organizations, policemen, owners of plants, officers, government 
employees and the members of their families.35 The other goal of planned resettlements 
was to speed up transition to collective farms. To illustrate, in a letter addressed to 
Zhdanov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, 
Botschkarev, a Soviet representative to Estonia, suggested that the problem of unequal 
distribution of land in Estonia and surrounding regions could be solved by resettling poor
33Grunskis, 11.
'4E.g., preparing for his visit to Moscow in May 1998, the Latvian President 
Guntis Ulmanis, a former deportee himself, said that he would like to visit Latvians 
residing in Siberia after his visit to Moscow, and called for legal and financial measures 
by the parliament and the government to help them to return to Latvia. FBIS-SOV-98-145 
(25 May. 1998). In his speech at the Conference “The Destruction and Defense of 
Lithuania.” the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus called for the “social 
rehabilitation” of the Lithuanians deported to Siberia who want to come back to their 
homeland. Valstybes zinios, The Destruction and Defence o f  Lithuania (Vilnius: 
Valstybes zinios, 1998), 34.
35Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas. 14-20. The document was written not earlier than 
19 May 1941.
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Russian villagers from the region of Petschory to the lands inhabited by Estonian
farmers.36
The official goal of Soviet deportations during the period 1945-48 was to crush 
Baltic resistance fighters and their supporters. This time, deportations were carried out 
according to ten categories, which included German nationals, families who had arrived 
from Germany during the years of occupation, and "traitors" (almost anyone could classify 
as a traitor).37 The most massive deportations were carried out on 25-29 March 1949 in 
Latvia (at least 41,708 people) and Estonia (at least 20,480) and on 22-27 May 1948 in 
Lithuania (approximately 41,000 people, see Table 1). In 1948-49, about 200,000 people 
were deported from the Baltic states.38 The last deportation took place in 1953 in 
Lithuania, when families suspected of supporting the anti-Soviet resistance movement 
were deported.
Despite the claims in official documents, national identity, however, did play a role 
in the deportations under Stalin. In the late thirties, when Stalin became uneasy about the 
possibility of another major war breaking out in Europe and thought that all neighboring 
countries (including Finland and the Baltic states) represented a threat to the security of 
the Soviet Union, he began to draft plans of repression along "national lines." Thus, Poles, 
Balts or Finns who were in the USSR became viewed as potential enemies of the state.
36A letter dated 21 October 1940. Sabbo, 688-89.
37Directive No. 0165, entitled “Registration of the anti-Soviet and Contra- 
revolutionary elements,” written by J. Bartasiunas and A. Guzevicius, the directors of the 
secret police in Lithuania. Reproduced in Grunskis, 59.
38Peteris Zvindrins, “Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States,” 
Nationalities Papers 22, no. 2 (1994): 366.
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Table 1. Number of People Deported from the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, 1940 to 
1953 (partly estimates)*





























































* “Repatriation” of Germans is not considered.
** Salo and Keruiis used the lists of deportees compiled during the German occupation, and the Nazi 
authorities had forbidden mention of the deportees of Jewish descent.
*** includes the Eastern territories, formerly Poland, occupied by USSR in 1939.
**** Memento, the organization of Illegally Repressed in Estonia, has compiled 40,455 cards of deportees, 
but this number is estimated to be much higher.
Sources:
Anusauskas. Arvydas. Lietuviy tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 rneiais [Devastation of the 
Lithuanian Nation by the Soviets in 1940-1958]. Vilnius: Mintis. 1998.
Grunskis.
Keruiis, Leonas, quoted by Anusauskas, 12.
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Table 1 (Continued)
LGGRTC. Lietuvos gyventojtf genocido ir rezistencijos ryrimo centras [Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance 
Research Center]. Data for the Museum of Genocide in Vilnius. 1999.
Oispuu, Leo, comp. Poliitilised Arreteerimised Eestis 1940-1988 [Political Arrests in Estonia. 1940-1988], 
vol. 1. Tallinn: Estonian Repressed Persons Records Bureau. 1996. See page A2 for information 
about the cards.
Salo. Velio. Population losses in Estonia, June 1940-August 1941. Scarborough. Canada: Maarjamaa. 
1989.
Spasenko. NKVD general, a report to Ryasnoy, dated 31 March 1949. Sabbo, 886.
Terekhov, report to Mikoyan (the head of USSR Supreme Council), dated 6 March 1965. Sabbo. 1038-43.
Vevers'report. dated 7 December 1962. Currently kept in the State Archive in Riga. Latvia, collection 
101-26. file 109.
In the late thirties and in 1940, many Balts who at the time resided in the territory 
of the Soviet Union were deported or otherwise repressed purely on the basis of their 
ethnicity.39 Feelings of insecurity vis-a-vis Germany were the most likely cause of these 
mass resettlements as well as the ones that occurred in the Baltic states in June of 1941. 
The "Memorial" historians in Russia argue that the reasoning behind this policy was the 
belief that Russia was "surrounded by enemies," and that it had to remove the "enemies" 
from its own territory.40
39E.g., on the certificate of rehabilitation, issued to Ema Melgal, there is a line 
which indicates that the reason for repression [on 23 June 1940] was “the person is 
Latvian." In 1940 Melgal resided in Kirovsk, Russia. The certificate is kept in the 
Museum of Occupation in Riga. Museum of Occupation, Riga, Latvia (July 1999).
■“N. V. Petrov, A. B. Roginsky. “ ‘Pol’skaya operatsiya’ NKVD 1937-1938 gg.” 
[NKVD’s “Polish Operation” in 1937-1938], in Memorial, Istoricheskiye sbom iki 
“Memoriala Repressiiprotivpolyakov ip o l ’skikh grazhdan [The “M emorial’s” 
Historical Collections: Repressions against the Poles and Citizens of Poland] (Moscow: 
Zvenya, 1997), 32-33.
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Nationality as a criterion for deportations within the territory of the Baltic states 
was openly used only after the Second World War, in 1945, in order to "cleanse out” 
Germans and everybody related to them from the Baltic states. Residents of the Baltic 
states with German names found themselves being dragged out of their homes to be 
deported.41 Resistance fighters, also known as "forest brothers," were referred to as 
"Lithuanian- (or Latvian- or Estonian-) German nationalists" who in the eyes of the Soviet 
state deserved the same fate as the G erm ans42
Not only the Germans, but also other minorities who lived in the Baltic states were 
not spared from mass deportations. As early as September 1940, the Soviet state began to 
“denationalize” the Baltic states by searching not only for Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, 
but also for Byelorussian, Polish, Jewish, Russian, and German members of ethnic (or, in 
the Soviet jargon, nationalist) organizations.43
In general, since there were so many categories for deportation (e.g., in 1941, there 
were as many as fourteen categories according to which people from the Baltic states had 
been deported), people had no idea why their relatives were being taken away and loaded
■“This is especially true in the case of the Germans from Lithuania, many of whom 
returned to their country of residence in 1942-1943 after the 1941 transfer to Germany. 
They were deported (by the Soviets) strictly on the basis of their nationality, which was 
often determined by their last names. Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Lietuvos 
vokieciai— pirmieji pokario mettj tremtiniai” [The Lithuanian Germans—the First 
Deportees of the Post-war Years], Lietuvos Istorijos Metrastis (1993): 92-105, and Patrik 
von zur Muehlen, “Die Umsiedlung und Vertreibung der Deutsch-Balten 1939-1945” 
[Resettlement and Expulsion of the Baltic Germans], in Flucht und Vertreibung [Flight 
and Expulsion], ed. Robert Streibel (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1994), 188-200.
42The directive to deport Germans from Lithuania was signed on 16 December 
1944. This directive ordered that everybody who is related in any way to Germans must 
be deported. The directive is reproduced in Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, 95-97. F o ra  
document reflecting the results the partisans’ and their families’ deportation, see ibid., 
120 - 2 1 .
43Anusauskas, 44.
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onto cattle-cars. Furthermore, there is evidence that the repressive institutions of the state
sometimes fabricated evidence about "guilt" by creating bogus resistance organizations
and accusing people of taking part in them.44 Thus, often people who had nothing to do
with the resistance and those who were even friendly to the regime were deported.
This happened as early as 1940-41, when the Soviet regime was still trying
ardently to find collaborators among the local population. This fact emerges from the
memoirs of the deportees:
"Being put onto the truck, we saw the family of Vytautas Duoba, whom we knew 
very well, approaching," writes Valentinas Gustainis, the former Director of Ella, 
the Lithuanian news agency, deported in 1940. "The parents of Duoba were poor 
peasants from an old peasant commune in 2emoji Panemune. The Duobos had a 
couple of hectares of land. They lived together with their old mother, who had 
never taken a bus, train, or car before in her life. Duoba had two little girls and a 
pregnant wife. The women were walking barefoot, trying to save the soles on their 
shoes . . .  We considered the Duobas to be pro-Soviet not only because of their 
[proletariat] origin, but also because of their beliefs. Vytautas Duoba had 
congratulated the Soviet regime in Lithuania. He became the first leader of the 
Kriukai district, and was an enthusiastic servant of the Soviet regime. And there 
he was, with us! Why? W e did not know, and neither did they. Realizing that not 
only the intelligentsia from the Baltic states was being deported, we began to calm 
down a little bit: maybe we won’t be shot."45
The wide scope of the deportations (see Table 1), which meant that almost anyone, 
including children, could be deported, created panic and fear among the Baltic 
populations, especially in June 1941. The survivors write that villagers rushed to church 
to pray, believing that this was the end of the world.46 NKVD (Secret police) accounts
^During the process of rehabilitation of some victims in 1952, the NKVD 
admitted that such organizations were created. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The 
Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l. file 2-3.
45Valentinas Gustainis, Be Kaltes: 15 melif Sibiro tremtyje ir lageriuose [Without 
Any Guilt: 15 Years in Exile in Siberian and Camps] (Vilnius: Mintis, 1989), 51.
JGLiudas Truska, Lietuva 1938-1953 metais [Lithuania in 1938-1953] (Kaunas: 
Sviesa, 1995), 91.
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suggest that during the days of mass deportations, such as 14 June 1941 or 25-29 March 
1949, there was a widespread belief in the Baltic states that "all Estonians" (or Latvians 
and Lithuanians) were going to be deported. To illustrate, in his letter to Kruglov, the 
USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. Rezev wrote, "After the operation (i.e., deportation) 
was finished, some residents of Estonia were spreading a rumor that forced resettlement is 
not over yet and that all Estonians must be deported."47
Similar thoughts were expressed by the survivors who remembered mass 
deportations: "In 1949 there were the deportations which affected my close relatives and 
neighbors. There was nervousness, that the same might happen to us. There were even 
explicit threats: If you don’t join the kolkhoz, you’ll find yourself traveling towards the 
white bears."48 Explicit threats are mentioned in numerous other accounts: "There [i.e., in 
the place where people were being forced to sign up for kolkhoz] were files from the 
Secret police containing information about everyone. Jurevicius, the Soviet collaborator, 
reads [the material from the files] and then [verbally] assaults his victims. Sebecki is the 
first to be [verbally] attacked. . .  . Jurevicius says, ‘see, we have some data about you.’ 
After that, Sebecki signs up for the kolkhoz-”49
During the postwar years and long after, the fear of deportations permeated the 
interaction among those who were left behind.50 This fear was aggravated by public acts 
of violence. Repressions used against the resistance fighters were especially cruel. The 
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However, even mothers of the killed could not "recognize" their sons because this meant 
deportation along with the rest of their families.51
Bitterness toward those co-ethnics who collaborated with the ruling regime is a 
recurring theme in the narratives of those deported from Lithuania: "My sister and I nearly 
went mad from fear [during the scene of deportation]. . . .  B.Lecaite-Pozeriene, a member 
of the central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, a 28-year old woman, was 
calmly sitting at the table. Her son was as old as mine, and she was married to my 
godfather Jurgis Pozera, but she had no pity for us. . . .  From time to time she gave 
orders to her co-workers who were looting our house."52
"I remember so well that Lithuanian executioners (of the deportations) were much 
more cruel than the Russians. The Russians told us that we will not be shot, but driven to 
Siberia instead, and we will have to stay there. Therefore, we should take warm clothes 
with us."53 "Two soldiers and one Lithuanian participated in the operation of the 
deportation. The Lithuanian was especially cruel: he gave us (only) half an hour to get 
ready. We were told not to take anything with us because we would have everything.”54
These Lithuanian narratives were probably influenced by the fact that the level of 
cooperation with the Soviet regime, especially in the post-Stalinist years, was somewhat 
higher than that in Latvia or Estonia. This was particularly true at the level of 
nomenklatura (elites). The Communist Party in Lithuania had the greatest percentage of 
indigenous population members. To illustrate, in 1970, the Latvian Communist Party
5lGaskaite, 49.
52Ignatavicius, 44.
5}Igarkos tremliniai [Deportees o f Igarka], comp. Aldona Matulkaite (Vilnius: 
Atkuia, 1998), 19.
54Matulkaite, 19.
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included 40.2%, the Estonian—52.3%, and the Lithuanian—even 67.1% locals.55 In 1990, 
there were 70.3% “indigenous” (Lithuanian) and 21.9% Russian party members in 
Lithuania. The corresponding number for Latvia was 34.5% and 43.5%; 49.9% and 38.6% 
for Estonia.56 During his 33-year rule, Antanas Snieckus, a Lithuanian-bom Soviet leader, 
who was well liked by Stalin and who was able to establish friendly relations with other 
Soviet leaders, surrounded himself with Lithuanian-bom nomenklatura instead of 
importing helpers from Moscow. Little help was needed because Snieckus and his 
Lithuanian followers were ardent supporters of deportations.57
In contrast to this, national Communists in the other two Baltic republics attempted 
to resist ethnic restructuring. For example, Simson, the Chief Justice of the Estonian SSR, 
and other members of the Estonian nomenklatura, wrote a letter to Moscow asking to let 
the formerly deported to settle in Estonia instead of hiding in neighboring Latvia or Pskov 
region. (Even though many of the formerly deported were formally "rehabilitated" at that 
time, they were not allowed to go back to their homeland.58) Moscow suppressed any 
resistance to ethnic restructuring by substituting the rebellious Communists with those 
who were more obedient. The latter were usually implanted from other parts of the 
USSR.59
55Kastytis Antanaitis, Lietuviskoji Sovietine Nomenklatura [The Soviet Lithuanian 
Nomenclature] (Kaunas: Vytauto Didziojo Universiteto leidykla, 1998), 49.
56Fowkes, 212-13.
57Tininis.
5&Obyasnitel'naya zapiska [An Explanatory Note], dated 5 May 1965, asked the 
central government to reverse the 12 October 1957 order which forbade some of the 
formerly deported to live in their homeland. Sabbo, 1082-83.
59In 1959, the Latvian Communists, led by Eduards Berklavs, attempted to reverse 
the demographic trend by resisting ethnic restructuring. A purge of 2,000 Latvian 
“national Communists” was undertaken in July 1959. Berklavs was deported to Siberia. 
Dreifelds. 45-46. Estonia experienced a similar purge in 1950-51. Also see Taagepera,
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Resistance to ethnic restructuring came not only from “above,” but also from 
“below.” During the forties and fifties, many Baltic deportees wrote to numerous 
institutions asking to revise their cases and to let them return to their homeland. Out of 
thousands of pleas only 278 were satisfied in 1951-52.60 However, there is evidence 
suggesting that family reunions were allowed.
The letters seized by the secret police suggest that many tried to escape, especially 
after the end of World War II: “Do not just wait there, wrote one deportee to those still in 
Siberia, sell everything and go back to Lithuania. W hile traveling speak Russian all the 
time, dress like Russians do, and nobody will ask you for documents.61
On 27 March 1953, the USSR Supreme Soviet declared amnesty for some 
deportees. Between 1954 and 1958, approximately 22,200 people (mostly ethnic 
Lithuanians) came back to Lithuania from the places o f deportation. Approximately 
71.522 survivors were allowed to settle in Lithuania.62 In 1957, commissions for 
rehabilitation were set up in the three Baltic republics, but the number of people 
rehabilitated was not substantial. In Latvia’s case, approximately 8.5% (13,480) of all 
people deported in 1949 were allowed to return63 Homecoming continued until 1961.
Estonia: Return to Independence, 85.
^Bougai, The Deportation o f  Peoples in the Soviet Union, 170.
61Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, 
collection K -l, file 10-39.
62The number for those who returned is from Lietuviai pasaulyje [Lithuanians in 
the World] (Vilnius: Rosma, 1998), 13. Other sources indicate that an approximate 
number of 22,200 families of those formerly deported have returned to Lithuania. 
Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Lietuvos gyventojij dinamika ir jos [taka gyventojij skaiciui, 
tautiniam pasiskirstvmui 5-6-ajame desimtmetyje” [The Dynamics of the Lithuanian 
Residents and Its Influence for the Num ber of Residents, and Their Ethnic Division in the 
Fifties and Sixties], Darbai 1 (1996): 109.
63Sabbo, 1087.
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Approximately 31,000 survivors resettled to Soviet Latvia.64 Ani, the M inister of Social 
Order in Estonian SSR, reported that 2.280 people were rehabilitated in the postwar 
years.65 From 1940 to 1989, 42,420 Estonians were repatriated from the East.66
However, permission to return home did not imply housing nor any civil rights. 
The passports of the previously deported were stamped, and access to universities, trips 
abroad, or certain jobs was strictly limited. Their family members also faced sim ilar 
restrictions. Lietuvos Baznycios Kronika, a publication of the Lithuanian resistance 
produced in Chicago, often published the letters of deportees.67 In 1975, K^stutis 
Jokubvnas wrote: "[After deportation], I got a passport with a stamp which is used to mark 
the passports of prisoners jailed for the worst crimes. It meant numerous restrictions." 
Even though Jokubynas was innocent, he wrote that after deportation "a chasm was 
opened in my life, and it is impossible to bridge it. . . .  I became invisible, unknown, 
silent."6*
This chasm— the experience of deportations— separated the deportees from the 
acquiescent members o f the Baltic Soviet societies. Coupled with nationality registration 
in the internal USSR passport, the experience of deportation also opened a chasm that was
^Latvijas Okupacijas Muzejs, Latvija zem Padomju Savienibas un 
nacionalsocialistiskas Vacijas varas [Latvia Under the Soviet and National-Socialist 
Rule] (Riga: Latvijas Okupacijas Muzejs, 1998), 147.
65Sabbo, 1076.
“ Juri Viikberg, “Estonians in Russia; Russians in Estonia. Some Comparisons,” 
in Keele ja  Kirjanduse Instituut, Oral Memory and National Identity: Papers fro m  the 
conference organized by the Institute o f  Language and Literature o f  the Estonian 
Academy o f  Sciences and the National Language Board o f  the Republic o f  Estonia in 
Tallinn, 18-19 September 1993 (Tallinn: Keele ja  Kiijanduse Instituut, 1994), 54-64.
Lietuvos Baznycios Kronika was a unique Lithuanian phenomenon. In Latvia, 
the Lutheran Church had very few possibilities to publish, and the publications were 
mostly limited to the church calendars. See Talonen, 293.
6XLietuvos Baznycios Kronika 19(1975): 184-87.
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separating the Russian speaking newcomers and noncompliant Latvians. Estonians and 
Lithuanians. Those who returned to their native towns had to compete with the Russian 
speaking newcomers for a place to live and other resources. From its inception, the Soviet 
regime regarded the Russian speakers as its core supporters, and extended a privileged 
access to scarce goods and services to many of them.69 The indigenous population 
clustered in the countryside, while the capital cities became a home to numerous Russian- 
speakers.'0 Thus, in 1979, the “titular” (territorial) nationals constituted 88.2% of rural 
population in Estonia, 73% in Latvia and 87.1% in Lithuania. They constituted only 32.2% 
of Tallinn residents, 40.9% o f Riga, and 42.8% of Vilnius.71
Migration into the Baltic Republics
Differences in migrant flows into the Baltic republics became apparent only in 
post-Stalinist years. As a matter of fact, mass migration into the Baltic republics did not 
start until the spring of 1941. In 1940, entry into the Baltic republics from other parts of 
the Soviet Union was highly selective. Only members of the Communist party and other 
important organs of the state were allowed to come to the Baltic republics.72
69The Soviets started the “cleansing of the cities from the unwanted” as early as 
1940 by introducing passport regime. They openly identified the Russian speakers living 
in Petschory region as the core basis of their new regime. Sabbo, 681-85.
70E.g., in 1989, ethnic Russians constituted 20.2% in Vilnius, 36.5% in Riga, and 
41.2% in Tallinn. Georgiy I. Mirsky, On Ruins o f  Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in 
the Former Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1997), 146.
’Boris Meissner, “The Change in the Social Structure of Estonia,” in Regional 
Identity Under the Soviet Rule: The Case o f  the Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber. V. 
Stanley Vardys, and Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown. N.J.: Institute for the Study 
of Law, Politics, and Society o f Socialist States, 1990), 168.
72Liudas Truska, “Lietuvos valdzios jstaigij rusifikavimas 1940-1941” [The
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
127
Since most of the members of the Baltic intelligentsia and most civil servants had 
been deported or repressed in 1940-41. the new regime lacked people. Soviet 
collaborators in Estonia sent a note to A. A. Andreyev. Secretary o f the Central Committee 
of the Soviet Communist Party, in which they wrote that "despite the fact that many young 
Communists were incorporated into the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist 
Party, there is a dire necessity to strengthen many aspects of the party’s activities. We ask 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party to send experienced Communists of 
Estonian nationality to Estonia."73 Moscow responded readily to such invitations. In 
addition to the Communists of Baltic nationality, it sent numerous Russians. The most 
populous inflow o f Russian speakers started in mid-1941, after the first mass deportation 
of the Baltic peoples. At that time, the greatest number of new Russian-speaking migrants 
worked for those state institutions responsible for carrying out acts of repression, such as 
the militia, the Communist party, or the secret police.74
After World W ar II. the percentage of Russian speakers increased from 8.2%
(1934) to 30.3% (1989) in Estonia, 8.8% (1935) to 34% (1989) in Latvia and 2.5%(1923) 
to 8.6% (1989) in Lithuania. At the same time, the percentage comprised by indigenous 
ethnic groups declined from 88.2% (1934) to 61.5% (1989) in Estonia, 77% (1935) to 52% 
(1989) in Latvia, but increased from 69.2% (1923) to 80.1% (1989) in Lithuania (Table 2). 
The exact number o f Russian speakers who came to the Baltic states is still unknown, but 
the peak of the influx probably occurred during the postwar years. About 400,000
Russification of the Lithuanian Political Institutions. 1940-1941], Darbai 1 (1999): 7.
7jA note dated 14 January 1941, in Sabbo, 730-32.
7JTruska, “Lietuvos valdzios jstaigij rusifikavimas 1940-1941” [The Russification 
of the Lithuanian Political Institutions, 1940-1941], 7.
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Russians and 100,000 people of other nationalities immigrated into Latvia from 1945 to 
1959, which was equivalent to 25% of the prewar population.'5 In comparison, at least 
60.469 were deported during that time (Table 1). In 1951-90, 2, 171,033 immigrants 
came to Latvia, some of whom settled for a longer period of time.76 More than 213,000 
non-Estonians came to Estonia in 1945-53 (19% of prewar population),77 while at least 
40.455 were deported. During 1945-89, 1.4 million (mostly) Russian speakers traversed 
the country (not including the military personnel). From 1944 to 1959, at least 150.000 
Russian speakers immigrated to Lithuania,'8 and approximately 132,000 people were 
deported. These numbers suggest that Latvia has experienced the highest level of ethnic 
restructuring, and Lithuania—the lowest.
The influx o f Russian speakers bothered the indigenous populations. Reports of 
the former Secret police and the intercepted letters to be sent abroad attest to the existence 
of severe ethnic polarization in the Baltic states, especially until 1953. when deportations 
were still being conducted.
75Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years o f  
Dependence, 1940-1990 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993), 112.
76Ausma Tabuna, “Migracija Latvija un Jedzlvotaju Attieksme pret Migration” 
[Migration in Latvia and the Attitudes of the Population Towards the Migrants], in 
Sabiedribas Pannaipas Latvija [Social Changes in Latvia], ed. Alvars Tabuns (Riga: 
Jumava, 1998), 174.
7'Misiunas and Taagepera. 112. Other sources quote more than 240,000 people 
who came to Estonia in 1945-50. See Estonian Institute, Report on Ethnic Issues in 
Estonia (February 2000). Available from http://www.einst.ee/sociery/ethnic_issues.htm: 
INTERNET.
78Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Lietuvos gyventoji} dinamika ir jos jtaka gyventojq 
skaiciui. tautiniam pasiskirstvmui 5-6-ajame desimtmetyje” [The Dynamics o f the 
Lithuanian Residents and Its Influence for the Number of Residents, and Their Ethnic 
Division in the Fifties and Sixties], 109.
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Table 2. Change in Ethnic Composition of the Populations of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania
Pre-1940 1959 Census 1989 Census 1998-1999
1934 1999
ESTONIA
Estonian 88.2% 74.6% 61.5% 65.20%
Russian 8.2% 20.1% 30.3% 28.09%
German 1.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.09%
Jewish 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.16%
Other 1.7% 4.7% 7.7% 6.46%*




Latvian 77.0% 62.0% 52.0% 55.7%
Russian 8.8% 26.6% 34.0% 32.3 %
Jewish 4.9% 1.7% 0.9% 0.4 %
German 3.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1 %
Other 6.0% 9.6% 9.3 % 11.5%**
Total Population
(million) 1.905 2.094 2.667 2.439445
LITHUANIA 1923 1970 1998
Lithuanian 83.88% 80.1% 79.6% 82.26%
Russian 2.49% 8.6% 9.4% 8.21%
Jewish 7.58% 0.8% 0.3% 0.16%
Polish 3.23 % 7.7% 7.0 % 6.84%
Other 2.82% 2.8% 3.7% 2.53%***
Total Population 2.62 2.756 3.675 3.653
(million) (1960)
Notes:
* Ukrainians (2.54%) constitute the second largest minority (after the Russians).
** Byelorussians (3.9%) constitute the second largest minority (after the Russians).
***Byelorussians (1.23%) constitute the third largest minority (after the Russians and the Polish).




Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia Statistical Yearbook o f  Lari’ia. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of 
Latvia. 1999.
Dreifelds.
EU. Briefing 42: The Russian Minority in the Baltic States and the Enlargement o f  the EU. Luxembourg: 
European Parliament, 1999.
Krupavicius. Algis. ed. Seimo rinkimai'96: Treaasis atmetimas [Election to the Parliament’96: The Third 
Rejection]. Vilnius: Tverme. 199S.
Raun. Toivo U. "Democratization and Political Development in Estonia. 1987-96." In The Consolidation 
o f Democracy in East-Central Europe. ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1997.
Statistical Office of Estonia Statistical Yearbook o f Estonia. Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. 1999.
E.g.. one such letter reads, "Many Lithuanians are banished to Siberia. At the 
same time, bearded young Soviet specialists are coming by cars and by foot from the East. 
These are our new masters, who are coming here to teach us. It is a pity, however, that 
they do not do much, only talk, and nothing is coming out of this."79 Or another one: "The 
Russians are deporting our people. But the time will come soon, when we will retaliate. 
But we will not deport them. Instead, we will hang them."80 Competing for scarce 
resources often aroused muted feelings of deprivation: "They (i.e., the state) would not 
give us a flat. They didn’t give us one, the queues are long. And some of the more
,9A letter by Palukaitis. dated 11 September 1946. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas 
[The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K-l, file 10-39.
80Kostas Staniunas, quoted by General-Lieulenant Gorminski in a letter by 
Palukaitis. dated 11 September 1946. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special 
Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l, file 10-39.
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powerful queues—I'm referring to the Russians—those move more quickly, but [for] 
ordinary people, the indigenous people, they do not only don't move forward but the 
queue gets longer all the time. . . .  [1 went to] to the executive committee and realiz[ed] I 
had no rights where I stood."81
A survey of emigres from the USSR conducted in Germany in the late seventies 
suggests that the influx of Russians to the Baltic states has resulted in the perceptions on 
behalf of the local residents that the "native power (i.e.. the power of the local residents) is 
decreasing." To cite a statement from the survey: "The power of Latvian decreases. Fewer 
are bom there, more die, and if one Latvian gets into governing there are two Russians 
[there] for him, the Latvian has to dance as the Russians call the tune. Voss (the Latvian 
Communist leader) now does everything that Brezhnev wants."82 Similar opinions were 
voiced in 1981 in Riga during interviews conducted by a Western journalist: "The 
factories (built in seventies and eighties in Latvia) could be anywhere in the Soviet Union, 
but they put them here to dilute our population. I tell my children to have nothing to do 
with the incoming Russians. They don’t belong here." "I’ve been fighting Russians all 
my life. In school we don’t mix."8'’
Those who experienced antipathy toward the Russian speakers sometimes found 
themselves distanced from other minorities residing in the Baltic states because the latter 
were, by and large, absorbed by linguistic and cultural russification. Ethnic tensions were
81Skultans, 115-16.
82National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Executive Summary o f  
a Research Project on Soviet Ethnic Relations (an unpublished draft, 1979), 14. The 
study is currently kept in the Open Society Archives. Budapest, collection 300, file 
80/1/547.
8'”Baltic States Worried About the Influx of Russians.” Radio Liberty Research 
Note (14 November, 1981).
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present in eastern Lithuania between the local Poles who often preferred Russian-language 
schools to Lithuanian ones.
On the other hand, the attitude of most incoming Russian speakers was that they 
were not minority groups outside Russia. As Nikolai Rudensky has argued, "[the Russians 
outside Russia] considered themselves to be representatives of the dominant nation in the 
multinational state. . . . Because of this basic attitude, most Russians felt no need to 
master local languages and traditions. Many of them, in fact, showed contempt for the 
cultural patterns of their ethnic environment, which could hardly improve their relations 
with native ethnic group.”84
During the postwar years, communication (other than interaction in the public 
domain) between the newcomers and the indigenous population must have been rare 
because after twenty years of independent statehood (1918-39) the majority of the Balts 
w ere not able to speak Russian, and vice versa.85 It took ten to twenty years for a change 
to occur. In the seventies, at least one half of Baltic populations claimed to know' 
Russian.86
In addition to the influx of Russian speakers to the Baltic states, there were several 
other, less visible waves of migration during the postwar years, such as forced repatriation 
from the Western territories, the return of emigrants who had gone to South America and
84Mirsky, 148.
85Despite intense russification pursued by czarist Russia in the Baltic states and 
Finland in 1850-1914, building national states w'ith a Latvian (also Estonian and 
Lithuanian) cultural content was a priority in 1918-19. This strengthened the knowledge 
of national languages. Edward C. Thaden. Michael H. Hatzel, C. Leonard Lundin, and 
Toivo Raun, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981).
80Aleksei Repin. “Vzgl’yad so storony” [An O utsider’s View'], Raduga 10 (1988):
83.
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other non-European territories in 1955-61. and population exchanges. Another wave of 
migrants came to Lithuania following the treaty between the Lithuanian SSR and Poland, 
signed in September 1944. In 1944-46, a population exchange between Lithuania and 
Poland took place. 171,158 people— former citizens of Poland who identified themselves 
as Poles and Jews— left Lithuania, but many Poles and Byelorussians came to Lithuania 
from the neighboring territories.87 The newcomers usually settled in the area around 
Vilnius, which had been previously inhabited by Poles.
The second population exchange between Poland and Lithuania was, until recently, 
virtually unknown. In 1956-59 about 48,600 people were repatriated from Lithuania to 
Poland. Repatriation to Poland was viewed as a step toward a freer world. Having found 
out about this population exchange, many deportees who were still in Siberia tried to 
identify themselves as Poles in order to get away from their places of deportation. At the 
same time, similarly to 1944-46, there was immigration of Poles and Byelorussians to 
Lithuania. That is why, even after this population exchange, the number of Poles residing 
in Lithuania did not change dramatically.88
Despite these waves of migration, Lithuania retained its ethnic homogeneity due to 
two factors: the policies of Antanas Snieckus, who insisted that Lithuania remains an 
agricultural republic, and fierce armed resistance. In those places where the partisan war 
was very intense, the influx of Russian-speaking immigrants was lower than in
8'The Polish sources cite 197,156. Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Vilniaus Krasto 
Gvventoji} Sudeties Pokyciai” [Changes in the Population Structure in the Vilnius Region 
1939-46], in Lietuvos Rytai [Lithuania’s East], ed. Kazimieras Garsva and Laima 
Grumadiene (Vilnius: Valstybinis Leidybos Centras, 1993), 292.
88Nastazija Kairiukstyte," 1956-59 mety repatriacija is LSSR [ LLR” [1956-59 
Repatriation from Lithuanian SSR to Polish People’s Republic], Lietuvos istorijos 
metrasiis (1996): 274-91.
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acquiescent areas.89 On the other hand. Snieckus' vision of Lithuania as mostly 
agricultural republic reduced the need for industrial workers. In 1953, Snieckus even 
pushed out some Russian speakers who resisted Snieckus’ policies. In November 1953. 
approximately 3.000 Russian speakers left the country. In 1959, the state, party, and 
economic sectors of the Lithuanian SSR were 70% Lithuanian, compared to 40-50% in 
1953.90 These facts do not imply, however, that Snieckus was tolerant o f any display of 
Lithuanian nationalism. He ruthlessly suppressed any opposition.
When it came to the implementation of the regulations of Soviet nationalities 
policy other than deportation or migration, such as teaching history or language policies, 
the Baltic Soviet elites also complied with most of the rules, although sometimes 
unwillingly. Eastern Lithuania and language politics in this region is a case in point. 
Eastern Lithuania is an area around Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, and its population was 
heavily restructured during the interwar period and during Soviet times.91 In 1950, 
Mecislovas Gedvilas and Justas Paleckis, Lithuanian party functionaries, suggested 
teaching Lithuanian instead of Polish in addition to Russian in Eastern Lithuania, arguing 
that Poles in that area were in fact "polonized Lithuanians and Byelorussians," and that 
teaching in Polish in those areas was the continuation of polonization pursued by
89Nijole Gaskaite-Zemaitiene, “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The 
Strategy of the Lithuanian Movement for Independence], Genocidas ir Rezistencija 1, no. 
5 (1999): 33.
^Tininis, 69.
91 According to 1989 census, Lithuanians constituted 50.6%, Poles 18.8%,
Russians 20.2%, and other nationalities 10.4% in this region. During the interwar period. 
Poland resettled 150,000 ethnic Poles to this region. Halina Turska, O proiskhozhdenii 
pol'skoyazychnykh cirealov v Vil’nyuskom kraye [On the Origin of Polish Speaking 
Regions in the Area of Vilnius] (Vilnius: Mintis, 1995). 85.
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"bourgeois" Poland.92 Moscow disapproved, and the proposal was denounced as 
nationalist. In mid-fifties, the Soviet Lithuanian intelligentsia became involved in another 
campaign of promoting the Lithuanian language, arguing that after the population 
exchanges with Poland the "real” Poles left and that there was no need to continue 
teaching Polish in that area. This time, local Polish leaders complained directly to 
Moscow, thus putting the campaign of lithuanization to an end.93 After the influx of 
Russian speakers in the sixties and seventies, the Russian language began to slowly push 
out Polish and Byelorussian languages.94 Thus, similarly to the northeastern Estonia (the 
Narva region) and southeastern Latvia (Latgale), eastern Lithuania became an ethnic 
enclave, heavily populated with Russian and Polish speakers.
The heavy concentration o f Russian speakers in northeastern Estonia is a result of 
forced industrialization and related mass migration in the 1960s and 1970s, which, at its 
height, amounted to 20,000-30,000 people per year. Three quarters of newcomers settled 
in Ida-Virumaa and Narva regions, thus creating an ethnic enclave.95 Even though 
Latgale, a former Polish territory, was multiethnic prior to Soviet times, its ethnic 
composition was radically changed by migration during the 1960s and 1970s. In early 
nineties, only 15% of the population was Latvian. 55% was Russian, 9% Byelorussian,
92Petras Kalnius, Etniniai procesai Pietryciif Lietuvoje XX amziaus II-ojoje puseje 
[Ethnic Processes in Southeastern Lithuania in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century] 
(Vilnius: 2ara, 1998), 47.
9jAntanaitis, 50.
94This is a finding of a jo in t Polish Lithuanian research group. Office for 
Statistical Publications. Lenkai Lietuvoje-Lietuviai Lenkijoje [Poles in Lithuania, and the 
Lithuanians in Poland] (Warsaw: Office for Statistical Publications, 1995), 32.
95Ilga Apine, “Nationality Policy in the Baltic States,” in The Baltic States at 
Historical Crossroads. ed. Talavs Jundzis (Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia, 1998), 
363.
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and the rest were mostly Russian speakers.96
Even though mass deportations ended in 1953, relations between newcomers and 
autochthonous residents were marred by memories about deportations. To make the 
matters worse, during the Soviet times, open criticism of deportations in Lithuania was not 
welcome and even silenced. In Latvia and Estonia, the atmosphere was somewhat more 
relaxed. In 1956. Estonian Rudolf Sirge (1904-70) wrote a novel Maa ja  rahvas [The 
Land and the People], which although otherwise pro-Soviet, included a realistic 
deportation scene and caused a sensation in Estonia. In Catholic Lithuania, embitterments 
were embodied by the crosses in Kryziij kalnas [The Hill of Crosses], Also known as the 
mound of Meskuiciai, or the Hill of Prayers, this site became a "sacred" place to which 
people came to pray and to put up crosses, leave rosaries, holy pictures and statuettes 
mourning those who were deported or killed. The Soviet authorities tried to destroy the 
hill numerous times: The hill was bulldozed; the crosses were burnt, taken away or buried. 
Despite a close watch by the authorities, new crosses kept reappearing during the night. 
There were plans to flood the place, block the roads and make the Hill an inaccessible 
island. It was only in 1985 that the Hill was finally left in peace by the government. In 
addition to these symbolic and nonviolent acts of resistance, ethnic restructuring triggered 
the emergence of politically active groups.
96IIga Apine, “Tolerantnosf v Multikul’tumom obshchestve” [Tolerance in a 
Multicultural Society], in Multiculturalism Latvija: leorija un prakse [Multiculturaiism in 
Latvia: Theory and Practice], ed. R. Bramane (Daugavpils, Latvia: Multinational Culture 
Center, 1996), 55. The data is for 1994.
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REACTION TO ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING: THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICALLY 
ACTIVE GROUPS
Based on their relationship with the Soviet state and its ethnic restructuring 
policies, the groups who responded to ethnic restructuring in the Baltic states can be 
classified into three broad categories. The first group, or restorationists, defined 
themselves in direct opposition to the Soviet state and aimed to recreate independent 
Baltic states. This was the goal of armed resistance movements in the forties and fifties, 
and later this goal was embraced by dissidents. The second group, or internationalists, 
expressed their full support for the Soviet state, but opposed the restorationists. Sponsored 
by Moscow, this group consisted mostly of Russian speaking immigrants. It became 
visible in the late eighties, after the emergence of national independence movements in the 
Baltic states. Both restorationists and internationalists lived in a polarized world of “us’’ 
versus “them,’' and continuously asserted their identity in opposition to that of the other 
group.97
The third group, or compromisers, tried to oppose ethnic restructuring within the 
political limits established by the Soviet state. In fact, some of them even did not 
completely reject the Soviet state. This group included activists of cultural ethnic 
organizations who resisted russification, also folklore ensembles, and some church
members.
Emigration movements from the USSR were another form of resistance. After the
9'Rein Taagepera, “Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists. Centrists and 
Restorationists." Journal o f  Baltic Studies 20, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 177.
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anti-Jewish campaign in the USSR in 1948 and 1953, and especially in 1970s, many Baltic 
Jews emigrated to Israel.9s After World War II, members o f Zionist organizations fled the 
USSR via Poland." So did numerous other Balts. Many refused to return to their 
occupied homelands from displaced persons' camps in Germany, Sweden, and other 
western countries, resisting the attempts of the Soviets to bring them back. The Baltic 
western diaspora formed several groups with political demands resisting ethnic 
restructuring in exile. Their demands were often congruent with those of the first group, 
the restorationists, described in the segment that follows.
The Restorationists
Mass deportations, conducted in June 1941 and after World War D triggered armed 
resistance among the Baltic populations. One immediate goal of the resistance fighters 
was to prevent deportations and to revenge for those deported. “We warn you: do not let 
yourselves to be deported: find a place to hide and stay there until freedom comes. It will 
come soon,” wrote resistance fighters in their leaflets. “We wam all those who are 
organizing the deportations. There will be no pity for you!” 100
9SZvi Segal, “Jewish Minorities in the Baltic Republics in the Postwar Years,” in 
Regional Identity Under the Soviet Rule: The Case o f  the Baltic States, ed. Andre D. 
Loeber. V. Stanley Vardys, and Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for 
the Studu of Law', Politics, and Society of Socialist States, 1990), 230.
"The attempts of the Sionist organizations to flee the Baltic states and to help 
other Jews to migrate were known to the Soviet Secret police. This police killed many of 
those who tried to escape. “Perepiska po planu meropriyatiya ‘Kapkan’”
[Correspondence about the Undertaking “Kapkan,” 5 June 1948— 29 July 1952],
Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection 
K -l, file 2-9.
‘"Document 40 in Partizanai apie pasaulf, polilikq ir save: 1944-1956 partizantf
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The strongest resistance movement was in Lithuania. It started as early as October 
1940. when the Lithuanian National Front of Activists (LAF) was formed.101 One year 
later, numerous underground organizations— the Front of Lithuanians, the Union of 
Fighters for Lithuanian Freedom, the Lithuanian Army of Freedom, the Lithuanian 
Nationalist Party, and the Reform Movement of Lithuanian movement sprang, hoping to 
reestablish an independent Lithuanian state.102
Having found out about the return of the Soviets, the restorationists did not lose 
hope. A more radical wing of restorationists in Lithuania, Lietuvos laisves armija, LLA 
(The Lithuanian Army of Freedom) urged everyone to continue resistance. The LLA 
announced that it did not expect other states to help Lithuania and encouraged the 
Lithuanians to “control their own fate.”103 In 1944-45, the LLA became the leader of 
resistance. At that time (until summer 1945), there were approximately 30,000 partisans 
in Lithuania, and they were able to act throughout the whole territory of Lithuania, even 
though their forces were not consolidated.104 On 23 April 1946, during the first conference 
of the leaders of the Lithuanian resistance, a declaration was adopted which spelled out the 
main goal of the movement— to recreate a democratic Lithuanian state.105 The same
spaudos publikacijos [The Partisans about the World, Politics, and Themselves: 1944- 
1956 Publications in the Partisan Press], comp. Nijole Gaskaite-Zemaitiene (Vilnius: 
LGGRTC, 1998), 688.
101lts activities were coordinated from Berlin. The Soviet Secret police knew 
about its existence, and wrote in its reports: ‘There is a big organization in Lithuania 
which spies for Germany. There are approximately 700 people in this organization.” A 
note dated 4 May 1941. signed by Gladkov, Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special 
Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l, file 10-5.
102Valstybes zinios. 43.
l03Gaskaite-2emaitiene. “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The Strategy 
of the Lithuanian Movement for Independence], 24.
I04lgnatavicius, 261.
l05Gaskaite-2emaitiene. “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The Strategy
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goal—to recreate a free Republic of Lithuania and to fight against colonization—was 
reiterated by Lietuvos Laisves kovos sqjudis (the Movement for Lithuania’s Freedom), 
created in 1949. Hoping to prevent the decline o f armed resistance, the leaders of the 
partisans established this organization, uniting several branches of partisan movement.106 
However, even these attempts did not help: after deportations and collectivization, the 
partisan movement to restore Lithuania lost its momentum in the early fifties.
The Estonian metsavendlus [forest brothers] also harbored a hope to restore their 
independent state. This drive became particularly strong in mid-June 1941, following a 
mass deportation.107 After the return of the Soviets, the special forces (“destruction 
battalions") brutally suppressed armed resistance. All the men in some Estonian villages 
were killed. Local partisan groups were weakened and therefore were unable to provide 
protection for the population which was driven to deportation camps. According to the 
Soviet sources, 15,000 Estonian “forest brothers” were neutralized by 1947.108 Several 
years later, armed resistance in Estonia was subdued.
The Latvian meza braji [forest brothers] lasted until mid-fifties. The most intense 
fighting went on in 1945.109 After cruel repressions and collectivization, the activities of 
the partisans abated. Most Baltic partisans were either killed or deported.
of the Lithuanian Movement for Independence], 28.
106Document 270 in Partizanai apie pasaulf, politiky ir save: 1944-1956 partizany 
spaudos publikacijos [The Partisans about the World, Politics, and Themselves: 1944- 
1956 Publications in the Partisan Press], comp. Gaskaile-Zemaitiene, 688.
l0,Tiit Noormets, “Armed Resistance Movement and Guerilla War in Estonia in 
1941," Genocidas ir Rezistencija 2 (1997): 53.
108Mart Laar, War in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle fo r  Survival, 1945-1956 
(Washington, D.C.: Compass, 1992), 155.
109Henrihs Strods, Latvijas NacionMo Partizanu kars 1944-1956 [Latvia's 
National Partisan W ar 1944-1956] (Riga: Preses nams. 1996), 432-33.
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After the decline of the partisan movement, restorationist ideas were, by and large, 
exiled from the Baltic soil—either to the Soviet deportation camps or to the West. Based 
on their own experiences and partisans' reports,110 the Baltic diaspora in the West 
produced numerous political memorandums and historical works depicting the 
illegitimacy of the Soviet actions in the Baltics.111 The Baltic Information Centers in the 
Scandinavian countries and diasporas in the United States and Germany were the outlets 
for these works. Each year the Baltic American Freedom League and other emigre 
organizations arranged demonstrations to commemorate Soviet deportations, which they 
called the “Baltic Holocaust.”112 Poetry and prose written by the displaced to the 
deportation camps, coupled with the memories of the authors themselves became a part of 
the diaspora’s attempts to remind the United States and its Cold W ar allies about the 
“other" Europe. It became the backbone of the diaspora’s political arguments for non- 
recognition of the Baltic states as a part of the Soviet Union.
Those restorationists who were exiled to deportation camps had fewer channels to 
assert their ideas. However, surviving reports of the Secret police suggest that those 
opposing the Soviet state rebelled even in the places of deportation. Mobilization was 
especially strong during World W ar D.113 More often, however, the deportees expressed
ll0Until 1948, some partisans were able to escape to the West and record their 
experiences. Gaskaite-Zemaitiene, “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The 
Strategy of the Lithuanian Movement for Independence], 30.
‘"E.g., A Register o f Deported Lithuanians: Stalin 's Policy o f  Terror, 1940-1941, 
comp. Leonas Kerulis (Chicago: Lithuanian World Archives, 1981), Lithuanians in 
Siberia: Lietuviai Sibire. ed. Juozas Prunskis (Chicago: Lithuanian Library Press, 1981), 
and Ants Oras. The Baltic Eclipse (London: Victor Gollanz. 1948).
"■“Baltic Holocaust Is Recalled by Those W ho Lived,” Radio Free Europe B- 
WIRE (13 June, 1983).
"'There are reports suggesting that in 1942 “the representatives o f the nations 
fighting against the USSR were especially active.” Sabbo, 1135. Memoirs of the former
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their disappointment in their letters, memoirs, and poems. Thus, memoirs and poems, 
written on pieces of sack material or on birch bark in the deportation camps and then 
tucked away, became another form of resistance. For each poem, if caught, the deportees 
were facing five more years of deportation. After Khrushchev’s amnesty, when many 
former deportees became leading dissidents, their memoirs and poems, written in the 
deportation camps, found their way into sam izdat (underground) publications and became 
an accusation of the Soviet system.
The analysis of the Baltic samizdat contents and recovered Secret police reports 
suggests that the Baltic dissident movements continuously asserted their right to restore 
the Baltic states."4 To illustrate, in the Program of the Democratic Movement of the 
Soviet Union, the anonymous Baltic authors asserted this right, arguing that “the road to 
national liberation lies through democratization of the entire Soviet society.” " 5 National 
independence was deemed as the only cure for demographic changes inflicted on the 
Baltic states by the Soviet Union."6
deportees attest that there were numerous strikes in the camps. Juozas Krakauskas, 
comp., Vorkutos politiniif kalinitj atsim inim ai [Memoirs of Political Prisoners in Vorkuta] 
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 1998), 30-38.
ll4The major goals and actions o f the Latvian dissident movement were aptly 
summarized in a conversation between Calytis, a Latvian dissident, and a Secret police 
agent. Calytis argued that the dissidents should try to gain trust of the intelligentsia and 
use its discontent with the current situation. Furthermore, he wanted to establish links 
with international organizations, such as the United Nations, and Baltic diaspora groups. 
Indulis Zallte, “Pagrindines neprievartinio pasipriesinimo formos ir slaptasis 
nacionalizmas” [The Main Forms of Nonviolent Resistance and Secret Nationalism], 
Genocidas ir Rezistencija 2 (1997): 118.
" 5Dzintra Bungs. “Joint Political Initiatives by Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians as Reflected in Samizdat m aterials— 1969-1987,” in Regional Identity Under 
the Soviet Rule: The Case o f the Baltic S ta tes , ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys, 
and Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for the Study of Law, Politics, 
and Society of Socialist States, 1990), 430.
"°This was the position of the Association of Concerned Estonians. Latvia's
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Predictably, embitterments about ethnic restructuring and russification were often 
invoked in the letters written by dissidents to international organizations. For example, in 
their letter addressed to the UN Secretary General w hich protested against a campaign of 
russification, a group of Lithuanian dissidents w'rote: “We, Lithuanians, feel somewhat 
disenchanted: why has the United Nations ignored . . .  numerous injustices inflicted by the 
USSR?” 117
Naturally, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
signed on 1 August 1975, was an impulse for intensified dissident activities. Numerous 
societal groups went public to record how Helsinki accords were implemented. The more 
radical restorationists, such as Lietuvos Lais\>es Lyga (the Lithuanian Freedom League), 
published appeals to the Russian nation, accusing the latter of genocide vis-a-vis the 
Balts.118 Radical restorationists also reprimanded the Russian dissidents who were, in their 
eyes, unw'illing to admit the guilt of the Russian nation vis-a-vis the Balts.119 However, 
these groups were promptly stifled by the Soviet state.
The second thaw, w'hich started in 1986. instantly awakened the restorationist 
movement. In 1986, a chapter of the human rights group Helsinki ’86 was formed by blue 
collar workers in the city of Liepaja in Latvia. Helsinki ’86 organized a series of 
demonstrations to commemorate the events of 14 June 1941 (the date of mass
Independence Movement, and Lithuanian Freedom League. These organizations were 
active during the seventies. Aina Zarips, “Dissent in the Baltic Republics: A Survey of 
Grievances and Hopes.” Radio Liberty Research Note (14 December, 1976).
117Stasys Stungurys. Sauletekio linkui [Towards Sunrise] (Vilnius: Margi rastai,
1998), 80.
,182ivile Rackauskaite, “Pasipriesinimas sovietiniam rezimui Lietuvoje 
asiuntajame desimimetyje” [Resistance to the Soviet Regime in Lithuania during the 
Seventies]. Genocidas ir Rezistencija 2 (1999): 95.
ll9Ibid., 94.
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deportations). In addition to stirring up rebellious feelings against the Soviet state. 
Helsinki ’86 pushed the Latvian Communist Party to reconsider the official interpretation 
of Latvian history. On 14 June 1987 (the day of mass deportations in 1941), despite the 
arrest of its leaders, Helsinki ’86 organized several thousand demonstrators to march to the 
Freedom monument in Riga and lay flowers. 14 June 1987 was the largest demonstration 
which sparked the following waves o f demonstrations in the Baltic states.120
On 25 March 1988, rallies were held to commemorate the mass deportations of 
1949. On 22 May 1988. memorial services were held simultaneously in Vilnius, Kaunas, 
and Riga to commemorate the 132,000 Lithuanians who were deported to Siberia. One 
year later, on 14 June 1989, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Cathedral in 
Riga to once again commemorate the 1941 deportation. Thus, the calendars of the three 
Baltic nations were marked with a new date—14 June 1941. Since then, this day became 
known as the Day of Sorrow and Remembrance.
By invoking memories about displacement and illegal occupation of the Soviet 
Union, the restorationists became powerful political groups in all three Baltic states. Mass 
rallies often coincided with moving public acts of commemoration, such as reburial of the 
bones of compatriots. Beginning in 1988, thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians and 
Estonians went to look for the graves of relatives who had been deported to Siberia. Some 
of the remains were brought back by plane. According to the Lithuanian Union of 
Political Prisoners and Deportees, since 1989 the remains of approximately 10,000 
deportees have been brought back to Lithuania from Siberia. Vytautas Landsbergis. the 
former leader of S^judis. the Lithuanian restorationist movement, captured the mood in his
l20Karklins, 70.
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memoirs: "In the wilderness of Siberia, from the Arctic Ocean to Altay and Kazakhstan, 
there are graveyards containing the remains of nothing but Lithuanians. Some of them 
have survived. People went there, and, having found the graves of their relatives, took 
care of them. Some of the remains were brought back, and re-buried in the homeland. 
Many graves are unknown."121
During the revival period, collecting the bones o f the compatriots and re-burying 
them in the Baltic states became a symbolic act of remembrance and a powerful source of 
legitimacy for the restorationist cause. Establishing a link between the armed resistance 
movements and the restorationist movements was another source of legitimacy. Thus, the 
name of Sqjudis [Movement], the Lithuanian restorationist movement, stems from the 
unified resistance organization active in 1949.
In addition, the restorationists began to reveal past injustices. The Estonian 
Heritage Society, one of the first civic restorationist organizations in Estonia, began by 
filling in the blanks in Estonia’s history. In 1988. the Estonian historian Mart Laar, the 
leader of this organization, published a series of articles entitled Vremia Koshmarov [The 
Time of Nightmares] about the fate of three villages in Estonia, the inhabitants of which 
perished from the activity of the "destruction battalions" during the summer o f 1941. The 
articles, based on research conducted by the Estonian Heritage Society, caused a sensation. 
The next year, the historian found himself in court: both Laar and the editors of the journal 
in which his articles appeared were accused of lacking evidence and of "a possible attempt 
to undermine the Soviet state." Half a year later, the case was dropped because
l2lVvtautas Landsbergis. Luzis prie Baltijos [A Change at the Baltic] (Vilnius: 
Vaga. 1997). 89.
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prosecutors were unable to show any "proof of misconduct.” Several years later, Laar 
became the Prime Minister of Estonia.'”  Mart Laar’s transformation is an excellent 
example of the entanglement between history and politics during this period.
A controversy that shook the Soviet Estonian establishment began when the 
cultural weekly Sirp ja  Vasar [Hammer and Sickle] published Evald Laasi’s survey of 
Estonians deported under Stalin.123 Under pressure from the Estonian people, the Supreme 
Council of the Estonian SSR passed a resolution condemning the repressions that were 
carried out by the Soviet regime during 1940-53.
In Latvia, the human rights group Helsinki’86 activated the discussion of the 
deportations and other repressions in media. On 25 March 1989, a special issue o f the 
journal Literatura tin Maksla [Literature and Art] focused on the mass deportations o f 14 
June 1941, and 25 March 1949, and outlined a project for gathering and publishing 
materials and the personal testimony of the victims. Societies and clubs founded by the 
victims of Stalinist repression, the Latvian Writers Union and committees formed to 
investigate the crimes committed under Stalin were proliferating.124 The demonstration on 
14 June 1987, which was organized by Helsinkj’86, helped to lift the taboo from the topic 
of deportations in Latvian society.125
122Toivo Kamenik, “The Estonian Practice Investigating Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes,” paper presented at the Conference “Investigation of the 
Problems of Crimes Against Humanity and W ar Crim es” on 5 November 1998 in Seimas 
(the parliament of Lithuania), Vilnius.
12'Dzintra Bungs, “Deportations of Balts to the USSR: Still an Uncomfortable 
Subject for the Soviet Authorities.” Radio Liberty Report (7 June, 1988).
l24Karlis Racevskis, “Voices from Gulag: A Review Essay,” Journal o f Baltic 
Studies 24, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 299.
l25Only after the 14 June 1987 demonstration the Latvian press began to discuss 
the topic freely. The ground-breaking article was written by Arturs Skuburs in the 
teachers' weekly Skolotaju Avize who refuted standard interpretation of deportations by
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Another aspect of the restorationist movements was to record the names of the 
deponed and otherwise repressed. This work—recording the names of the deported— was 
later undertaken by the Commission for Research into Stalinist Crimes Committed in 
Lithuania, a research center in Latvia and Memento, the Association of the Illegally 
Repressed, in Estonia. These lists are a site of memory. Enumerating thousands of names 
with similar stories, they represent the fate of family members, neighbors, or 
acquaintances— those who underwent forced resettlement or who knew someone who did.
In January 1989, however, different lists began to be compiled. The Estonian 
Heritage Society, which had begun by filling in the blanks in Estonia’s history, called for 
the creation of a congress elected exclusively by pre-1940 citizens and their descendants. 
Citizens Committees, which were widely supported by former political prisoners and 
deportees, began to register the names of all citizens of the interwar republic and their 
descendants. The idea of a relationship between nation and state began to crystallize. In 
198S-90. the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics adopted laws declaring the 
restoration of independence and constitutional amendments declaring Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian the state languages.
The "Internationalists”
The activities of the restorationists and especially their goal to recreate independent 
nation states aggravated the supporters of the Soviet stale. Together with public
historian Janis Riekstins. Dzintra Bungs, “Deportations of Balls to the USSR: Still an 
Uncomfortable Subject for the Soviet Authorities.” Radio Liberty Report (7 June, 1988).
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commemorations of the formerly deported, embitterments spilled out onto the streets.
Thus a former deportee observed that he found it very vexing to hear some Russian 
speakers on the streets of Riga employing the particular insult aimed at Latvians that was a 
feature of the language of labor camp guards.126 On the other hand, many Russian 
speakers felt threatened by the visible actions of the restorationists. In 1988, 
Intennovements (social movements supported by the conservatives from Moscow) were 
proclaimed in opposition to popular restorationist movements in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The newspapers put out by the Intermovements lamented about 
commemorations of the Soviet deportations initiated by the restorationists. referring to the 
latter as “national-socialists,” and called to build more monuments for those killed by the 
“forest brothers”— i.e., mostly supporters of the Soviet regime.12'
The internationalists drew their support mostly from Russian speakers. A poll 
taken in late 1988 in Latvia indicates that 48% of Russians in Latvia supported the 
Intennovement, while only 6% of the Latvians did.128 A similar poll taken in 1989 in 
Estonia suggests that the Intermovement was supported only by non-Estonians (10.9% of 
non-Estonian inhabitants).129 Public opinion data of 1989 from Lithuania implies that 
Yedinstvo (Lithuania’s Intennovement) was supported only by non-Lithuanians (13% of 
non-Lithuanian inhabitants).130
The internationalists, represented by the Intennovement and the Joint Council of
126Ibid.
12,“For Some— Memory, for Others— Forgetting?.” Vestnik ID  (Estonia) (9 July. 
19S9). “Who Are the Real Occupiers,” Yedinst\>o (Latvia) (9 July, 1989).
128Dreifelds, 60.
129Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence, 150.
1?0Vladas Gaidys and Danute Tureikyte, Nuomones 1989-1994 [Opinions 1989- 
1994] (Vilnius: Filosofijos. sociologijos ir leises institutas. 1994), 47.
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Labor Collectives (labor unions) in Estonia, Yedinstvo (“Unity”) in Lithuania, and the 
Intennovement in Latvia, found most of their supporters in ethnic enclaves of the three 
states. In April 1989, the Latvian Russian speakers who embraced orthodox Communist 
views were demanding for a territorial autonomy in Daugavpils.131
In 1990, pro-Moscow deputies of the Estonian Supreme Council and other pro- 
Soviet organizations met in Kohtla-Jarve (northeastern Estonia) to establish the 
Interregional Soviet, which conducted an unofficial referendum asking whether the 
population approved of Estonia remaining within the USSR. In Tallinn, Narva and 
Kohtla-Jarve 92-96% of those voting approved of Estonia staying within the USSR.132 In 
1989. the local government of Vilnius region declared a territorial autonomy and 
demanded to be within the Soviet Union.133 In 1990, only 9% of Russians and 10% of 
Poles in eastern Lithuania supported the independent Lithuanian state.134
I31V. Menshikov. “Sotsiologicheskiye problemy multikul’tumogo obshchestva” 
[Social problems of a Multicultural Society], in Multiculturalism Latvija: teorija un 
prakse [Multiculturalism in Latvia: Theory and Practice], ed. R. Bramane (Daugavpils, 
Latvia: Multinational Culture Center. 1996), 101.
I32Klara Hallik, “Ethnopolitical Conflict in Estonia,” in Ethnic Conflict in the 
Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose 
Gottemoeller, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, and Lee Walker (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996), 101.
'•3A. Brodavskis, “A letter to Michael Gorbachev,” in Lietuvos Rytai [Lithuania’s 
East], ed. Kazimieras Garsva and Laima Grumadiene (Vilnius: Valstybinis Leidybos 
Centras, 1993). 383.
,34Arunas Eigirdas, “Pietryciy Lietuvos gyventojai” [The Inhabitants of 
Southeastern Lithuania], in Lietuvos Mokslo akademija, Pietrycii/ Lietuva: Socialiniai 
teisiniai aspektai [Southeastern Lithuania: Social and Legal Aspects] (Vilnius: Lietuvos 
Mokslo akademija, 1990). 42.




In addition to the two types of polarized political movements, there were other 
groups and individuals—cultural organizations, religious groups, or folklore 
ensembles— whose responses to ethnic restructuring were less noticeable, but more people 
could associate themselves with such groups even during the Soviet times. Commitment to 
Catholic and Lutheran religious beliefs provided the Balts w'ith strong ties to Western 
Europe and the United States, which helped to sustain underground publications and, 
especially in the case of Lithuania, voice protest against ethnic restructuring and other 
aspects of the Soviet nationalities policy.135
The rise of the folklore movement started in the sixties: students and intelligentsia 
gathered in small groups to leam folk songs, study history, and pagan religion.136 This 
movement continued until mid-eighties. Folklore groups were proliferating. To illustrate, 
in Lithuania, the number of such groups increased from 5,000 in 1964 to 64,000 in
1977 157
l35V. Stanley Vardys, ‘T h e  Role of the Churches in the Maintenance of Regional 
and National Identity in the Baltic Republics,” in Regional Identity Under the Soviet 
Rule: The Case o f  the Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys, and 
Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for the Study of Law, Politics, and 
Society of Socialist States, 1990), 152.
I36Romualdas Apanavicius, “Sovietizmas ir lietuviij etnine kultura” [The Soviet 
Times and Lithuanian Ethnic Culture], in Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija, Priklausomybes 
met if (1940-1990) lietuvit/ visuomene: pasipriesinimas ir/ar prisitaikymas [The 
Lithuanian Society During the Years of Dependence (1940-1990): Resistance and/or 
Adaptation] (Vilnius: Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija, 1996).
l3/Jonas Trinkunas, “Autentiskos liaudies kulturos paieskos 7-8 desimtmetyje” 
[Looking for Authentic Folk Culture in 7-8th Decades], in Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija, 
Priklausomybes met if (1940-1990) lietuvit/ visuomene: pasipriesinimas ir/ar 
prisitaikymas [The Lithuanian Society During the Years of Dependence (1940-1990): 
Resistance and/or Adaptation] (Vilnius: Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija. 1996). 64.
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Cultural activities were especially important for the non-territorial minorities living 
in the Baltic states. Their communities were severely affected by deportations. Those who 
survived had even fewer cultural rights than Lithuanians, Latvians or Estonians. Only a 
large Polish minority in Lithuania managed to acquire some rights: in mid-fifties, as many 
as 263 Polish schools were opened plus 82 schools in which Polish was taught.138 
However, the Poles in the other Baltic republics and other minorities did not have the 
same rights. For example, only in the late fifties were the Baltic Jewish communities 
allowed to engage in a very limited number of cultural activities, such as drama groups 
and choirs.139 The Polish minority in Latvia, unlike the one in Lithuania, did not have 
newspapers nor schools. Only in seventies was it allowed to renew one cultural
1 4 0association.
When the power of the Soviet state began to decline, non-territorial ethnic 
communities were the first actors to establish active organizations.141 Even prior to the 
consolidation of popular national movements within the Baltic states, multiple cultural 
minority associations were created. In 1988. the Lithuanian Jewish community renewed 
its activity. By then, out of a vibrant community of 200,000 Litvaks, only several 
thousand Jews were left in Lithuania, and they were contemplating moving to Israel. Many 
did so. Several organizations—Tkuma. a Sionist association, and a chapter of Sochnut, the
l?8Tomasz Piesakowski. The Fate o f  Poles in the USSR 1939-1989 (London: Gryf, 
1990), 254.
139Segal, 226.
l4,)Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Latvia, National and Ethnic Groups in 
Latvia: Informative Material (Riga: Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Latvia, 1996), 
16.
|4|Algis Krupavicius. Lietuva kelyje / demokratijq [Lithuania on Its Way to 
Democracy] (Kaunas: Technologija. 1992).
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World Jewish organization—were created in Lithuania to coordinate the Jewish emigration 
to Israel.u: Prompted by the activists of the tiny Lithuanian Jewish community of fewer 
than 4.000 members, Lithuania became the first post-communist state (or, at that time, the 
first post-communist entity) to adopt a law to ensure that the graves and cemeteries of 
Jews would be taken care of.
At the same time, the Latvian Jews and Poles recreated their cultural associations. 
Similar phenomena were taking place in Estonia. The Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, and 
other non-territorial ethnic groups began to organize their communities and even created a 
unified Forum of National Minorities which included more than twenty ethnic groups.143 
The Program of the Forum asked for Cultural Autonomy for non-territorial nationalities 
living in Estonia.144 In Lithuania, the Jewish community lobbied other minority groups to 
support the adoption of a law on national minorities, which allocated some state support 
for a Jewish cultural association. The Estonian and Latvian republics also adopted the 
laws supporting the rights of minorities. Welcoming these laws on minority rights, the 
non-territorial minorities supported the re-establishment of independence and were willing 
to get engaged in the political processes within the democratizing Baltic polities.
l42SoIomonas Atamukas. Lietuvos zydtfkelias  [A History of Lithuanian Jews] 
(Vilnius: Alma Littera, 1998), 357-69.
14'By 1992, there were no fewer than 65 ethnic clubs and societies in Estonia.
Rein Ruutsoo, “T he Emergence of Civil Society in Estonia 1987-1994,” in Between Plan 
and Market: Social Change in the Baltic States and Russia, ed. Raimo Blom, Hari Melin. 
and Jouko Nikula (Berlin: Waller de Gruyter, 1996), 115.
l44Forum of Estonia’s National Minorities, “Estijos tautybiy forumo nuostatai” 
[The Program of the Forum of Estonia’s National Minorities], in Persitvarkyrno 
Pabaltijyje motyvai [The Aspects of Changes in the Baltics], comp. Aleksandras 
Krasnovas. Uldis Nuorietis. and Endelis Pilau (Vilnius: Vaga. 1989). 75-76.
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CONCLUSION
Tracing the process whereby ethnic restructuring was conducted in the Baltic states 
points to two mechanisms at work. First, forced resettlements spurred armed resistance 
movements and incurred long lasting polarization within societies. By and large (with a 
partial exception o f Lithuania), this polarization occurred along ethnic lines: i.e., the 
Russian speaking newcomers versus the autochthonous residents. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that resistance movements in the three states had a nationalist flavor: they 
embraced the goal o f eventually restoring the nation state.
By producing underground publications and transmitting information to the West, 
the restorationist movements strived not only to invoke, but also to preserve historical 
memory about deportations and other repressions conducted by the Soviet state. Adhering 
to historical memory about ethnic restructuring helped the restorationists to legitimate 
their activities and to gain overwhelming public support during the initial stage of 
democratization. Supported by autochthonous ethnic groups, the restorationists 
constituted the backbone of future political communities in the three polities. Yet their 
reliance on historical memory also suggested a possibility that some groups may be 
excluded from emerging political communities. Especially those social and political 
groups who were associated with the former perpetrators became likely to be excluded.
Second, not only did ethnic restructuring prompt polarization between the older 
residents and the newcomers, it also sharpened ethnic consciousness of smaller (non­
territorial) minorities. Even though the latter did not form strong movements during the 
Soviet times, they became very active— by asking for cultural rights and recounting past
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injustices—during the initial stage of democratization. Yet instead of joining Moscow- 
supported Intennovements. most non-territorial minorities supported the emerging nation 
states. Thus, the existence of numerous ethnic groups did not impede the process of 
democratization. On the contrary, by voicing their demands to protect what was left from 
their communities after deportations and russification, the non-territorial ethnic 
communities helped to strengthen nascent civil societies within the Baltic polities.
In sum, having experienced five decades of ethnic restructuring, the democratizing 
entities were faced with a serious obstacle to successful political community building. 
There were political groups, supported by Moscow and numerous local Russian speakers 
and, in the case of Lithuania, the Poles, who contested the existence of independent nation 
states. On the other hand, the radical wing of restorationist movements resisted inclusion 
of the “others”— i.e., political and social groups, associated with the former perpetrators 
from the Soviet regime— into the emerging polities.
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CHAPTER VI 
POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ESTONIA
The goal o f this chapter is to trace the approaches that the Estonian state used to 
reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power toward minorities opposed to the 
state. This case study consists of four parts. First, it traces the attitudes o f Estonia’s 
minorities towards the state during the initial stage of political community building and 
documents the presence of polarized ethnopolitical groups. Second, this chapter traces 
political community building “from above.” This means that the chapter discusses the 
policies that were adopted by the Estonian state toward its minorities. Third, the chapter 
traces political community building “from below.” It examines ethnic relations at the level 
of local governments, exploring whether Estonia’s Russians were allowed to use the state 
as a “service station” (i.e., whether they received full economic and social rights as 
permanent residents o f Estonia), and looks at the ways that the two communities handled 
their different historical memories. This chapter concludes by exploring the level of 
polarization in Estonia in the late nineties and analyzing which of the approaches used by 
the Estonian state were most successful at reducing polarization.
ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING TH E INITIAL STAGE 
OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1989-95)
In the context of regaining the past and commemorating it (as described in the 
previous chapter), Estonia declared itself independent in 1991. The newly restored polity
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found itself filled with people for whom the years 1940—41 and 1945—53 had different 
meanings. As sociological studies conducted during the early stages o f community 
building suggested, the attitudes of Estonians and Russians toward history and the 
influence of the Soviet Union were, by and large, diametrically opposed. Estonians held 
negative opinions about the increasing percentage of non-Estonians living in their state1 
and were concerned about the geographical proximity of Russia. Estonia’s Russians 
thought that the fact that their "mother" state was nearby was a positive factor.2
As Table 3 shows, in 1988, approximately half of ethnic Russians held a negative 
attitude toward the Estonian state and citizenship. In 1990, the majority of the Russians 
living in Estonia preferred only partial independence for Estonia. Approximately one half 
of the respondents thought that Estonia should stay within the reformed Soviet Union. On 
the other hand, an absolute majority (96%) of Estonians supported independence.3 
Similarly to divisions along ethnic lines within society, Russian and Estonian political 
forces held radically different opinions about the existence of an independent Estonian 
state.
There were three major clusters. The first one, the restorationists (the right), 
focused on bringing about the "decolonization" of Estonia. This goal was especially 
pronounced during the first stage (1991—95) of community building.
'O f the 602,380 non-Estonians living in Estonia in 1989, only 38,174 were either 
bom in Estonia before 1940 or descended from someone bom in Estonia before 1940. 
Statistical Office of Estonia. 33.
:Michael Geistlinger and Aksel Kirch. Estonia—A New Framework fo r  the 
Estonian M ajority and the Russian Minority (Vienna: Braumiiller, 1995), 43.
3Ibid., 44—45.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
157





















positive positive 9 17 10 18 30 55 55 (positive)
neutral positive — 13 29 42 23 24 21 (ready to 
engage into 
politics)
neutral neutral 7 40 30 15 21 7 -
neutral negative 37 21 11 17 19 9 -
negative negative or 
neutral
47 9 20 8 7 5 3 (for 
emigration)
Notes:
* Data for 1989-96 is from Aksel Kirch’s studies. In 1989. the questionnaire for Russian speakers included 
four answers to the question on their preferences concerning the future political status of Estonia. The first 
was "the maintenance of the present status," the second. "Estonia must stay in reformed Soviet Union 
(confederation)." the third. "Estonia as an absolutely independent state." and the fourth was "cannot 
answer." The first answer is put into the fifth row of this table (neutral/negative attitude). The second is put 
into the sixth row (negative/negative or neutral). The third is deemed to correspond with the second row 
(positive/positive), and the fourth is equated with the fourth row (neutral/neutral).
** Data for 1999 summarizes the findings of the Institute of the Open Estonian Society, published in the 
Postimees (5 November. 1999): 7. Approximately one fifth of non-Estonians held a highly positive attitude 
towards developments in the country. 55*%- opposed emigration from Estonia. (In this graph, the attitude is 
marked as "positive.") The institute study included a rating of five potential strategies. The options were: 
to leave Estonia for the ethnic country of origin, to fight with the Estonians for political power, to learn the 
state language, to attempt to influence developments and to help the Estonians to build a better country.
The "emigration" option was the least desirable. The option of participation in the political process had 
21% support. The remaining three strategies had roughly 42% support.
Sources:
Geistlinger and Kirch.
Kirch. Marika, and Aksel Kirch. "Identity Changes and the Emergence of a New Integration Paradigm.” In 
The Integration o f  Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History. Problems, and Trends, ed. Aksel 
Kirch. Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997.
Ott. Attiat F.. Axel Kirch, and Marika Kirch. "Ethnic Anxiety: A Case Study of Resident Aliens in Estonia 
(1990-92)." Journal o f Baltic Studies 27. no. 1 (Spring 1996): 21-45. Includes a description of 
the methodology used in their study.
Postimees (5 November. 1999). 5.
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Their political discourse was based on the state-bearing nation’s claim to its 
historical homeland.4 The second cluster included extreme left wing parties, the most 
radical o f which (e.g., the Coordinating Committee for the Autonomy o f Northeastern 
Estonia) had their origins in the Iniemiovement. They were directly opposed to the 
restorationists’ case. The third cluster consisted of compromisers, most notably the Center 
party (a product of the national revival movement), which tried to live up to the demands 
of both Estonians and non-Estonians.5
At first, the restorationist cause was most intensively championed by the Estonian 
Congress, which was established in 1989 by Estonian nationalists and the Estonian 
National Independence Party.6 After the restoration of statehood in 1991 and the 
emergence of a multiparty system, this cause was most strongly supported by the Pro 
Patria party.7 This party opposed liberalization of the citizenship law and the easing of
4Graham Smith et al„ Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 96.
5For a comprehensive description o f the evolution of the Estonian party system, 
see Pettai and Kreuzer, 148-89.
6During 3 January-24 February 1990 the Estonian Congress set up an alternative 
(to Soviet Estonia) election procedure, which excluded all post-1940 immigrants. The 
Estonian National Front decided to support this movement and to participate in these 
elections. The electoral districts corresponded to the administrative boundaries of 
counties and municipalities in Estonia in 1940. The Estonian Congress wanted to 
become a legislative institution, and, as time went on, it demanded more power. In 
August 1991, after the restoration of independence, both the Supreme Council of the 
Estonian SSR and the Estonian Congress agreed to work on a Constitution.
'This Party was extremely successful in the first elections to the Estonian 
parliament, winning 22% of the vote in 1992. It won 7.9% of the vote during the second 
election (1995) and 15.98% of the vote (the second largest share after the Centrists) in 
March 1999. After the local and parliamentary elections of 1999, Pro Patria Union held a 
leading position in the Estonian parliament and in the Tallinn city government. “The 
Chickens of Pro Patria Union Are the Fattest,” Eesti Paevaleht (29 November, 1999), 2. 
Its supporters are mostly Estonian (11.6% of the electorate), although non-Estonians 
(0.7% of the electorate) support this party as well. In 1998 it received 9.7% of the vote.
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language requirements for non-citizens. In the words o f Mart Laar. Estonia's Prime 
Minister, the position of Pro Patria could be summarized as follows: "Pro Patria Union 
does not oppose the idea of integrating non-Estonians [into the political community], but 
they must learn the language first. The government should improve its language teaching 
policies instead of making concessions to Russia.”8 This party's position regarding the 
citizenship law and language policies remained consistent throughout the later stages of 
political community building, despite occasional criticism of these policies by some party 
members (e.g.. Minister Juris Mois).9
Other political parties, such as the Right-wingers or the People’s Party, have 
embraced positions similar to those o f Pro Patria Union, but Pro Patria has exercised the 
most political influence.10 Furthermore, Memento (the Union of the Formerly Repressed) 
also supports the cause of the restorationists.11 It is a social movement that has significant 
moral authority.
At the other end of the spectrum, in the late eighties and the early nineties the 
restorationist cause was opposed by the Interregional Soviet, a Moscow-supported 
organization, and the Coordinating Committee for the Autonomy of Northeastern Estonia
8“Ex-PM Slams Government’s Leniency With Non-Citizens,” ETA News Release, 
(9 December, 1997).
’Writing in Eesti Paevaleht in April 1999, Juri Mois argued that Estonian 
citizenship policy has been too inflexible and that the state “should be braver in making 
exceptions in the granting of citizenship.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 
(10 April, 1999). "
l0Since 7 March 1999, the Pro Patria Union has been in alliance with the Reform 
Party and the Moderates. These parties have formed a government.
11 Memento claims that their goal is to preserve the memory of those who have 
suffered. According to their statement o f  purpose the “ [com pilation of the register [of 
those were deported or otherwise repressed]” and the “perpetuation of the collected 
information on [Soviet] genocide policy and its results will help to direct Estonia’s 
domestic and foreign policy.” Oispuu, A6.
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(CCANE), which called for political and territorial autonomy for regions of Estonia with a 
Russian-speaking majority.12 The political rhetoric o f the CCANE. which was especially 
active in 1992-93. described the independent Estonian state as a threat to Russians living 
in Estonia.
With the exception of the CCANE, Estonia’s Russians were relatively unorganized 
during the first stage of community building. The first political parties began to emerge 
only in the mid-nineties (see the following section of this chapter). The first large-scale 
protest took place on 21 March 1992. when approximately 8—10.000 Russians 
demonstrated in Tallinn. They demanded that the government freeze prices and guarantee 
food for the poor. Organized by the former hard-line Communist faction of the Estonian 
parliament, this group also demanded that Gorbachev be put on trial for dismantling the 
Soviet Union.13
In addition to these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical movements, there was a 
weak movement that allegedly tried to look for compromises between the two 
communities. This movement considered itself to be the successor of the Estonian 
National Front which tried to build bridges between the two communities. This 
movement, the "compromisers," was led by the Center party and Edgar Savisaar, former 
leader of the Estonian National Front. Savisaar has frequently argued that the existence of 
many people without citizenship "may cause the creation of closed communities which 
could be dangerous to the Estonian state."14 Often the goal of such discourse, however.
12John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, Ethnopolitics in the New Europe 
(Boulder. Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 98.
13SauIius Gimius, “Russians Demonstrate in Tallinn,” Radio Liberty Report (23 
March, 1992).
l4“Center Party Leader Demands Simpler Requirements in Granting Citizenship,” 
ETA News Release (24 August, 1997).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
161
has been to gain political capital and to remain in power.15
This analysis of the domestic actors and their platforms suggests that during the 
first stage of community building in Estonia, there were no domestic actors genuinely 
interested in building an inclusive political community in Estonia. The actors that were 
interested in achieving this goal were, by and large, international institutions and Western 
governments, especially those of the Nordic states. These actors were fearful that any 
dispute between Russians and Estonians in Estonia could escalate into violence 
threatening European security. Tracing the strategies used by the Estonian state from 
above illustrates the influence of these actors.
TRACING TH E PROCESS OF COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "ABOVE"
19S9-95: Defining the Borders o f  Political Community
In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestiya, Estonian president Lennart 
Meri thus explained the rationale behind the 1992 citizenship law, which granted 
citizenship only to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and their 
descendants: "We [i.e., the policymakers] were faced with a problem: How could the 
rights and interests of the citizens of prewar Estonia and their descendants, who had no say 
in becoming Soviet citizens, be maintained? . . . After independence was restored, we 
chose the option of the continuity of Estonian citizenship. There was no other way for
l5It won 14.2% of the vote in 1995 parliament elections and 23.6% in 1999. The 
support for the Centrists grew mainly due to the backing of the non-Estonian voters.
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us."16 Men acknowledged that when state creation was in its early stages, memory of past 
wrongs and especially a yearning for restitution became a constitutive element of political 
community building in Estonia.17 A closer analysis of the arguments put forward by the 
political actors identified above should help to explain why many Estonians, especially the 
restorationists, believed that "there was no other way for us" other than to accept such a 
citizenship law.
Remembering the deportations and other forms of repression that were carried out 
during Soviet times became a part of the debate on citizenship. Those who argued for 
restrictive citizenship laws (first and foremost, the restorationists, some of whom were the 
victims of Soviet repression) noted that the Baltic states fall under provisions o f the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the deportation or transfer of members of an 
occupying power's population into territory it occupies during war. Thus, they argued, 
Estonia should be permitted to "decolonize" its territory.18 For some, "decolonization” 
implied disenfranchisement and for some even resettlement of Estonia’s Russians. Such 
opinions, emphasizing the link between memories of past wrongs and deciding who will 
be "one of us," were captured in the writings of Rein Taagepera:
If you were to subtract deportees’ children and their relatives few Estonians would
I6“Not the Right o f the Strong but the Right of the Equal,” Izvestiva (2 April,
1999). Available from http://www.president.ee; INTERNET.
17During his interview with the Ljubljana Delo in Slovenia, Men acknowledged 
that "it is no secret that we wanted to continue our political path where it had been 
stopped by the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, that is, in 
1940. That was not very realistic.” "Estonian President Interviewed on NATO, EU 
Membership,” FB1S-SOV-97-142 (22 May, 1997).
I8CSCE, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia (Washington, D.C.: 
CSCE. 1993), 8. In 1993, Jiiri Estam, a member of the Congress of Estonia, established a 
Decolonization Foundation. The goal of this foundation was to pursue the process of 
"decolonization." which for some radical restitutionists meant the expulsion o f Estonia’s 
Russians.
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be left. And this [the deportations] was done to Estonians by Russians, not by 
some faceless "Soviets"— unless, of course, one is also willing to claim that the 
Jewish Holocaust was Nazi and therefore not German. Russian colonists took the 
place o f Estonians who either fled or were deported. Forgive? Yes. Forget? No. 
Accept colonial settlers who refuse to leam Estonian as substitutes for those 
Estonians who were killed and those who. as a result, were never bom ? Take a 
guess at the answer.19
During the intensive discussions that took place in the Estonian parliament on the 
laws of citizenship (September and October o f 1991), the following opinion was voiced by 
Johannes Kass, one of the more radical members of parliament: "In an indirect way, you 
[i.e., ethnic Russians living in Estonia], as citizens of the Soviet Union, are guilty for what 
that slate did to the Republic of Estonia in 1939."20 Others feared that the existence of the 
Estonian state and nation would be threatened if the Russians (the "latecomers") were 
granted citizenship.
The opponents (the "compromisers," most of whom were members o f the Estonian 
Popular Front and former Communists) based their arguments on the fact that the 
application of any requirements for citizenship in a retroactive order was "illegitimate, 
illegal, and undemocratic" (Pavel Panfilov, Enn Leisson), that the alienation o f Estonia’s 
Russians was "not in our national interest" (Rein Veidemann), and that the restoration of 
the citizenship law of 1938 would be criticized by the West (Peet Kask).21 International 
conventions on the reduction of statelessness were cited.
These arguments, however, were undermined by the results of a poll taken by the 
Interregional Soviet (an organization closely related to the Intennovement), which asked
19Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence, 218. 1 would like to thank the 
author for his permission to use this quote.
:oPeet Kask, “National Radicalization in Estonia: Legislation on Citizenship and 
Related Issues,” Nationalities Papers 22, no. 2 (1994): 382.
:iKask, 382-83.
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the people of Estonia if they would like to remain within the Soviet Union. In Tallinn, 
Narva, and Kohtla-Jarve (areas with large numbers of Russians), 92—96% of the 
approximately 330.000 people who participated in the vote said "yes" to staying in the 
USSR.22 This enabled the restorationists, such as Andres Tarand, to argue that many 
Russians "have been loudly bellicose against the Estonian state. And now those people 
only remember their rights."23
In addition to reviving memories of the deportations and the subsequent influx of 
Russian settlers, the arguments o f the restorationists were strengthened by the fact that 
until August 1991, the Interregional Soviet (which was supported by Moscow and some 
Russians, especially in Northeastern Estonia) possessed all the attributes of state power: a 
government, armed forces, control of the economy, and its own radio station.24 This state­
like entity became a source o f anxiety among Estonians. Thus, eventually, the 
Interregional Soviet added political capital to the restorationist cause. The restorationist 
version of the citizenship law, which granted Estonian citizenship only to those who held 
Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and to their descendants, was accepted in 
February 1992. Furthermore, the Estonian Citizen Party, Pro Patria, the Moderates, and 
the Estonian National Independence Party—parties that supported the restorationist 
cause—were elected to parliament in September 1992.
The initial version of the Estonian law on aliens (adopted on 21 June 1993) and the 
introduction of temporary travel documents were also partly intended to make the 
Russians leave. In accordance with the law on aliens, most residents who had settled in
"Hallik, “Elhnopolitical Conflict in Estonia,” 101.
23Kask, 383.
24HalIik, “Ethnopolitical Conflict in Estonia.” 101.
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Estonia prior to 1 July 1990 were initially given only temporary residence permits valid 
for two years.2-'' 8.238 Russians left Estonia in 1991. Then their number increased to 
25.892 in 1992. 10.983 left Estonia the following year. 6.421 Russians left Estonia in 
1994. and 6.525 in 1995. The out-migration of Russians began to decline in 1996, when 
4.844 Russians left the country. In 1998, only 1,401 Russians decided to leave.26
The law on aliens, adopted in 1993, caused the most upheaval, both nationally and 
internationally. Years 1992 and 1993 marked the beginning of the "internationalization" 
of community building in Estonia. Among the numerous governmental and non­
governmental actors that got involved in political community building in Estonia, the 
CSCE (OSCE since February 1993), its High Commissioner for Minorities, and, to a 
lesser extent, the Council of Europe were the most visible and vociferous.27 In July 1992, 
at the summit of the CSCE, a High Commissioner on National Minorities—a post "on" 
minorities rather than "for" minorities—was created.28 This post was created with Russia's
25Bungs. The Baltic States, 79. The CSCE High Commissioner began to push for 
residence and work permits. He argued that “the best course of action would be to allow 
those who were permanent residents during Soviet times, and those who continue to 
reside in Estonia, to become Estonian residents without a three year waiting period." 
Estonian Review (16—22 May, 1994). It was not until 1997 that a significant number of 
Russians were finally granted permanent residence permits.
26Statistical Office o f Estonia, 54. In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe urged Russia to draft legislation for ethnic Russians wishing to return 
to Russia from the Baltic states, arguing that repatriation was not the result of national 
discrimination, but of a “loss of privileges.” Radio Liberty Report (8 February, 1993).
27Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, “Preventive Diplomacy: Conclusions from 
International Intervention into the Estonian and Latvian Conflicts Over Citizenship,” 
Schleswig-Holstein Institute fo r  Peace Research Paper No. 44 (1997), 9. Also see ‘The 
Baltic Revolution: Sea of Dreams.” Economist (18 April, 1998): 50—52.
2s“On minorities” means that the High Commissioner’s mandate prevents him 
from seeking to resolve conflicts that already have erupted. It is not a vehicle through 
which the violations of human rights can be addressed. Jane Wright, “The OSCE and the 
Protection of Minority Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 18. no. 1 (February 1996): 200. 
Also see “Max van der Stoel. Minority Man,” Economist (11 September, 1999): 60.
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support and with the Russians in Estonia in mind. Beginning in December 1992, the 
CSCE and its High Commissioner became heavily involved in community building in 
Estonia. They tried to help Estonia by offering their comments on the law on aliens.
When addressing the question of Estonia’s Russians, the Nordic states often 
referred to the statements of CSCE/OSCE High Commissioner Max van der Stoel.29 The 
European Union and NATO also played significant roles in the process of political 
community building in Estonia.
After 1993, Russia began to link the issue o f its "compatriots" with other issues in 
its negotiations with the Estonian government. These included a border accord and the 
issue of troop withdrawal.30 Numerous threats were made to the Estonian government, 
especially in 1992-95. These included Yeltsin’s infamous warning to remember "certain 
geopolitical and demographic realities."31 Statements about the "plight" of Russians in 
Estonia by Russian leaders were often meant for domestic consumption, especially to 
please the Duma which was dominated by the Communists until the end of 1999.32 On the 
other hand, Russia’s endless complaints to the international community about alleged 
human rights violations in the Baltic states were an attempt to assert its influence in the
29Martti Ahtisaari, “The Position of Finland and Estonia in Today’s Europe,” 
speech in Tallinn, 12 November 1998. Available from http://www.president.ee: 
INTERNET.
30“Estonia: Russia’s Baburin Links Border Accord With Other Issues,” FBIS- 
SOV-96-247 (21 December, 1996). Sergey Baburin, the Deputy Speaker of the Russian 
Duma, said that “any agreement concluded with Estonia” would be linked to the 
problems of Russians living in Estonia.
3l“StiIl on the Prowl,” Economist (28 August, 1993). In addition, Russia has 
linked the issue of the border agreement with the “problems of Russian speaking 
residents.” “Yeltsin Puts Condition on Estonia, Latvia Border Treaties,” FBIS-SOV-97- 
336 (2 December, 1997).
32An example of such a statement is: “A m ajor objective of foreign policy is to 
protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population living abroad.” Boris Yeltsin, Sixth 
Annual Report to the Federal Assembly and State Duma, 30 March 1999.
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territory of the former USSR.33
Given this enormous international pressure. Estonia's laws and policies of 
community building had to be constantly revised. Initially, in the words of Andres Kollisl 
(the author of the law on aliens), this notorious law was intended to "regulate the relations 
with those [aliens] who already live here; to document and somehow classify them."34 
Reportedly, Kollist wanted to make those Russians who ignored the calls for registration 
apply for residency and job permits. However, this did not happen. Instead, many 
Russians, especially those in Northeastern Estonia and in Russia, characterized this 
attempt as "ethnic cleansing."35 The Russians in Northeastern Estonia held a referendum 
on regional autonomy. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev threatened to "halt all 
oil and gas deliveries to the county [Estonia] if it did not change course."36 These 
developments attracted international attention. International institutions and Western 
governments were worried that the goal of the law was not only to regulate the status of 
non-citizens, but also, in the words of Joanne Skolnick, to "make them feel unwelcome in 
the hope that they would leave."37
The Council of Europe—the international institution that Estonia hoped to join at 
that time—announced that the law contained inconsistencies with the norms of public
33Zevelev, 276.
34“Red Passports Out of Use for Good,” an interview with Andres Kollist, ETA 
Insight (16—22 May, 1997).
35Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians the New Minority (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview, 1996), 102.
36Ott, Kirch, and Kirch, 22.
37Joanne Skolnick, “Grappling with the Legacy o f the Soviet Rule: Citizenship 
and Human Rights in the Baltic States,” University o f  Toronto Faculty Law Review 54, 
no. 2 (Spring 1996). Available from http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/law-review; 
INTERNET. I am indebted to the OSCE mission in Tallinn for referring me to this
source.
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international law, and with European law in particular. This was a change compared to the 
previous position of the Council of Europe regarding Estonia’s minorities, which can be 
summarized using the words of Catherine Lalumire. the Council of Europe’s Secretary- 
General in 1992: "giving the right to vote to all Russian people living in Estonia could 
jeopardize Estonia’s identity."38
The CSCE High Commissioner expressed concern that the vague wording of the 
law would, in effect, put a lot of power in the hands of Estonian government officials.39 
The CSCE criticized the requirement that "permanent residents" would have to repeat the 
registration process every five years.40 The Committee of Senior Officials o f the CSCE 
was so concerned with the Estonian case that it became the topic of discussion during their 
17th, 18th, and 19th meetings between November 1992 and February 1993.41 In response 
to this enormous pressure, President Meri asked the parliament to amend the law. He 
refused to sign it until it was endorsed by the CSCE and the Council of Europe.
Amended because of international pressure, the final version of the law on aliens 
guaranteed residency and work permits to those who settled in the country prior to 1 July 
1990. Those who were denied residency permits had the right to appeal this decision. 
During the same year (1993), the President’s Roundtable was created to establish 
institutional contact between Estonia’s Russians and the state. The Roundtable, supported 
by a number of foreign embassies in Tallinn, became a forum in which the representatives 
of Estonia’s minorities held monthly discussions with the representatives of the Estonian
38Riina Kionka, “Lalumire: Estonia Does Right By Minorities,” Radio Liberty 
Report (20 February, 1992).
39SkoInick.
40CSCE, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia, 15-16.
4lFalk Lange, ‘The Baltic States and the CSCE.” Journal o f  Baltic Studies 25. no.
3 (Fall 1994): 248.
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parliament on issues that concerned them and came up with recommendations for the 
lawmakers.42 In addition, a law governing local elections was passed, which permitted 
permanent residents and citizens of other countries who had lived in Estonia for five years 
to participate in local elections (see Table 4). Under the pressure of the Council of 
Europe, the organization which Estonia was hoping to join, the citizenship law was 
amended to add those whose maternal ancestors were pre-1940 citizens (see Table 4).43
Furthermore, the Estonian Constitution, adopted in 1992, guaranteed non-citizens 
equal civil rights to those of citizens.44 The Constitution gave numerous rights, such as 
freedom of expression, access to the courts and limited participation in the political 
process to all residents of the state. The adoption o f the Dwelling Privatization Act gave 
everybody, regardless of citizenship, the right to acquire their present apartment in 
exchange for vouchers given to them by the government.45
Estonia’s willingness to guarantee these rights to non-citizens was duly noted by 
the Council of Europe. Thus, in 1993, over the protests of the Russian delegation, Estonia 
was admitted to the Council of Europe.
4:Office of the President o f Estonia, “A New Cycle of the President’s 
Roundtable,” Press Release (15 January 1996). Available from http://www.presideni.ee: 
INTERNET. In 1995, the Roundtable included five members of the Estonian parliament, 
five members of the Association of Estonia’s Nationalities, and five members from the 
Russian Representative Assembly.
43Lowell W. Barrington. ‘T h e  Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States,” 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 13. no. 159 (1999): 193. The previous law 
included only those whose paternal ancestors were pre-1940 citizens.
44SkoInick.
45Vouchers were given to all residents of Estonia for the years that that resident 
worked in Estonia. Non-citizens got the right to own apartments and real estate virtually 
at no cost to them. Ainso, 19. Others have argued, however, that Estonians received 
proportionally greater compensation than Russians for illegally expropriated property. 
Erik A. Andersen, “The Legal Status o f Russians in Estonian Privatization Legislation 
1989-95,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 2 (1997): 305.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
170
Table 4. Estonian Legislation: Citizenship Laws, the Law on Aliens, the Language Law, 
and the Local Election Law
DATE LEGISLATION
Feb. 1992 The citizenship law of 1938 (ins sanguinis) is re-established.*
Automatic citizenship granted to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 
1940 and their descendants (Art. 3)
The naturalization process for other residents included:
- residence in the territory of Estonia for at least the last two years and a one year 
waiting
period (residence census "2+1 ”),
- proficiency in the Estonian language.
- an oath of loyalty to the state: "In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal 
to the constitutional state system of Estonia."
Feb.-March
1993
The citizenship law is amended.
Citizenship is offered to those who have registered for citizenship prior to the elections 
to the Congress of Estonia (February-March 1990);**
Citizenship is offered to those whose maternal ancestors held Estonian citizenship 
before 1940.
July 1993 A revised version of the law on aliens is adopted. (It was first adopted on 21 June 
1993.) This version
- classifies all non-citizens as aliens and requires them to apply for residency and work 
permits within two years (and not five, as in the previous version) if they wish to remain 
in the country;
- establishes that non-citizens must apply for Estonian. Russian, or other citizenship or 
an alien's passport if they want to travel abroad.
May 1993 The local election law is passed. It permits the permanent residents and citizens of other 
countries who have lived in Estonia for five years to participate in local elections.***
Jan.1995 The citizenship law is amended. The amendments include:
- residence in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit issued at least five years prior 
to the date of written application for Estonian citizenship and at least one year after the 
registration of the written application (residence census "5+1"),
- plus: knowledge of the Constitution and the citizenship law (20 questions on the 
Constitution and the law, 16 of which must be answered correctly.)
Feb.1995 A new language law is passed. It includes the following:
- the Estonian language is the only official state language,
- the use of minority languages is allowed in areas of minority concentration.
- unlike the 1989 law, this version does not oblige state officials to use Russian when 
interacting with Russian speakers.
Sept. 1997 The aliens law is amended. Those who applied for temporary residence permits before 
July 12. 1995 become eligible for permanent residence permits starting 12 July 1998.
Dec. 1998 The citizenship law is amended. Children under the age of 15 who were bom in Estonia 
after independence and who do not have the citizenship of any state become eligible for 
Estonian citizenship through naturalization.




* Article 2 of the law on citizenship states that Estonian citizenship:
1) shall be acquired by birth:
2) shall be received by naturalization:
3) shall be restored to any person who has lost Estonian citizenship as a minor:
4) shall be lost through release form or revocation of Estonian citizenship or upon acceptance of the 
citizenship of another state.
** In February 1993. approximately 20.000 non-Estonians were granted citizenship by the Estonian 
Citizens' Committee for having supported Estonian independence in 1990.
***According to the Estonian Constitution (adopted in 1992). Estonia's non-citizens have the right to use 
the courts, to exercise freedom of expression, and to vote in municipal elections. The latter right was 
approved by the law on elections to local government councils in 1996.
Sources:
The Estonian Constitution [Russian Version]. Tallinn: Ilo, 1998.
Estonian Parliament. Law on Citizenship (8 December 1998). Available from the Embassy of the Republic 
of Estonia in London.
This event was one of Estonia’s greatest foreign policy successes.46 Intense 
international involvement in political community building did not go unnoticed by the 
domestic actors. At first the widespread international criticism of the laws which 
attempted to regulate the borders of the community (e.g., the law on Aliens and the 
Citizenship law) was interpreted by the restorationists as a result of the Russian 
"propaganda campaign."
The Foreign Ministry was reprimanded by for low efficiency in mounting a
46Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania: Country Studies, ed. Walter R. Iwaskiw 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 73.
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counter-campaign.47 Later, many complained about the "double standards" applied by the 
international institutions to the small versus big states and the pressure exerted on Estonia 
to "give a definite answer to the classic tension between group rights and individual 
rights."4'5
Yet in spite of the worries by the international actors and Russia’s threats about the 
restrictiveness of the citizenship law and the law on aliens,49 some Russians were 
applying for (and receiving) the Estonian citizenship. Thus, as illustrated by Table 5, the 
number of Russians who chose Estonian citizenship increased from 16% of those residing 
in Estonia in 1993 to 35% in 1994. It became approximately 30% in 1995.
When Russian citizenship became available in 1993 to the Russians living in 
Estonia, some of them opted for both Russian and Estonian citizenship. (The Russian 
citizenship law allows double citizenship.)
47Kask, 385.
48Peter Vares, “Estonia Returns to the International Community: History Repeats 
Itself.” Journal o f  Baltic Studies 25, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 122. In this article, the rights 
of the Estonians to recreate their nationstate are referred to as the "group rights,” and the 
rights of the Russians to obtain citizenship are understood as individual rights. The 
comment about double standards relates to the fact that unlike Estonia and Latvia, Russia 
has not invited the international community to comment on its citizenship law. Erika B. 
Schlager. “The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship in Newly Independent OSCE 
countries,” Helsinki Monitor 8, no. 1 (1997). Available from 
lutp://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_moni/\ INTERNET.
49Russia attempted to link troop withdrawal to the “human rights abuses” of the 
Russian speakers in Estonia, but. under the pressure of the CSCE and other international 
actors, it finally withdrew its troops from Estonia in August 1994. Renatas Norkus, 
“Preventing Conflict in the Baltic states: A Success Story That Will Hold?,” in 
Preventing Violent Conflict, ed. Gianni Bonvicini (Baden-Baden. Germany: Nomos 
Verlagsgessellschaft, 1998), 141—42.
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In 1993-94. the Russians living in Estonia were becoming a highly differentiated 
ethnic group. The ones with a higher social status (i.e., a higher educational and job 
status) were usually the ones who had lived in Estonia for a longer period of time and thus 
had a better knowledge of Estonian. The Russians from a lower social stratum were likely 
to have a negative or neutral attitude vis-a-vis the Estonian state.50 As shown by Table 3, 
in July 1993. approximately 30% of the Russians held a positive attitude toward the 
Estonians and the state, while all the rest were either neutral or negative.
The restorationists were concerned about the last category o f the Russians (see 
Table 3) who tended to hold a negative attitude toward the Estonian state. They became 
especially alarmed when Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Russian ultra-nationalist arguing for the 
reintegration of the Baltic states into Russia, began garnering considerable support am ong 
Narva’s Russian citizens.51
50This differentiation was shown by the Identity Structure Analysis (a survey 
method), conducted in Estonia in 1993 and 1995. The data showed that in four Estonian 
cities Russians identified themselves more with Estonian-Russians than with Russians in 
the Russian Federation. Marika Kirch, “Integration Processes in Estonia, 1993-96,” in 
The Integration o f  Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends, 
ed. Aksel Kirch (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997), 37—41.
5l“Estonia in 1993: A Year of Challenges,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Research Report (21 December, 1993). Those Russians in Estonia who took part in April 
1993 Russia’s presidential referendum voted overwhelmingly (over 70%) against Yeltsin. 
Most of the votes cast in December 1993 were for Vladimir Zhironovsky (49%). Ain 
Haas. “Non-Violence in Ethnic Relations in Estonia,” Journal o f  Baltic Studies 27, no. 1 
(Spring 1997): 70.
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Citizens of Estonia Citizens of the Russian 
Federation
April 1992 2% (Kirch) -
February 1993 167c (Kirch) 10% (Kirch)
December 1994 35% (Kirch) 8% (Kirch)
May 1995 30% (Kirch) 12% (Kirch)
June 1996 29% (Kirch) 18% (Kirch)
February 1997 32.71% (ETA)* 26.65% (ETA)




* According to 18 February 1997 ETA announcement, out of predominantly Russian-speaking aliens living 
in Estonia. 135.000 are Estonian citizens; 110.000 have taken Russian citizenship and 177,000 do not have 
citizenship. According to another source in January 1997. 119.752 people living in Estonia were the 
citizens of Russia. FBIS-SOV-97-007 (10 January. 1997). According to the Estonian Statistical office, in 
1997. there were 412.628 Russians who were the permanent residents of Estonia.
**According to a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, between 100.000 and 150.000 of Russian 
speakers in Estonia hold Estonian citizenship, which makes them one fifth of the electorate. There were 
approximately 500.000 Russian speakers in Estonia in 1999.
***The data for 1999 was received by ETA from the Russian Embassy. On 6 August 1999. nearly 100.000 
Russian citizens were registered in Estonia. This represented a drop in approximately 24.000 cases since 1 
August 1997. The percentage of the Russians holding the Russian citizenship has been calculated using 
1998 data for the total number of Russian residents (409, 111).
Sources:
ETA. Estonian News Agency.
"Ethnic Russian Voters in Estonia Could Play a Key Role in Sunday's Parliamentary Elections.” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Report (5 March. 1999).
Kirch. Aksel, ed. The Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends. 
Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers. 1997.
Statistical Office of Estonia Statistical Yearbook o f  Estonia 1999. Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. 
1999.
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Partially in response to these activities, but partially hoping to push out the 
"colonists." in February 1993. Jiiri Estam. an Estonian-American politician, established 
the Decolonization Fund and the electoral bloc Parem Estii [Better Estonia], which openly 
sought an "Estonia for the Estonians."5'  Such radical restorationist views were not widely 
supported by the Estonian public. However, in 1993, a substantial minority (27%) of 
Estonians continued to think that the danger of their ethnic extinction was growing.53 
Responding to such fears, in February 1995, the restorationists passed a new language law 
which reiterated Estonian status as the state language (see Table 5). This law reflected a 
new ethnopolitical balance of power, since it no longer obliged state officials to use 
Russian when interacting with Russian speakers, as the language law adopted in 1989 
did.54 One goal o f this new language law was to strengthen the position of the Estonian 
language because Russian was claimed as the first language by 83% of the residents of 
Estonia, and Estonian—only by 77%.55
In addition, in January 1995 the citizenship law was made even stricter (see Table 
4). The residency requirement for those who entered Estonia after 1992 was changed from 
two to five years. For those applying for the citizenship the requirement to know the 
Constitution and citizenship law was spelled out, and the language requirement was 
tightened.56
5:David J. Smith, “Russia, Estonia and the Search for a Stable Ethno-politics,” 
Journal o f Baltic Studies 29, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 7. In 1995 parliament elections, the 
Better Estonia received only 3.6% of the popular vote.
53Haas, 72.
54Vello Pettai, “Estonia’s Controversial Language Policies,” Transition (29 
November, 1996): 22.
55“Use of Language in Central European Countries.” Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer (March 1996), Annex Figure 44.
56In February 1992. the language requirement for citizenship was defined at a 
fairly liberal level. It was equivalent to the active knowledge of about 1,500 words of
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The European Union did not approve of these changes in legislation. A 
conservative politician Mart Nutt, one of the authors of the citizenship law and one of the 
founders of Pro Patria party, confronted this criticism by saying that "considering the 
present situation in Estonia, it is not possible to follow these suggestions [of the European 
Union]."57 Nutt went on to say that even though Estonia asked the EU experts to give their 
opinion about the law, this does not give them [the EU experts] the right to demand 
changes.58
In 1995, the controversies about the citizenship and language laws abated and were 
not rekindled until several years later. However, during this period, several Russian 
political parties (most notably, the Russian Party and the United People’s party) came into 
being.59 The Russian party, led by Nikolai Maspanov, has represented the Russians with 
an Eastem-orientation (i.e., those mostly supporting Moscow). Maspanov summarized his 
party's platform by saying that "the society of Estonia will be stable only when the 
Russian language is declared the second official language” (which is unacceptable to most 
Estonians and especially the restorationists).60 Even though in 1995 this party joined the
Estonian. The idea was to accelerate the process o f integration (understood as learning 
the language) by offering “a carrot”— the citizenship. See Pettai, “Estonia’s 
Controversial Language Policies,” 22. Following the 1995 law, the language ability exam 
tests listening and reading comprehension, writing and speaking ability. Each part is 
completed when approximately 60% of the answers are correct. Listening comprehension 
includes official statements and announcements, news, description of events and 
explanations. Conversation includes expressing opinions.
57“Estonian Parliament Adopts New Citizenship Law,” ETA News Release (19 
January, 1995).
58Ibid.
59During 1995 elections to the Estonian parliament, these two Russian parties 
together with the Russian People’s Party of Estonia formed an electoral coalition “Our 
Home is Estonia” and received 5.9% of the vote. The alliance disintegrated. In 1999 
elections, the United People’s Party won 6.13% of the vote. Its supporters included 7.4% 
non-Estonians and 0.3% Estonians, or 1.6% of the vote.
‘"interview with Nikolai Maspanov, Postimees (27 February, 1998), 2. The
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electoral bloc "Our Home is Estonia!" with the United People’s Party led by Viktor 
Andreyev, the alliance was short lived. Consequently, the two most influential Russian 
parties—the Russian party and the United People’s Party—have remained two separate 
actors.
According to Viktor Andreyev, the chairman of the United People’s Party (the 
second Russian party), the goal o f his party is "to liquidate national segregation [because] 
the Estonian parties just do not notice that."61 Andreyev’s organization does not support 
isolation of the Russians and promotes integration based on equal rights.62 The platform 
of the party states that equality (between different ethnic groups) can be achieved by 
liberalizing the existing law of citizenship. Automatic citizenship should be given to all 
those who were bom in Estonia and live in the country at the time of such a new law.63 
The party claims that it does not contest the Estonian language law per se, but it disagrees 
with "the law’s discriminating nature." The party has opposed the principle of collective 
guilt [they see it in the application of exclusive citizenship law] and has argued that all 
sections of the population should be equal before the state.64 The party says that it does 
not have official relations with the Russian government, but representatives of the party 
often travel to Russia to establish trade links and even to soothe Estonian-Russian 
relations, when needed.65 One of the main interests of the party is to help to maintain
Russian party’s supporters include 14.6% non-Estonians (2.6% of the vote).
6lInterview with Viktor Andreyev, Postimees (1 March, 1999), 2.
62“Russian-Speaking Party Holds Congress, Re-elects Chairman,” FBIS-SOV-97- 
025 (1 February, 1997).
6?Klara Hallik, “From M inority Consciousness to Nation-statehood: Estonian 
Political Parties on Ethnic Policy,” Revue Baltique no. 7 (1997): 12.
“ Ibid.
65Sanita Upleia, “Levye Latvii i Estonii aklivno obrashchayutsya s M oskvoi” [The 
Leftists of Latvia and Estonia Actively Communicate with Moscow], Diena (12 April. 
1999), 3.
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stable relations between Russia and Estonia. Predictably, the party has opposed the 
prospect of Estonia's membership in NATO.66
1995-Present: Defending the Borders o f Political Community
After introduction of more restrictive language and citizenship laws, ethnic 
differentiation which was present during the first stage of political community building 
continued to take place.67 Estonia was still a two-society state, in which the Russian and 
the Estonian communities had little in common other than using the state as a "service 
station." Social differentiation was taking place among the Russian Estonians as well. In 
1995, by no means were they a united disenfranchised group as portrayed (and 
instrumentalized) by Russia. Within the Estonian Russian community, the length of their 
stay in Estonia remained the dividing line between those who supported the state and those 
who opposed it.68
At the same time, Russia continued to complain about the rights of Russians living 
in Estonia. According to Vladimir Parshikov of the Russian M inistry’s International and
“ During the Latvian-Russian crisis in March 1998, triggered by the protests of the 
Russian speaking pensioners, the United People’s Party of Estonia, fearful of a potential 
spillover of the conflict to Estonia, called for the normalization of economic ties between 
the two countries. See the interview with Aleksandr Glukhov, the Russian Ambassador 
to Estonia, in Postimees (26 March, 1998), 2. After the US-Baltic Partnership Charter 
was signed, this party urged Estonia to sign a similar agreement with Russia. “Russian 
Party Calls for Partnership,” Baltic Times (5 February, 1998), 4.
6,For a description of this process, see Aksel Kirch, “Social Integration of Loyal 
Non-Estonians in Estonia,” in PilsoniskaApzipa  [Civic Consciousness], ed. Elmars 
Vebers (Riga: MacTbu apgads, 1998), 204—7.
“ Ariadna Elango and Viktor Denks, “Estonskiye Russkiye: Prishla Pora 
Obustravivat’sva” [Estonia’s Russians: The Time Has Come to Settle], Molodezh' Estonii 
(10 January, 1996). 2.
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Human Rights Department, a member of a Russian "fact-finding mission" in Estonia, "the 
key problem [in Estonia] is that tens of thousands of people simply cannot get citizenship 
of the country in which they live."69 To solve the problem. Russia wanted to create a joint 
Russian-Estonian group to reconstruct the Estonian legislation. Such a group was 
unacceptable to the Estonians, who argued that would be an outright interference into the 
state’s internal affairs.
Responding to Russia’s pressure, the Estonian government did not prevent and 
even encouraged international observers to investigate the situation of human rights and 
Russians in particular in their state. In January 1997, the Council o f Europe decided that 
Estonia no longer needed to be specially monitored by this human rights organization. 
Rudolf Binding, the chief Council of Europe rapporteur, told the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly (CEPA) that "many accusations against Estonia, also in the 
Western press, are very much exaggerated and unfair to Estonia."70 Having experienced 
pressure from the Russian deputies, who managed to gamer support from some Moldovan 
and Ukrainian deputies, the CEPA did pass a resolution requiring the Estonian 
government to ensure state support for Russian language schools.71 In addition, Estonia 
was asked to improve teaching Estonian to the Russians and to offer free or reduced rate 
courses to applicants of citizenship. Helped by the United Nations Development Program
69Tarmu Tammerk, “Wrangle Over Rights Continues,” Baltic Times (2 January,
1997), 1.
70Tarmu Tammerk, “Council of Europe Ends Estonia Monitoring,” Baltic Times 
(6 February, 1997), 1.
7lIbid. There are Russian schools supported by the Estonian state. Recently, 
during a public discussion, there was a suggestion to establish centers for developing 
Estonian culture and to give Estonian citizenship to Russian secondary school graduates. 
“Scientists Recommend that Russian School-Leavers Should Be Granted Citizenship.” 
Eesti Pdevaleht (14 June, 1999), 3. 0
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(UNDP) and Nordic countries, the Estonian government tried to comply with these 
recommendations.7"II
The Council of Europe decision was criticized by Moscow, who complained that 
Tallinn now can use the Council of Europe decision to counter M oscow’s claims about the 
minority situation in Estonia.73 Furthermore, this Council o f Europe’s decision stirred a 
debate in the Russian Estonian daily Estoniya, which, basing its report on the Russian 
Information Agency, wrote that van der Stoel. OSCE High Commissioner, found 
"systematic prosecution" of Russians in Estonia, and this finding supposedly contradicted 
with the Council of Europe’s decision. Van der Stoel responded to Estoniya by saying 
that since 1993 he "found no evidence of systematic persecution of national minorities or 
of systematic violation of human rights in Estonia."7-1 Furthermore, he praised Estonia for 
a larger number of Russian citizenship applicants. Indeed, in 1997, the rate of 
naturalization increased: in 1997, 32.7% of all Russian speakers had Estonian citizenship 
compared to 29% last year (Table 5). Helped by the OSCE, Estonia was issuing aliens’ 
passports to those Russians who did not want or could not get Estonian citizenship.75
72Since May 1997, Estonia’s attempts to speed up the process of integration 
included the creation of a new minister without portfolio with responsibility for 
integration issues, formation o f the policy proposal for integration, and the formation of 
the Non-Estonians Integration Fund. The project together with the UNDP and the Nordic 
governments will continue into the year 2001 and will attract approximately $1.3 million 
to provide funds for teaching the Estonian language to Russian children, training of 
Estonian in Russian language schools, and regional development in ethnic enclaves. 
Denise Albrighton, “UNDP, Nordics Lend a Hand for Integration,” Baltic Times (17 
September, 1998). 9.
liOMRI Daily Digest (5 February, 1997).
74Kristopher Rikken, “OSCE Chief Denies Estoniya Report,” Baltic Times (6 
February, 1997), 1.
75“Mission to Estonia Notes Positive Developments in Citizenship Issues.” OSCE 
Newsletter I February 1997).
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Estonia’s willingness to follow the recommendations of the international institutions were 
promoted by Goran Persson, then Swedish Prime Minister, who argued that Estonia’s 
Russian speakers, even those living in the ethnic enclave in Northeastern Estonia, no 
longer constitute a hurdle for Estonia to be admitted into the European Union.76
These developments probably helped Estonia (prior to Latvia and Lithuania) 
receive a recommendation by the EU Commission in July 1997 to be invited for starting 
accession negotiations. Estonia’s success in the transition to a market economy and its 
willingness to accommodate the non-citizens were among the reasons why Estonia was 
singled out of the three Baltic states.77 However, a visit by Jom Donner, a rapporteur from 
the EU Parliament, in August of the same year, re-politicized the ethnic divisions within 
the Estonian state. In his interview with Eesti Ekspress, Donner suggested that Estonia 
declared itself bilingual, i.e., that Russian would be declared the second official language 
of the state and loosened the citizenship requirements. He drew parallels with the position 
of the Swedes in Finland.78
Donner’s comments prompted polarization in Estonian society. Donner was 
harshly criticized by the Estonian language press and Estonian politicians, while the 
Russian press applauded his comments. The Estonians saw Donner’s suggestions going 
"further than those in Moscow'." Kristiina Ojuland, one of the leading Estonian 
politicians, argued that Donner’s suggestions contradicted Estonia’s integration policy
76“Estonia Has Found Good Solution to Non-Citizens Problems in North-East 
Estonia.” ETA News Release (15 April, 1997).
"The other reasons probably were the willingness o f the Commission to signal 
that the EU was ready for the members from the former area of the USSR, but, at the 
same time, the institution did not want to stress its institutional capacity for enlargement. 
Bungs, The Baltic States, 26.
,8“Daily Comments on Donner’s Advice to Estonia.” FBIS-WEU-97-241 (12 
August, 1997).
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which has been geared to integrate the Russians through learning the language.79 Donner 
was seen as hampering Estonia’s border agreement with Russia, since his statement, along 
w ith the criticism by the Baltic Sea States’ Council’s Human Rights Commissioner Ole 
Espersen, was later (in November 1997) instrumentalized by Russia’s Primakov during the 
border negotiations with Estonia.80 When the EU Parliament decided to include the 
w'ording of Kirsi Piha, the chairman of the Estonian group in the EU Parliament, praising 
the integration of non-Estonians instead of Donner’s opinion, into its statement, this move 
w as hailed as "Estonia’s victory" by the Estonian press.81
Eventually, however, the recommendation of the European Commission to start the 
negotiations temporarily helped to improve the Estonian-Russian relations. When Estonia 
received an invitation to start the talks, the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense 
policy suggested that Russia instrumentalized the Estonian Russians not as "a fifth 
column," but as a "weighty instrument of political and economic rapprochement of 
peoples [i.e., the Russians in Russia proper and Estonians]."82 Furthermore, in October 
1997, Russia changed its "steel" ambassador, Alexander Trofimov with a "softer" Alexei 
Glukhov. It silenced its rhetoric about the "abuses of the human rights" in Estonia, and 
appointed Ludvig Chizhov (instead of Vassili Svirin) as the head of Estonian-Russian
?9“Estonian Press Reacts to Proposal on Bilingualism,” FBIS-WEU-97-240 (9 
August, 1997).
80Aivar Jame, “Primakov’s Whip,” Posiimees (6 December, 1997), 7.
81Paavo Palk, “EU Enlargement Is Still Unclear,” Posiimees (5 December, 1997),
9.
82Paul Goble, “An Experts’ Report Defines a Novel Policy,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (7 November, 1997). In this report, a group of 
senior Russian experts on foreign policy encouraged the Russian government and Russian 
businesses to spend more money on Estonian Russians to make relations between the two 
nations better. Also see “Russians Prefer Baltic EU Membership to NATO,” FBIS-WEU- 
97-100(6  May, 1997).
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border negotiation team, which made the border negotiation process somewhat smoother.85
Hoping for further improvement in Russian-Estonian relations through EU 
membership, the Estonian government decided to submit legislation which grants 
citizenship to children bom in Estonia to non-citizen parents to the Estonian parliament. 
This move was made strategically on 16 December 1997, just days ahead of a key EU 
summit in Luxembourg which identified the states for the first round of enlargement. This 
decision was welcomed by the United States, who said that "Estonia now has acted on all 
thirty recommendations made by Max van der Stoel in 1994," van der Stoel himself, and 
the EU.84
On the domestic front, the decision was assaulted by restorationist Mart Laar who 
argued that it contradicts with Estonia’s national interests. Laar argued that the simplified 
order of giving citizenship would slow down the integration of non-Estonians into the 
Estonian society because there "will be no incentive for non-Estonians to learn to speak 
Estonian." Laar went on to say that the government should aim to improve its language 
teaching policies instead of making concessions to Russia.85 Jiiri Adams, a member of the 
committee supervising the draft law on the citizenship from Laar’s party (Pro Patria 
Union) was alarmed about the possibility that the government was trying to "gradually 
introduce the ‘zero option’ of citizenship" which was rejected by the Estonian voters in 
1992. Pro Patria Union warned that this amendment could launch the disintegration of the
83After spring 1998, Russian-Estonian border negotiations intensified. They were 
completed on 29 March 1999. The next step would be to sign and ratify the agreements. 
Estonian Foreign Ministry, “Border Negotiations Completed,” Press Release (29 March 
1999).
W“U.S. Applauds Estonia’s Citizenship Policies,” ETA News Release (9 
December, 1997).
85“Ex-PM Slams Government’s Leniency with Non-Citizens.” ETA News Release 
(9 December, 1997).
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Estonian state.86 The ruling Coalition Party was reminded about its 1993 program which 
mentioned that "Estonia cannot afford an explosive and uncontrolled increase in the 
number of citizens."87 "Neither domestic political documents nor politicians have ever 
mentioned that the principle of ius soli should be introduced together with ius sanguini," 
argued the restorationists, fearful about the changes to the citizenship law which, they 
thought, should remain fixed to the 1992 version.88
On 18 December 1997, two days after the draft law was submitted to the 
parliament, four Russian Estonian parliamentarians submitted an amendment of their own, 
suggesting liberalizing the law of citizenship even further. They offered to extend 
Estonian citizenship to all stateless children under 18.89 In a backlash, the Right wing 
parties of Estonia released a statement, addressed to the president, the parliament, and the 
government, which argued that "the Republic of Estonia, restored under the principle of 
legal continuity, should not retreat from nationstate politics of citizenship, language, and 
aliens. Language and citizenship policies and complicated demographic issues resulting 
from genocide carried out during the Soviet occupation (i.e., deportations and repressions) 
should not be solved at the expense of the interest of the nation."90 Similarly to the first 
stage of community building, historical memory about the past ethnic restructuring once 
again entered political discourse.
Trying to alleviate the fears of the restorationists and at the same time reiterating
86Aivars Jame, “Estonian Citizenship Law Under Siege,” Posiimees (12 January, 
1998). 9.
8'Allan Alaktila, “Citizenship Together with Birthplace,” Sdnumileht (10 
December. 1997), 6.
88Ibid.
89Aivars Jame, “Estonian Citizenship Law Under Siege.” Posiimees (12 January, 
1998). 9.
‘^ “Russia’s Policies Slammed.” Baltic News Service (5 February. 1998).
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its willingness to adjust to the democratic norms of inclusiveness, on 10 February 1998, 
the Estonian government, which in 1998 was dominated by the compromisers, adopted the 
Estonian national integration policy. The policy included, among other things, a statement 
underlining the importance of "the serious effort [by the non-Estonians] to study the 
Estonian language" and a goal to foster regional development in the ethnic enclave in 
Northeastern Estonia.91 The essence of this policy, however, was the continuation of the 
previous integration attempts, which was based on the idea that the integration of Russians 
into the Estonian state should proceed through language.
The restorationists supported this policy (adopted by the Estonian parliament in 
June 1998), but they continued to resist any changes in the citizenship policy, arguing that 
citizenship should not be changed without a public discussion.92 On the contrary, the 
President’s Roundtable of Ethnic Minorities, led by non-Estonians (with the exception of 
two members), supported the move to extend Estonian citizenship to all stateless children 
by arguing that it would not significantly alter the existing citizenship law but criticized 
the integration policy for lacking a focus.93 Finally, in March 1998, the bill offering 
Estonian citizenship to children under 15 passed the first reading in the parliament.
9lAndra Veidemann (a former Minister of Ethnic Affairs), “Perspectives of 
Estonia’s National Integration Policy,” speech at the conference ‘Towards a Civil 
Society,” Riga, 11-12 June 1998. A copy of her presentation was given to me by the 
Naturalization Board of Latvia on 7 July 1998.
92“We Should Start with a Discussion,” Postimees (11 March, 1998), 8.
930ffice of the President of Estonia, “Resolution of the President’s Roundtable of 
Ethnic Minorities on the Citizenship Act” (10 March 1998). Available from 
hnp.V/www.president.ee: INTERNET. Vladimir Vel’man, one of the members of the 
Roundtable, criticized the program by saying that it does not identify the main goal. “It is 
no clear,” he argued, “whether the Estonian state is trying to create a multicultural 
society, assimilate the Russians, or pursue integration on the individual level.” 
“Razrabatyvayets’a programma integratsii nekorennogo pokoleniya” [Creating a Program 
of Integration of non-Autochthonous Population], Molodezh' Estonii Subbota (13 
November, 1999), 5.
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However, the parliament rejected a similar draft law submitted by the Russian deputies.
A similar amendment to the citizenship law passed by the parliament of the 
neighboring Latvia under pressure from international actors reactivated the debate about 
citizenship in Estonia. The amendment offering citizenship to the stateless children was 
passionately promoted by Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik lives and the committee on 
the foreign affairs of the parliament who argued that Estonia had to change the law if it 
w ants to join the EU. The restorationists continued to view the amendment as "letting in 
the Trojan horse" (i.e.. allowing the "aliens" trespass the borders o f the Estonian political 
community).94 They also argued that by giving in to the pressure of the OSCE, Estonia, in 
fact, is "giving in to Russia," since Russia is using the OSCE to pursue its own interests. 
Should Estonia accept the proposed amendments, the argument went, there will be new 
ones. Finally, by using the international institutions, Russia will get what it wants.95
To keep the passions down, the parliament delayed the second reading of the bill 
until September. The same month, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked 
that "the way Estonia tackles the issue of protecting the rights of minorities is the key to its 
accession to the EU." He continued by saying that he hopes that Estonia will soon 
implement Max van der Stoel’s recommendations.96 Cook’s "encouragement" was 
reiterated by Max van der Stoel, w-ho expressed a wish that "Estonia will follow Latvia in 
adopting the amendments to its citizenship law."97 The Estonians heard the same 
"recommendation" for the third time during the negotiations with the EU which started on
94Enn Tarto, “Should the Citizenship Law Be Alleviated?,” Eesti Pdevaleht (20 
June. 1998), 2.
9SVahur Made, “Estonia’s Foreign Policy is Changing,” Posiimees (26 June,
1998), 9.
96Baltic Times (3 September, 1998). 3.
9/“OSCE Shifts Attention to Estonia.” Baltic Times (8 October. 1998), 3.
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10 November 1998.98 Responding to this pressure, Tune Kelam, the chairman of the 
committee in charge of bringing the Estonian laws in compliance with EU standards, 
argued that even though the government of Estonia supports the amendment proposed by 
the international actors and Moscow, "we [Estonia and international institutions] must 
make it absolutely clear where the end [to these amendments] will be. This should be the 
last demand for Estonia or any Baltic state."99
In order to persuade the lawmakers to adopt the bill. President Lennart Meri asked 
them to overcome the "political passions."100 Raul Malk, Estonia’s Foreign Minister, 
argued that the amendments are crucial for Estonia’s future in international arena, and that 
failure to pass the amendment would "baffle" the international community. The 
restorationists still tried to protest by arguing that citizenship should be used as a reward 
for those who have already integrated instead of being utilized as an impetus for 
integration.101 The Estonian Freedom Fighters Union (an organization tracing itself to the 
resistance fighters o f the postwar years) gathered in front of the parliament building on the 
day of the vote to protest what they thought was "russification through the European 
Union."102
In spite of these protests, the amendment offering citizenship to the children bom 
in Estonia to stateless parents after 26 February 1992, was passed by a vote of 55 to 20 by
98Rebecca Santana, “Estonia Moving Steadily Toward EU,” Baltic Times (12 
November, 1998), 8.
"Ibid.
l00Jean Cleave, “Averting ‘One State-Two Societies’ in Estonia,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (18 November, 1998).
10lRebecca Santana, “Citizenship Amendments Clear Another Hurdle,” Baltic 
Times (26 November, 1998), 4.
l02“Protesters Gather Outside the Parliament,” Baltic Times (10 December, 1999).
4.
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the parliament. Yet many members o f the parliament still held reservations about such 
intense outside intervention to promote inclusiveness, and admitted that their vote was 
crucially affected by Estonia’s need to get into the EU .103
Having amended its citizenship law under external pressure, the Estonian state has 
been very reluctant to make its language laws more liberal. In December 1998 (the same 
month when the citizenship law was amended), the Estonian parliament adopted a draft 
law which would require the members of the parliament and elected officials in local 
governments to be fluent in the Estonian language. The proponents o f the law knew that it 
was naive to hope that these language requirements would increase the willingness o f the 
aliens to study the language, yet, they professed, [the law] "had a symbolic meaning [to 
them] nevertheless."104
This time, despite the criticism by Max van der Stoel, President Meri promulgated 
the amendment, even though he had declined to do so in 1996 and in 1997.105 In his 
interview to Eesti Paehvaleht, Max van der Stoel criticized the law by saying that he 
thought that it should be "up to the voters" to decide whether to elect someone who does 
not speak the official language.106 Predictably, van der Stoel was criticized by the 
Estonian restitutionists who argued that even though "many people indeed hoped that after 
the liberalization of the citizenship law, the High Commissioner and Russia would not
l03Rebecca Santana, “Estonia Amends Citizenship Law,” Baltic Times (10 
December, 1998), 1.
l04“Language Rung in the Career Ladder.” Posiimees (16 December, 1998), 8.
I05Refusing to promulgate this amendment to the language law in 1996 and in 
1997, Meri argued that this piece of legislation would “upset the constitutional balance of 
power because it would allow the government to evaluate and determine the level of 
proficiency of parliamentary deputies and local government officials.” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (6 February, 1998).
l06“Stoel Attacks Language Requirements,” Eesti Pdevaleht (8 January, 1999), 3.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
189
advance any new claims, it did not happen so."107
Responding to Meri’s decision to promulgate the law, four Russian members of the 
President’s Roundtable on Ethnic Minorities resigned, arguing that the lawmakers have 
ignored their opinion on the language law and thus making this multiethnic institution 
useless.108 The United People’s Party, defending the interests of Russian Estonians, 
appealed to the EU "to force the Estonian authorities to cancel the amendments."109 
Several months later, in April and June 1999, Max van der Stoel once again criticized the 
amendment to the Estonian language law (the one requiring the members of the parliament 
and elected officials in local governments to be fluent in Estonian and also establishing 
requirements concerning the minimum level of Estonian for public servants, employees 
and individual entrepreneurs) as too intrusive.110 His visit to Estonia in June was protested 
by the Memento organization, uniting the victims of the previous regime.111
This time, even the Estonian compromisers did not share van der Stoel’s views. 
Arnold Ruiitel, a former leader of the Estonian Popular Front and a member of the Rural 
Union (in 1999), argued that "it is not correct [to amend the language law according to the 
recommendations of van der Stoel because] this means that we should rely on interpreters 
in the parliament and elsewhere. . . .  I think that our Constitution and all other laws 
[already] correspond with the modem (i.e., the Western) requirements." Another 
moderate—Andra Veidemann, a former minister o f ethnic relations— argued that even
l0,Aivar Jame, “Max van der Stoel Makes Language Policy.” Postimees (30 
December, 1998), 6.
'“ “Language Made the Roundtable Split Up,” Postimees (20 February, 1999). 10.
‘“ “Estonia Tightens Up Language Law,” Baltic Times (18 February, 1999), 4.
"°“OSCE Again Points to ‘Deficiencies’ in Estonian Language Law,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (27 April, 1999).
" '“Van der Stoel Makes Concessions in Estonia,” Baltic Times (17 June, 1999), 2.
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though the Estonian citizens should not be differentiated by their ethnic origin (as the law 
may potentially do). Estonia is in a unique [demographic] situation and therefore should 
"find a solution when formal legal truths do not conflict with our interests."112
When this amendment to the language law was once again criticized by the OSCE, 
disapproved by the EU Commission in its second annual report on Estonia’s progress 
released in October 1999, and recommended being revoked ("harmonized with EU 
norms") by Martti Ahtisaari, the Finnish President, some prepared to defend them by 
saying that the EU criticism concerns just "one legal act," and this criticism can be 
addressed by merely changing the text, but not the essence of the law.113 The Commission 
on the European Affairs within the Estonian parliament has reacted to the EU Commission 
report by remarking that the "Russian problem" has been mostly "imposed [on Estonia] 
from above." Instead, the Estonian parliamentary commission suggested that the EU 
should focus its attention on other problems in Estonia, such as agricultural issues or 
economic difficulties instead of dwelling on the ethnic issues.114
So far, there has been little domestic support for changing the amended language 
law, which went into effect in July 1999, as previously planned. This unwillingness to 
give in to the external pressure regarding the language law, as well as the previous
II2Answers to the question “Should the Language Law Be Amended According to 
the Recommendations of Max van der Stoel?,” Eesli Pdevaleht (27 April, 1999), 2.
113For OSCE criticism, see “OSCE Official Lauds Estonian Integration Efforts,” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (21 October, 1999). For a summary of the 
European Commission’s position on the Estonian language law, see Donald Brooke, “An 
A for Effort, an F in Languages,” Baltic Times (21 October, 1999), 3. For Finnish 
President Ahtisaari’s “encouragement” (in the second half of 1999, Finland held the 
rotating presidency of the EU). see “Ahtisaari Discusses Estonian Language Law,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (8 November, 1999). For a response to these 
criticisms, see Harri Tiido, “Reading Between the Lines of the Euro-report,” Eesti 
Pdevaleht (15 October. 1999), 2.
UiM olodezh’ Estonii (11 November, 1999), 1.
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resistance to changing the citizenship law suggests that in spite of intense international 
involvement, the restorationist idea of political community as "a post factum kind of 
affirmative action, commemorating past persecutions""3 has not been abandoned yet.
Response o f the Russians
The Russians within Estonia have tended to support Estonia’s membership in the 
EU much more passionately than Estonians.116 Encouraged by a positive EU attitude 
toward the Estonian state and hoping for the future Estonia’s membership within the EU, 
many of them decided to go through the process of naturalization in 1997. In 1996, 
Estonia granted citizenship to only approximately 3,000 people. In 1997, this number was 
8,132. The number of people who received Estonian citizenship in 1998 was even 
larger—9,969."'
However, this "rush" for citizenship abated in 1998. The adoption of the 
amendment further liberalizing the law in 1998 did not significantly alter the pace of 
naturalization. Even though approximately 7,000 new citizens were expected, the non-
I!5This phrase has been used by William Safran to describe Israel’s political 
community. William Safran, “Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: 
Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community,” 
International Political Science Review  18, no. 3 (July 1997): 327.
" 6In November 1997, 35% of those questioned (Estonians and non-Estonians) 
were in favor of EU membership. A year later, 25% of Estonians and 37% non-Estonians 
were in favor. In October 1999, 36% of Estonians and 48% of non-Estonians held such 
views. EU, Briefing 41: Public Opinion on Enlargement in the EU Member States and 
Applicant Countries (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1999).
"'M ati Heidmets, “Integration: What and How?” paper presented at the 
conference “Multicultural Estonia” on 26 December 1998 in Helsinki, and Bungs, The 
Baltic Slates, 66.
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citizen did not hurry to apply for Estonian citizenship for their children.118 As of 5 March 
1999. approximately 220.000 residents of Estonia (about 17%) reportedly were still 
"stateless." or undecided, which citizenship (Russian or Estonian) to apply for.119 The 
language requirement established by the Estonian state on one hand and poor knowledge 
of Estonian by the Russian speakers on the other were some of the reasons why many 
Russians could not opt for the Estonian citizenship.120
At the same time, the attitude of the Russians toward the state has been gradually 
improving (Table 3). In fact, in 1995-96, the Russians began to actively discuss their role 
in the restored state.121 One group, led by the Estonian United People’s Party, argued that 
the Russian Estonians should seek integration into the Estonian state. Another group, led 
by the Russian Party of Estonia, supported consolidation of all movements and parties of 
Estonian Russians to be able to voice their own, yet specifically "Russian," demands to the 
Estonian state.122 These debates signal that many Russians began to foresee their political 
activities within the Estonian state.123 Tracing community building processes at the sub-
ll8“Time to Make Choices” Eesli Paehvaleht (29 July, 1999), 6.
ll9Anthony Georgieff, “Ethnic Russian Voters May Play a Key Role,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (5 March, 1999).
120According to the September 1999 data, approximately 72% of non-citizens 
(356.000 people) are only now acquiring the skills of Estonian language. Iris Pettai, 
“Info-isolation of non-Estonians,” Postimees (3 September, 1999), 9.
121Lembit Annus, “Tanets vokrug passportov” [A Dance Around the Passports], 
M E Russkiy Telegraf (16 January, 1996), 2. A widespread wish among the Russian 
speakers has been to “adapt to the local conditions, but preserve the culture.” See 
“Russkaya molodezh’ istorii ne skovyvayet” [The Russian Youth Is Not Overwhelmed by 
History], Narvskaya Gazeta (8 March, 1997), 4.
I22Valentin Strukhov, “Grazhdanskoye obshchestvo vse eshsche tol’ko tsel’”
[Civil Society Is Still Only a Goal], M E Russkiy Telegraf (16 January, 1996), 3.
123This statement is supported by Saar Poll studies, conducted in April 1997 and 
in November 1996. The poll conducted in 1997 suggested that 53% of Estonia’s non­
citizen population wanted to become Estonian citizens. The study conducted in 1996 
revealed that 79% of non-citizens wanted their children to have Estonian citizenship.
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state level helps to understand this change better.
COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "BELOW"
Local Governments
Even though the Estonian language law pronounced Estonian as the only state 
language, it has permitted the use of minority languages in the areas of minority 
concentration.124 Furthermore, all residents of Estonia, regardless o f their citizenship, have 
been allowed to vote in the local elections, even though non-citizen cannot be elected to an 
office.125 In practice, this meant that multiethnic localities with a large percentage of 
Russians (i.e., Tallinn and Narva) were endowed with a significant degree of self- 
governance and even cultural autonomy. Estonia’s non-citizen were eager to use these 
rights: their participation in local elections has been quite intense. To illustrate, in 1996. 
85% of aliens and only 49.7% of Estonian citizens voted in local elections.126 Three years 
later, the majority of the non-citizen still considered it worthwhile to cast their vote.127
“Over a Half o f Estonia’s Non-Citizens Would Like to Be Citizens,” ETA News Release 
(3 April, 1997).
124Vello Pettai,“Estonia’s Controversial Language Policies,” Transition (29 
November, 1996): 22.
125The right to vote in the local elections is extended to “all residents over 18 years 
old, regardless of citizenship, who reside permanently on the territory of the local 
government; for non-citizen: if s/he has resided legally in the territory of the 
corresponding local government for at least five years by 1 January of the election year.” 
Estonian National Election Committee, Fact Sheet (October 1999). Available from 
h tip:/Avww. vm. ee/eng/local. el. 99: ENTER NET.
126Merike I^ees, “Leftists Win in Ida-Virumaa,” Luup (4 October, 1999). The 
turnout in local elections was 52.3% in 1993, 52.5% in 1996, and less than 50% in 1999.
127“Tum out High in Early Voting for Estonian Local Elections,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (15 October, 1999).
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The state decided to tolerate a high degree of self-governance after a strike at the 
two plants near Narva and simultaneous attempts by the Russian secessionist 
organizations to collect the signatures for a referendum on the future of Narva in 1992. (In 
Narva, at least 96% of the population is Russian, and out of 74.000 inhabitants 
approximately 55% hold the Russian citizenship, and approximately 80% of the residents 
do not speak any Estonian.)128 However, the right to vote in local elections extended to 
non-citizen by the Estonian state did not prevent secessionist groups from organizing a 
referendum on Narva’s regional autonomy in July 1993, in which the majority of 
participants voted in favor o f establishing an autonomous territory. The Supreme Court 
declared the referendum unconstitutional, but it did not revoke the right of the non-citizen 
to vote in local elections.
As the time went on, the popularity of the conservative Russian secessionist 
leaders among the Narvans declined.129 Three months later, in October 1993, the voters of 
Narva elected to power the leftist but not secessionist parties—the Trade Union Center, the 
Democratic Labor Party, and the Estonian Society—to the local government.130 During the 
next round of elections in 1996, three representatives of the Estonian "compromisers"—the
I28Sergei Gorokhov, “Integration in Practice: The Case of Narva,” in The 
Integration o f  Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends, ed. 
Aksel Kirch (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997), 131, 134. Gorokhov gives 
the following figures on citizenship (1996): 27% of the population are the citizens of 
Estonia, 55% of Russia, and 18% are without citizenship. Another estimate is that 27% 
of Narvans hold the Russian citizenship. Denise Albrighton, “Estonia’s Little Russia,” 
Baltic Times (17 June, 1999), 16.
l29Gorokhov, 128. In 1999, electoral district of Ida-Virumaa was home to 74,263 
aliens and 66,113 citizens.
l30“Posmotrite, kto prishel” [Look Who Is Here], Nar\>skaya Gazeta (12 February, 
1997), 2. Trade Union party won 11 seats, the Democratic Labor Party— 13, and the 
Estonian society— 7 seats.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
195
Estonian Center Party—was elected to the local government.131 In 1999, the Center party 
won the local election.132 During 1989-99. mostly Russians who hold Estonian 
citizenship were elected to the local government (see Table 6).
By and large, the voters in Narva take the local elections quite seriously. For 
example, while complaining that the parliamentarians are not responsible to the non­
citizen, even when the policies which directly affect the life of the latter are adopted, the 
Ncin’skaya Gazeta (the local newspaper) wrote that "the matters are quite different on the 
local level [than on the national]. Everybody is electing [those who hold power]. In this 
case [local elections], not only can we expect and even demand that our problems are 
solved, but we can anticipate that our way of thinking will be taken into account as well. 
For the local population [i.e., in Narva], an increase in the prices of utilities is more 
important than European integration."133
During October 1999 local elections, readiness to cater for these elementary 
interests of regional communities and to fight corruption in the local city administration 
which grew under the Center party (the compromisers) became a stimulus for power 
sharing of several diametrically opposed ethnic parties.
I31Ibid. The electoral union “Narva” won 12 seats, the Democratic Labor Party 
won 8 seats, the United People’s Party won 6 seats, and “My Home Is Narva” won 2
seats.
l32The Center party won 14 seats, the Social Democratic Labor party won 3 seats, 
the electoral union “Unity and Trust” (includes the Russian party of Estonia) won 7 seats. 
“Narva-21" won 4 seats, “Narva’s People’s Trust”won 2 seats, and an electoral union 
“Arukus” won I seat. Narvskaya Gazeta (26 October, 1999), 1.
13jN. Dmitriyev, “Narod bezmolstvuyet, no mneniye imeyet” [People Are Quiet. 
But They Have Opinions], Narvskaya Gazeta (3 June, 1997), 2.
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Table 6. Ethnic Identification of the Deputies Elected to the Local Government in Narva
Identification 1989 1991 1993 1996 1999
Russian 40 20 15 16 29 (non- 
Estonian)
(80%) (77%) (48.4%) (51.6%) (93.5%)
Estonian 4 3 14 9 2
(8%) (11.5%) (45.2%-) (29%) (6%)
Other 6 3 2 6 n/a
(12%) (11.5%) (6.4%) (19.4%)
Source:
N'a n'skaya Gazeta (12 February, 1997): 2. and (26 October. 1999): 1.
In Tallinn City Council, the ruling coalition of Pro Patria (the arch restorationist 
party), the Reform party and the Moderates, signed an agreement with the People’s Trust, 
an electoral union of ethnic Russian organizations.134 The October elections were different 
from the previous ones because only one electoral union—the Joint Russian List—based its 
election strategy on ethnic issues while campaigning in multiethnic areas. Yet this 
strategy failed.135 In order to form a city government that is capable of catering to all 
residents of the city, it became necessary for the restorationists to seek allies from the 
electoral list which included Yevgeni Kogan, one of the most ardent enemies of Estonia’s
l34“Russian Party Ensures Ruling Estonian Coalition Local Victory,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (25 October, 1999).
135II’ya Nikiforov, “Who Is Behind Yevgenii Kogan,” Eesti Pdehvaleht (21
October. 1999), 2.
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independence and the former leader of the Intemiovement-136 Welcoming the prospect of 
cooperation between the arch enemies on the local level and referring to Kogan, Prime 
Minister Mart Laar. the former leader of the restorationist movement, said that "we will 
not attach any mythological features to one or another person."13' Kogan asserted his 
willingness to cooperate by saying that "there is no more Popular Front and there is no 
more Intemiovement. Popular Front or Intermovement is of no importance in the 
discussions on road repairs or water pipes."138 However, Kogan's presence was unwanted 
by the other members of the right-wing coalition. To help the right-wingers and the 
coalition of Russian parties reach an agreement, Kogan gave up the seat he won on 
Tallinn’s City Council.139
Everyday needs of local communities have been an important issue not only during 
the local elections. As a matter of fact, the Estonian central government has paid a lot of 
attention to regional economic development and the effectiveness of local governments. 
Attempting to curb unemployment in Northeastern Estonia, the state set up a free 
economic zone in the town of Sillamae.140 (The town, as well as the whole northeastern 
region, was strongly affected by the Russian financial crisis and the demise of massive 
Soviet-style energy industries.) Furthermore, helped by the EU, OSCE, Open Society 
Foundation, the Nordic governments and other international actors, the state has funded 
the so-called "integration projects," pursued on the community level, which have included
1‘6“Let Us Avoid Conflicts.” Postimees (22 October. 1999), 6.
13,“The Post-Election Miracles,” Postimees (20 October, 1999), 6.
ll&Eesti Pdevaleht (19 October, 1999), 1.
139”Anti-Independence Activist Rejects Tallinn City Council Seat,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (22 October, 1999).
U0”Free Economic Zone Created in Estonia’s Northeast.” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (13 January, 1999).
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language courses, seminars for teachers, and training centers.141 International gatherings 
have been organized in Narva to promote regional development and to sell the area to the 
potential investors as "a port of transit."142 These strategies of functional integration have 
been geared toward sustaining a good level of economic well-being within the region and 
toward enabling the non-citizen to "use the state as a service station.”
Using the State as a Service Station: The Development o f  Civil Society
Many Russians, especially those living in the ethnic enclaves of Northeastern 
Estonia were previously employed in large industries sponsored by Moscow. Sudden loss 
of employment has been one of the most serious issues that they have faced.143 Although 
ethnic affiliation does not present an insurmountable hurdle for economic success, the 
Russians were found to be somewhat more vulnerable to unemployment than Estonians,144 
often due to their poor Estonian and the lack of Estonian citizenship. Consequently, the
141Denise Albrighton, “Reformers Focus on Social Issues,” Baltic Times (8 April, 
1999), 4.
142In May 1997, an international conference “Narva-Transit ’97” was held in 
Narva. The local newspaper evaluated this development by saying that “transit [to 
Russia] is key to self-governance o f the region.” “Vse dorogi vedut v Narvu” [All Routes 
go to Narva], Narvskaya Gazeta (24 January, 1997), 1. The goal of the conferences and 
exhibitions held in Narva is to “mark Narva on the map of Europe.” See “Oboznachif 
Narvu na karte Evropy” [Marking Narva on the Map of Europe], Narvskaya Gazeta (6 
May, 1997), 1.
U3Mikk Titma. Nancy Brandon Tuma. and Brian D. Silver, “Winners and Losers 
in the Postcommunist Transition: New Evidence from Estonia.” Post Soviet Affairs 14, 
no. 2 (1998): 134. The authors argue that the Russians were especially hard hit by 
transitional changes.
144Aadne Aasland, “Ethnicity and Unemployment in the Baltic States,” 
International Politics 35 (September 1998): 353—70. This article summarizes the results 
of the NORBALT living conditions survey, conducted in 1994.
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purchasing power of non-Estonians has been growing slower than that of the Estonians.145
It is not surprising, therefore, that civic activity of non-Estonians began in 
associations that deal with economic issues—i.e.. economic interest groups, trade unions 
and, to a lesser degree, in professional associations.146 Recently, the share of people active 
in trade unions and professional associations has increased. To illustrate, in 1996, the 
share of Russians active in trade unions was almost twice as high (34%) when compared 
to 1993 (18%).147 The leaders of the trade unions, especially in Estonia’s northeast, have 
been quite vociferous in demanding to make the implementation of the law on language 
or on education more lenient.148
Some concerns, such as crime control or care of residence facilities, prompted the 
development of the organizations involving both Russians, Estonians, and other residents 
of the Estonian state. An example o f such organizations is the apartment-owners' 
associations, which constitute approximately a half of 10,000 nonprofit organizations 
registered in Estonia.149
Ethnic cleavages, however, are still discernible. As Aksel Kirch has argued, the
li5ETA Insight (12-18 November, 1999).
146Ruutsoo, 119.
l47Aksel Kirch, “Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Different Strategies of 
Integration into the Nation-State,” in The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads, ed. 
Talavs Jundzis (Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia, 1998), 591.
148On 7 December 1999, a group of trade union leaders from Estonia’s northeast 
wrote an open letter “Zashchitim russkuyu shkolu” [We Will Defend the Russian School] 
to President Meri, in which they asked to refrain from making abrupt changes to the 
current Estonia’s language policy. They were worried about the implementation of the 
language law in the Russian schools. The teachers of those schools were asked to leam 
Estonian. Molodezh' Estonii (7 December, 1999), 1.
l49Tricia Cornell, “Civil Society at the Crossroads,” Baltic Times (2-9 December, 
1999). According to the United Nations, there are at least 4,000 societies, associations, 
and foundations in that country. UN, Estonian Human Development Report 1998: 
Integrating into Europe and the World. Available from http://www.undp.org: 
INTERNET.
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emerging structures of civil society among the Estonians are rooted in their historical 
memory (e.g.. the prewar Republic, folklore activities during the occupation, organizations 
of formerly deported, etc.)150 Historical memory, however, separates these Estonians and 
some Russians from the Russian speaking "latecomers." Therefore, many sub-state 
associations only underline the bifurcation of the Estonian society.
Different Perceptions o f  the Past: An Insurmountable Obstacle?
In ethnically divided societies, commemorations often incite ethnic hatred or even 
prompt violence. This has not been the case in Estonia, even though Estonians and 
Russians commemorate different days. Most Russians (especially the older "latecomers") 
devotedly celebrate May 9—the Victory day, or the day when the Russian army captured 
Berlin after World War II. Gatherings to celebrate this day has become a tradition among 
Russian war veterans.151 Many Estonians, however, associate the end o f World War II 
with the return of the Soviets and deportations. Instead, they tend to celebrate Estonia’s 
independence day and June 14, the Day of Mourning and the day of one of the greatest 
deportations.
The official rhetoric of commemoration during the Day of Mourning has often
tried to downplay different historical experiences of Estonia’s current residents:
"The word ‘deportation,’ remarked Lennart Meri, the President o f Estonia, in his 
mourning day address on 14 June 1998, turned overnight into a term of equal 
abhorrence as ‘genocide,’ ‘holocaust,’ marking the crimes against humanity that 
were committed on the Estonian territory by foreign invaders. . . .  As we mourn
l50Kirch and Kirch, 590.
I5IAivar Jame, “The Riga Incident Is a Lesson for Estonia,” Postimees (10 March, 
1999), 9.
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our compatriots today, we also moum all the victims of Stalinism and Nazism, 
regardless of their nationality, religion or land of residence."15'
Furthermore, to confront the legacy of the past, the government initiated an intense
search for the individuals guilty of deportations. Thus, in January 1999, an Estonian court
convicted Johannes Klaassepp, a former Soviet security official who was involved in the
deportations that occurred in 1949. Mikhail Neverovski, another person in charge of
deportations, was convicted in August 1999.153 The state’s decision to initiate the search
for the "guilty" did not prompt ethnic tensions.154
Neither commemorations nor trials turned out to be the most challenging
outgrowths of different historical experiences of the autochthonous residents o f Estonia
and the "latecomers." However, conflicting historical memories have translated into
different perceptions o f threat.
Since the reestablishment of the independent state, the Estonians and the Russians
have had different attitudes on Russia as a source of threat. To illustrate, in 1994, 84% of
the Estonians thought that Russia presented a threat to the Estonian state, but only 12% of
the Russians shared their view.155 In 1996, 79% of the Estonians and 14% of the Russians
thought that Russia still presented a threat to the independence of Estonia.156 In 1999,
l52Lennart Meri, ‘The Mourning Day Address,” Tallinn, 14 June 1998. Available 
from http://www.president.ee\ INTERNET.
153Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (2 November, 1999).
154Toivo Kamenik (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes), interview by 
author, 6 November 1998, Vilnius.
l55Richard Rose and William Maley, “Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic 
States? What Do the Peoples There Think?” Studies in Public Policy No. 231 (Glasgow: 
University of Strathclyde, 1994), 43. 38% of the Estonians thought that the Russian state 
definitely is a threat to “peace and security in this country.” and 46% thought that this is 
possibly the case. 3% of the Russians thought that Russia definitely presents a threat to 
Estonia, and 9% thought that this is possibly the case.
l56Kirch and Kirch, 154. 43% of the Estonians thought that Russia “definitely” 
presents a danger to the independence of Estonia, and 36% thought that Russia
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ethnic restructuring which took place in Kosovo and in Chechnya were interpreted 
differently by the Estonians and the Russians. In the words of Andrei Hvostov, these 
events underscored "the line between 'us' and ‘them .’ ”157 Most Estonians sympathized 
with the Albanians and the Chechnyans, but most Russians living in Estonia sympathized 
with the Serbs and the Russians. Protesting against NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict, in March 1999 a group of the Russian youths even staged a protest in front o f the 
American embassy.158 During the same month, more than 1,000 Russian citizens who live 
in Narva have signed a plea against NATO air strikes in Kosovo. Yuri Mishin, the leader 
of the association of Russian citizens in Estonia, threatened that Northeastern Estonia may 
follow the example o f Kosovo,159 but this threat remained hollow.
Predictably, the majority of Estonians and the Russians have disagreed on 
Estonia’s membership in NATO. The majority o f the Russian Estonians have been either 
against or undecided about Estonia’s NATO membership, but all Russian parties have 
been strongly against.160 Realizing that the majority of the Russians do not share their 
ideas about the membership in NATO, in mid-1999, two thirds of Estonians still felt that 
the Russians pose a threat to the survival of the Estonian nation and were opposed to
“probably” presents a danger to the independence of Estonia. 4% of the Russians fell into 
the first category and 10% into the second.
157Andrei Hvostov, “Harmonization of the Youth,” Eesti Pdevaleht (16 
November, 1999), 2.
158Ivi Proos, “Crisis of the Status of the Russian Youth,” Postimees (7 April,
1999), 7.
159“Russian Citizens in Estonia Collect Signatures Against NATO Air Strikes,” 
£TA News Release (29 March, 1999).
160In 1998, 29% of non-Estonians were against Estonia’s NATO membership. In 
May 1999. 53% non-Estonians were against NATO membership. This number dropped 
to 43% in October 1999. The corresponding percentages for Estonians were 10%, 20%, 
and 15%. Postimees (26 November, 1999), 2. Also see ‘T he Russians of Estonia: On the 
Other Side of the Front Line,” Eesti Pdevaleht (3 April, 1999), 2.
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automatic integration.161 These developments prompted some to argue that political 
community building in Estonia is far from complete because different perceptions of threat 
have been more difficult if not impossible to negotiate, even when compared to the 
citizenship or language policy.'62 Consequently, there has been considerable support 
"from below" (i.e., on behalf of the Estonian electorate) for the restorationist idea of 
political community which deters the "latecomers" from making decisions about security 
arrangements for the state.
TOWARD A STABLE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY IN ESTONIA? ATTITUDES 
AND POLARIZATION IN LATE NINETIES
The examination of the actions of the actors involved in political community 
building together with the circumstances surrounding this process suggests a conclusion 
that one of the most influential explanatory factors regarding the state’s attitude vis-a-vis 
non-Estonians has been the salience of historical memory, especially among the Estonians 
living in Estonia. This is the reason why the restorationist approach to political 
community building has prevailed and has been regarded as more legitimate compared to 
the one suggested by the compromisers. The restorationists have aimed to forge a 
"historic” state, or the "community of fate," the membership in which is limited to the 
residents of pre-1940 Estonia and their descendants.
Overall. Estonia’s approach to political community has reflected a tension between
I6lIris Pettai, “Info-isolation of Non-Estonians,” Postimees (3 September, 1999),
9.
l62Aleksandr Shegedin, “What Keeps Estonians and Russians Apart?” Eesti 
Pcievaleht (18 November, 1999), 2.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
204
the restorationist orientation and external pressures, pushing Estonia to introduce the 
elements of ius soli and thus create a more inclusive political community. The attempts of 
the international actors to expand the membership within the restorationist political 
community have been energetically opposed. As a matter of fact, a strong push for 
inclusive state policies vis-a-vis its minorities from “above” has even intensified the 
activity of extreme political parties, capable of invoking the yesterday’s embitterments of 
both Russians and Estonians.
Estonia’s dependence on the international actors for its security requires the 
government to maintain an image of a modem democratic state. Therefore, unwillingly, 
the state decided to liberalize its citizenship law. Nevertheless, it refused to liberalize its 
language law, which implies that the state is not ready to challenge the prevalent 
restorationist orientation.
Even though most international actors interested in fostering integration in Estonia, 
regarded the isolation of the groups with different sets o f historical memory as a threat to a 
functioning democratic state, this separation has been a part of solution and a reason why 
Estonia managed to maintain a relatively stable political community. The consequences of 
forced "integration" of Russian speakers into the Estonian community, especially if 
"integration" had involved strict implementation of the language law and imposition of 
Estonian commemorative practices, would have been grave, especially in the ethnic 
enclave of Ida-Virumaa. Instead, the state has tolerated a virtual cultural autonomy in the 
ethnic enclave and has extended a high degree of self-governance for local communities.
The arrangements adopted by the Estonian slate—a fairly liberal law on local 
elections and allowing minorities to speak their language in the areas of
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concentration—even prompted cooperation of the former enemies on the local levei (i.e., in 
Tallinn during 1999 October local elections). Together with the rights to use the state as a 
"service station" (i.e., social and economic benefits and the ability to be a full-fledged 
member of civil society), these arrangements have probably contributed to the growing 
acceptance of the Estonian state by the Russians.
Since 1993, the attitudes of the non-citizens vis-a-vis the state have been warming 
up. In 1999, the political preferences of the Russians (both citizens and non-citizens) were 
divided between different parties. During the local elections, some Russians supported 
even the right wing Estonian nationalist parties.163 The existence of these trends (see 
Table 3) was also identified by the findings of other opinion polls.164
Unfortunately, different perceptions of threat embraced by the autochthonous 
residents of the state and the "latecomers" are an obstacle to replicate such pluralistic 
arrangements linking the communities with different historical memories on the national 
level. Theoretically, a bilateral agreement with the minorities’ "mother state," involving 
reconciliation and transparent communication between the minority’s host state and the 
minority’s "mother" state, also between the minority and minority’s "mother" state, would
163Prior to October 1999 local elections, a telephone poll was carried out by the 
Estonian Centre for Sociological Research. The greatest percentage of the non-citizens 
supported the Center party (the compromisers). A large number of the non-citizens 
supported the right wing Pro Patria (12%) and the right center Reform party (12%). Siije 
Kiin, “Non-Estonians Turned to Estonian Parties,” Eesti Pdehvaleht (28 October, 1999),
2 .
164This does not mean that the non-Estonians regard themselves as “Estonians” 
nor do they completely identify with the state. See Titma, Tuma, and Silver. Their article 
includes the results o f a longitudinal survey of one generation in Estonia. Also see Rose 
and Maley. For a survey of different public opinion polls in the Baltic states, see 
Jekaterina Dorodnova, “Identity Formation of the Russian Speakers in Estonia and 
Latvia.” in Diasporas and Migrants in 20th Century Europe, ed. Rainer Miinz, Rainer 
Ohliger. and William Safran (Newbury Park, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, forthcoming).
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be one way to alleviate such fears. However, given the domestic instability of Russia, 
such an agreement is unlikely.
Consequently, the Estonian state and especially the domestic actors embracing 
restorationist views are likely to remain quite cautious in extending membership within the 
Estonian political community. The influence of the restorationists is likely to be 
moderated by Estonia’s membership in the Western community of democratic states, 
which will help to sustain the Estonian state as an effective "service station" and thus 
encourage the multiplication of sub-state mechanisms linking the two communities on the 
grassroots level.
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POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN LATVIA
This chapter presents a case study of political community building in Latvia. Its 
goal is to analyze the approaches employed by the Latvian state to legitimatize its power 
vis-a-vis ethnic minority groups who initially opposed the existence of an independent 
Latvian state. In addition, this chapter will assess the influence of international actors who 
affected Latvia's decisions regarding its minorities.
To achieve this goal, the chapter will undertake three steps. First, it will evidence 
the existence of polarization between the state and the ethnopolitical groups who opposed 
the state and who claimed to represent Latvia’s Soviet-era immigrants (i.e., Russians, 
Byelorussians, Ukrainians, etc.) during the initial stage of political community building.
To do that, the first part of the case study will outline the platforms of these ethnopolitical 
movements. As Chapter V has shown, the emergence of these diametrically opposed 
ethnopolitical movements (restorationists and internationalists) was prompted by the 
ethnic restructuring carried out by the Soviet Union. In addition, this part will examine the 
attitude of the minorities toward these ethnopolitical movements and their attitudes toward 
the independent Latvian state during that time.
Second, the chapter will trace the process o f political community building “from 
above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first 
part. The second part of the case study focuses on the approaches undertaken by the 
Latvian state “from above.” It examines the following: Why did the state make a decision 
to exclude a significant number o f residents (mostly non-Latvians) from the political
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process by disenfranchisement? To answer this question, the chapter will explore the 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the law on citizenship and other laws affecting 
the status of minorities. The third part o f the chapter focuses on developments within civil 
society (i.e., “below”)— the creation of local governments, the ability of the minorities to 
use the state as a service station and the impact of different historical experiences on 
ethnic relations.
The chapter will conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the approaches 
employed by the Latvian state. To do that, the concluding part of the chapter will trace the 
changes in the attitudes of minorities and ethnopolitical actors vis-a-vis the state.
ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING THE INITIAL STAGE 
OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1990-94)
In 1990-91 many Russians had high hopes, thinking that their life in the newly 
restored Latvian state would be better than in the Soviet Union (see Table 7). Yet their 
support for the Latvian state during the initial stage of state building should not be 
overestimated. According to a survey conducted by SM-Segodnya (one of the most 
popular Russian language newspapers in Latvia) in April 1990, 71% of non-Latvians 
thought that if Latvia became an independent state there would be mass unemployment, 
and 62% thought that there would be discrimination against non-Latvians.1
'Vladimir Bespalko, “Ugol zreniya: pochemy my takiye?” [A Point of View: Why 
Are We the Way We Are?], SM-Segodnya (6 January, 1993), 3.
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9% 269c 26% 35% 53% 56%
Notes:
*The data for June 1989, June 1990 and October 1990 is from Latvian Social Research Center. This is a 
response to the question “Should Latvia become an independent state outside the USSR?” In Dorodnova. 
"Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia.”
**The data for 1991, 1994. and 1997 was compiled by the Baltic Data House. This is a response to the 
question “Do you support Latvia as an independent state?” Baltijas datu nams. Na puti k grazhdanskomu 
obschesn'u: Ctchet po rezul’tatam dvukh etapov [Toward a Civil Society: Results of Two Stages] (Riga: 
Baltijas datu nams, 1998). 22.
Sources:
Baltijas datu nams. Na puti k grazhdanskomu obschestvu: Otchet po rezul'tatam dvukh etapov [Toward a 
Civil Society: Results of Two Stages]. Riga: Baltijas datu nams. 1998.
Dorodnova. “Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia.”
Such opinions became even more pronounced after the Supreme Council decision 
about restrictive citizenship which was adopted on 15 October 1991. The Soviet-loyalist 
Intermovement (Yedinstvo) was the first political actor in Latvia to disagree with Latvia’s 
nationalist leaders and voice its disapproval of an emerging independent Latvian slate in 
ethnic terms. Prior to 1991, the leaders of Intermovement were active participants in and 
organizers of conservative pro-Soviet rallies, such as the “Solidarity march” organized by 
the Supreme Council of the USSR and the weekly Literatumaya Rossiya [Literary'
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Russia]. The goal of this march was to show the support of the “Soviet nation” for 
Russians residing in the Baltic states.2
In spring 1991. Intermovemeni publications began to promote the “Russian idea” 
instead of Communism as a new platform for their movement.3 By presenting itself as the 
guardian of Russian interests Iniemiovement was trying to increase its political capital. 
Consequently, it got a lot of support from those Russians who had a hard time dealing with 
the resurgence of Latvian nationalism.4 In addition, Intemiovement tried to cash in on the 
differing interpretations of history held by Latvia’s Russian residents and by Latvia’s non- 
Russian residents.5
Despite these attempts to cash in on ethnic ideas, Intermovement could not regain 
its supporters after its involvement in the events of January 1991, when the Soviet army 
attacked neighboring Vilnius and Riga. It was banned in August 1991 by the Latvian 
government for backing the coup attempt that month in Moscow. In 1992, a weakened 
Intennovement merged with other pro-Soviet/anti-Latvian organizations, such as the
:Arkhipov. “V bede rossiyan ne ostavim” [We Will Not Leave Our Russian 
Compatriots in Trouble], Molodaya Gvardiya (27 January, 1990): 156-59. This article 
describes the “solidarity” march of Russians from Moscow through Narva, Tallinn, and
Riga.
'Pal Kolsto, Russians in the Fom ier Soviet Republics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), 115.
4E.g.. Galina Tkachenko, who decided to leave Latvia, thus described the 
atmosphere in Latvia during the beginning stages of community building: ‘T he more 
Latvian I understood, the more difficult it was to live there. It was difficult to tolerate 
everyday nationalism. One type of ethnic relations was prevalent in the workplace, but 
another one (i.e.. unfriendly) in the street.” “Pochemy ya pokinula Pribaltiku: Ispoved’ v 
puti" [Why I Left the Baltics: Confession On My Way Out], Sovetskaya Latviya (25 
November, 1989), 3.
5E.g.. a newsletter published by Yedinstvo argued that the Soviet-Nazi pact signed 
in 1939 was legitimate. I. Ivanov, “Litso istinnych okkupantov” [Who Are the Real 
Occupants]. Yedinst\>o (9 July, 1989).
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organization of Soviet military veterans, the Council of W ar and Labor Veterans, the 
Latvian Communist Party Operative Center and the Association of Russian Citizens.6 
Reportedly, the latter had close contacts with representatives of the Northwestern Group of 
Forces still stationed in Latvia (they left in 1994) and extremist organizations in Russia, 
such as the National Salvation Front.' On 23 May 1992, during a meeting in Liepaja (a 
town with a considerable Russian population) the Association of Russian Citizens 
distributed leaflets encouraging Russians to oppose the Latvian state and even to initiate a 
struggle against it.8 In December, several organizations representing Soviet war veterans. 
Russian citizens, and civilian employees of the Northwestern Group of Forces picketed in 
front of the Latvian Supreme Council in Riga, expressing support for the USSR and 
demanding equal rights for both citizens and non-citizens in Latvia.9
The same year, the Latvian Foreign Ministry called the activities of these 
associations “unacceptable” and a threat to Latvia’s sovereignty. This declaration 
triggered a passionate response from several deputies of the Ravnopraviye (Equal Rights) 
faction within the Latvian Supreme Council who admitted to having contacts with these 
pro-Soviet organizations, arguing that they “had to maintain contacts with their voters.” 10 
In October 1993, the Latvian government banned the activities of the Association of
6“Anti-independence Forces in Latvia,” Radio Liberty Report (20 February, 1992).
'“Latvians Protest Soviet Veterans’ Organizations,” Radio Liberty Report (30 
November, 1992).
8Tatyana Kolgushkina, “Kak MVD Latvii zashchishchalo chest’ Yel’tsina ot 
kritiki russkoyazychnogo naseleniya respubliki” [How Latvian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs Defended the Honor of Yeltsin Against the Criticism of the Russians], SM- 
Segodnya (19 June, 1992), 1.
‘'“Russians Rally in Latvia, Estonia,” Radio Liberty Report (2 December, 1992).
10“Ravnopraviye Deputies Deny Cooperation,” Radio Liberty Report (9 October.
1992 ) .
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Russian Citizens, the Union for the Protection of Veterans’ Rights, and the Latvian Union 
of Communists, arguing that these groups supported the restoration of the Communist 
regime in Latvia. Predictably, this move provoked protests from the members of these 
organizations who argued that they were “the champions of the interests o f Russian- 
speakers in Latvia.”11
W ithin the emerging political system, the interests of the Russians were 
represented by several ethnopolitical parties: Ravnopraviye (the Equal Rights movement), 
Harmony for Latvia, and Rebirth for the Economy. The Equal Rights movement became 
active during the initial stage of political community building. It consisted mostly of 
Russians. Initially, this movement supported the idea that Latvia should remain a part of 
the Soviet Union. In 1991, it severely criticized the Latvian Supreme Council decision of 
October 15 which outlined the principles of granting citizenship. According to this 
decision citizenship would be granted only to those who had been citizens o f the interwar 
Latvian republic and their descendants, arguing that this decision will “bring apartheid to 
Latvia.”12 In 1993. during the first postcommunist parliamentary election, this ex- 
communist ethnopolitical movement managed to gam er 5.8% of the vote and won seven 
seats (7%) in the first parliament.13 According to Aleksandrs Bartashevitch, an 
"ethnocratic Latvian state [was] absolutely unacceptable to us.” u As the title of the
"O leg  Kapranov, the leader o f the Association of Russian citizens, quoted by the 
Baltic News Service (11 October, 1993).
l2“Criticism of the Latvian Citizenship Legislation,” Radio Liberty Report (17 
October, 1991).
I3Pettai and Kreuzer, 155.
"Aleksandrs Bartashevitsch. “Ravnopraviye-levaya partiya” [Equal Rights—the 
Party of the Left], Panorama Latvii (27 December, 1996), 4. In 1996, the Equal Rights 
movement began calling itself a political party. Even though they refer to themselves as a 
“Leftist political party.” they oppose the increase of the role of the state in economics.
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movement suggests, Ravnopraviye (the Equal Rights movement) opposes the Latvian 
state's laws regulating membership in the political community (see Table 8 for an outline 
of these laws). It has fought for a more inclusive approach to citizenship, which would 
include most Russians currently residing in Latvia.
Harmony for Latvia is another Russian-based ethnopolitical party which was active 
during the initial stage of political community building. In 1993, it formed an alliance 
with Rebirth for the Economy. Together they received 12% of the vote and 13 seats (13%) 
in the 1993 parliamentary election. That year also saw the birth of a new party devoted to 
the interests of Latvia’s Russians, aptly called the Russian party. Led by Andrei 
Vorontsov, it also intended to defend the interests of “all non-Latvians who consider 
Latvia to be their homeland.” 15 The views of these Russian-based ethnopolitical 
movements and parties on the laws regulating membership in the demos were, by and 
large, similar to those of the Equal Rights movement. The enthusiastic support that 
Russians (both citizens and non-citizens)16 have given to the Equal Rights movement and 
to Harmony—clearly ethnopolitical parties— was probably caused by their disappointment 
with the Latvian National Front—the compromisers. The compromisers tried to forge 
multiethnic unions (see Chapter V).
thus trying to gain support from the Russian speaking businessmen in Latvia.
1JAndrei Vorontsov (the Founder of the Russian Party), “Ob”yedinyennaya 
Baltiya-v ob”vedinnenoi Evrope” [A United Baltic States In a United Europe], Ekspress 
(5-11 December, 1992), 4.
l6In 1993, approximately 25% of Latvia’s citizens were non-Latvian. CSCE, 
Implementation o f the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia 
(Washington. D.C.: CSCE, 1993), 5.
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The Latvian parliament passed legislation on the free development 3nd the right to cultural 
autonomy of nationalities and ethnic groups.
This law included:
- a guarantee that all permanent residents have equal rights with respect to employment;
- activities that promote national hatreds or discrimination are banned;
- a guarantee for national minorities to set up their own educational institutions, to create 
their own outlets of mass communication, and to use the mass media of the state;
- a guarantee that the Latvian government promotes these activities and supports them 
materially;
- calls for the creation of a Consultative Nationalities Council.
Oct.
1991
The Latvian parliament passed a resolution restoring Latvian citizenship for those who held 
Latvian citizenship before June 17, 1940 and their descendants.
Naturalization process for the other residents included:
- residence in the Latvian territory for 16 years
- proficiency in the Latvian language at the conversational level, confirmed by examination
- an oath of loyalty to the state.




Latvia adopts a law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of 
Latvia or Any Other State (the “illegals").
The Citizenship and Immigration Department is entrusted with preparation of new travel 
documents verifying the rights of approximately 700.000 noncitizen residents to reside in. 
leave, and return to Latvia. Those who have a residency permit with no time restriction are 
considered as permanently resident.
Permanent residents are allowed to:
- free choice of residence in Latvia;
- freedom to leave and return to Latvia;
- the right to a family reunion;
- protection against expulsion;
- preservation of native language and culture;
- assistance by an interpreter in court;
- the right to choose the language of communication with state authorities and 
administrative institutions.
The amended law allows the “illegals” to register as non-citizens of Latvia.
1996 A Presidential Consultative Council on Nationality Issues is established. It is geared to 




The Citizenship Law is amended. It is promulgated by the State President and afterwards 
confirmed in the Referendum.
Several amendments to the Citizenship law:
- the “window" system is abolished.
- the language test simplified for most categories of applicants.
- stateless children bom in Latvia after 21 August 1991 are entitled to the Latvian 
citizenship.
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Table S (Continued)
Dec. The Parliament passes the new language law. which is later confirmed by the President.
1999 The law regulates language usage in the public sector as well as in private sector, first aid
and public safety.
Notes:
* 16 March 1995 and on 6 February 1997 the law was slightly amended, but these changes did not affect the 
majority of non-citizens.
** The "windows system" means that the older a person was. the longer s/he would have to wait to apply. 
This system was seen by many as an attempt to punish those who had been in the first wave of Stalin’s drive 
to russify Latvia.
Sources:
Bungs. Dzintra. Saulius Gimius. and Riina Kionka. “Citizenship Legislation in the Baltic States.” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (18 December, 1992).
Latvian Center for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. Human Rights in Latvia in 1998. Riga: Latvian 
Center for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, 1998.
CSCE. Implementation o f  the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia.
Washington, D.C.: CSCE. 1993.
Latvian parliament. The Law o f the Republic o f  Latvia on the Citizenship o f  the Republic o f  Latvia (22 June 
1998). Available from the OSCE Mission in Latvia.
US Department of State. Lan-ia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996. Washington, D.C.: 
US Department of State, 1997.
During the period of national revival, the leaders o f the Latvian National Front 
promised that “free individual choice” would be the basis for deciding who would be 
granted citizenship in the Latvian state-in-the-making.17 This was an attempt to gain the
l7ln the March 1990 elections for the Supreme Soviet (when Latvia was still a part 
of the USSR), all adult residents, including Soviet soldiers stationed in the republic, were 
allowed to vote. However, on 5 and 6 June 1993 (during the first post-communist 
election), only citizens o f the pre-1940 Latvian republic and their descendants, who were
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
216
support of the Russians. This promise, however, was not fulfilled: many non-Latvian 
“newcomers” were not allowed to vote in the 1993 parliamentary election.
Right-wing nationalist organizations and ethnopolitical parties— the National 
Independence Movement, the Homeland and Freedom Group, the Popular Front, the 
National Soldiers Association, the Immigration Council, the Politically Repressed 
Persons’ Association, and the Livs’ Association to name but a few—were among those 
w ho strongly opposed the inclusion of the “latecomers” into the emerging demos. As a 
matter of fact, inclusive citizenship policies have been vehemently resisted by the victims 
of the former regime. They voiced their protest through the Politically Repressed Persons' 
Association and the Congress o f Latvian Citizens.18 The latter organization was set up in 
1989 as “an alternative parliament of Latvian citizens”— alternative, that is, to the 
Supreme Council of Latvian SSR, which included many Russians. The raison d'etre of 
this organization, whose political influence is rather substantial, was to restore the pre- 
1940 Latvian political community by extending citizenship exclusively to pre-1940 
Latvian citizens and their descendants.
In 1993, these ethnopolitical groups consolidated their power in the Association of 
Latvia’s National Forces in order to promote the restrictive citizenship bills sponsored by 
the For Fatherland and Freedom and the National Independence Movement factions— the 
right-wing groups elected to the first postcommunist Latvian parliament.19 For Fatherland
mostly Latvians, were eligible for vote. The inclusive version of the citizenship bill was 
championed by Juris Boyars, a leader of the National Front.
l8“Latvian President Downs Referendum for Citizenship Law,” Baltic News 
Seri’ice (26 November, 1993), and “According to the Congress of Latvian Citizens.
Latvia’s Parliament Has No Right to Conduct a Referendum on Citizenship,” Interfax (29 
November, 1993).
‘"'“Latvia’s National Radicals to Promote Citizenship Bills,” Baltic News Sendee
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and Freedom received 5.4% of the vote (6 out of 100 seats), and the National 
Independence Movement received 13.4% of the vote (15 out of 100 seats).20 Even though 
these two ethnopolitical parties were surpassed by a more moderate center-right force 
called Latvia’s Way in the 1993 elections, their moral and political influence was quite 
substantial during the initial stage of political community building in Latvia.21
In sum, the analysis above suggests that during the beginning stage of political 
community building the Latvian political landscape was characterized by polarized 
ethnopolitical groups. The ethnopolitical parties of the Right, led by For Fatherland and 
Freedom, refused to include the “latecomers” in the political process. The Russian-based 
ethnopolitical parties and movements, on the other hand, were repelled by the nation- 
centered idea of political community that was promoted by parties of the Right. The 
following sections trace the steps undertaken by the Latvian state geared to forge a 
functioning political community and at the same time to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis 
the non-Latvian minorities under these initially unfavorable conditions.
POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “ABOVE”
Negotiating the Law on Citizenship, 1991-95
According to theorists of democratization and international analysts who have
(22 November. 1993).
20Pettai and Kreuzer, 155.
21During the next parliamentary election in October 1995, For Fatherland and 
Freedom won 11.9% (14 seats) of the vote. It was assigned the task of forming a 
government.
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written on political community building in the Baltic states, the optimal solution for 
sustainable community building in Latvia would have been the suspension of a 1991 
parliamentary resolution restoring citizenship to prewar citizens and the adoption of a 
more inclusive approach to citizenship which would guarantee the right to vote to all 
residents o f Latvia.22 The analysis that follows traces the process whereby Latvian policy 
makers decided upon the laws regulating the status of the “latecomers” (mostly ethnic 
Russians). It also assesses the effects that these decisions had on the polarization 
described in the previous section.
Unlike Estonia, which adopted its citizenship law in 1992, Latvia refused to adopt 
its law until 1994, waiting for the retreat o f the Russian army (see Table 8).23 The essence 
of the Latvian citizenship problem during the first stage of community building can be 
summarized as follows: Russian residents, backed by Russia, demanded that their Soviet 
citizenship automatically translate into Latvian citizenship (zero option), but the Latvian 
government was unwilling to grant automatic citizenship. International organizations (the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) ) tried to convince the Latvian government to liberalize its citizenship 
policies. Like in Estonia, the memory of the deportations carried out under Stalin became 
a part of the debates on citizenship.
In February 1993, Georg Andreyevs, Latvia’s Foreign Minister, attributed his 
country’s demographic situation (more than a third of its residents are Russians) to large
"E .g., see Skolnick. John T. Ishivama and Marijke Breuning have argued that, 
given disenfranchisement in Latvia, one should expect mobilization of the Russians and 
possibly even their reliance on Moscow. Ishiyama and Breuning, 105.
:?This position was forcefully (and successfully) pushed forward by the 
representatives of For Fatherland and Freedom.
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scale population transfers and called for “affirmative action for Latvians to compensate 
them for the discrimination they have experienced in their own country.” He went on to 
say that “we will not sacrifice our country for the democratic rules of the Western world 
which are currently simply not suitable for our situation.”24 Juris Bojars, who drafted the 
citizenship law, argued that “unfortunately, the [citizenship] Law of 1994 gave no decisive 
priorities to applicants of indigenous ethnic groups—Latvians and Livs— who suffered the 
most from Stalinist reprisals in the Soviet Union.” He suggested liberalizing the 
requirements for Latvian citizenship for applicants of Lithuanian, Estonian or Polish origin 
who were residents of Latvia and who decided to settle in Latvia because they were 
prevented by the Soviet government from returning to their homelands after their 
deportation time was over.25
Predictably, most Russian-speakers believed that anyone who is a resident of 
Latvia should receive automatic citizenship. The citizenship bill submitted by the 
Ravnopraviye (Equal Rights Movement) to the Latvian Saeima suggested that Latvian 
citizenship should be granted to all foreigners and stateless people who have resided in the 
Latvian state for five years.26 At the same time, many Russians wanted to have dual 
citizenship— Russian and Latvian, which would have made travel to Russia and back 
easier.2'
24CSCE, Implementation o f  the Helsinki Accords, 8.
25Juris Bojars, “The Citizenship Regulation of the Republic of Latvia.”
Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia 1, no. 6 (1995): 26.
26“Equality Movement Wants Lithuanian-like Citizenship Law in Latvia,” Interfax 
(28 September, 1993).
27Dzintra Bungs, Saulius Gimius, and Riina Kionka. “Citizenship Legislation in 
the Baltic States.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Libertv Research Report (18 December, 
1992).
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This triggered a response from right-wing political activists who argued that the 
Russians were not loyal to the Latvian state, could vote for return to the USSR and 
therefore should not be given Latvian citizenship. For example, in an interview with SM- 
Segodnya, Juris Dobelis, a member of the right wing National Independence Movement, 
after having asserted that he had “fought against the Soviet regime during all of his life,” 
openly argued that “the Latvian nation should be the master in its land [because] very 
many of non-Latvians feel absolutely no moral responsibility (i.e., loyalty) toward the 
Latvian state.” He went on to say that even the Russians who are economically successful 
in Latvia (i.e., the “newly rich,” or businessmen) think, first and foremost, only about 
themselves and not about the Latvian state.”28
The members of more radical Latvian nationalist groups made no secret of the fact 
that they would like to see Latvia’s Russians leave.29 Thus, in their letter to Max van der 
Stoel, High Commissioner of the CSCE, the members of the For Fatherland and Freedom 
party asked van der Stoel to “use his influence to get the CSCE’s backing for Latvia’s 
intention to repatriate Soviet-era immigrants.”30 Even more moderate politicians, such as 
Valdis Birkavs, who was Latvia’s Prime Minister in 1993, thought that the solution to the
28Juris Dobelis, “V Latvii tol’ko odin chozvain-Latyshskiy narod” [There Is Only 
One Boss in Latvia— the Latvian Nation], ” SM-Segodnva (17 October, 1992), 1. Also 
see Ian Black, “Latvia Looks at Giving Russians Vote,” Guardian (9 July, 1994).
29E.g., see Ritvars Eglas “The Ethnic Situation in Riga and How It Must Be 
Solved” (translated from Latvian by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute), 
Laivijas Jaunalne (7 August, 1993), 2. Eglas writes that “ [forced] migration could be one 
of the main means for achieving a Latvian majority in Riga. Unfortunately, the colonists 
[i.e.. Latvia’s Soviet-era immigrants] are taking root in Riga: they are allowed to 
participate in privatization and receive certificates. This does not promote 
decolonization.”
^ “Latvian Saeima Faction Denies Existence of Minorities’ Problem in Latvia.” 
Baltic News Sendee (6 January, 1994).
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“Russian problem” could be found not only through naturalization, but also by 
“encouraging voluntary repatriation and emigration to third countries.”31 Latvia’s 
President, Guntis Ulmanis, promised that the Latvian state would not engage in the 
forceful repatriation of Russians, and that repatriation would be “peaceful and 
voluntary.”32 At one point (in February 1993), voluntary repatriation of Russians from 
Latvia was contemplated by the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe which 
urged Russia to draft legislation for ethnic Russians wishing to return to Russia from the 
Baltic states, arguing that repatriation (i.e., out-migration) is not the result of national 
discrimination, but of the process of a “loss of privileges” by Latvia’s Russians.33
In the heat of this debate about the future of the Russians in the emerging political 
community, the out-migration of Russians, which had already begun in 1989-90, received 
the official backing of the Latvian government.34 In 1991, 5,394 Russians left Latvia. In 
1992, 27,332 Russians left. 17,762 followed the next year.35 Emigration peaked in 1992, 
but began to decline in 1994. In 1995, 8.395 Russians left Latvia. In 1998, their number 
declined to 3 ,4 4 2 /6
In 1992-93, Russia began to politicize this return migration by launching an active
3l“Euro Parliament’s Deputies to Consult Latvia on Citizenship,” Baltic News 
Sen’ice (24 November. 1993).
3"“Latvian President Receives Euro Parliament’s Delegation,” Baltic News Service 
(25 November, 1993).
33Saulius Gimius, “Council of Europe Recognizes Baltics as ‘Occupied,’ ” Radio 
Liberty Report (8 February, 1993).
^Financial support was offered to Soviet-era settlers. Since the mid-nineties, 
official support for repatriation has declined. Repatriation is still a sensitive issue and 
politicians are reluctant to talk about it. See “Latvia’s Forgotten Few,” Baltic Times 
(22-28 July, 1999), 7.
35Gunlars Stamers, Latvia Today I Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 
1995), 13-14.
36Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 73.
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campaign in international institutions to allegedly “protect the rights of Russians” in 
Latvia.37 Furthermore, Russia kept referring to the “threats to ethnic Russians” in Latvia 
as an excuse to keep its troops in the country.38 Andrei Kozyrev, who was Russia’s 
Foreign M inister at that lime, referred to the out-migration of Russians from Latvia as 
"ethnic cleansing” and accused the Latvians o f trying to “deport thousands of people to 
Russia.”39 Russian representatives began raising the issue o f the rights of Russians in 
Latvia during CSCE meetings. Meetings between delegations representing Latvia and 
Russia in international organizations, such as the CSCE or the Council of Europe, became 
forums in which the representatives of the two delegations exchanged insults.40
Sometimes Russian laments about their compatriots were supported by the 
representatives of Western states. For example, during a CSCE meeting on April 10, 1992 
in Helsinki, Russian demands for the Baltic states “to do something” about the rights of 
Russians were supported by the American and many other Western delegations.41 One 
year later, in September 1993, the CSCE issued appeals to Latvia to “adopt a fair law on 
citizenship” which, in their opinion, was necessary for the internal stability o f Latvia as
37For examples of such opinions, see Oleg Meshkov, “Desyataya kategoriya” [The 
Tenth Category], Trud (3 November, 1993), 5.
38“CSCE Urges Fair Law For Russian Minority in Latvia,” Radio Free Europe B- 
WIRE (15 September, 1993).
39“Kozyrev Accuses Baltics of Ethnic Cleansing,” Radio Free Europe B-WIRE  (7 
February, 1994).
"^Another example: on 29 September 1992, Russia’s delegation to the UN General 
Assembly warned Latvia against pursuing a policy of “ethnic cleansing.” From that time 
on. Russia pledged to conduct its policy vis-a-vis the Baltic states “in light o f their 
success in finding solutions to their ‘human rights problems.’” Riina Kionka and Dzintra 
Bungs, “Russia Warns Baits Against ‘Ethnic Cleansing.’” Radio Liberty Report (30 
September, 1992).
4UT he Rights of Minorities Are Being Discussed In the Forum of CSCE in 
Helsinki.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Media News and Feature Digest (10 April.
1992).
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well as for good relations with its neighbors (i.e.. Russia).42 In a meeting with Latvian 
legislators. Max van der Stoel argued that while deciding on its citizenship law, Latvia 
should “take into consideration Russia’s possible negative reaction to the law”— a 
“negative reaction” that could be prompted by Latvia’s annual naturalization quotas.43
These suggestions elicited an agitated response from Latvian policy 
makers— especially from those on the Right who interpreted these comments as a breach 
of Latvia’s sovereignty. Thus, after a meeting with Max van der Stoel, Georg Andreyevs, 
who was Latvia’s Foreign Minister at that time, argued that the CSCE’s recommendations 
on the citizenship law were “unacceptable” to the sovereign Latvian state and that the aims 
of van der Stoel’s visit to Latvia “remained unclear to him” (suggesting that the CSCE was 
merely Russia’s instrument to assert its influence in the near-abroad).44 The right-wingers 
criticized both the Council of Europe and the CSCE for failing to press for the withdrawal 
of Russian troops from Latvia. They suggested that the only thing that one could expect 
from the two organizations was “advice on how to create a citizenship bill.”45
The stalemate surrounding Latvia’s citizenship bill— Russia linking the withdrawal 
of their forces to a “fair” treatment of the Russians in Latvia and Latvia’s influential right­
wingers refusing to consider the citizenship bill until the Russian army left Latvian
42“CSCE Urges Fair Law For Russian Minority in Latvia,” Radio Liberty Report 
(15 September, 1993).
43“Van der Stoel Visiting Latvia,” Interfax (6 January. 1994). Also see “CSCE 
Commissioner. Latvian MPs Meet On Citizenship,” Baltic News Service (6 January, 
1994).
■“ “CSCE High Commissioner on Ethnic Minorities Discusses His Previous 
Recommendations On Citizenship with Latvian Foreign Minister,” Interfax (14 
September, 1993).
45Alexander Kirsteins, a representative of the National Independence Movement 
(LNNK) faction, quoted by the Baltic News Service (27 November, 1993).
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soil— was finally broken in March 1994, when Germany reiterated its desire to see the 
European Union expanded to include the Baltic states and insisted that Russia should meet 
its agreement to withdraw troops from Latvia by the end of August. At the same time, 
during the meeting between Klaus Kinkel, then Germany’s Foreign Minister, and his 
Baltic counterparts, Germany made it clear that there was “no alternative to the integration 
of Russians” into the Latvian political community. Kinkel urged the Latvians to listen to 
the CSCE’s suggestions.46 The CSCE has been calling for a more liberal version of the 
citizenship law, which would grant citizenship to those permanent residents who have a 
conversational knowledge of Latvian, are familiar with Latvia’s Constitution, and are 
ready to give an oath of loyalty to the Latvian state. Van der Stoel also suggested getting 
rid of the quota system, which would have allowed only a limited number of non-citizens 
to be naturalized every year.4'
In addition, hoping for membership in the Council of Europe, Latvia had to take 
the suggestions of this institution into account. These included criticism of the quota 
system and giving stateless people priority in the naturalization process.48 The Council of 
Europe told Latvia that it wanted to accept Latvia before Russia, which gave Latvian 
policy makers a strong incentive to push for a citizenship law which incorporated the 
Council of Europe’s recommendations.49 Under this pressure and after Clinton’s visit to
46Kinkel, Klaus. “Eingangserklarung des Bundesministers des Auswartigen Dr. 
Klaus Kinkel” [Klaus Kinkel’s Opening Remarks], Bonn (9 March 1994).
47“Van der Stoel Advises Latvia to Adopt Liberal Citizenship Law ''B a ltic  News 
S en ’ice (8 February, 1994).
48Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, On Naturalization in Latvia 
(Riga: Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 1997), 64.
49“The Council o f Europe Advises Latvia to Temporize With Citizenship Law.” 
Baltic News Service (16 June, 1994).
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Riga, the President of Latvia urged the members of Latvia’s parliament to adopt the 
suggested changes. According to his staff, however, this move “went against his ‘Latvian 
instinct.” '50 Predictably, the citizenship bill (which had been modified to please foreign 
critics) triggered large protests from the right-wingers who accused the ruling coalition of 
center-right parties of an “inability to explain the real [demographic] situation in Latvia 
and the status of its residents [i.e., Russian residents] to international institutions.”51 
During the debate over the ruling coalition’s citizenship bill protesters marched in front of 
the parliament, demanding that the “Soviet colonists” be repatriated.52
Despite these protests, and after years of delay, a citizenship bill incorporating the 
suggestions of international institutions was passed by the Latvian parliament on 22 July 
1994. The law still tried to restore the pre-1940 citizenship body, but it included a 
schedule for the naturalization of non-citizens and eased the requirements for 
naturalization (see Table 9). One year later, the Latvian state decided to adopt a law on the 
Status of Former Soviet Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State (i.e., 
“illegals”). Approximately 700,000 non-citizen residents were given permission to reside 
in, to leave, and to return to Latvia (see Table 9).
Ethnic Latvian voters, however, were upset by the continuing international scrutiny 
of their political community. Consequently, they voted for right-wing radical nationalist 
forces led by the Movement for Latvian National Independence. This ethnopolitical party
50Quoted in Mark Frankland, “War of Russian Pride and Baltic Swank,” Obser\>er 
(7 August, 1994). During his visit, Clinton warned Latvians that the rights of Latvia’s 
Russians had to be protected.
5l“Latvian Faction to Gather Signatures Under Alternative Citizenship Law,”
Baltic News Service (15 June, 1994).
5:“Homeland and Freedom Supporters Picket at Latvian Saeima,” Baltic News 
Service (9 June, 1994).
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won an overwhelming victory in the local elections held on 26 May 1994 (i.e., during the 
time that the citizenship bill was being discussed in parliament).53 Latvia's Way— the 
center-right party that had a controlling majority in parliament when the citizenship law 
was adopted— did not do well in the local elections.54 Latvia’s non-citizens were not 
happy with the outcome o f this election. According to Boris Tsilevitch, the Chairman of 
the League of Non-citizens in Latvia, many Russians began to fear that in Riga the newly 
elected local government would try to push out the nonnative population from the city.55 
One year later (in 1995), parties on the Right won the parliamentary election.56 
Consequently, the immediate by-product of international intervention into political 
community building was to increase the polarization between ethnopolitical parties and 
movements in Latvia. The following section examines the response of Latvia’s minorities 
to the adoption of the citizenship law and their participation in the debates about the 
emerging political community in Latvia.
53“Right-Wing Radicals Score Electoral Success in Latvia,” Interfax (6 June, 
1994). Unlike in Estonia, only citizens could vote in local elections. Approximately one 
third of citizens at that time were non-Latvians.
54Dzintra Bungs, ’’Local Elections in Latvia: The Opposition Wins,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Draft Research Paper (7 July, 1994).
^ “Nationalists Win Elections in Latvia,” Interfax (30 May, 1994).
56For Fatherland and Freedom won 11.9% of the vote (14 out of 100 seats). It 
formed a coalition with the National Conservative Party of Latvia. Other right-wing 
parties, such as For Latvia (the Siegerists) and the National Conservative Party of Latvia, 
also won a considerable portion of the vote. In addition, in 1995, the country’s major 
bank suddenly collapsed, which contributed to the failure of the leading coalition. Pettai 
and Kreuzer. 156.
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The Response o f  Latvia's Minorities to the Adoption o f  the Law on Citizenship
Ethnic relations remained relatively calm on the individual level, even though in 
1995 only 2% of Latvians and 4% of non-Latvians thought that they were completely 
without any problems (see Table 9). At the same time, Latvia’s minorities were 
developing a feeling of being “second class residents” in Latvia. According to the Latvian 
sociologist Brigita Zepa, in 1994. Russians in Latvia began to develop “an imposed 
negative collective identity.” This means that most Russians in Latvia began to see 
themselves as belonging to a separate social and political group (i.e., one that did not 
belong to the Latvian political community), but one that had nonetheless chosen to reside 
in the Latvian state.57
An analysis o f the actions of the Russians and their debates in the mass media 
during that period suggest a similar conclusion. The leaders of Latvia’s Russian 
community could not imagine cooperating with right-wing politicians who sometimes 
assigned guilt for past wrongs collectively on an entire ethnic group. Consequently, some 
of them concluded that the main problem facing Russians and Latvians was to find ways 
of dealing with conflicting historical memories. Thus, Vladlen Dozortsev, a former 
deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, argued that community building in Latvia must 
involve the suppression of historical memories about deportations.58 Until that happened, 
Latvia would remain a two-community state.
5/Dorodnova, "Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and 
Estonia," 9.
58Vladlen Dozortsev, interviewed on “Sootechestvenniki” [Compatriots], a 
Russian TV program, broadcast 11 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in 
the Open Society Archives, Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.
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After the adoption of the 1991 and 1994 Citizenship laws, the members of the 
Russian elite who had initially supported the Latvian National Front began to feel 
alienated from the state. Vladimir Stashenko. a former Director of the Department on 
National Questions in Latvia, is a case in point: “I had to ask myself who 1 was first and 
foremost— the representative o f a national minority or the representative of a state. I 
realized that I was first and foremost the representative of a national minority. Given the 
“nationalization” of the emerging state and its institutions, I could not defend the interests 
of Russians anymore. That is why I had to leave my position [as the Director of the 
Department on National Questions].”59
Stashenko’s resentment toward the emerging Latvian state was shared by many of 
Latvia’s 800,000 ethnic Russians, who despised the idea of pending naturalization and 
their status as non-citizens.60 Many thought that “the best that we [Russians] can expect is 
a round stamp in our passports and permanent residence in Latvia.”61
59Vladimir Stashenko, interviewed on “Compatriots,” a Russian TV program, 
broadcast 10 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in the Open Society 
Archives. Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.
“ E.g., see Sergei Zaletayev’s open letter to the President of Latvia (“I s mneniyem 
otverzhyennych neobkhodimo schitat’sya” [The Opinion of Those Rejected Must Be 
Taken Into Account], Panorama Latvii (23 November, 1993), I). Zaletayev, a political 
analyst of Panorama Latvii, presented himself as the voice of Russian public opinion in 
Latvia. Similar opinions were voiced by Russians living in Latvia in interviews with 
Russian journalists. Oleg Meshkov, “Desyataya kategoriya” [The Tenth Category], Trad 
(3 November, 1993), 5, and Juri Lepski, “Apatridy” [The “Apatrids”].. Trad (20 July,
1993), 2.
61Vladimir Buzaev, the co-president of the Latvian Committee on Human Rights, 
referred to this situation as a “genocide.” See “Welcome to the State of Apartheid.” SM- 
Segodnya, reprinted in Human Rights in the Countries o f  the Former Soviet Union (2 
August. 1994), 15—16. Predictably, such opinions were not shared by those Russians who 
were citizens of the interwar republic of Latvia (and their descendants) who formed their 
ow n organization, led by Vladimir Sorokin. The goal of this organization, according to 
Sorokin, was “to make sure that people distinguish between the Russians in this 
organization and those who belong to the Intennovement and other organizations
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Even though this resentment did not spill into ethnic relations, in 1993, only 1% of 
Latvians and 3% of non-Latvians described ethnic relations in Latvia as “without any 
problems" (see Table 9). Taking into account the results of the 1993 survey conducted by 
Rose and Maley, the essence of ethnic tension in Latvia can be described as follows: a 
majority of Latvians thought that Latvia’s Russians were treated fairly, but a majority o f 
Russians thought that they were treated unfairly, especially when it came to the right to 
vote. Furthermore, attitudes toward Russia were a dividing line between the two ethnic 
groups. Unlike Latvia’s Russians, 73% of Latvians saw Russia as a threat to their 
security.62
In 1994, non-citizens (approximately 34% o f Latvia’s permanent residents at that 
time) began to unite into the League of Aliens. Led by Boris Tsilevitch, this organization 
claimed to represent the interests of non-citizens to Latvian authorities and international 
organizations and to provide legal assistance to non-citizens when dealing with the state.63 
This was a change in the behavior of non-citizens, especially when compared to the early 
nineties. Until 1994, there was no coherent Russian organization to defend the interests of 
Russians in Latvia. Furthermore, in 1993-94, Latvia’s Russians began to spell out their 
needs and fears to international actors, such as then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, the Council o f Europe, and the CSCE, more actively.64
opposing Latvia’s independence.” “Latvia’s Russians Organize,” Radio Liberty Report 
(26 February, 1992).
62Rose and Maley, 10.
63“Non-citizens Unite in Latvia,” Interfax (3 May, 1994). Many Russians need 
legal assistance when dealing with the Department o f Citizenship and Migration.
wE.g.. see Nigel Stephenson, “Latvia’s Non-Citizens Seek Clinton’s Support,” 
Reuters (5 July. 1994). “Latvia Restricts Rights of Russians, says Spokesman,” Baltic 
News Sen’ice (27 October, 1993), or “Council of Europe’s Experts Continue to Examine 
Drafts of Law on Latvian Citizenship,” Baltic News Service (14 September, 1993).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
230
Table 9. Ethnic Relations in Latvia









No problems 1 3 2 4 2 4
All right, we can handle 
whatever problems arise
61 59 62 68 72 72
Not so good, difficulties 21 19 30 23 22 21
Bad 1 3 2 1 3 2
Source:
UN. Lat\’ici Human Development Report 1997. Available from http://www.undp.org-. INTERNET.
In sum, after the adoption of the laws approved by international organizations 
which defined the status of non-Latvians within the emerging political community, the 
polarization which was present within Latvian political community in 1990—93 did not 
abate. Non-Latvians began to develop social and political identities separate from the 
state. Furthermore, the pressure exerted by international actors to liberalize the law on 
citizenship triggered a backlash from ethnic Latvians who became increasingly supportive 
of right-wing ethnopolitical parties.
Revising llte Law on Citizenship, Looking fo r  Alternative Solutions (1996-99)
To relieve the polarization present in the Latvian state, Guntis Ulmanis, the
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President of Latvia, decided to create a Minorities Advisory Council. The Council was 
expected to promote govemment-minority dialogue and to encourage the participation of 
minorities in political life.65 Despite its promising beginning in 1996 (the Council 
managed to pull in the political leaders of Latvia’s Russian community, such as Vladlen 
Dozortsev), this institution proved to be incapable of sustaining govemment-minority 
dialogue: radically different opinions regarding the citizenship law simply made dialogue 
impossible. The leaders of Latvia’s Russian community continued to argue for the 
elimination of quotas on the number of non-citizen residents who could be naturalized as 
established by the 1994 law on Citizenship, but the ruling political parties refused to do 
so.66 Meanwhile, the number o f ethnic Russians who became Latvian citizens stayed 
almost the same as in 1994, when the Citizenship law was adopted (see Table 10).
Despite the impotence of the Council, President Ulmanis continued to push for equal 
social and economic rights for all segments o f the population— citizens, foreigners, and 
non-citizens, as suggested by the Council of Europe.67 To implement equal rights between 
citizens and non-citizens, a parliamentary human rights committee was established.
65Prior to 1996, the Section on National Affairs within the Latvian government 
had performed this function. It focused on cooperating with minority cultural societies, 
especially the Latvian Association of National Cultural Societies, which united nineteen 
different organizations. Since downsizing in the mid-nineties, the function of the Section 
has been the distribution of state subsidies for minority cultural affairs. UN, Latvia 
Human Development Report 1997, 54.
“ “Vladlen Dozortsev: Neobkhodimo razbiokirovat’ zakon o grazhdanstve” fit Is 
Necessary to Lift the Blockade Off of the Law on Citizenship], SM-Segodnya (13 
December, 1996). This article argues that the Council on National Minorities did not 
address any specific problems.
67“Guntis Ulmanis: Ya ushyel ot populizma” [I Moved Away from Populism], 
SM-Segodnya (8 August. 1996). The Council of Europe’s suggestions are covered by 
“Experts from Council of Europe to Examine All Drafts of Law on Latvian Citizenship 
Before Discussion in Latvian Parliament,” Baltic News Sendee (16 September, 1993).
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Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. Statistical Yearbook o f  Latvia. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of 
Latvia. 1999.
The latter institution had the power to dismiss the employees of the citizenship and 
immigration department who had refused registration to several thousand Russians who 
had the right to permanent residence. In addition, a National Human Rights Office 
(funded by the state) became an outlet for minorities to voice their needs.68 De facto 
discrimination against non-citizens in the economic sphere ended in 1998, when non­
citizens no longer had to demonstrate a knowledge of Latvian to get unemployment 
benefits.
68One of the functions of this office was to identify which rights of non-citizens 
were in contradiction to Latvia’s international obligations. Prodded by Boris Tsilevich, a 
member of the Latvian parliament and an active minority leader, this office also pushed 
policy makers to broaden the rights of non-citizens. Natalya Lebedeva, “ ‘Spisok byuro’ 
kak razvitiye ‘spiska Tsilevicha” [List of Office as the Extension of the List of Tsilevich], 
SM-Segodnya (18 December, 1996).
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Furthermore, the President expressed support for a revision of the citizenship law 
to grant citizenship to all children bom in Latvia after the country regained its 
independence.69 These actions won him trust and respect among the Russians. When 
experiencing problems that they believed to be ethnic discrimination, many Russians and 
other minorities went directly to the President for support.70 Since then, Latvia’s 
minorities have viewed the Presidency as an institution capable o f defending their 
interests.
In spite of the stabilizing role of the President, polarization between ethnic 
Latvians and ethnic Russians re-emerged in August 1996 when the Latvian parliament 
adopted a declaration denouncing the occupation of Latvia by the USSR as illegal. This 
document, which was strongly supported by the right-wing parties in the parliament, 
argued that “the time has come to find out whether the Geneva convention of 1949 
[forbidding forceful population transfers in occupied territories] applied to Latvia.”71 
Some ardent proponents of the declaration believed that if the convention is applicable to 
Latvia, then “decolonization” (possibly including the resettlement o f Latvia’s Russians) 
should be feasible as well. Latvia’s Russian community protested. The Russian Duma in 
Moscow echoed this protest, and in September 1996 the Russian Federation imposed 
tariffs on transit from Latvia.72
69“Latvia’s President Backs Premier Over Naturalization,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (3 February, 1998).
70Dmitri Nikolayev, “Jusu Ekselence, Podderzhite Natsional’niye Mens’shistva" 
[Dear President, Support the National Minorities], Diena (16 June, 1999), 2.
7lJuris Sinka, a Deputy in the Latvian Parliament, quoted in Leonid Fedoseyev. 
“Deklaratsiya na gvozdike” [Declaration of a Nail], SM-Segodnya (2 September, 1996).
72Sergei Jushenkov. “Deklaratsiya ob okkupatsii-bol’shaya glupost’” [Declaration 
of Occupation— a Big Stupidity], SM-Segodnya (18 September, 1996).
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Russia imposed more economic sanctions on Latvia after a protest by some 1,000 
elderly Russians in Riga in March 1998 against a recent increase in utility rates.73 This 
demonstration, which was broken up by the Latvian police, was an international scandal. 
Moscow accused Latvia of a “blatant violation of elementary human rights” and threatened 
to "demand that all discriminatory measures against Russians be removed.”74 
Furthermore, Russia linked its signing of a treaty delineating the border between Latvia 
and Russia with the status of Russians living in Latvia.75 (Latvia needs this treaty to get 
into the European Union.) According to Moscow, removal of those “discriminatory 
measures” meant accepting the revisions to the law on citizenship proposed by the OSCE. 
OSCE suggestions regarding the law on citizenship— to make it easier for stateless 
children bom in Latvia after the country regained its independence in 1991 to obtain 
citizenship and to abolish the “windows” system allowing only a limited number of 
applicants per year— were forcefully advocated by Sweden and Finland and the rest of the 
EU.76
Responding to international pressure and trying to prevent other expressions of 
protest from Latvia’s Russians, Latvia immediately extended the validity of Soviet-era 
passports for thousands of Russians. Furthermore, urged by Max van der Stoel of the 
OSCE and Ole Espersen of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Latvian government
7?This protest was instigated by an article in the newspaper Panorama Lati’ii. 
which called upon Russian pensioners to gather in front of Riga’s city hall.
74The first quote is from Paul Goble. “Playing the Ethnic Card,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (10 March, 1998). The second quote is from a speech 
given by Yevgeniy Primakov, then Russia’s Foreign Minister, at a session of the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg, as reported by Interfax (4 May, 1998).
75Moskovskiye Rossiyskiye Vesti (18 February, 1998), 2.
7o“Swedish. Finnish Leaders Back Latvia,” FBIS-WEU-98-134 (12 May, 1998).
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decided to try to persuade the parliament to amend the citizenship law. Yet, according to 
Ulmanis, the greatest problem was that “it became clear [to us] that we had to amend our 
citizenship law under pressure from the East [i.e., Russia] and not on our own will.”77 
Many ethnic Latvians perceived this pressure as a violation of the sovereignty of their 
state. Consequently, Latvia’s parliamentarians were very unwilling to give in to the 
pressure “from above.”
In the midst of the debate on whether to amend the citizenship law, the EU issued a 
statement reminding Latvia that it “had earlier raised the issue in the context of Latvia’s 
bid to join the European Union,” and hoped that “the Latvian parliament will take early 
action to adopt the government’s decisions.”78 After prolonged inter-party debates and 
active lobbying by Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs, Latvian lawmakers finally approved 
amendments to the citizenship law on June 22 whereby citizenship was granted to all 
children bom to non-citizens residing in Latvia after August 1991.
However, similarly to the first stage of community building, there was a backlash 
from ethnic Latvians who had opposed any changes to the law of citizenship. The right- 
wing For Fatherland and Freedom party managed to collect the required number of 
signatures to hold a referendum on the law. According to Guntars Krasts, Latvia’s Prime 
Minister and a member of the For Fatherland and Freedom Party, “if we make one
77Quoted in Sergei Zaletayev, “Zamenit’ by populizm” [How to Get Away from 
Populism], Panorama Latvii (17 April, 1998), 2.
78“EU Wants Riga to Act Quickly on Citizenship Law,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Newsline (20 April, 1998). Prior to this statement, Italian Foreign Minister 
Lamberto Dini said during a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister 
Yevgenyi Primakov that “recent problems [i.e., the march] with Latvia’s ethnic Russian 
community will not help Latvia’s case for EU membership,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Newsline (8 April, 1998).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
236
concession [to the Russians], then they will demand more and more until we are once 
again controlled by them.”79 The President, the other major political parties, the leading 
national newspaper and numerous international actors opposed the right-wingers. The 
opponents of the right-wingers managed to convince 53% of the electorate to vote to 
liberalize the law. The right-wingers managed to get approximately 45% of the vote in 
support of their law on citizenship.80 Many ethnic Latvians who voted against the right­
wingers were under the impression that their vote would put an end to OSCE intervention 
into political community building in Latvia and that a stricter language law (then under 
debate in the parliament) would ensure their survival as an ethnic group.81
Even though the law on citizenship was liberalized, the referendum did little to 
reduce ethnic division in Latvia. This division became apparent in December 1999, when 
Latvia's Russians protested against the law on Latvian language which had already been 
watered down under pressure from the OSCE and the EU.82 The major parties voted for 
the bill, but For Human Rights in a United Latvia, an ethnopolitical party which claims to 
protect the interests of Russians in Latvia, voted against it. This party, which enjoys the 
support of a substantial number of ethnic Russians, also opposed the new education law 
(which had received the “approval” of international organizations) that will require high
79Quoted by Milka Hellsten, “Russia’s Thirst for Power Is Frightening the 
Latvians,” FBIS-WEU-98-203 (17 June, 1998).
S0Karlis Streips, “Latvian Voters Open the Door to Citizenship— a Little,” 
Transition 27, no. 2 (June 1999).
8|lT he Legacy of Fifty Years of Russification is Still Here,” an open letter by the 
members of the Commission on the Latvian Language, Panorama Latvii (29 November, 
1999), 2.
82The Law on Language represents a compromise between OSCE experts and 
those interested in protecting the Latvian language. The OSCE pushed Latvia to prevent 
state intervention into the private sphere. “Saeima Passes State Language Law,” LETA 
(Latvian News Agency) (9 December, 1999).
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schools to use Latvian as the language of instruction by 2004. These fundamental 
differences on language and education have prevented ethnopolitical parties from 
cooperating in the implementation of the National Programme on the Integration of 
Society in Latvia adopted in 1999.83
The Response o f  Latvia's Minorities to Changes in the Law on Citizenship
Despite the liberalization of the law on citizenship, the number of Russians who 
have received Latvian citizenship has remained low (see Table 10). In 1999, 58.9% of the 
Russians living in Latvia were non-citizens, and only 39.7% were Latvian citizens, an 
increase of only 3.7% since 1994, when the first law on citizenship was adopted. The 
slow speed of naturalization (an increase of only 1.49% in the body of citizens since 1996) 
came as a surprise to all involved parties, including international organizations (see Table 
10).84 One of the major reasons for slow naturalization is a lack of proficiency in the 
Latvian language, especially among older Russian residents of Latvia. In workplaces 
where the majority of workers are Russian there is no incentive to leam Latvian.85 In
83The Programme defines integration as “achieving mutual understanding and 
cooperation among different social groups and individuals in one state.” The essence of 
the Programme is to foster “loyalty to the Latvian slate” by teaching the Latvian language, 
by making changes in the education system, by encouraging dialogue between the 
Russian and Latvian mass media, etc. Preses Nams, Integratsiya obshchestva v Latvii: 
proyekt [Integration of Society in Latvia: A Draft] (Riga: Preses Nams, 1999). The 
Programme is opposed by sixteen non-governmental organizations of Russians in Latvia.
wAina Antane and Boris Tsilevich, “Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in 
Latvia,” in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Pal 
Kolsto (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999), 93.
83Ibid., 118. Antane and Tsilevich also compare the results from the 1989 census 
and a 1995 survey which showed an increase in proficiency in the Latvian language 
(55.8%, up from 22.3%) among Latvia’s Russians. However, the data from the survey
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addition, an unwillingness to serve in the army, passivity, and dissociation from political 
life are often cited as other potential reasons.86 According to a survey conducted by the 
Naturalization Board, the main reason why young non-citizens are not willing to acquire 
Latvian citizenship is because they “do not see any reason for it.”87 This may be because 
permanent residents in Latvia enjoy rights which are almost the same as those enjoyed by 
citizens. A survey done according to region of attitudes toward the state suggests that in 
regions with a predominantly Russian population, such as Daugavpils, people tended to be 
more interested in local issues than in citizenship.88
Despite the slow speed of naturalization, the attitude of the majority of non- 
Latvians toward Latvia as an independent state has been improving (see Table 7). 
Furthermore, the percentage of non-Latvians who thought that both Latvians and non- 
Latvians were capable of “handling whatever problems might arise” was also on the rise 
(see Table 9). Consequently, even though the Russians living in Latvia have developed an 
identity separate from the state, the survey data suggests that they have not rejected the 
state (i.e., they have continued to use it as a “service station”) and have even gotten used to 
their status as non-citizen residents within the Latvian political community. An 
investigation of sub-state developments sheds more light on the reasons why such attitudes 
became widespread among Russians living in Latvia.
and the census are not directly compatible, and the increased figure probably shows 
changes in the self-perception of those who were interviewed.
86The Programme cites the following reasons: a lack of information, the 
inefficiency of state institutions responsible for naturalization, belonging to ethnopolitical 
groups opposed to the Latvian state, and poor knowledge of the Latvian language. Preses 
Nams, 9-10. Antane and Tsilevich argue that the main reason is that the tests for 
citizenship are loo stringent. Antane and Tsilevich, 94.
87Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 29.
88Baltijas datu nams. 13.
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POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “BELOW"
Local Governments
Unlike Estonia. Latvia decided to bar non-citizens from voting in local elections.
In 1994. the Latvian parliament did not even consider the possibility that non-citizens 
could participate in local elections, arguing that “the issue should be considered only after 
the adoption of the law on citizenship."”'9 The 1994 local elections were won by parties 
that were not willing to represent the interests of Latvia’s Russians. In five of the seven 
cities in Latvia the majority of the city council seats were filled by members o f right-of- 
center. pro-Latvian rights political parties and organizations. In the regions, for every four 
right-wing representatives elected, there was only one left-wing representative.90 The low- 
level of minority representation in local governments did not help to build an inclusive 
political community. It probably contributed to alienation among Russians in 1994—95 
who complained that the nationalist parties were interested solely in reducing the number 
of schools in which the Russian language was taught and w ere not doing much to alleviate 
the plight of the needy.91
There was a slight change during the next local elections, which took place in
89“Latvian Lawmakers Adopt Law on Local Elections." Baltic News Service (IS 
January. 1994).
rT>zintra Bungs, “Local Elections in Latvia: the Opposition Wins." Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Draft Research Paper (7 July. 1994).
9iE.g.. see Konstantin Kazakov. “Rizhskaya Duma—Mini Seim" [The Council of 
Riga Is a Mini Parliament] Bizness i Baltiya (14 February. 1997). In 1990—95. the 
number of students in Russian language schools dropped from approximately 150.000 to 
125.000. Antane and Tsilevich. 122.
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March 1997. Even though right-wing parties got most of the votes, the level of minority 
representation actually increased in some areas. These were areas with large 
concentrations of Russians. There was a threefold increase in the number of non-Latvian 
deputies in the Riga City Council.92 In Daugavpils, another city with a large Russian 
population, the extreme left Social Democratic Party, which championed the interests of 
Latvia's Russians, won 13 out of 15 seats.93
Latvia’s Russian parties— the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party, and the 
Unity Party— have been trying to convince the Latvian government to give Russians the 
right to elect or be elected to local government, regardless of their citizenship. Such 
demands have sometimes translated into street protests.94 The Latvian parliamentarians 
who have refused to grant this right argue that only those who are fluent in Latvian should 
be able to participate in local elections and to be elected. Others have argued that 
extending such a right would be only a halfway measure in the process of integration. 
Instead, they argue, Latvia should focus on political community building “from 
above”— i.e., finding incentives for Russians to learn Latvian and apply for Latvian 
citizenship.95
92UN. Latvia Human Development Report 1997, 54.
93Saulius Gimius, “Latvian Local Election Update,” OMRI Daily Digest (11 
March, 1997).
94For example, this happened in Daugavpils in 1997. The Russian community 
wanted to keep Aleksey Vidavskiy, a popular city mayor, in power. However, the law 
governing local elections did not allow him to be a candidate for the city council because 
he had not resigned from the Communist party. Aleksandr Shinkin, “Second Class 
Citizens in Latvia Have Something in Common: They Are All Russian,” FBIS-SOV-97- 
015 (18 January, 1997).
95Galina Pommere, “I mestnaya vlast’ tol’ko iz 'ariytsev '” [Local Power Is in the
Hands of the Aryans As Well], SM-Segodnva (10 October, 1996).
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Using the Stale as a Service Station
Even though the majority of Russians living in Latvia could not or were not willing 
to become citizens, they became full-fledged members of Latvia’s civil society. Both 
Latvians and non-Latvians were fully entitled to use the Latvian state as “a service 
station.” First, both citizens and non-citizens were included in the process of privatization. 
All residents of Latvia received vouchers to privatize their apartments, land, and 
enterprises. When the city council of Riga tried to limit the rights of non-citizens to 
privatize their apartments by asking for supplemental documents from the Citizenship and 
Migration Board showing their (non-citizen) status, Anatol Gorbunov, the Minister of 
Regional Development, stepped in and vetoed this decision, thus defending the rights of 
non-citizens.96 Second, both citizens and non-citizens could participate in the conduct of 
business. Consequently, there have been no distinct differences between the income of 
citizens and non-citizens.97 Even though, as non-citizens (until 1998), many Russians had 
fewer rights to pensions and jobs in the public sector, many of them became active 
members o f a vibrant business community in Latvia.98
As a matter of fact, there is evidence to suggest that Latvia’s Russians, especially 
those with contacts in the industry and the transport sectors, were better able to adapt to a
" “Gorbunov Protiv Rizhskoy Dumy” [Gorbunovs Against the Council of Riga], 
Bizness i Baltija (20 September, 1996).
9/Baltijas datu nams, 22.
98William E. Schmidt, “Latvia’s Worry: What to Do With All Its Russians,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty B-WIRE (1 March. 1994). Furthermore, a study of living 
conditions in the Baltic region (conducted by NORBALT in autumn 1994) found that, all 
other things being equal, Russian men are no more likely to be unemployed than men of 
Latvian ethnicity. Unemployment among Russian women, however, was found to be 
greater than unemployment among Latvian women. Aasland, 353-70.
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market economy than those ethnic Latvians who had been engaged in agriculture." Some 
of the Russians who belong to this socioeconomic group joined an organization called 
Russkiye Zapada [The Western Russians] and tried to persuade the Latvian government to 
let them act as a liaison between Russia and Latvia in order to further the economic 
interests of Latvia.100 It is not surprising, therefore, that the civic activity of non-Latvians 
has been most intense in interest groups dealing with economic issues— business 
associations and trade unions.101
Similarly to Estonia, the attitudes of Russians with a high level of income toward 
the state tended to be more positive than of those with a low level o f income.102 On the 
other hand, older Russians (e.g., retired Soviet military officers and workers sent to Latvia 
in 1950s and 1960s) were more likely to be incapable of leading an active life in the 
business community and therefore to be opposed to the Latvian state.103
Different Perceptions o f  the Past: An Insurmountable Obstacle?
In Latvia, similarly to Estonia, Russians and Latvians commemorate different days.
"N ils Muiznieks, quoted in Antane and Tsilevich, 133. However, there is no data 
to substantiate the popular belief in Latvia that the majority of Latvian capital belongs to 
non-Latvians.
100Dmitri Nikolayev (President of the “W estern Russians”), “Vostrebovannosf 
russkikh” [The Needs of the Russians], Diena (19 April, 1999), 2.
101Trade unions are the most popular civic organizations in Latvia. 12% of all 
citizens and 5% o f non-citizens are members o f such unions. Overall, however, non­
citizens were found to be less active than citizens. Approximately 90% of non-citizens 
have not joined any organizations. Baltijas datu nams, 27.
102Non-citizens with a low level of income were more interested in leaving Latvia 
than those with a higher level of income. Baltijas datu nams, 22.
103William E. Schmidt, “Latvia’s Worry: What to Do With All Its Russians,” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty B-WIRE (1 March, 1994).
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Most Russians (especially the older generation) commemorate May 9, Victory Day (the 
day when the Russians captured Berlin in 1945). while the Latvians associate this day with 
the return of the Soviets and deportations. Instead, Latvians commemorate March 25 and 
June 14, the days when mass deportations were carried out in 1941 and 1949, as days o f 
national mourning.
To confront the legacy of the past, the Latvian government initiated an intense 
search for those guilty of deportations. The first case was initiated in 1995 against Alfons 
Noviks. a former KGB general. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In 
1998. a case was initiated against Vasily Kononov, who, together with eighteen other pro- 
Soviet partisans (dressed up in German uniforms) had committed atrocities in a Latvian 
village in 1944. Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, criticized Latvia for “harassing war 
veterans.’* and the Russian Duma passed a resolution in favor of Vasily Kononov. The 
trial w as vehemently opposed by Latvia’s Russian community.104 On 27 September 1999 a 
Riga regional court found Mikhail Farbukh, an 83-year-old former KGB agent, guilty of 
signing the deportation orders.105
Even though it is too early to hypothesize about the long term impact of these trials 
on the bifurcation o f Latvian society, it is probably safe to say that they have become a 
forum in which former victims can voice their memories. “Taboo” topics are openly 
discussed. During this process, survivors and other members of society agree on what is 
“real history” and what is myth. This helps to reduce polarization.
,04Uldis Strelis, “The Latvian Practice Investigating the Crimes of Totalitarian 
Regimes.” paper presented at the conference “Investigation of the Problems of Crimes 
Against Humanity and W ar Crimes” on 5 November 1998 in Vilnius, Lithuania.
105Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (28 September, 1999).
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Post-independence commemorations have played a similar function. For example, 
on 25 March 1999, the day on which Latvians remember the mass deportations of 1941. a 
special exhibition was opened in the Museum of Occupation in Riga. Henrihs Strods, the 
head of the Museum’s research program, reformulated the question of guilt by revealing 
that even though the deportations had been orchestrated by officers from other parts of the 
USSR, many Latvians had, in fact, been involved as well. Local score-settling and greed 
among neighbors were the partial reasons why many Latvian names appeared on the 
deportation lists.106 Although it is probably too early to speak about complete 
reconciliation between Latvians and Russians, the establishment of functioning state 
institutions (specifically, courts and museums) helped to place the experiences of the past 
into history books and to record them as crimes.
TOWARD A STABLE POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN LATVIA? ATTITUDES AND 
POLARIZATION IN THE LATE NINETIES
In the late nineties, the polarization that was present in Latvia during the initial 
stage of community building decreased. According to data for the years 1997-98, around 
80% of Latvia’s non-citizens (mostly Russians) felt “close connected” to Latvia, and 
around 90% had made a decision to stay in Latvia.107 There was no revival of the
106“Remembering a Legacy of Terror,” Baltic Times (1-7 April, 1999), 17.
l0'Baltijas datu nams. 22. Some of those who have decided to stay, however, may 
have done so because they lacked the funds to emigrate to Russia. According to the Riga 
office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 10% of the 
70,000 ethnic Russians living in Latvia would like to emigrate to Russia. The reliability 
of this data, however, is questionable, since the IOM did not conduct an official survey. 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (9 December. 1999).
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Intennovement. The political parties representing the interests of Latvia’s Russians— the 
Russian party, Harmony for Latvia, the Party of Latvia’s Russian Citizens, the Movement 
for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia, the Latvian Socialist party, and For Human 
Rights in a United Latvia— were all willing to compete for power in parliamentary and 
local elections.108 Furthermore, the number of ethnic Russians elected to the Latvian 
parliament has been increasing. In 1993, only 6 of the 100 deputies were ethnic Russians. 
By 1998, this had increased to 10.109 These facts indicate that the two communities are 
willing to play the democratic game.
The decrease in polarization, however, does not imply that the Russians have been 
assimilated into the Latvian political community. A series o f interviews with the leaders 
of Latvia’s Russian community revealed a strong resistance to “assimilation” (understood 
as forceful linguistic integration into the nation state). Many argued for even more 
autonomy within the Latvian state. This was understood to be a condition under which 
Latvia’s minorities felt “secure being Russians. Byelorussians, or Ukrainians.” 110 Similar 
opinions were expressed during a series of debates in April and May 1999 involving the 
leaders of Latvia’s Russian community, the representatives of the Latvian Migration and 
Naturalization Board, and representatives from various international organizations. 
Furthermore, conservative representatives of Russkaya obschina Latvii [the Russian
i08This information is from the list of political parties and organizations registered 
by the Latvian Ministry of Justice (as of 1 May 1999). In 1998, Russian ethnopolitica! 
parties failed to win any seats in parliament.
109There was also a parliamentary election in 1995. Candidates nominated for 
parliament, however, did not have to indicate their ethnic origin. Latvian Parliament, 
“History and Legislature of the Republic of Latvia.” Available from 
hap:IIwww.saeima.lanel.lv/LapasEnglish/Hislory_saiurs.htm-, INTERNET.
ll0Baltijas datu nams. 28.
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Community of Latvia] rejected the possibility that Latvia could ever create an inclusive 
political community if it stuck to its current interpretation of the Soviet past. Mikhail 
Gavrilov, the leader of the Latvian Association of Russian Communities, argued that if 
Latvia really wanted to build an inclusive community, it should have suppressed “the 
whole issue of occupation” because “it is a source of passions” and interethnic tensions.111
Understandably, such approaches to community building are absolutely 
unacceptable to ethnic Latvians, many of whom see themselves as victims of the former 
regime and are interested in recording the crimes of the previous regime.112 So far, the 
Latvian state has been sympathetic to such requests.113 Taking the interests of the two 
ethnic groups into account, the cultural autonomy of Latvia’s Russians (i.e., letting them 
speak their own language and have their own schools) was probably the optimal approach 
to community building in Latvia. This approach was condoned by influential groups in 
Latvia’s Russian community.114 Consequently, the state has not tried to regulate the 
activities of political and social groups representing Latvia’s Russians and has tolerated 
their links with Russia.115
11‘Vladislav Sorokin, “Integration Involves All Residents of Latvia,” Diena (3 
May, 1999), 3.
112Groups representing the former victims have opposed what they call “two- 
community” approach in Latvia, arguing for stronger policies of assimilation. Mara 
Grinberga, “Zakon yazyka razdelil Daugavpil’skoye obschestvo” [The Language Law 
Has Divided the Community in Daugavpils], Diena (24 April, 1999), 1.
113The state has incorporated the stories of former victims into official history 
books: it has financed a Museum of Occupation in Riga, has offered compensation to 
victims or their descendants, and has conducted trials o f those responsible for crimes 
committed during Soviet times.
114Dmitri Nikolayev, “Natsional’nyi protektsionizm i konkurentosposobnost’ 
russkikh v Latvii” [National Protectionism and Competitiveness of the Russians in 
Latvia], Diena (29 April, 1999), 2.
115The Equal Rights party, for example, has close links with Moscow and the 
Russian parliament. Sanita Upleia. “Leviye Latvii i Estonii aktivno obraschavutsa s
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However, one repercussion of this approach is that the state is currently incapable 
of promoting the Latvian language among Latvia's Russians (e.g., by teaching some 
subjects only in Latvian). Policies that encourage Latvia’s Russians to leam Latvian are 
supported by the European Union and other international organizations.116 Latvia’s 
Russians, however, have stubbornly resisted these policies. Members of the conservative 
Russian Community of Latvia and Russian ethnopolitical parties have actively resisted the 
law on education. They have also disapproved of the language law because it regulates the 
use of language, not only in the public sector (in areas such as first aid and public safety), 
but in the private sector as well.117 Thus, the Russian enthnopolitical party For Human 
Rights in a United Latvia voted against the State Language Law in December 1999.118 
Furthermore, conservative groups of Russians have resisted the state language 
implementation policies pursued by Dzintra Hirsa, director of the State Language 
Inspection Center (the institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
Language Law).119 These policies have included requiring medical doctors and lawyers to
Moskvoi” [Left-wing Parties in Latvia and Estonia Have Active Communication with 
Moscow], Diena (12 April, 1999), 3.
116The National Programme for Language Training, which is designed to prepare 
teachers to teach Latvian as a second language to the 150,000 students in Latvia’s 
Russian language schools, is supported by Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, 
and other states. It is also supported by the UN Development Program ($3.2 million for 
the first two years and $4.7 million for the next two) and the EU. Katya Cengel, “No 
More Emotional Gibberish,” Baltic Times (14 January, 1999), 9.
“ 'According to the law on education, most o f the secondary schools in which 
instruction is currently conducted in Russian will be required to switch to Latvian by 
2004. The Latvian language law passed on 9 December 1999. was praised by the EU, the 
OSCE, and the Council of Europe, but criticized by Russia and by the conservative 
Russians living in Latvia. Hoping for membership in the EU, Latvia listened to OSCE 
recommendations (e.g., less state intervention in the private sphere) and watered down its 
language law.
118“Saeima Passes State Language Law,” LETA (9 December, 1999).
119Andrev Vorontsov. “Oko za oko: nash otvet Dzintre Hirshe” [Eye for an Eye:
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pass a language test in order to keep their licenses.
The most successful community building approach employed by the Latvian state 
has been to extend to Latvia’s Russians the full rights of membership in the civil society. 
That is, even though Latvia’s Russians could not vote, they were able to participate in the 
business community and to conduct business with Russia with very little state 
intervention. This helped to legitimatize the power of the state in the eyes o f those 
Russians who were successful in Latvia’s emerging market economy. On the negative 
side, this may have reduced the need of Russians to apply for Latvian citizenship (or any 
other citizenship, for that matter). In 1998, approximately 26.5% of the people living in 
Latvia were still stateless.120 Since 1998, the number of applications for naturalization has 
been rising, but slowly.121 Naturalization is generally viewed by Latvia’s Russians as an 
unnecessary and humiliating process because it involves demonstrating knowledge of the 
Latvian language, Latvian history, and the Constitution, and because of the fee.122
Finally, a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the adoption and revision 
of the law on citizenship suggests a conclusion about the role of international actors in 
political community building in Latvia. Intense international pressure affected the policies
Our Answer to Dzintra Hirsa], SM-Segodnya (11—17 November, 1997), “Sed’moye 
Nebo” [The Seventh Sky] section.
i20UNDP, Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Naturalization Board, Human 
Rights and Social Integration in Latvia: A General Survey (Riga: Latvian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1998), 10.
121In 1995, there 4,543 applications for citizenship were submitted to the 
Naturalization Board. In 1996, this number was 2,627; in 1997— 3,075. In 1998, 5,608 
applications were accepted. This number increased (6,507) in 1999. Republic of Latvia 
Naturalization Board, Fact Sheet: Naturalization Process in Latvia (Riga: Naturalization 
Board, 1999).
i2248% of non-citizens think that the language test is too difficult. 56% of non­
citizens think that the test on Latvian history is too difficult. Baltijas datu nams, 24.
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of the state towards its minorities: Latvia agreed to liberalize its law on citizenship. 
However, a by-product of this international action has been to induce more polarization 
within Latvian society. In addition, this pressure gave more legitimacy to more radical 
ethnopolitical parties. Consequently, the sustainability of a functioning political 
community in Latvia in the future depends not on further liberalization of laws on 
citizenship and minorities, but on the ability of the state to remain a functioning 
decentralized “service station.” willing to preserve the de facto cultural autonomy of its 
Russian community. EU membership, which has been promised to Latvia, should help to 
achieve this goal.
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CHAPTER V m  
POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN LITHUANIA
This chapter is a case study o f political com m unity building in Lithuania.
Similarly to the previous two chapters, the goal of this case study is to analyze the 
approaches that were employed by the Lithuanian state to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis 
ethnic minority groups that were initially opposed to  the existence of an independent 
Lithuanian state. There was much less international involvement in Lithuania than in 
Latvia and Estonia. However, consistently with the research design, this chapter considers 
this variable and assesses its impact on Lithuania’s decisions regarding its ethnic 
minorities.
To analyze the approaches used by the Lithuanian state, the chapter will undertake 
three steps. First, it will evidence the existence of polarization between the state and 
ethnopolitical groups that opposed the existence of an independent state and that claimed 
to represent Lithuania’s Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and 
ethnic Poles) during the initial stage of political community building. To do that, the first 
part of the case study will analyze the results of public opinion surveys done during that 
period. The surveys reflect the attitude of minorities toward the independent Lithuanian 
state. In addition, this part will outline the platforms of these ethnopolitical movements. 
As Chapter IV has shown, the emergence of these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical 
movements (restorationists and internationalists) was prompted by the ethnic restructuring 
that was conducted by the Soviet Union.1
‘Lithuanian-Polish relations, however, are a bit more complicated. In addition to
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Second, the chapter will trace the process of political community building “from 
above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first 
part. The second part of the case study focuses on the approaches used by the Lithuanian 
state “from above.” It examines the following: Why (unlike Latvia and Estonia) did the 
state make a decision to include all residents of Lithuania into the political process? How 
did this move affect the attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the state? To answer these 
questions, this chapter will explore the circumstances surrounding the adoption o f the law 
on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of minorities. It will also document the 
response of Lithuania’s ethnic minorities and their “mother states” (i.e., Russia and 
Poland) to these policies.
The third part of the chapter focuses on developments within civil society (i.e., 
“below”)— the creation of local governments, the ability of Lithuania’s minorities to use 
the state as a service station and the impact of different historical experiences on inter­
ethnic relations. The chapter will conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the 
approaches employed by the Lithuanian state. To do that, the concluding part of the 
chapter will trace the changes in the attitudes of Lithuania’s minorities and ethnopolitical 
actors vis-a-vis the state.
the policy of ethnic restructuring pursued by the USSR, the historical memory of the 
interwar period (1919-39) plays a significant role. In 1919, Poland seized eastern 
Lithuania militarily and kept it until 1939.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
252
ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING TH E INITIAL STAGE 
OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1988-91)
As in the other two Baltic states, the attitude of the Poles and other Slavic ethnic 
groups living in Lithuania toward Lithuanian independence was reserved or even hostile. 
The prospect of an independent nation state provoked nervousness among the Russian and 
the Polish populations in Lithuania. A sizable number of Poles and other Slavs living in 
eastern Lithuania—one of the most ethnically restructured areas in the country— opposed 
the establishment of an independent state. As Table 11 shows, only the Lithuanians living 
in that area welcomed the prospect o f independence.
Table 11. Support for an Independent Lithuanian State in Eastern Lithuania by 













Does not Support, 
late 1994
Lithuanian 86% 65% 9% 23% 3% 9%
Russian 38% 46% 35% 29% 13% 16%
Polish 35% 40% 35% 34% 19% 19%
Other
nationalities
41% 48% 38% 29% 12% 12%
Source:
Grigas. Romualdas. "Socialines Itampos laukai” [The Fields of Social Tension). In Lietuvos Filosofijos ir 
Sociologijos Institutas. Paribio Lietuva [Lithuania On the BorderJ. Vilnius: Lietuvos Filosofijos ir 
Sociologijos Institutas. 1996.
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In contrast, in March 1990 (shortly before Lithuania declared itself independent 
from the USSR), approximately one third of all residents in Snieckus (a town heavily 
populated with ethnic Russians) wanted to remain citizens of the USSR. Every fifth 
resident said that s/he would consider leaving Lithuania if it became de facto independent 
from the USSR. Percentages were similar in other parts of Lithuania. In April 1990 (after 
Lithuania had declared itself independent), only 18% of non-Lithuanians said that they 
supported the existence of an independent Lithuanian state. Several months later, in 
August 1990, only 8% of ethnic Russians and 17% of ethnic Poles said that they supported 
Lithuania’s independence.2
Yedinstvo (Unity or Intermovement), the movement that opposed Lithuania’s 
independence and tried to keep the USSR intact, received most o f its support from non- 
Lithuanians. In October 1989, 13% of non-Lithuanians supported Yedinstvo and even 
45% supported the Soviet Communist party.3 The Unity movement was especially 
influential in eastern Lithuania, where it was promoted by the local authorities. In eastern 
Lithuania, ethnic identity was the most important factor when it came to the affiliation of 
individuals with political parties and political movements.
Thus, in 1990, in the region of Vilnius, 47% of non-Lithuanians supported the pro- 
Soviet Communist party and 12% of the residents expressed their support for the Unity 
movement. In 1989, in the region o f Svencioniy, 64% of non-Lithuanians supported the
:Krukauskiene, Eugenija, “Nepriklausomybes samprata kitatauciy symoneje”
[What Do non-Lithuanians Think About Lithuania’s Independence], in Tautines 
mazumos [Ethnic Minorities], ed. Vida Kasparaviciene (Vilnius: Filosofijos, Sociologijos 
ir teises institutas, 1992), 16-17.
3Vladas Gaidys, “Political Party Preferences and Political Identities in Lithuania.” 
in Changes o f  Identity in M odem Lithuania, ed. Meilute Taljunaite (Vilnius: Institute of 
Philosophy and Sociology, 1996), 77.
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pro-Soviet Communist party. In contrast, only 8% o f Lithuanians living in the same 
regions supported the pro-Soviet Communist party and only 2% (Vilnius) and 1% 
(Svencioniq) supported the Unity movement.4
Aware of the widespread support that the pro-Soviet Communist party enjoyed 
among non-Lithuanians living in eastern part of the country, A. Brodavski, one of the 
leaders of the anti-independence movement, decided to gain some political capital by 
finding allies in Moscow. Thus, in May 1990, Brodavski wrote a letter to Mikhail 
Gorbachev telling him that his region was loyal to the USSR and had declared territorial 
autonomy within the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.5 Knowing Gorbachev’s desire 
to keep the Soviet Union intact, Brodavski was trying to push for a “Polish territorial unit” 
within the USSR in which he would continue to hold a position of power.
He was not alone. Jan Ciechanowicz, a deputy of the Soviet Supreme Council 
from Lithuania, also argued that creation of “real equality for ethnic Poles [when 
compared to other ethnic groups] in the USSR will be achieved when there are autonomies 
in Lithuania. Latvia, Byelorussia, and other parts o f  the former USSR.”6
To achieve this goal, Ciechanowicz proposed the establishment of an “Eastern 
Polish Republic” as a constituent part of the Soviet Union on the basis of the territories 
joined to the Soviet Union as a result of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. His proposal appeared 
in Nasza Gazeta, a newspaper published by the Union o f Poles in Lithuania. According to
4Arvydas Matulionis, “Politines orientacijos” [Political Belief Systems], in 
Lietuvos Mokslo akademija, Pietryciy Lietuva: Socialiniai teisiniai aspeklai 
[Southeastern Lithuania: Social and Legal Features] (Vilnius: Lietuvos Mokslo 
akademija, 1990), 46-47.
5Garsva and Grumadiene, 383.
6M. Botyan and V. Zarovski, “Anatomiya Avtonomii” [An Anatomy of the 
Autonomy], Komsomol'skaya Pravda, (25 November. 1989), 2—3.
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this proposal, the first step in the process of creating an Eastern Polish Republic within the 
Soviet Union would be the formation of Polish autonomous regions within already 
existing republics, such as Lithuania.' In October 1990, representatives from local 
governments in eastern Lithuania met in the town o f Eisiskes and announced their plan to 
create a “Polish National Territorial Unit” in the territory of Lithuania. Predictably, this 
announcement prompted a wave of dissatisfaction among ethnic Lithuanians.8
Brodavski and his followers were supported by approximately 28% of the residents 
in eastern Lithuania.9 This group actively supported the Soviet Union, which was strongly 
opposed to Lithuania’s independence. They tended to associate the prospect of an 
independent Lithuania with economic hardship, and were ready to continue to support the 
Lithuanian SSR as a part of the USSR if this preserved the economic status quo. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that in 1989, 76% of the residents of the Vilnius and Salcininkai 
regions (located in eastern Lithuania) revealed that material well-being was more 
important to them than the type of political unit in which they would live.10 Furthermore, 
in 1990, Sqjudis (Lithuania’s pro-independence movement) had the lowest support in 
eastern Lithuania. Its supporters were spread throughout all regions in Lithuania except 
eastern Lithuania.11
'Roman Solchanyk, “A Sixteenth Soviet Republic,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Research Report (22 June, 1990).
8Lashkevich, “V Litve - avtonomniy pol’skiy kray?” [An Autonomous Polish 
Region in Lithuania?], Izvestiya (8 October, 1990), 1.
t ig ird a s , “Pietryciq Lietuvos gyventojai” [The Inhabitants of Southeastern 
Lithuania], 36.
l0Krukauskiene, “Nepriklausomybes samprata kitatauciy sqmoneje” [What Do 
non-Lithuanians Think About Lithuania’s Independence], 17.
“ Rasa Labulyte, “ ‘Politiniai’ regionai Lietuvoje” [“Political” Regions in 
Lithuania], in Seimo rinkimai’96: Treciasis atmetimas [Parliamentary Election 1996: The 
Third Rejection], ed. Algis Kxupavicius (Vilnius: Tverme. 1998), 274—75.
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Brodavski’s anti-independence movement was looking for allies in Moscow. 
Brodavski attended the IVth Conference of Soviet Deputies in Moscow, during which he 
argued that “the current Lithuanian government is not willing to take the interests o f Polish 
speakers into account” and that only the USSR could help the non-Lithuanian residents of 
the Vilnius region to be granted territorial autonomy.12 Polish political activists in eastern 
Lithuania were also looking for allies in Warsaw. They managed to find some support in 
Poland, even though the majority of Polish political parties, numerous non-govemmental 
organizations, and Poland’s Senate all expressed support for an independent Lithuanian 
state. To illustrate, in 1990, a group of Polish activists who supported their compatriots in 
Lithuania complained to the President of Poland about the alleged mistreatment of Poles 
living in Lithuania.13 These problems included the “lithuanization” of Polish names (i.e., 
having to choose Lithuanian substitutes for letters that occur only in Polish),14 historical 
accounts of the interwar period that condemned the actions of Poland in eastern Lithuania, 
the decreasing number of Polish-language schools in Lithuania, and the incorporation of 
areas with a large number of ethnic Poles into the city of Vilnius.
In 1991, the Warsaw-based Citizens Committee for the Defense of Poles in the 
Vilnius region was formed. This Committee, led by Bronislav Geremek, pushed for more 
autonomy in the Vilnius region, more cultural rights for ethnic Poles, and a revision of the 
laws governing restitution to allow people who were not Lithuanian citizens to participate 
in the restitution process (e.g., Polish citizens who owned, or whose ancestors owned, land
12Garsva and Grumadiene, 395-7.
13Lietuvos Mokslo akademija, 126-38.
I4Elvyra Baltutyte (Deputy Director of the Lithuanian Human Rights Center), 
interview by author, 22 June 1999. Vilnius.
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in the area of Vilnius when that area was occupied by Poland during the interwar period 
would be eligible to get it back).15 The Committee managed to convince the Polish 
Foreign Ministry to support the first two demands at the international level. Consequently, 
these demands translated into cool Polish-Lithuanian relations in the early nineties.
Despite the support it gave to Lithuania’s Poles and their demands for cultural 
autonomy, Poland warned them that their “mother state” would not support the pro-Soviet 
Unity movement. This warning coincided with a fall in Unity’s popularity and a rise in the 
popularity of the Union of Poles among ethnic Poles in Lithuania. The Union proclaimed 
itself the major representative of Polish interests in Lithuania. These interests included 
minority rights, a variety of cultural concessions for all minority groups in Lithuania, and 
political representation. Cultural issues, such as the fact that Lithuania’s Catholic bishop 
refused to allow a Polish-language mass once a week in Vilnius’ reopened Cathedral, 
became a source o f bitterness among Poles living in Lithuania.
Thus, in the early stages of political community building in Lithuania, there were 
two major organizations— the Unity movement and the Union o f  Poles— who claimed to 
represent the interests of non-Lithuanians.16 The Unity movement was pro-Soviet and 
fiercely anti-independence, while the Union of Poles claimed that its main goal was to 
fight for minority rights. According to Jan Sienkiewicz. leader o f the Union of Poles, the 
primary goal o f this organization was “to Find a political voice for themselves” as 
Lithuania tried to get out of the Soviet Union.17 Ethnic Poles became the most active
l5Arunas Bubnys, an article in Vomta (10 June, 1992). 7.
16“The Polish Political Activism,” RFE Report (7 September, 1990).
l7John Daniszewski, “Cut off by Post-war Borders. Poles Seek Place in New 
Lithuania.” Radio Free Europe B-Wire (19 March, 1990).
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minority group. Other minorities were less active.
The creation of the Unity movement and the Union of Poles became a source of 
concern for some Lithuanians. A non-govemmental union— Vilnija (the area around 
Vilnius)— consisting of ethnic Lithuanians was founded in 1988 to counteract the 
perceived threat of growing Polish influence in eastern Lithuania. It still exists today. The 
main goal of Vilnija is to “lithuanize” the eastern part of Lithuania by “getting rid of alien 
(i.e.. Polish or Russian) textbooks, school teachers, symbols and other aspects of foreign 
states.”18
The union is supported by the victims of the Soviet regime and ethnic Lithuanians 
who suffered under the policies of Poland in occupied eastern Lithuania in 1919-39.
Vilnija's drive to make eastern Lithuania more “Lithuanian” was defended by Zigmas 
Zinkevicius. a leading expert on the Lithuanian language.19 Consequently, Vilnija has had 
a considerable influence on Lithuanian politics.
Predictably, there has been little dialogue between Vilnija and organizations 
uniting non-Lithuanians. Even though Vilnija is not a political party, it has attracted the 
support of right-wing political parties, such as Naujoji Lietuva [New Lithuania], and some 
radical members of Krikscionys Demokratai [the Christian Democrats] and Sqjudis.
'*Vornta (2 January, 1992), 2.
l9Zigmas Zinkevicius, Rytif Lietuva praeityje ir dabar [Eastern Lithuania: Past 
and Present] (Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijq leidykla, 1993).
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Negotiating M inorities’ Rights, 1989—94
Even prior to declaring independence in March 1990, Lithuania’s political leaders 
(at that time still members of the Lithuanian Soviet establishment) adopted the law on 
language, which made Lithuanian the official language of the state. The goal of the law 
was to address the consequences of russification. In 1989 (the year when the Law was 
adopted, see Table 12), most business in state-owned enterprises was conducted in 
Russian. Consequently, the requirement to switch to Lithuanian was met with outrage, 
especially in the Russian and Polish dominated parts of Lithuania. In eastern Lithuania, 
for instance, it was more common to hear Russian and a dialect of Polish (po prostu) than 
Lithuanian.20 Many ethnic Poles, Russians and ethnic Byelorussians did not know the 
state language.
Even though the law assured ethnic minorities residing in Lithuania that their 
constitutional rights would not be abridged and promised state support for the teaching of 
minority languages (see Table 12), it prompted some anxiety among Lithuania’s ethnic 
minorities. Brodavski, Ciechanowicz and other politicians from the region decided to
:oEugenija Krukauskiene, “Pietryciq Lietuvos kalbine ir kulturine charakteristika” 
[The Linguistic and Cultural Characteristics of Eastern Lithuania] in Lietuvos Mokslo 
akademija, Pietry a  if Lietuva: Socialiniai Teisiniai Aspektai [Southeastern Lithuania: 
Social and Legal Features] (Vilnius: Mokslo Akademija, 1990), 52. Also see Zofia 
Kurzowa. “Die polnische Minderheit in Litauen am Ende der achtziger Jahre”
[Lithuania’s Polish Minority During the Late Eighties] in Der “Ring urn die 
Haptstadi”—die polnische Minderheit in Litauen 1989-1993 [A Circle Around the 
Capital: Lithuania’s Polish Minority, 1989-93], ed. Hans-Wemer Rautenberg (Marburg 
an der Lahn. Germany: Herder-Institut, 1994), 29-71.
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make political capital from this fear by promoting the idea of the “Polish National 
Territorial Unit” described in the first part of this chapter. Local Communist leaders in 
eastern Lithuania supported the idea because they argued that there was “a lack of teachers 
capable of teaching Lithuanian and communication [in eastern Lithuania] took place in 
Russian, not Lithuanian.”21 Ethnic Poles showed little enthusiasm for learning Lithuanian. 
To illustrate, in 1990, in the whole region of Salcininkai only 40 people (out o f 40,000) 
took courses in the Lithuanian language.22 Several groups of ethnic Lithuanians (e.g., the 
representatives of right-wing parties such as Jaunoji Lietuva [Young Lithuania] and the 
Democratic Party) interpreted this willingness to create an autonomous pro-Soviet 
territorial unit in Lithuania as disloyalty toward the emerging state and argued that only 
pre-1940 residents of Lithuania and their descendants should be entitled to citizenship.
The arguments made by such groups were similar those made by the 
restorationists in Latvia and Estonia. It was argued that the Baltic states fell under the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibited the transfer or settlement 
of members of an occupying power's population into territories it occupied. Thus, 
“colonists” would not be eligible to become citizens in the restored state. Otherwise, 
Lithuania would be implicitly recognizing its own occupation by the Soviet Union. Such 
opinions were rejected by Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sqjudis, who argued that 
Lithuania should follow the inclusive traditions of the Lithuanian medieval kingdom and 
be magnanimous to its ethnic minorities.
2IEdislav Palevitch, a Communist youth leader from Salcininkai, cited by M. 
Botvan in “Anatomiya Avtonomii” [Anatomy of Autonomy], Komsomolskaya Pravda 
(25 November, 1989), 3.
"Zinkevicius, 293.
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Law on language was adopted.
- The Lithuanian language was declared as the official state language;
- Enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose internal business was conducted in 
Russian were required to make the transition to Lithuanian in 2 years (Article 2; In 1991. 
the deadline was extended to 1995.);
- Non-Lithuanians were to be provided with appropriate facilities for organizing education 
and conducting cultural activities in their own language (Article 7).
Nov.
1989
Law on Citizenship was adopted. The Lithuanian citizenship was extended to:
- all persons who were bom in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania;
- who were citizens prior to 1940; as well as to their children and grandchildren (Article 1). 
All permanent residents were eligible for Lithuanian citizenship.
The deadline for their decision on citizenship was 3 November 1991.
In order to qualify for naturalization, an applicant had to:
- pass a Lithuanian language examination:
- have been a resident in Lithuania for the last 10 years;
- have a permanent job or source of income.
- renounce his current citizenship (Article 15).
Nov.
1989
Law on ethnic minorities was adopted. It guarantees, extended to all ethnic minorities 
residing in Lithuania, include:
- the right to freely develop their culture:
- the right to obtain aid from the state to develop their culture and education;
- depending on demand and (economic) capacity. Lithuanian institutions of higher learning 
shall train specialists to respond to needs of ethnic cultures;
- signs used in public areas can be in the Lithuanian language and in the language used by 
that minority (Article 5).
Jan.
1991
Law on ethnic minorities was amended. Extra rights guaranteed to ethnic minorities include:
- to have schooling in one's native language (Article 2);
- to use the language spoken by ethnic minority in offices and organizations located in areas 
serving substantial numbers of a minority with different language (Article 3).
Dec.
1991
The law on citizenship was amended.
Citizenship was granted to:
- those who became citizens under 1989 Law;
- those who have lived in the territory of Lithuania since 9 January 1919 until 15 June 1940 
and their descendants if they were the residents o f  Lithuania on 1 December 1991 and did 
not have a citizenship of another stale (Article 1)
The 1991 Lithuanian-Russian agreement offered citizenship to Russian residents who had 





The citizenship law was amended.
Citizenship restoration for citizens of the pre-World War II Lithuania and their descendants 
is simplified.
The right to citizenship was retained for an indefinite period for:
1) persons who were citizens of the Republic of Lithuania prior to 15 June 1940 and their 
children .. . who are residing in other states and
2) persons of Lithuanian origin residing in other states (amended on 6 February 1996). 
(Article 17)




Jan. 1995 The law on language was amended.
Language requirements for local governments were added. They included:
- a requirement for the representatives of local institutions to know the state language 
according to the language categories established by the Lithuanian government (Article 6);
- all secondary schools were required to teach the state language “in the manner prescribed 
by the state” (Article 12):
- the State Lithuanian Language Commission was established to “protect the state language 
and approve linguistic norms” (Article 20).
Sources:
Lithuanian Parliament. Law on Citizenship As Amended by 2 July 1997, No. V lll-391. Available from the 
Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt,; INTERNET.
 . Law on the State Language. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt;
INTERNET.
 . Lithuania's Law on Citizenship. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lr,
INTERNET.
Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Law on Citizenship. Available from the 
Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lv, INTERNET.
Thus, in contrast to Latvia and Estonia, the demographic situation never became a 
part of the debates about citizenship. The law adopted on 3 November 1989 extended 
citizenship to all people bom in Lithuania and to all permanent residents of Lithuania (see 
Table 12). Furthermore, the act restoring Lithuania’s independence on 11 March 1990, 
included a guarantee that ethnic minorities would have the same constitutional rights as 
those enjoyed by citizens.23
The day after Lithuania declared its independence, the Lithuanian government
2-’Jovita Litvaitiene (a lawyer from the Lithuanian parliament), interview by 
author. 10 June 1999, Vilnius.
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addressed the ethnic communities of Lithuania, promising them cultural rights and a voice 
in the political and economic decisions of the state. The same rights— the right to freely 
develop their culture, state support for the cultural activities and organizations of ethnic 
minorities, a promise to provide money for schools to teach the official language of the 
state— had already been included in the law on ethnic minorities adopted in November 
1989.
However, these laws did little to increase the popularity of and support for the 
Lithuanian state in eastern Lithuania. Local governments in eastern Lithuania denounced 
the laws issued by the politicians in Vilnius and continued to express their support for the 
Soviet Union. Thus, in May 1990 local government in the Vilnius region voiced their 
disapproval of the “restoration of the bourgeois system” and proclaimed their support for 
Moscow.24 At the same time, the Moscow-supported Unity movement increased its 
activities in eastern Lithuania. The Unity movement helped the USSR and local 
authorities to draft residents into the army of the USSR (while the rest of the state 
boycotted the draft) and refused to adopt the symbols of the recreated state.
Trying to reduce polarization, on 29 January 1991, the Lithuanian government 
amended the law on ethnic minorities and extended more rights to Lithuania’s ethnic 
minorities. This included schooling in their native language and the right to use non-state 
languages in offices and organizations (including in the official institutions o f the state) 
that were located in areas serving substantial numbers of an ethnic minority (see Table 12). 
The goal of this amendment was to show the willingness of the state to listen to the
24Roman Solchanyk, “A Sixteenth Soviet Republic?,” Radio Liberty Research 
Report (18 June, 1990), 24.
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demands of its ethnic minorities. Praised by international institutions, this law, however, 
was fiercely criticized by some ethnic Lithuanians.
But even this legal measure did not work. In 1991, the Unity movement was as 
strong as ever. The Lithuanian government began to receive complaints from residents in 
eastern Lithuania that those with positions in local governments who supported 
Lithuania's independence were losing their jobs.25 When, in August 1991, the 
representatives of the local governments backed an attempt by hardcore Communists to 
overthrow Gorbachev, the Lithuanian government changed its compromising stand and 
imposed “direct rule” upon the disobedient territory. This meant that the powers of the 
local governments were restricted. Two pro-Moscow regional councils in predominantly 
Polish parts of Lithuania were dissolved.
Thus, September 1991— the month when the Lithuanian parliament passed a 
resolution reaffirming its decision to remove the pro-Moscow chairmen from their seats on 
the regional councils in eastern Lithuania— marked a change in Lithuania’s policy towards 
the disobedient ethnic enclave. The government took a firmer stand. The parliament also 
suspended (on the same grounds) a council in Snieckus (now Visaginas), a predominantly 
Russian region. In addition, the liberal law on citizenship was amended. It was decided to 
include a clause extending Lithuanian citizenship to those “who lived in eastern Lithuania 
from 9 January 1919 until 15 June 1940 [i.e., during the time when Poland occupied 
eastern Lithuania] and their descendants if  they . . .  did not hold the citizenship of another
25The local government in Vilnius region introduced a payment for job placement 
and registration. Arunas Eigirdas, “Migracija ir visuomenines politines nuostatos” 
[Migration and Public Opinion on Politics], in Lietuvos Rytai, ed. Kazimieras Garsva and 
Laima Grumadiene (Vilnius: Valstybinis Leidybos Centras, 1993), 328.
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state" (Table 12). By including this "if,” the Lithuanian government was trying to make 
sure that people who were citizens of Poland during the interwar period would not be 
eligible for the privatization o f land in eastern Lithuania. This amendment was adopted in 
order to assuage the fears of those who feared yet another "polonization” of eastern 
Lithuania.
This decision prompted protests from the ethnic Poles, Poland and from the 
disintegrating USSR.26 In Lithuania, these protests translated into demonstrations by 
ethnic Poles in front of the Lithuanian parliament followed by public statements by the 
leaders of the Polish community. Thus, Ryszard Maciejkianiec. the leader o f the Polish 
faction in the Lithuanian parliament, remarked that some ethnic Poles “felt threatened by 
Lithuanian independence.” Michail Trescinsky, a member of one of the dissolved 
councils, complained that the dissolution of the councils was “unjust because they [the 
councils] were fairly elected.”27 The decision made by the Lithuanian government to 
disband the councils was criticized by the Polish government, the U.S. embassy, and the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Lech Walesa wrote a letter to Vytautas 
Landsbergis arguing that if individual deputies of regional councils breached the law, then 
they should be individually punished. The decision to disband whole councils involves 
application of collective guilt toward the Polish community.28
Other international actors— the Polish parliament, the Helsinki Foundation, and the
26E.g„ see Nikolai Lashkevich, “Zakon dlya pol’skoi avtonomii?” [A Law of 
Polish Autonomy?], Izvestiya (28 December, 1990), 2.
27These leaders were quoted by Reuters (11 September, 1991).
2KLech Walesa, Letter to Vytautas Landsbergis (15 September 1991), in Lietuvos 
ir Lenkijos santykiai 1917-1994: Dokumenitf rinkinys [Lithuanian-Polish Relations, 1917-
1994. A Collection of Documents], comp. Vytautas Pleckaitis and Janas Widackis 
(Vilnius: Vaistvbes zinios, 1998), 188-89.
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US embassy in Lithuania— put forward similar arguments. They claimed that if elected 
officials had taken part in illegal activities against the state, then local elections should 
have been held to replace them. Poland’s Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 
decided to postpone a planned visit to Lithuania until an “acceptable” agreement between 
the Lithuanian government and Lithuania’s ethnic Poles were reached.29
The official response o f the Lithuanian stale was that “the councils were disbanded 
because they supported the coup attempt” and that the question of eastern Lithuania was 
“not a question of nationality but a question of loyalty [to the state].”30 Yet, responding to 
international pressure, the Lithuanian government promised to hold local elections by 
March 1992.
Despite this attempt to reach a compromise, interstate relations between Poland 
and Lithuania began to deteriorate. During a press conference on 26 March 1992, 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski expressed concern about the state of Lithuanian-Polish relations, 
arguing that “mistreatment o f ethnic Poles in eastern Lithuania has a negative effect on 
interstate relations.”31 His opinion was echoed by the Warsaw-based Citizens Committee 
for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius region. Vilnija reacted to these announcements by 
referring to the mistreatment o f Lithuanians during the interwar period and calling for 
power sharing arrangements in eastern Lithuania. According to Vilnija, which claimed to 
speak for ethnic Lithuanians living in eastern Lithuania, the local governments in the 
region should include representatives from all ethnic groups living in the region instead of
29Saulius Gimius, “Lithuanian Conflict with Poles,” Radio Liberty Report (16 
September, 1991).
?(JAudrius Azubalis, a spokesperson for the Lithuanian parliament, quoted by 
Reuters (11 September, 1991).
3iArunas Bubnys, article in Voruta (10 June, 1992), 7.
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being dominated by representatives from the Polish Union and the Unity movement.
There was no political opposition to Polish ethnopolitical parties in the ethnic enclaves of 
eastern Lithuania. Consequently. Vilnija argued that elections to the local government in 
this region should be postponed.32
After prolonged political battles at the national and international level, direct rule 
of the region was lifted and local elections finally took place in December 1992.
However, only 34% of the residents in Vilnius region and 45% in Salcininkai region 
participated in local elections.33 Voter turnout was too low, and new elections had to be 
held in early 1993. However, even after a third attempt to hold local elections in April 
1993 not a single deputy was elected to the local councils. This was because o f voting 
irregularities. To solve this problem, Snieckus (Visaginas) was put under the authority of 
an ethnic Russian administrator appointed by the central government in Vilnius. This 
reduced the anxiety of ethnic Russians living in eastern Lithuania. Eventually, in eastern 
Lithuania, after several rounds of elections, local deputies (mostly from the Union of 
Poles) finally formed a government.
In addition, to reduce polarization, in 1992 the Lithuanian parliament adopted the 
Law on Election to the Parliament. This law gave special treatment to ethnopolitical 
parties. This treatment lowered the barrier for ethnopolitical parties, thus hoping to 
involve those parties in the political process. The Union of Poles, the strongest social 
movement in the ethnic enclave, consolidated into an ethnopolitical party in 1994 and won
32Resolution by Sqjudis' and Sandrauga’s candidates to local governments of 
Vilnius region (22 November 1992), Vornta (25 November, 1992), 1.
33“Rinkimai Vilniaus ir Salcininkq rajonuose” [Elections in Vilnius and 
Salcininkai regions], Vornta (2 December, 1992), 1.
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2% of the vote. Following the special treatment given to ethnopolitical parties by the Law 
on Election to the Parliament it received two seats (taken by Jan Minciewicz and Artur 
Ploksto) in the Lithuanian parliament.
These two concessions paid off. Gradually, the negative attitude which ethnic 
Poles had toward the Lithuanian slate began to change. New leaders, such as Czeslaw 
Okinczyc and Zygmund Balcziewicz, emerged in the Polish community. They began 
building bridges between ethnic Lithuanians and ethnic Poles. This was done by 
publishing a state-friendly newspaper, Kurier Wilenski (edited by Balcierowicz) and by 
establishing a dialogue with the government (Czeslaw Okinczyc). The Union of Poles, 
whose position had been similar to that of the Unity movement during 1988-90, began to 
warm up to the Lithuanian state and to separate itself from pro-Soviet leaders.
Furthermore, Russia’s position regarding the Russian ethnic minority in Lithuania 
in the early nineties was much warmer than their position toward their co-ethnics in Latvia 
and Estonia. According to Nikolai Obertyshev. Russia’s ambassador to Lithuania, Russia 
“took into account” the fact that Lithuania’s law on citizenship was more liberal than in 
the other two states.34 Russia was satisfied with the agreement that it had signed with 
Lithuania in 1991 (see Table 12). This agreement allowed the naturalization of Russians 
who came to Lithuania after the 1989 citizenship law was adopted. However, one of the 
major disappointments expressed by Lithuania’s Russians regarding the law on citizenship 
was that this law, especially after its December 1993 amendments (see Table 12), did not 
allow dual citizenship for Soviet-era immigrants. Lithuania’s Russian community 
complained that it was still possible for ethnic Lithuanians living abroad to obtain dual
yi ITAR-TASS (9 February. 1993).
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citizenship, while they were prevented from doing that.35
At the same time, despite the liberal citizenship law, by 1993, approximately 
12,000 of the approximately 304,800 Russians living in Lithuania had acquired Russian 
citizenship. This meant that the voters had Russian citizenship. Furthermore, despite the 
liberal citizenship and language laws, Russians were leaving Lithuania. 10,409 ethnic 
Russians left in 1991. Their number increased to 16,380 the following year. It began to 
decline in 1993. 9,423 ethnic Russians left that year; 2,145 during the following year.
This number declined to 827 in 1998.36 Unemployment and “returning to one’s roots”
(i.e., to the ethnic motherland) were among the major reasons for these flows o f out­
migration. The presence of relatives abroad (i.e., in Russia), the difficulty of learning 
Lithuanian and an unsatisfactory financial status were other motives for leaving.37
Unlike Lithuania’s ethnic Poles, the ethnic Russians who stayed in Lithuania did 
not mobilize themselves into a politically influential force. According to a survey 
conducted in 1994 among ethnic Russians and other non-Lithuanians in Klaipeda (a city 
whose population is 28.2% ethnic Russian), 83.4% said that they were not interested in 
and did not participate in the activities of national organizations and political parties.38
35Vesna Popovski, “Pilietybes klausimai Lietuvoje: [statymai ir kaip jie 
traktuojami” [The Issues of Citizenship in Lithuania and Their Interpretation], 
Politologija 5 (1994): 58-62.
36Statistical Department, Demographic Yearbook o f  Lithuania (Vilnius: Statistical 
Department, 1999), 112.
3,These reasons were indicated by the respondents to the survey in the city of 
Klaipeda. The survey was conducted by the Klaipeda University Sociological Service at 
the request of the State Nationalities Department. “Russians in Lithuania Feel OK. 
Survey Says,” Baltic News Service (19 January, 1994).
38Juriy Stroganov, “Grazhdanstvo razreshit’. No o rodine zabyt’” [The Issues of 
Citizenship Are Resolved. But We Must Forget About Our Homeland.], Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta (15 January, 1994), 6.
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Russian language publications from that time show a similar attitude: political leaders had 
a very difficult time organizing ethnic Russians— even into folklore groups or cultural 
organizations.39
At the same time, the attitude of Lithuania's Russians toward the independent 
Lithuanian state improved. 78.9% o f those polled in Klaipeda said that they did not 
experience any discrimination in public places and only 3.1% indicated that they “felt 
segregated.” Only 2 out of 450 respondents said that they considered their relations with 
Lithuanians to be bad.40 Ethnic Russians living in eastern Lithuania expressed similar 
views (see Table 11). The number o f those who expressed support for an independent 
Lithuanian state increased from 38% in 1990 to 46% in late 1994. The number of ethnic 
Poles who expressed support for an independent Lithuanian state also showed a slight 
improvement (from 35% in 1990 to 40% in 1994).
However, according to the same survey, the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians who 
supported an independent Lithuanian state in eastern Lithuania dropped from 86% in 1990 
to 65% in 1994 (see Table 11). This group felt betrayed by the Lithuanian state which, 
they thought, was making too many concessions to ethnic Poles and to Poland.
Furthermore, the number of Russians living in eastern Lithuania who did not support an 
independent Lithuanian state increased from 13% to 16%. They probably also felt that the 
Lithuanian state was giving too many special privileges to the ethnic Polish minority.
These data suggest that polarization between different ethnic groups living in eastern
39Petr Frolov. “Pora Zayavit’ o sebe” [It Is Time to Announce about Ourselves], 
Ekho L in y  (24 February, 1994), 5. Petr Frolov. “Realniy Vykhod iz tupika” [A Realistic 
Solution to Our Problems], Ekho L in y  (25 June. 1994), 4.
40“Russians in Lithuania Feel OK. Survey Says,” Baltic News Service (19 January,
1994 ) .
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Attempting to Solve the Remaining Issues, 1994—present
Polish-Lithuanian Treaty. Even though Lithuania adopted a liberal citizenship law 
and extended numerous cultural rights to its ethnic minorities (a decision that was praised 
by the Council of Europe and other international actors),41 a number of issues, such as the 
demand for the establishment of a Polish university in Vilnius, the interpretation of the 
events of 1919-39 in eastern Lithuania and the proposed redrawing of regional boundaries 
to expand the region which includes Vilnius (which is perceived by some ethnic Poles as 
an attempt to upset the “ethnic balance” in eastern Lithuania), were causing tension at the 
domestic and international levels. These questions were addressed during negotiations 
between Poland and Lithuania, both of whom wanted to join NATO and were aware o f the 
fact that NATO did not want to “ import” ethnic tensions from its prospective members. 
Yet evaluations of the past (the annexation of eastern Lithuania by Poland during the 
interwar period) and the rights o f ethnic minorities (ethnic Poles in Lithuania and 
Lithuanians in Poland) became m ajor stumbling blocs during the process of negotiating 
the friendship treaty required for entry into NATO.
The prospect of a Treaty prompted protests and the gathering of signatures against 
the treaty in Vilnius. Vilnija and other right wing organizations w'ere especially opposed
41E.g., in 1994, Miguel Martinez, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, expressed his satisfaction with Lithuania’s policy toward ethnic 
minorities. “Martinez Praises Lithuania’s Care for Ethnic Minorities,” Baltic News 
Serxhce (14 April, 1994).
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to the legalization of the Annia Krajowa Club (the Polish War Veterans’ Club) in Vilnius 
and a treaty that did not condemn the interwar period in eastern Lithuania.42 Opponents of 
the treaty argued that the Union of Poles was uniting with the (at that time still illegal) 
Polish War Veteran Club and that this consolidated bloc could become another source of 
demands for territorial autonomy.43 The Lithuanian government tried to relieve these 
tensions by organizing a Commission of historians to evaluate the legacy of Annia  
Krajowa. Initially, the Commission wanted to sell to the public a “historical 
rehabilitation” report to the public, but this report was received with outrage. Under 
pressure, five of the seven members on the Commission decided to change their 
conclusions.
Furthermore, many Vilnija activists thought that the signing of the Treaty with 
Poland would open the way to another polonization of eastern Lithuania. After the Treaty, 
it was argued, the Poles would be interested in teaching their language in eastern 
Lithuania, which would eventually lead to “re-polonization.”44 Opponents of the treaty 
urged the Lithuanian government to demand that Lithuanians living in Poland be 
guaranteed the same minority rights as Poles living in Lithuania.
Passions were running equally high in Poland. In January 1994, 72 Polish 
lawmakers wrote an open letter to the Polish President in which they expressed concern 
about the status of ethnic Poles in Lithuania. In it they demanded that cultural autonomy
42Antanas Valionis, Evaldas Ignatavicius. and Izolda Brickovskiene, “From 
Solidarity to Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations, 1988-1998,” Lithuanian Foreign 
Policy Review 2 (1998): 15-16.
43Vornta (13-19 January, 1994), 6.
44Petras Averka, “Lietuvos Rytai-misijy krastas” [Eastern Lithuania is the Land of 
Missionaries], Voruta (21-31 December, 1994), 1-2.
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be granted to the predominantly Polish Vilnius and Salcininkai regions (i.e., eastern 
Lithuania), that nationalized property be returned to Polish organizations, that the 
evaluation of the interwar period be excluded from the agreement with Lithuania, and that 
a Polish university be given the right to function in Vilnius.45
The letter appeared in the Lithuanian press, creating some tension between ethnic 
Poles and ethnic Lithuanians. This polarization did not disappear even after the Good 
Neighborhood Treaty was finally signed by Poland and Lithuania in April 1994, after 
successful lobbying by Jan Widacki, Poland’s Ambassador to Lithuania, and a series of 
articles by prominent public figures, such as Czeslaw Milosz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adam 
Michnik, and Tomas Venclova. Finally, both sides agreed to make concessions. The 
Treaty stated that ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland 
had the right to “freely develop their own culture and preserve their traditions.” According 
to the Treaty, membership in an ethnic group is a matter of individual choice and should 
not be a source of discrimination.46
Yet this was not enough for ethnopolitical activists. Some Polish activists in 
Lithuania denounced the Treaty and claimed that Poland had “left them at the mercy o f the 
Lithuanian government.”47 Ryszard Maciejkianec, one of the leaders of the Union of Poles 
in Lithuania, went as far as to compare the Treaty with the Molotov-Ribbentrov Pact.
(The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into German and Russian spheres 
of influence in 1939.) Jan Minciewicz, chairman of the Union of Poles, argued that [after
45Tim Snyder, “National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania. 
1989—1994,” East European Politics and Societies 9, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 333.
46Stephen R. Burant, “Overcoming the Past: Polish-Lithuanian Relations, 1990-
1995.” Journal o f  Baltic Studies 27. no. 4 (Winter 1996): 320-24.
47Ibid„ 334.
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the Treaty] “the situation of the local Poles worsened in all spheres.”48 Such positions 
were echoed in Poland by the Civic Committee for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius 
region which reprimanded the Polish government for “betraying” its co-ethnics. This 
discontent was fueled by the decision of the Lithuanian state to continue its investigation, 
begun in November 1993, of so-called “Polish autonomists” (i.e., those who supported the 
idea of autonomy in 1989-91) who were charged with anti-state activities. However, most 
of the “autonomists” refused to adopt Lithuanian citizenship and thus managed to 
temporarily avoid punishment.
Attempts to Solve Problems in International Institutions. The unresolved issues 
raised by ethnic Poles— the expansion of the boundaries of the city o f Vilnius, the creation 
of a Polish university in Vilnius, instruction in Polish, and the representation of ethnic 
minorities in national power structures— became topics of discussion during regular 
meetings between the two states. By 1997, Poland and Lithuania had created numerous 
intergovernmental institutions, such as the Parliamentary Assembly o f Lithuania and 
Poland, the Government Cooperation Council o f Lithuania and Poland, and the Advisory 
Committee of the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland.
Intergovernmental attempts to solve these problems, however, still did not satisfy 
some ethnic Poles residing in Lithuania. They argued that in eastern Lithuania the pace of 
privatization was slower than in the rest of Lithuania. Furthermore, they complained that 
the amount of land returned to previous owners in eastern Lithuania was two times less 
than in the other parts of Lithuania. According to Eugenijus Petrovas, a representative
J8“The Polish Union Sees Inferiority of Lithuania’s Poles,” Baltic News Service 
(19 February, 1994).




from the Lithuanian Department for Regional Problems and National Minority Affairs, 
there is currently very little that the Lithuanian government can do to speed up the process. 
This is because of a lack of documents and because of the intricacies of land ownership 
dating back to the interwar period.49
Although more than 180 legal acts and laws were adopted by the Lithuanian state50 
to address the problems of Lithuania’s Poles they were still not satisfied. They decided to 
complain about their status to the European Council. The Council sent a delegation to 
Lithuania led by George Frunda. This delegation wrote the scandalous “Frunda report" in 
which Lithuania was charged with breaching international law, refusing to allow the 
creation of a Polish university in Vilnius, and discriminating against its Polish minority in 
education.
This report generated a wave o f protests in Lithuania. The Lithuanian government 
expressed its objections to the report by complaining that the report was opinionated and 
“lacked credibility.”51 In Poland, on the other hand, the report was supported by some 
Polish senators (e.g., Senator Alicja Grzeskowiak). Nasza Gazeta, the Polish newspaper 
in Lithuania, suggested that the organizations of ethnic Poles living in Lithuania should 
use this document as a guide for political action.
After complaints from the Lithuanian government, the Parliamentary Assembly of
49Eugenijus Petrovas, interview by author, 23 June 1999, Vilnius.
50The laws were counted by Severinas Vaitiekus in his study “Asmentj, 
priklausanciij tautinems, etninems, religinems ir kalbinems mazumoms, teises, tautines 
diskriminacijos draudimas ir prevencija” [The Rights of Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic 
Minorities: Fighting with Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Other Forms 
of Intolerance] (1998), 13. Available from the Lithuanian Centre for Human Rights in 
Vilnius.
5lElvyra Baltutyte, interview by author, 22 June 1999, Vilnius.
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the European Council decided to review the “Frunda report” and to send another 
delegation to Lithuania.52 This time, the delegation came up with a report that was 
favorable to Lithuania. The fact that a group of ethnic Poles had complained to the 
European Council about their status, however, irritated some ethnic Lithuanians, especially 
the members of right-wing organizations and Vilnija. The members o f Vilnija intensified 
their demands that ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland be granted the same minority rights 
as ethnic Poles living in Lithuania.
Furthermore, Vilnija and its sister organizations were especially offended by the 
decision of the Brazauskas government to officially recognize the Polish War Veterans 
Club (Annia Krajowa) in February 1995.53 This decision did improve relations between 
Lithuania and Poland. At the same time, however, it strengthened the anti-Polish stance of 
some Lithuanian activists. Thus, the members of the Former Political Prisoners and 
Deportees party decided to initiate a protest against President Brazauskas, accusing him of 
bad policies toward eastern Lithuania. This protest was supported by Vilnija, the 
Homeland Union, and other organizations who were worried about the emergence of a 
secessionist movement in eastern Lithuania and thought that the government was not 
doing enough to prevent this from happening.54
Yet the voice of the protesters was heard. In 1996, in an attempt to prevent the 
formation of politically influential ethnopolitical parties capable of leading a secessionist 
movement in eastern Lithuania, the Lithuanian parliament amended the Law on Elections.
52“Strasburo tribunoje— parlamentanj is Lenkijos ir Estijos politiniai akibrokstai”
[In Strasbour, the Polish and Estonian Parliamentarians Surprise the Lithuanians”]
Lietuvos Rytas (27 June, 1996), 3.
53Valionis, Ignatavicius, and Brickovskiene. 21.
54Vornta (16—22 December, 1995), 1. and Vornta (12 October 1995), 5.
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Special provisions which made the entry of ethnopolitical parties into the parliament easier 
were eliminated. The parliamentarians (the majority of whom belonged to left-wing 
parties at that time) hoped that ethnic Poles would begin voting for other parties, such as 
the Democratic Labor Party led by Algirdas Brazauskas or other leftist parties. This 
decision, however, did not help to strengthen the trust of ethnic Poles in the parliament and 
other state institutions. The trust of Lithuania’s Poles in state institutions remained very 
low.55
Numerous Polish-Lithuanian intergovernmental institutions, although quite 
successful in building trust between Poland and Lithuania at the interstate level, could do 
little to address the concerns o f ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians 
living in Poland. The treatment o f ethnic minorities is constantly raised by politicians on 
both sides, but so far no solution has been found for some contentious issues, such as the 
Polish university in Lithuania, the speed of privatization in eastern Lithuania, or demands 
for more cultural rights by ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland.56 In the words of Jerzy 
Buzek, Poland’s Prime Minister, despite good interstate relations, “the problems [related 
to] ethnic minorities still remain a cause of tension and doubt.”57 According to Eugenijus 
Petrovas, a specialist on the issues of ethnic minorities in Lithuania, the solutions to ethnic
55Only 5% of ethnic Poles said that they were willing to entrust their problems to a 
member of parliament. Friedrich-Naumann Fund and International Relations and 
Political Science Institute at Vilnius University, “Political Culture as an Essential 
Prerequisite to Civil Society,” public opinion survey, Vilnius, 1994.
56Jakub Karpinski, “Poland and Lithuania Look Toward a Common Future.” 
Transition (4 April, 1997), 15. Also see “Lithuania, Poland Fail to Solve Minority 
Issues,” New Europe (12-20 July, 1999), 8.
5'Vytautas Bruveris, “Lenkija ir Lietuva: strategine partneryste ir tautines 
mazumos” [Poland and Lithuania: A Strategic Partnership and Ethnic Minorities], 
Lietitvos Aidas (19 June, 1999). 2.
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issues in Lithuania must be found at the local level.58 Consequently, the following section 
examines community building from below.
COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “BELOW”
Local Governments
During the first stage of community building (1988-94). the Lithuanian 
government decided to move toward the decentralization of state power. It planned to give 
more rights to local political bodies. However, the secessionist movement that started in 
eastern Lithuania in the late eighties made the government rethink its plan to decentralize 
its power in eastern Lithuania. In response to this movement, the state decided to 
temporarily limit the power of local governments. Consequently, Lithuania has been much 
slower to create functioning local governments than Estonia or Latvia.
Like the ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, local issues were of extreme 
importance to Lithuania’s minorities. In 1994, trying to quickly resolve the problem 
related to local elections, the Lithuanian parliament debated a law that would limit 
participation in local elections to political parties. Lithuania’s ethnic minorities, 
represented by the Union of Poles, the Russian Society, the Byelorussian Language 
Society and the Foundation of Russian Culture (all of which were social organizations and 
therefore would not be able to participate in local elections if the bill passed) staged
58Eugenijus Petrovas, interview by author, 23 June 1999. Vilnius.
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meetings in front of the Lithuanian parliament to protest against the proposed law.56
Despite these protests, the law limiting participation in local elections to political 
parties was adopted. Responding to this decision, the Union of Poles quickly created a 
new political party, Election Action for Lithuanian Poles. Its platform was a list of all the 
issues causing tensions between Poles and Lithuanians. Election Action promised to fight 
for more rights for the “illegal” Polish university, for the restitution of prewar property to 
Poles, and for more language rights. Some ethnic Lithuanians were deeply worried by the 
promise made by Election Action to create “one political Polish unit” out of the Vilnius 
and Salcininkai regions. To some, this promise was reminiscient of calls for a “Polish 
national-territorial unit” dating back to the late eighties.60 Consequently, Election Action 
became viewed as a potential secessionist movement.
The government’s decision to limit participation in local elections to political 
parties was strongly criticized by pro-Lithuanian Polish activists, such as Czeslaw 
Okynczyc who argued that the emergence of Election Action was a direct result of the 
adoption of this law. Clearly, argued Okynczyc, this party was not capable of representing 
the interests of more moderate Poles. Moderate Poles, however, were not willing to 
support Lithuanian parties because the majority of those parties had made anti-Polish 
statements in the past.61 Consequently, the votes of moderates Poles would go to Election
“ “Brazauskas Promises Careful Consideration of Local Elections Law,” Baltic
News Service (26 May, 1994).
“ “Regarding the Declaration made by the Election Action,” Voruta (18-24
March, 1995), 3.
61 Furthermore, some of the parties (e.g., Tautininkai) allowed only Lithuanians to 
join the party. Other parties (e.g., the Center party), included openly anti-Polish leaders 
such as Romualdas Ozolas. Ceslovas Okincicas, “Lietuvos lenkai didziajame valstybes 
eksperimente” [Lithuanian Poles in the Great Experiment of the State], Lietuvos Rytas (8 
March, 1995), 4.
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Action, which would make this anti-Lithuanian party stronger. This party would be likely 
to dominate local politics, which would lead to the politization of numerous issues, such 
as education and territorial reform. This would become a source of ethnic tensions in 
eastern Lithuania. This scenario, however, could have been prevented if social 
organizations and individuals had been allowed to participate in local elections.
Okynczyc’s prediction turned out to be true. In the 1995 elections, Election Action 
scored significant victories in eastern Lithuania.62 Even the representatives of the party 
were surprised by their success at the ballot box. As a consequence, since 1995, local 
politics in eastern Lithuania has been a constant fight between the representatives of the 
central government and local non-Lithuanian officials.
Since 1996, when the law on elections to the Lithuanian parliament was amended 
(it introduced a 5% threshold, effectively preventing ethnopolitical parties from getting 
into the parliament), non-Lithuanian officials have tried to gain more power at the local 
level. Education, territorial reform, privatization, and even the expansion of the borders of 
Vilnius all became hotly debated issues. To illustrate, politicians in eastern Lithuania 
complained that their constituency was the least educated. The state, they argued, should 
pay for a Polish university.63 The Lithuanian central government responded that the Poles
“ Election Action won significant victories in Vilnius and Salcininkai, the two 
major regions in eastern Lithuania. It won 13 and 19 seats. It also won four seats (13%) 
in Klaipeda, which has only 1,107 (0.5%) Polish residents. The electoral success of 
Election Action in Klaipeda can be explained by the fact that it received the support of 
other non-Lithuanians besides Poles. These “others” were protesting against the 
prevalence of Lithuanian parlies in politics. Artasesas Gazarianas, “ 1995 m. rinkimq \ 
savivaldybes rezultatai ir demokratijos perspektyvos Lietuvoje” [1995 Local Election 
Results and the Prospects of Democracy in Lithuania], Poliiologija 1 (1995): 134—49.
63There is some truth to this claim. According to 1992 data, for every 1,000 Poles 
only 50 have a university degree. This compares to 109 Lithuanians, 172 Russians and 
385 Jews in Lithuania. Severinas Vaitiekus, Lietuvos lenkai [Lithuania’s Poles] (Vilnius:
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and the representatives of other national minorities from eastern Lithuania already had the 
right to enter Lithuanian universities. Besides, ethnic Poles were eligible to study in 
Poland. Furthermore, the government argued that it lacked the money to establish a 
Polish university.64
As Okynczyc had predicted, Lithuanian language schools became another hotly 
contested issue between the central government and local authorities. Ethnic minorities in 
eastern Lithuania had the right to get an education in their native language as well as in the 
state language. However, the schools with the Lithuanian language of instruction 
complained that they did not get enough support from the local governments.65 
Responding to these complaints, in June 1998, the central government in Vilnius adopted 
a law on education that transferred responsibilities related to education to the district (i.e., 
to the central government). Jan Minciewicz, the Polish parliamentarian in Lithuania, 
argued that this law limited the power of the local governments.66 This decision was met 
with protests from Polish political leaders who in December 1997 proposed the 
establishment of two state languages— Polish and Lithuanian— in eastern Lithuania.67
Two other sensitive issues were administrative territorial reform and privatization.
Valstybinis nacionaliniij tyrirmj centras, 1994), 33.
MIn addition, some parliamentarians argued that the university (which is currently 
known as the “illegal” university) should be banned. See Seimo Kronika (The Parliament 
Chronicle), No. 3 (9—22 October, 1995), 8, 15.
65Thus, according to Evaldas Geciauskas of Vilnija. local governments refused to 
support Lithuanian schools in 1996. Voruta (15-21 February 1997), 2.
“ Quoted in Vaitiekus, “Asmenvj, priklausanciij tauiinems, etninems, religinems ir 
kalbinems mazumoms, teises. tautines diskriminacijos draudimas ir prevencija” [The 
Rights of Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities; Fighting with Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Other Forms o f Intolerance], 18.
67This decision was related to Lithuania’s presidential elections. One candidate 
(Arturas Paulauskas) tried to gain political capital by promising to recognize two state 
languages in eastern Lithuania.
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The complaint of ethnic Poles was that the Lithuanian government did not allow local 
governments to participate in privatization. In addition, there was a latent fear among 
ethnic minorities that the state would change the boundaries of territorial units, thus 
diluting ethnic proportions. To address these fears, in 1994, the state passed a law 
promising that the territories of local governments would not be altered. In addition, in 
January 1999, President Adamkus pledged his personal support to the needs of ethnic 
Poles. He promised to include the representatives of ethnic minorities whenever decisions 
about eastern Lithuania would be made.68 President Adamkus argued that the first priority 
of the state should be to create functioning local governments capable of addressing 
privatization issues. His statement was passionately supported by Election Action which 
wants more power at the local level.69
Using the State as a “Service Station ”
Eastern Lithuania— the area troubled by ethnic tensions— is also one of the poorest 
regions of the country. After Lithuania regained its independence, the economic 
conditions in eastern Lithuania became worse. In late 1994, 30% o f the Poles in eastern 
Lithuania perceived themselves as being worse off than others in that region (compared to 
17% of the Lithuanians and 19% of the Russians). Furthermore, compared to Lithuanians 
and Russians living in that region, Poles were the most dissatisfied with their quality of
68An interview with Vladas Adamkus conducted by Barbara Machnicka, reprinted 
from Kurier Poranny by Vornta (30 January, 1999), 5.
69Vladimir Tomasevski, the chairman of Election Action. “O reforme 
administrativno-teritorial’noi i samoupravlenii” [A Statement on Territorial 
Administrative Reform and Local Governments], Druzhba (1-7 July, 1999), 4.
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life (the figures are 23% of Poles; 13% of Lithuanians and 18% of Russians).70 The 
economic situation in Poland, the “mother state" of Lithuania's Poles, has been better than 
that in eastern Lithuania. When comparing themselves to their co-ethnics living across the 
border, Lithuania's Poles probably feel economically deprived. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that 68% of the Poles in eastern Lithuania think that life during Soviet times was 
better than in independent Lithuania. 56% of the Russians and 32% of Lithuanians living 
in that region held similar views.71
To lessen the economic woes of eastern Lithuania, the state decided to allow its 
ethnic minorities to receive help from their mother states. The Poles living in eastern 
Lithuania received some help from Wspolnota Polska (an organization sponsored by the 
Polish parliament to support Poles living outside of Poland). Recently, instead of simply 
giving aid to their co-ethnics, Polish activists have tried to encourage Lithuania’s Poles to 
learn Lithuanian and to integrate themselves into the Lithuanian state.72
In 1996, the Lithuanian state adopted a program designed to develop Eastern 
Lithuania. So far, however, this program has not produced any tangible results. The speed 
of privatization in the region remains slow: as o f January 1999, only 18% of the land has 
been returned to its previous owners. In the words of President Adamkus, privatization 
has been a “bureaucratic disaster.”7"
70Vytautas Slapkauskas, “Paribio gyventojij socialiniij poziurit} ypatumai” [The 
Characteristics of Social Attitudes of Residents in Eastern Lithuania], in Lietuvos 
Filosofijos ir Sociologijos Institutas, Paribio Lietuva [Border Lithuania] (Vilnius:
Lietuvos Filosofijos ir Sociologijos Institutas, 1996), 127.
71 Ibid., 129.
72E.g., this is the opinion of Andrzej Zaksewski, chairman of the Polish 
Department for Communication with Poles Living Abroad. Vornta (5 December, 1998),
11.
'“ ''Voruta (30 January, 1999). 5.
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These factors explain why support for Lithuania's independence among ethnic 
Poles has not increased significantly since 1990 (see Table 11). Data collected by 
Lithuanian sociologists shows that the anti-Lithuanian party Election Action gets most of 
its support from the poorest residents o f Lithuania.74 As long as this party is supported by 
a large number of disgruntled Poles, its popularity is unlikely to decline in the near future. 
At the same time, ethnic tensions stemming from language issues and education are likely 
to remain there as well.
The Role o f  Different Perceptions o f  the Past
Even though the Poles living in eastern Lithuania suffered considerably under the 
Soviet regime, surveys of public opinion show that they tend to have a more positive view 
of the Soviet past than Lithuanians living in the same region. At the same time, the 
Lithuanian state has not forgotten that in the early nineties this region was the main 
stronghold of Soviet power. Consequently, in 1999, in an attempt to discourage 
secessionist attempts in the future, the Lithuanian state began to try Soviet-era local 
council members who had opposed Lithuanian independence. In April 1999, after a two- 
year process, a Lithuanian court found five people, mostly ethnic Poles, guilty of setting up 
anti-state organizations during the initial stage of state building.75 The secessionists 
received penalties ranging from two years to six months in prison.
74VILMORUS data, January 1999 (Vilnius: VILMORUS, 1999).
75lngrida Vegelyte, “Paskelbtos bausmes Salcininkq rajono teritorines autonomijos 
organizatoriams” [Penalties Announced for the Organizers o f Autonomy in Salcininkai 
Region], Lietuvos Aidas (3 April, 1999), 2.
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This decision elicited protests from Jan Sienkiewicz, a member of the Lithuanian 
parliament, and numerous Polish senators who argued that trial and punishment would 
stifle the civic activities of ethnic Poles.76 Former Senate chairman Andrzej 
Stelmachowski, who now heads Wspolnota Polska, a society for relations with Poles 
abroad, said that the trial was “purely political” and therefore “we [i.e., Poles] should take 
political [protest] actions in Poland.”77 Some members of the Russian Duma, along with 
Russia's representatives in Lithuania, also protested.
So far, the trials have not had a significant impact on Polish-Lithuanian or Russian- 
Lithuanian relations. The reaction to the trials in eastern Lithuania has been muted. This is 
a reflection of the low level of political involvement in the region. It is unlikely, however, 
that these trials will increase the support for the Lithuanian state among ethnic Poles living 
in that area.
ATTITUDES AND POLARIZATION IN THE LATE NINETIES
In the late nineties, the polarization that was present in Lithuania in the late 
eighties decreased. There is no serious threat of a secessionist movement emerging in 
eastern Lithuania because the Lithuanian state is currently strong enough to suppress such 
a movement. In addition, after the Good Neighbor Treaty signed by Poland and Lithuania, 
Poland is unlikely to support any attempts by Lithuania's Poles to secede from Lithuania.
76Linas Jonusas, “Lenkij senatorial' bando teisinti Salcininkij autonomininkus” 
[Polish Senators Are Trying to Make the Secessionists Look Innocent], Lietuvos Aidas 
(26 June. 1999), 2.
nRadio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (18 August, 1999).
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However, there were a considerable number of people in eastern Lithuania whose 
approval of an independent Lithuanian state decreased during the second stage of political 
community building. The number of those who felt disappointed with the independent 
Lithuanian state in this region was 2.5 times higher than the rest of Lithuania. According 
to 1997 data, the loyalty of ethnic Poles toward Lithuania, their state o f residence, has not 
increased since 1988.78 Content analysis of the newspapers that are published by the 
ethnic minorities living in this region suggests a similar conclusion.79
Given the large number and the liberal nature of the minority laws that Lithuania 
has adopted, this would seem to be a surprising development. The lack of funds at the 
local government level and the intervention of the central government in local politics are 
probably the major causes for this discontent. Local governments are still heavily 
dependent on subsidies from the central government.80 Furthermore, in eastern Lithuania, 
the local governments are dominated by the anti-Lithuanian members of Election Action. 
This situation is a direct result of 1994 law on local elections. This law has prevented 
broad representation of both political and social movements at the local level. 
Consequently, the domination of local politics by this ethnopolitical party alienates the
78Jurgis Krikoniskis, “Paribio Lietuva” [Border Lithuania], Vornta (1-10 January 
1997), 15.
79For example, Drnzhba, a newspaper published by a group of anti-Lithuanian 
Russians and Poles, complains that the state program to develop eastern Lithuania has 
been forgotten by Lithuania’s politicians, and that the expansion of Vilnius is a “political 
decision” designed to dilute this ethnic enclave. In addition, this newspaper has 
complained about the lack of attention that eastern Lithuania has received from the 
central government.
80In February 2000, 27 of 46 Lithuania’s local governments still lacked approved 
budgets for 2000. They objected to cuts planned by the central government. On the other 
hand, given a difficult economic situation, the central government is not able to allocate 
subsidies to local governments. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (28 
February, 2000).
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ethnic minorities— Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Russians— that live in that region. 
These minorities feel that the state gave into international pressure and has been favoring 
one ethnic group. As a consequence, the lack of “ethnic" balance at the local level is 
likely to foster further ethnic tensions over issues such as language, education, and 
privatization.
Lithuania’s central government, as well as the ethnic Poles, Lithuanians and other 
minorities living in eastern Lithuania, hope that the Nemunas Euroregion which will unite 
this part of Lithuania with part o f Poland will help to reduce poverty in that area. This 
endeavor is expected to encourage the free movement of people and goods across the 
Polish-Lithuanian border, thus enhancing the well-being o f this poverty-stricken 
Lithuanian region.
Furthermore, in 1999 the Lithuanian parliament ratified the European Local 
Governance Chapter. By signing this document, Lithuania has promised to speed up 
decentralization and local government reform. With the help of the European Union, 
Lithuania will probably be able to create functioning, self-sustaining local governments. 
This will help Lithuania to become a functioning “service station” in the future. This is 
exactly what the ethnic minorities in eastern Lithuania are waiting for.
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CONCLUSIONS: REFINING TH E THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY
The goal of this concluding chapter is to relate the findings of the case studies to 
the on-going debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas (which was outlined in the 
introduction). The first part puts forward a theory of political community, which 
conceptualizes the demos as an entity with two dimensions.1
The second part of this chapter applies the two dimensional model to ethnically 
restructured states. By doing that, the chapter exposes the importance of the horizontal 
dimension for successful political community building. This dimension is sometimes 
referred to as “the missing thread in democratic thought.”2 Drawing on empirical evidence 
from the case studies, the second part identifies ways in which democratizing states can 
promote the peaceful co-habitation of several national groups with different historical 
memories, or, in the words of Charles Taylor, what can be done to learn to “share identity 
space.”3 In addition, it theorizes about the impact of historical memory on the dynamics of 
community building. This variable is often omitted in the analyses of political scientists 
dealing with ethnopolitics and stale building in multiethnic areas.
'A similar theory was put forward by Alan C. Cairns, who argued that citizenship 
has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. See Alan C. Cairns, “Introduction,” in 
Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan 
C. Caims. John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 4. The major difference between 
Caims’ theory and this dissertation is that the latter conceptualizes community as a space 
inhabited by actors with different historical memories. In addition, the theory is applied 
to ethnically restructured states inhabited by more than one major nation.
2Saunders, 55.
^Taylor, 281.
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The third part of this chapter focuses on the international dimension of community 
building. Drawing on the case studies, it theorizes about the roles that are played by those 
international actors who are interested in encouraging democracy in ethnically polarized 
states. It identifies several “by-products,” such as the intensification of activities by 
extremist political groups, that are prompted by international involvement in community 
building. By doing that, this part contributes to the ongoing debate about invoking 
political conditionality in democratizing states (e.g., exerting pressure for political reforms 
in return for financial aid and membership in the European Union).
The chapter concludes by summarizing lessons to be learned from the Baltic 
experience. Furthermore, it hypothesizes about the future re-application of the community 
building strategies that were employed by the Baltic states in states with similar 
conditions. The findings from the case studies are integrated into the wider debate on 
democracy building in multiethnic areas.
A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING
A democratic community can be understood as a political space inhabited by 
numerous actors. These actors— political parties, leaders, minority groups— create state 
institutions, write rules of engagement, get engaged in conflict or cooperate within that 
space. The interests of these actors are shaped by their previous experiences or, in other 
words, their historical memory. That is, the actors remember what has happened to them 
in the past and act accordingly. Historical memory affects their present actions. That is 
why history plays an important role in this political space. In fact, it is why political
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community can also be referred to as a “historical construct.”
Such a conceptualization of political community is based on the belief that it is not 
a power-free social medium, as conceived by the liberal institutionalist accounts of 
political community. Social and political power play important roles within that space. 
Some groups of actors are more visible and more influential in the political space than 
others. For example, actors who can stir up the accumulated historical memories and 
remembered grievances of a larger group of people are more powerful than those who 
can’t. Former victims whose experiences were shared by a large number of people have 
enormous moral power.4 An ethnic minority group with a strong and vocal “mother state” 
is another example of a powerful actor. It is likely to be taken more seriously by other 
actors in the political community than a minority group that lacks a powerful foreign 
champion. To illustrate, the status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states— a minority 
group with a mother state— is closely followed by international actors. In contrast, little is 
known about the status of Roma in the Baltic states.
This political space has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical 
dimension refers to the basis of legitimacy for state power. The legitimacy of this power is 
based on an on-going association of people loyal to the state who possess the citizenship 
of the state.5 This on-going association implies a common history, shared historical 
memory and a common identity. In most nation states, these three aspects are the basis of
^These experiences are also passed from one generation to another. Sometimes 
this may lead to the exaggeration of ethnic group identity. For further discussion, see 
Vamik D. Volkan, Cyprus— War and Adaptation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia,
1979), 90.
^ h e  description that follows refers, first and foremost, to democracies. In 
dictatorships, decisions regarding ethnic minorities and citizenship are made by a small 
group of people.
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a common identity that keeps the nation state together. Consequently, the question of the 
relationship between the vertical and the horizontal axes is the question of nation building 
and the attitude of the nation state toward its immigrants and ethnic minorities.6
The citizens, or the members of this on-going association, are the decision makers 
in the political community. Decision making includes creating the rules, policies and 
regulations related to ethnic minorities, immigrants, or foreigners who may not have a 
voice in the decision making process within that community. In this dissertation, the 
vertical dimension is referred to as “political community building from above.”
The horizontal dimension refers to political community building from below. It 
captures developments within civil society, such as building associations among people 
living in the same state.7 Within this layer of community, some residents do not have the 
citizenship of the state in which they live. The horizontal dimension refers to sub-state 
relationships (i.e.. business, trade, or cultural associations) that citizens and non-citizens 
establish. The existence of the horizontal dimension is a necessary condition for 
democratic regimes because it is a source of an alternative foci of power to that of the 
state. Furthermore, this is the space within which the learning of democratic norms and
bLately democratic and democratizing states have been increasingly wary about 
extending citizenship to the immigrants. Even cultural minority rights have become an 
object of heated debates. Behind this unwillingness to change the borders o f political 
community is the fear of losing social cohesion, which, many believe, would weaken the 
vertical axis. Alternative approaches to integration of non-citizens include “democratic 
obligation” to protect the rights of disadvantaged groups and mutual recognition.
Anthony H. Birch, “Reflections on Ethnic Politics,” in Citizenship, Diversity, and 
Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan C. Cairns, John C. 
Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 64.
'Some members of the civil society are engaged in relationships that transcend the 
borders of the state. This is especially the case for diasporas, who have a “host” state 
(i.e.. the state of their residence) and a “mother” state (i.e., the state o f their origin).
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principles takes place, as it is being passed on from one generation to the next.
Democratic states that want to integrate large immigrant populations or minority 
groups into their body politic usually start from “below.” They usually give social and 
economic rights to their immigrant populations, but are reluctant to extend the right of 
citizenship to them. For example, Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany are entitled to a 
variety of social and economic rights (that is, they are entitled to use the state as a “service 
station”), even though many do not have citizenship. In most nation states, Gastarbeiter, 
immigrants, and ethnic minorities either by choice or by law are not a part of the vertical 
axis (the ongoing association of citizens). At the same time, they are excluded or they 
choose to exclude themselves from the official history and national memory embraced by 
the major national group or groups.8
Liberal theorists, including Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan and Will Kymlicka, have 
argued for more lenient approaches to citizenship and minority rights, whereby anyone 
willing to abide by the laws of the state and pay taxes would be awarded membership in 
the political community.9 Consistent with the orthodox liberal paradigm, OSCE and EU 
policy recommendations to the Baltic states (and to other states in East Central Europe) 
have focused on the vertical dimension, calling for the immediate incorporation of ethnic 
minorities into the political community.
The major problem with the liberal view of political community is that it 
conceptualizes political community as a power-free social medium, within which actors
8Girard Noriel, “Immigration: Amnesia and Memory,” French Historical Studies 
19. no. 2 (1995): 367-98.
9Linz and Stepan, Kymlicka.
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exist regardless of historical circumstance.10 According to the orthodox liberal view, 
national integration can be achieved by extending the rights of citizenship and minority 
rights to the “have-nots” (i.e., immigrants and ethnic minorities). This would also help to 
address the legacy of ethnic restructuring. Such arguments do not take into account the 
crucial role played by historical memory during the process of community building.
Very few would disagree with the argument that has been put forward by liberal 
scholars and embraced by international institutions: that basic democratic rights such as 
the right to participation or basic human rights should be applicable to the members of all 
ethnicities. However, given the presence of actors with political power and different 
historical memories, there are different ways to implement democratic governance. In 
other words, there are different ways to build and balance the two axes, the backbone of 
democratic communities. This is especially true in ethnically polarized states. The 
application of the theory to the post-Soviet Baltic experience illustrates this point.
l0Peggy Watson refers to such political space as a “curved” space. Drawing on the 
Einsteinian understanding that “there is no absolute space” (i.e., power relations are 
present in all social media). Watson argues that social sciences should discard the idea of 
an absolute (“power-free” ) social space, often assumed by liberal theories. Understood as 
a "power-free” space, political community is viewed as “a level playing field set aside for 
the pursuit of individual or group interests,” without taking prior history nor already 
existing power relations into account. See Peggy Watson, “Civil Society and the Politics 
of Difference in Eastern Europe,” in Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminisms 
in International Politics. ed. Joan W. Scott. Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates (New York: 
Routledge, 1997). 24.
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The Two Axes and Political Systems
In dictatorships, the power within both dimensions o f  the political space is 
monopolized by the state. Under such conditions, the state “bends” the space in any way 
that it considers necessary. Its main goal is to control the vertical dimension— the “on­
going association” of people sharing one history. The state puts a lot o f emphasis on the 
vertical dimension. It allows very little or no activity in the horizontal layer.
In order to insure its monopoly on the vertical axis, the state can deport or 
eliminate those sub-state actors who pose a threat (whether real or imagined) to the major 
supporters of the state. Therefore, theoretically, it is in the best interests of a non- 
democratic state to pursue a policy of social homogenization. This means that the state 
tries to obliterate, or at least to control, the ethnic, political o r social differences in its 
population. By pursuing a policy of social homogenization, the state ensures that there are 
no alternative centers of power and, therefore, that no group is capable of challenging its 
power. In other words, there is one vertical axis.
Under such conditions, the “horizontal” dimension of political community (civil 
society) is a sum of “atomized” households, in which people associate only with their 
family members and friends. These individuals are, by and large, incapable of mobilizing 
for political action." The goal of the deportations and resettlements carried out by Stalin
"In the former Communist bloc, there were small groups of dissidents. However, 
such “civil societies” were dependent on the existence of a hostile state. These groups 
defined themselves in opposition to that state. See Aleksander Smolar. “From Opposition
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was to create such a space, thus preventing potential mobilization.
Furthermore, to reduce the power of on-going associations among the so-called 
“titular” nations (i.e., Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, etc.), the state decided to 
transform the vertical axes of titular nations with planned injections o f other nationalities, 
mostly ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. The Soviet approach to 
nationalities after Stalin consisted o f three stages. These were rastsvet (flourishing, or 
allowing the “equal” development o f  socialist nations within the USSR), sblizheniye 
(rapprochement, or a movement away from rastsvet towards an eventual unity), and 
sliyaniye (assimilation, amalgamation, or the final process after the stage o f unity).12 
Sliyaniye, or the third stage, envisioned the creation of a Soviet nation around the Russian 
nation and its language. In other words, the ultimate goal of the Soviet approach to 
community building after Stalin was to create one strong vertical “Soviet” axis and to 
eliminate the horizontal dimension.
In the late eighties, when it became impossible for the authorities in Moscow to 
continue “bending” the political space, new actors emerged in that space. These actors 
included nationalist movements— movements that have often been mistakenly viewed as 
representatives of the horizontal dimension (i.e., civil society).13 Many o f these 
movements were in fact representatives of the previous “vertical” axes that the Soviet state 
wanted to subdue. That is especially true in the case of the restorationist movements in the
to Atomization,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond,
Marc F. Planner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 268.
l2“The Code Words and Catchwords of Brezhnev’s Nationality Policy,” Radio 
Liberty Research Report (29 June, 1976).
l3“The myth of civil society as united, anti-political, and supportive of radical 
reform was one of the first casualties of the postcommunist era,” writes Smolar. 268.
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Baltic states. These movements openly proclaimed themselves the heirs o f the 
independent Baltic states that existed prior to 1940.
This “return of the repressed” was the first stage of democratic community 
building in post-Soviet era. Its major goal was to re-create the vertical axis of 
communities. During this stage, there were widespread demands that the experiences of 
ethnic restructuring, deportation, and forced migration (i.e., the amalgamation methods 
used by the Soviet Union) be officially recognized by the democratizing polities as 
genocide. Such demands became a powerful source for mobilization and the recreation of 
the vertical axis. However, one other legacy of the ethnic restructuring carried out by the 
Soviet Union was the presence of ethnic groups opposed to the emerging nationalist 
movements in the territory of the emerging political communities.
During the process of mobilization, the previous experiences of displacement 
played a major role. It is probably not a coincidence that many Baltic politicians had a 
personal experience of displacement.14 This experience helped them to become effective 
“entrepreneurs of memory” (in Maurice Halbwach’s terminology),15 capable of stimulating 
personal memories in Baltic societies. This, in tum, created a sense of unity and became a 
basis for social cohesion among ethnic Balts, which was a necessary condition for nation 
building, and, at the same time, a sustainable vertical axis. Mobilization defined the
14E.g., Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Valdas Adamkus, the presidents of Latvia and 
Lithuania, have experienced displacement to the West as their families were fleeing the 
Soviet onslaught. Vilis Kristopans, a former Prime-Minister of Latvia, was bom in 
Siberia. Guntis Ulmanis, the former president of Latvia, was deported to Siberia in his 
youth. This fact softened the opposition of radical nationalists and the Independence 
movement to his candidacy as a president. Lennart Men, the president of Estonia, and his 
family were exiled to Russia during World W ar II.
15Maurice Halbwachs. The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row,
1980).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
297
boundaries of the emerging political communities. The experiences of deportation became 
a dividing line between the autochthonous residents of the Baltic polities on the one hand 
and the “newcomers” on the other. Even in the case of Lithuania, which decided to adopt 
the most liberal laws on citizenship, the memory of ethnic restructuring played a major 
role. It became a dividing line between ethnic Lithuanians on the one hand and ethnic 
Russians, Poles, and other minorities on the other. It became a source of polarization, 
insecurity, and fear that the emerging state would lose territory to the “mother states.”
During the second stage of political community building the vertical axes in all 
three Baltic states were restored. Since then, the major remaining problem facing these 
states has been to address another aspect of the Soviet legacy— the recreation of the 
horizontal axis. Developing a functioning civil society (i.e., restoring the horizontal axis) 
offers one way to integrate disappointed and alienated minorities who are incapable or 
unwilling to merge into the vertical axis. This would prevent the minorities from 
consolidation into their own vertical axis within the same state.
The following section examines the dominant features o f different arrangements 
that helped to reduce polarization and to insure peaceful coexistence among different 
ethnic groups in the three states. In addition, it seeks to explain why and how these 
arrangements were accepted and experienced by ethnic minorities. The analysis is 
organized around two aspects of the regimes— political power and the economic 
dimension.
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Balancing the Vertical and the Horizontal: Peacefid Coexistance in Ethnically 
Restructured Slates
In previous works on ethnic relations, toleration (or coexistance) has been viewed 
as the product of an unequal relationship— a relationship in which the “tolerated” group 
(an ethnic minority) is in an inferior position when compared to the dominant ethnic 
group. The dominant ethnic group decides whether it will tolerate the minority and under 
what conditions. The minority decides whether to accept the diktat o f the dominant ethnic 
group. Ideally, in consolidated democracies, all involved parties should be willing to go 
beyond such arrangements and try to base their strategies on mutual respect.16
Polarization along ethnic lines refers to the absence of toleration. If ethnically 
polarized states are unwilling to take action to deal with this condition, then, as was argued 
in Chapter m , the state is unlikely to develop a sustainable democratic regime.17 One of 
the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of political 
communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic differences 
were conditioned by the historical memory of previous deportations, displacement and 
forced population transfers. A closer look at the power dimension of the institutions 
adopted by ethnically restructured states illustrates this point.
16For a further discussion of toleration as a relationship of inequality, see Michael 
Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University, 1997), 52.
‘'For a detailed discussion of polarization along ethnic lines, see Pal Kolsto, 
“Bipolar Societies?” in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: 
An Investigation o f  Lan’ia and Kazakstan, ed. Pal Kolsto (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 
1999). 15-43. Kolsto and his co-authors applied Horowitz’s thesis about the difficulties 
related to community building in multiethnic states to the cases of Latvia and Kazakstan.
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The three states chose to legitimatize their power by giving citizenship only to pre- 
1940 inhabitants and their descendants. By doing that, the authorities took into account 
the historical memories of the Soviet occupation that were rekindled by individual scholars 
and political groups during the period of national revival in the three states. Thus, many 
individuals, especially those belonging to the autochthonous ethnic groups, could relate 
their individual experiences with those legitimatized by the state. Consequently, in the 
three states, the atrocities committed by the previous regime, including deportations and 
forced resettlements, became the central component of legitimacy within the emerging 
communities. Especially during the initial stage of community building, historical 
legitimization of citizenship laws (referring to the pre-World War II states and the 
illegitimacy of the Soviet republics) was perceived as indispensable by the leaders of the 
national revival movements.18
In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, membership in the recreated communities 
favored ethnic Latvians and Estonians. In all three states, the members of diasporic 
communities were given preferential treatment when it came to citizenship.19 In this 
respect, membership in the Baltic communities is curiously similar to the Law of Return in 
Israel that grants citizenship to ethnic Jews and constitutes a post factum  kind of
l8For a similar discussion about the role of historical images on nation-building, 
see Peter Thaler, “National History—National Imagery: The Role of History in Postwar 
Austrian Nation-Building,” Central European History 32, no. 3 (1999): 277—309.
l9In Lithuania, this treatment was institutionalized by 1996 Amendment to the 
Citizenship Law.
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affirmative action by commemorating past persecutions.20
The remembrance of the past during the debates on citizenship in Estonia and 
Latvia (Chapters VI and VII) explains why the more radical, exclusionist version of 
citizenship gained legitimacy vis-a-vis the more moderate approaches to political 
community building. Historical memory, and not the suggestions of outside actors, was 
the determining factor in the shaping of the political community in these two countries.
Legitimatizing the citizenship laws by remembering the past resulted in powerful 
arguments for defining the borders of political communities to exclude Soviet-era 
immigrants. This action won the approval of the autochthonous residents of the state and, 
interestingly, silenced potential opposition among ethnic Russians. With the exception of 
the Russians living in the Northeast, the response of most Russians in Estonia to the 
exclusivist nature of the citizenship laws was muted. They decided either to leave the 
country or to retreat into the private sphere (or just focus on making money). Mobilization 
of ethnic Russians living in Estonia has remained low. The reaction to the development of 
ethnic democracy in Latvia was similar among Russians living in Latvia (see Chapter VO). 
Those who stayed in Latvia began to develop a sense of being second class citizens— but 
they did not rebel.
In Lithuania, despite its inclusive citizenship law and numerous laws promoting 
the rights of ethnic minorities, the level of mobilization by ethnic Poles living in 
southeastern Lithuania has been much higher than that of the Russians living in Latvia and 
Estonia. Ethnic Polish political entrepreneurs who emerged from the ranks of local Soviet 
leaders have been rather successful in exploiting the feelings of relative economic
20Safran, 325-27.
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deprivation (when compared to other regions in Lithuania) and resistance to the Lithuanian 
language among ethnic Poles and other ethnic Slavs living in Northeastern Lithuania (see 
Chapter VIII).
To legitimatize their power vis-a-vis minorities living in ethnic enclaves and to 
reduce polarization, the Lithuanian and the Estonian governments chose to grant a high 
level of autonomy to the inhabitants of those regions. In Lithuania, this decision was met 
with resistance from organizations that united former victims of the Polish and Russian 
occupations. These organizations continued to press the central government for more 
schools in the Lithuanian language in the region and for more attention to the rights of 
ethnic Lithuanians living in this ethnic enclave. Extending partial autonomy to ethnic 
Poles in Eastern Lithuania helped to relieve tensions during the first stage o f community 
building. However, because of a dearth of state funds, the economic backwardness of the 
region, and only half-hearted attempts at reform by the local government, tensions have re- 
emerged. Ethnic Poles living in the region continue to view themselves as an 
underprivileged minority and continue to press for more funds from the central 
government. On the other hand, support for the restored state among ethnic Lithuanians 
living in the enclave has declined sharply. Many think that they are treated unfairly by the 
local government (see Chapter VUI). As the literature on autonomy in multiethnic areas 
suggests, this happens frequently in multiethnic areas in which the dominant ethnic group 
is granted self-governance.21
The Estonian decision to extend the right to vote in local elections to all residents
2lE.g., see Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts 
(Washington. D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 193, 198.
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was more successful than the attempts of the Lithuanian government to balance the 
demands of ethnic Poles for more autonomy against the demands of ethnic Lithuanians to 
“re-lithuanize” Southeastern Lithuania. As the analysis o f  the arrangement in Chapter VI 
shows. Estonia’s Russians were very active at the local level. Furthermore, they were 
interested in having a say in the issues discussed at the local government level. Including 
the Russians in decision making at the local level helped to prevent ethnic Russian 
political leaders from exploiting feelings of perceived humiliation and ethnic deprivation 
among Estonia’s Russian population.22 On the other hand, ethnic Estonians did not view 
this arrangement as a threat to their national identity. Consequently, even nationalist 
parties eventually decided to cooperate with Russian parties at the local government level.
The Estonian case clearly shows that the most successful strategies to reduce 
polarization were implemented at the local level, or “below.” These strategies— extending 
full social and economic rights to all residents of the state and extending the right to vote 
in local elections— were sensitive to the historical sensitivities of ethnic Estonians on the 
one hand and to the need of the Russians to have a say in community building and 
everyday affairs on the other. The successful implementation o f these strategies was the 
reason why the Estonian state managed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Estonia’s Russian 
community.
The other two states also extended full social and economic rights— the right to use 
the state as a “service station” and a full membership in civil society— to their ethnic 
minorities. As the analysis conducted in Chapter VII shows, the approach used by Latvia 
to reduce polarization, in which full rights of membership in civil society were extended to
:2Such a scenario was described by Laitin, Identity in Formation, 327.
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Latvia’s Russians, was the most successful approach. As a consequence, Latvia’s 
Russians are perceived (both by themselves and by ethnic Latvians) as the richest ethnic 
group in Latvia.23
Lithuania extended full political, social and economic rights to its minorities. 
However, as Chapter VUI shows, this nation state was not entirely successful in reducing 
ethnic tension in the Eastern part of the country. It failed to create representative local 
governments and to increase the level of economic development in that area. Unlike the 
Russians in Latvia and Estonia, ethnic Poles in Eastern Lithuania continue to view 
themselves as the worst educated, poorest and most politically underprivileged group in 
the country. The case of Lithuania’s Poles points to the importance of the economic 
dimension in legitimatizing the state in the eyes of its ethnic minorities.
Sustaining the Legitimacy o f  Power: The Economic Dimension
As the three states strengthened their market economies, different non-state actors, 
such as labor unions or business associations, slowly began to assert themselves. Even 
though it is too early to assess the importance of these associations in building bridges 
between different ethnic groups, it is probably fair to suggest that the emergence of these 
organizations provides channels for voicing the grievances of ethnic minorities in the three
23Given the scarcity of data on real wages, it is difficult to determine whether this 
stereotype correspond to the actual distribution of wealth in Latvian society. However, it 
is important that Latvia’s Russians do not consider themselves to be an underprivileged 
ethnic group. For sociological data from the mid-nineties, see Irina Maikova, Pal Kolsto, 
and Hans Olav Melberg, “Attitudinal and Linguistic Integration in Kazakstan and Latvia.” 
in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation o f  
Latvia and Kazakstan, ed. Pal Kolsto (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999), 235.
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states.
Of the three Baltic states. Estonia is usually considered to be the most successful in 
the economic sphere. It was the only state to receive an early invitation to start accession 
talks with the European Union (in 1997). In the words of EU Commissioner Erki Likanen, 
Estonia was singled out because “of its functioning market economy and free trade.”24 In 
addition to its liberal trade policy and market economy, Estonia established a stable 
currency prior to the other two Baltic states. Furthermore, it received a lot o f assistance 
from Finland and other Nordic states— both at the national and local levels.25 Good 
economic performance enabled the state to establish functioning local governments and 
thus make their state a functioning “service station” at the local level.
Good economic performance was another reason (in addition to the integration 
policy at the local level) why the Estonian state managed to win loyalty among its citizens 
and noncitizen residents. According to opinion polls conducted in 1997, the percentage of 
people who are disloyal to the stale is far less in Estonia than in Lithuania and Latvia: only 
10% of those polled in Estonia would like to see the old Soviet order restored.26 In Latvia, 
approximately 26% of citizens thought that “due to the help of the nations o f the Soviet 
Union, Soviet Latvia reached a high level of economic and cultural development.” 58% of
24Quoted in Bungs, The Baltic States, 26. On 6 April 2000, Estonia finished 12 of 
the 25 chapters that have been opened for talks with the EU. Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Newsline (7 April, 2000).
25More than 65% of Estonia’s trade is with the EU. Trade with Sweden and 
Finland alone accounts for 50% of all trade. Estonia managed to establish an export- 
oriented economy, supported by substantial investment by foreign companies, such as 
Nokia of Finland and Tolaram of Singapore. It also has developed a very successful 
banking sector. Bruce Barnard, ‘The Baltics: Seven Years After the Breakup of the 
Soviet Union, the Baltic Countries Are on the Economic Fast Track,” Europe (October 
1999): 23.
26UN, Estonian Human Development Report 1998, 45.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
305
non-citizens embraced this opinion. In 1998, the number of those who thought positively 
about Soviet times increased compared to 1994.27 According to 1995 data, Lithuania’s 
residents have the most positive evaluation of the Soviet past, and Estonia’s residents the 
worst.28 According to the World Bank Lithuania has the worst overall economic situation 
of the Baltic states.
At the same time, a functioning market economy made it possible for Estonia to 
provide the necessary funds with which to investigate the crimes of the past. In the early 
nineties, Estonia created a special police department to conduct historical research and to 
search for the perpetrators of crimes committed during Soviet times. It played the role of a 
historical truth commission.29 Similar commissions were established in the other two 
slates. Furthermore, the establishment of functioning state institutions in the Baltic area 
helped to put the experiences of displacement and deportation in the history books and to 
record them as crimes. Displacement and deportations were revisited by public debates, 
trials, and public commemorations. Consequently, even though only a few conscious 
efforts at reconciliation were made by the representatives o f the different ethnic groups, 
historical memories were not transformed into a desire for revenge. Instead, these 
memories are becoming a learned history. As the second-generation permanent residents 
and citizens of the three states learn this history, they become part of the vertical axis.
2/Baltijas datu nams, 84.
28Gaidys, 87. Gaidys refers to the study conducted by the centers for market and 
public opinion research in the Baltic states and the Centre for the Study o f Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde.
29Toivo Kamenik (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes), interview by 
author. 6 November 1998, Vilnius.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
306
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
As the case studies (Chapters VI-VIII) indicate, a large number of international 
actors were involved in community building in the Baltics. This is especially true in the 
cases of Latvia and Estonia.30 The dissertation focused on the most prominent 
organizations— the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and, in the case of 
Lithuania. Polish-Lithuanian institutional arrangements— and the minority’s mother states, 
Russia and Poland. After the Baltic states joined the Council of Europe, the influence of 
this organization on the decision making processes within those countries was reduced. 
After that, the EU and Western governments directly affected decisions on citizenship and 
minority laws in the three states.
The actions of these international actors, and Western international institutions in 
particular, were representative of a larger trend in postcommunist politics during the post- 
Cold war era. Numerous international actors, such as governments, international 
organizations, and non-govemmental bodies, did not hesitate when it came to intervening 
in the domestic politics of nation states in East Central Europe.31 The official goal of these 
interventions, especially those conducted by Western international organizations, was 
certainly noble: to promote human rights, minority rights, and democratic government.
Previous research on the impact o f international institutions on community 
building in the Baltic states has tended to hail the political conditionality exercised by
^For a list of international institutions active in the Baltic region, see “The Baltic 
Revolution: Sea of Dreams,” Economist (18 April, 1998): 50-52.
3,Michae! Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘T h e  Rise of ‘Political Aid’,” in Consolidating the 
Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond. Marc F. Planner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung- 
maoTien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 295-324.
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international institutions as “successful preventive diplomacy” or as a necessary step to 
promote democracy in “an inclusive mode.”32 Indeed, it would not be fair to ignore the 
positive influence that international institutions and international actors have had on the 
Baltic states. If it were not for American and EU pressure, then the withdrawal of the 
Russian military would have been much slower. Furthermore, foreign investment, military 
cooperation, and financial help received from the West played a positive role during the 
initial stages of democratization. These actions by international institutions helped to 
strengthen the institutions of the states, to increase the welfare of their citizens, and, 
consequently, to legitimatize the states in the eyes of their ethnic minorities.
Recently, however, some students of democratization have begun to question the 
effectiveness of political conditionality in promoting human rights and minority rights in 
states undergoing the transition to democracy.33 So far, however, little is known about the 
effect that political conditionality (as exercised by international organizations) has had on 
ethnic relations in the Baltic states.34 The case studies of this dissertation trace the process 
of community building in detail and help to fill in this gap in knowledge.
32E.g., see Birckenbach.
33E.g., see Pinto-Duschinsky, 302-4. Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton 
argue that efforts to influence policy reforms should be tailored to individual country 
positions. Joel D. Barkan suggests that international actors may be helpful during the 
first stage of democratization, but can do little in order to consolidate democratic regimes. 
Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, “Encouraging Democracy: What Role for 
Conditioned Aid?” Policy Essay No. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development 
Council, 1992) and Joel D. Barkan, “Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy 
Abroad?” in Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 371^103.
3JVamik D. Volkan has conducted focus group studies in Latvia and Estonia. One 
of his conclusions is that despite Latvia’s willingness to join international organizations, 
by 1995. the “emotional fragmentation among Latvians remained, and the psychological 
border between Latvians and Russians living in Latvia seemed even more rigid.” See 
Volkan. Bloodlines, 145.
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The basic requirements adopted by the EU Councils at Copenhagen and Essen for 
those states interested in joining the EU stated that the “applicant must be a stable pluralist 
democracy.” This meant that a prospective member must have, among other things, 
independent political parties, regular elections, be committed to the rule of law, respect 
human rights and protect its minorities.35 These basic requirements are very broad. 
Furthermore, the fact that there is widespread disagreement among international 
organizations and specialists in international law on what in fact constitutes a “minority” 
and whether non-citizen residents should be entitled to collective cultural rights, has 
complicated the process. To illustrate, during the 1993 summit of the Council of Europe 
in Vienna, its members pledged to protect the rights of their countries’ minorities, but they 
failed to agree on what a minority is.36 In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, the initial 
versions of their citizenship laws were at first approved by the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE, and other international organizations as being in accordance with international 
law /7 However, as the case studies show, several years later the international actors 
changed their position and began exerting pressure on these states to change their 
citizenship laws, hoping that this would make the creation of political communities easier.
The concessions made by Estonia and Latvia—revising their citizenship laws 
several times, in the case of Latvia watering down its language law (see Chapters VI and 
VII)— were agreed upon for a very simple reason: the desire o f the Baltic states to join the
35For further discussion, see Marie Lavigne. “Conditions for accession to the EU,” 
Comparative Economic Studies (Fall 1998); PROQUEST.
36George Jahn, “European Summit Ends Short on Results.” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty B-WIRE (9 October, 1993).
37Jekaterina Dorodnova, “EU Involvement With M inority Issues in Estonia and 
Latvia: Considerations of Democracy and Human Rights.” an unpublished manuscript.
Riga (April 2000).
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European Union and NATO. These international organizations, which offered implicit 
and explicit security guarantees to their members, were the only ones capable of providing 
for the national security of the Baltic states. Latvia and Estonia made concessions related 
to the citizenship laws and the rights of minorities only when they became convinced that 
these concessions would directly affect their chances for membership in these 
organizations.
The greatest problem related to the political conditionality exerted by Western 
states is. as Chapters VI and VO show, the fact that Russia has used the “human rights” 
and the “rights of compatriots” rhetoric to assert its influence in Latvia and Estonia.
Russia is perfectly aware o f the fact that the European Union is “conditioning their [the 
Baltic states] further integration on improving their relations with Russia and . . .  the rights 
of their Russian-speaking populations.”38 Consequently, “human rights” rhetoric has been 
a powerful tool in the hands of Russia. The March 1998 crisis in Russian-Latvian 
relations is a case in point. Russian officials and the Russian mass media drew 
international attention to the dispersion of a crowd of protesting Russian pensioners by the 
Latvian police by describing this action as a violation of human rights and implementing 
economic sanctions against Latvia. Shortly afterward, the OSCE High Commissioner, 
with the support of the European Union, began exerting pressure on the Latvian 
government to revise its citizenship law. The law was amended in April of 1998 (see 
Chapter VII).
Ethnic Latvians perceived this pressure to liberalize the law on citizenship to be the
38Igor Yurgens, member of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, 
quoted by ITAR/TASS (24 September. 1999).
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direct result of Russian influence. Thus, one unintended consequence of political 
conditionality in Latvia (and also in Estonia) was that the OSCE High Commissioner for 
minorities became perceived by both ethnic Russians and ethnic Balts as the “defender" of 
the ethnic Russians living in those countries.39 Van der Stoel’s visits to Latvia and Estonia 
were met with protests by the former victims of the Soviet regime and by former partisans, 
thus adding to ethnic polarization within those two states.
It is, therefore, not surprising that many ethnic Estonians and ethnic Latvians 
perceived EU and OSCE pressure to amend their citizenship laws to be something that 
would benefit only Russia and ethnic Russians. Very few viewed the liberalization of laws 
on language and citizenship as something that would help them to build bridges between 
the two communities. Having made all the required concessions on its law on citizenship, 
Estonia refused to water down its language law. Under international pressure, Latvia 
agreed to liberalize its language law by agreeing not to monitor the use of language in the 
private sphere. However, the Latvian government has not abandoned its willingness to 
make the position of the Latvian language stronger. Its new Law on Education envisions 
switching to Latvian in all state-run schools by 2004. The EU has not yet objected to this 
law, even though it is frowned upon by Russian ethnopolitical groups.40
Another unintended consequence of international intervention into political
39Malkova, Kolsto, and Melberg found that in Latvia Max van der Stoel is widely 
seen as a champion of the interests of non-Latvians. Maikova, Kolsto, and Melberg, 231.
■^The intention to sw-itch to Latvian was also included in the document outlining 
Latvia’s strategy for integration into the EU. The plan to switch to Latvian as the sole 
language of instruction in public schools was attacked by Russian political groups an hour 
and a half prior to the visits by Romano Prodi, head of the European Commission in 
2000, and Guenther Verheugen, EU Commissioner, to Riga’s parliament. “Latvia 
Approves Strategy of Integration into the EU,” ITAR/TASS (15 February, 2000).
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community building in Latvia and Estonia was an increase in feelings of victimhood 
among ethnic Balts: a feeling that they were not the “masters of their own fate.” Such 
perceptions can easily be exploited by nationalist parties who often argue against 
international influence and call for ways to “strengthen the nation.” As the case study of 
political community building in Latvia (Chapter VII) shows, the swing to more radical 
ethnopolitical parties in Latvia’s local elections was the direct result of international 
pressure to amend the law on citizenship. Thus, during the initial stage of political 
community building in Latvia and Estonia (1990 to the mid-nineties) political 
conditionality exerted by international actors helped right wing political parties to make 
some gains and thus strengthened those groups.
As the case study on Lithuania (Chapter VIII) shows, this country received less 
international scrutiny than Latvia and Estonia. However, similarly to the previous two 
cases, attempts by Poland to monitor the status of ethnic Poles in eastern Lithuania 
prompted widespread resistance among right wing activists. Such groups argued that 
Lithuania and Poland should establish “ethnic minority parity” : that is, any rights that are 
granted to Lithuania’s Poles, should be also granted to Poland’s Lithuanians. Even though 
the two states have developed a variety of intergovernmental institutions, these bodies 
have failed to alter the attitudes of ethnic Poles and their perceptions of the Lithuanian 
state.
In sum, the case studies show' that attempts by international actors to change 
political communities from above (that is, attempts to restructure the vertical axis) are 
likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of nationalist 
groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as an
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endangered ethnic identity. Such by-products of political conditionality hinder the 
creation of the tolerant political culture that is necessary for democratic consolidation in 
multiethnic areas tom by different historical memories.
This is not to say, however, that international institutions should not intervene into 
political community building in multiethnic states. The most successful programs 
launched by international actors interested in helping to reduce ethnic polarization were 
long term multilateral projects with little visibility in the political arena. For example, the 
EU has given financial support for the National Program for Training in the Latvian 
Language which aims to promote the Latvian language among Latvia’s Russians. A 
similar language training project— Individual and Constant Language Teaching of Russian 
Children in Estonian Families—that aimed to place Russian children in Estonian families 
was supported by the Open Society Foundation. The European Council supported 
Slenkstis [Threshold], a program for teaching Lithuanian to non-Lithuanians interested in 
learning the state language.
These programs helped to de-politicize the language issue in the Baltic states 
because they were conducted by “third parties” (i.e., neither by the nation states nor by 
minority mother states). They were consistent with international laws, such as the Council 
of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, that prohibit 
national assimilation, but encourage minorities to leam the official language of the state in 
which they live.41 In contrast, the programs geared to help Lithuania’s Poles that were 
organized by Wspolnota Polska , a Polish organization interested in helping ethnic Poles
4lIneta Ziemele, “The Role of State Continuity and Human Rights in Matters of 
Nationality of the Baltic States,” in The Baltic Stales at Historical Crossroads, ed. Talavs 
Jundzis (Riga: Academy Sciences o f Latvia. 1998). 265.
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living abroad, usually aroused the suspicions of ethnopolitical groups interested in the “re- 
lilhuanization” of Eastern Lithuania.
The international attention given to the economic condition in the ethnic enclave in 
Northeastern Estonia is another example of successful international intervention in 
community building. Ethnic Russians living in that area got used to on-going international 
attention. Visits by the representatives of Western governments or Western businesses 
became so commonplace that they barely even made it into the local news. To illustrate, 
in 1999, reporting on a visit by representatives of the Swedish government interested in 
helping Narvans to deal with unemployment and Estonian language education, the local 
newspaper wrote, “there was a visit from our regular guests, the Swedish government.”42 
EU help for the strengthening of local governments in the region coupled with the help of 
Scandinavian governments at the local level helped to relieve the grievances of Russians 
living in that area and to focus their attention on local projects. Thus, in 1999, Narvskaya 
Gazeia (Narva’s local newspaper) wrote, “We must try to gain respect from the West 
instead of looking to the East. . . .  Our local government is working on the projects that 
may get attention and money from the West.”43 The Latgale region in Latvia and 
Southeastern Lithuania would probably benefit from similar endeavors.
These strategies by international actors were carried out within the “horizontal” 
area of communities. Their components were multilateralism (that is, numerous state and 
non-state actors were involved) and not top-down pressure and long term commitment. 
Such programs, directed at community building efforts at the horizontal level and
i2Narvskaya Gazeta (22 January, 1999), 1.
i2Nar\’skaya Gazeta (19 January, 1999), 1.
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consistent with the major policies of the states, are likely to help states to legitimatize their 
power in the long run.
REVISITING THE DEBATE ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE BALTIC EXPERIENCE
The tension between the need for some form of state-wide community cohesion 
and recognition of the needs and histories embraced by different ethnic groups is going to 
remain a sensitive issue in world politics. Contemporary nation states, either established 
democracies or states undergoing transition, have become increasingly ethnically 
heterogenous. They have become home to ethnic groups with different historical 
memories, different mother states,.and different political interests. Ethnic heterogeneity 
has become a normal characteristic of a nationstate.
At the same time, ethnic conflict has become more dangerous. In the post-Cold 
War era. civil wars and ethnic conflicts have become more prevalent than interstate wars. 
Consequently, understanding why a group of people gets mobilized to address past wrongs 
and knowing what can be done to reduce ethnic polarization are of tremendous importance 
to those interested in creating sustainable, consolidated democracies capable of tolerating 
difference.
The huge body of literature on identity construction and mobilization, reviewed in 
Chapter m , has produced rich case studies on the intersection of identity and democracy 
and a list of ways to promote democracies in multiethnic areas. A large number of 
scholars agree that in order to achieve democratic consolidation in multiethnic areas,
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governments and international actors must create an inclusive political process that 
includes ethnic minorities. This belief translated into policies promoted by international 
institutions such as the EU or the OSCE and their use of political conditionality in the 
Baltic states. The orthodox liberal idea— integration and democratic consolidation 
through democratic citizenship rights and minority rights— has become the basis of the 
external aspects of democratization in the Baltic states and elsewhere. It is widely 
believed that rights in and of themselves constitute the basis of legitimacy for state power 
in democratizing states.
The research contained in this dissertation challenges this consensus. It shows that 
orthodox liberal approaches have ignored the crucial role that historical memory plays 
during the processes of community building. Historical memory and official history are 
probably one of the most powerful ways that emerging states legitimate the social order 
and their power. Alternatively, actors who are capable of stirring up historical memory 
have the power to demonstrate that the existing political order is illegitimate.-14 This was 
the role played by the nationalist movements in the Baltic states during the initial stage of 
political community building.
Logically and historically, the existence of political actors with a sense of 
cohesiveness is prior to the rights and laws. The rights and laws must be written by 
someone. Furthermore, there must be ways to enforce the laws. In democratic 
communities, citizens must feel that they are the authors of the laws and that they have the 
power to change the laws if they want. Often, historical memory and official history
^Kristian Gemer makes a similar point about historiography. Kristian Gemer, “A 
Moveable Place with a Moveable Past: Perspectives on Central Europe,” Australian 
Journal o f  Politics and History 45, no. 1 (March 1999); INFOTRAC.
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become the basis of cohesiveness uniting the members of one national group. However, 
by establishing functioning state institutions and inclusive local governments an ethnically 
heterogenous state may be able to achieve peaceful co-habitation between ethnic groups 
with different historical memories.
These observations suggest two questions crucial for the debate on the relationship 
between multiethnicity and democracy. First, how do we explain the movement from the 
multitude of diverse individual historical perspectives to the collective “we”? Second, 
what can be done to prevent the group’s “we-ness” from becoming exclusionary and even 
deadly? Stirring up memories of past wrongs may lead to calls for revenge. In such cases, 
the same variable that is necessary for the establishment of a functioning democratic 
regime may become deadly for the members of other ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts and 
genocide are often at least partially provoked by competing mobilized memories about 
past abuses and past experiences of genocide and ethnic conflict.45
These two questions include clumsy variables such as historical memory and ethnic 
hatred that have been traditionally treated with scepticism by political scientists. This 
probably explains why the orthodox liberal perspective has been much better received in 
political science and international relations than historical approaches. Norms, laws, 
rights, or institutions are easier to explore than the role of history. Meanwhile, other 
disciplines, such as history, anthropology or even psychiatry, have been much more open 
to studies of historical memory. In order to successfully integrate such insights into the
45For the role o f the memory of the genocide of Serbs during the World War II in 
the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, see Wolfgang Hoepken, “War, Memory, 
and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia,” East European 
Politics and Societies 13, no. 1 (1999): 190—227. For a discussion of the relationship 
between historical memory and ethnic conflict in the Caucasus, see Tishkov, 155—206.
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debate on democracy and multiethnicity, political actors must be conceptualized, in the 
words of John Ruggie, “as not only strategically but also discursively competent.”46 That 
is. one must acknowledge that actors have rational egoistic interests, but at the same time, 
one must take into account their discourse and their memories.
The concept of political community as a two-dimensional space with actors who 
bend this space is one of the first steps in this direction. Such conceptualization 
encourages us to take the previous experiences of the actors into account in order to 
understand how they have become powerful. Thus, the first question about the movement 
from the multitude perspectives to the collective “we” is addressed. In the Baltic case, the 
major forces behind this movement were public commemorations, some of which were 
preserved even during the times of dictatorship (see Chapter V). Furthermore, many of the 
former victims and former deportees became “entrepreneurs” capable of stirring up 
historical memories for political goals and thus constructing the “vertical” axis.
A close examination of the constitutive elements of the vertical axis reveals that 
historical memory became the basis of political community and cohesiveness in all three 
Baltic states. The fact that they ended up with similar citizenship laws and that the 
political activity o f minorities became limited to the horizontal axis is a case in point. 
Exploring the relationship between the vertical and horizontal axes helps to answer the 
second question: W hat did the states do to reduce ethnic polarization? The case studies 
suggest that the most successful arrangements— inclusiveness at the local level in Estonia, 
the extension of social and economic rights in Latvia, and balancing between the demands 
of the minority and the majority’s sensitivities in Lithuania— took historical sensitivities
40Ruggie, 869.
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and ethnic fears into account (see table 13).
If this is the case, then it follows logically that there is no one universal way to 
reduce ethnic polarization and to consolidate democracies. Ethnic arrangements must be 
context-specific. Reducing ethnic polarization is a long, painstaking process that involves 
many actors at both the state and sub-state level. At the state level, economic strength may 
aid in the development of institutions to deal with different memories. It may also foster a 
generation of historians who are willing to discover and publicly discuss painful aspects of 
the past, thus distinguishing between memory and history.
The most successful approaches to reduce polarization, however, are likely to be 
exercised at the “horizontal level.” As the Estonian case suggests, a state that is doing 
well economically and is willing to foster strong local governments may eventually be 
rew arded with fledgling ethnic coalitions at the local level. The Latvian and Lithuanian 
cases suggest that economic grievances may be very easily transformed into ethnic 
tensions and complicate the reduction of ethnic polarization.
Consequently, international actors (that is, international actors other than a 
minority’s “mother state”) are extremely helpful in fostering the horizontal sphere— by 
extending economic help, smoothing relations between the multiethnic state and the 
“mother state” or, as in the case o f Lithuanian-Polish relations, integrating the triadic state- 
minority-mother state relationship into larger and more attractive international structures. 
Political conditionality while attempting to transform the vertical axis should be exercised 
w ith a great caution.
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THEORY Focus on the Vertical Axis 
Outcome-Oriented
Means to Reduce Polarization:
- Focus on prescribed liberal democratic 
norms, rights, institutions and policies
The Role of International Actors:
- Generally approve of political 
conditionality:
- The outsiders are seen as experts in 
democratization.
Focus on the Horizontal Axis 
Process-Oriented
Means to Reduce Polarization:




The Role of International Actors:
- Suspicious of political conditionality;





Ways to Strengthen the Vertical Axis:
- Mobilize historical memory (all 
cases);
- Establish historical continuity of the 
state (all cases);
- Political disenfranchisement of large 
segments ethnic minorities (Latvia and 
Estonia in particular).
The Role of International Organizations:
- Pivotal role in liberalization of the 
Citizenship laws (Estonia and Latvia);
- Provoked ethnic polarization (Estonia 
and Latvia).
Ways to Strengthen the Horizontal Axis:
- Give full social and economic rights to 
non-members living in the state; let them 
use the state as a “service station” (all 
cases);
- Give cultural autonomy to the interested 
ethnic groups (all cases);
- Establish functioning local governments 
(Estonia).
The Role of International Organizations:
- Relieve ethnic anxiety of autochthonous 
groups by promoting national language 
among ethnic minorities (all cases):
- Help in establishing functioning local 
governments (the Narva region in Estonia).
Note:
'liana Shapiro refers to these two schools of thought as “Modernization" and “Conflict Resolution.” She 
traces the philosophical roots of the first school to “positivist objective truth.” The roots of the second 
school are described as “constructivist multiple truths.”
Source:
Shapiro. liana. “Beyond Modernization: Conflict Resolution in Eastern and Central Europe.” Annals o f  the 
American Academy o f  Political and Social Science 552 (July 1997): 26.
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In sum, the Baltic experiences suggest that in territories inhabited by ethnic groups 
with different and recently activated historical memories, process-oriented approaches to 
community building should be preferred to outcome-oriented, or orthodox liberal 
approaches. The goal of process-oriented approaches to political community building is to 
create interdependent relationships between different ethnic groups instead of trying to 
create one cohesive “integrated” democratic state. Process-oriented approaches admit that 
the integration of different ethnic groups into one cohesive unit in ethnically restructured 
and other history-sensitive regions is not possible. After the vertical axis has been re­
established, one should aim for co-habitation. Flexible forms of political organization 
capable of addressing the historical sensitivities o f different ethnic groups and capable of 
building a strong civil society are the means to achieve this goal.
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